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An unusual document caughtJudge Allen Minker's eye as he sifted
through the mail on a chilly afternoon in late January 1986. The
document was an order from the Arizona Supreme Court. Minker, the
sole superior court judge in Arizona's small-sized Greenlee County
(population 11,400), rarely got orders from the Arizona Supreme
Court-especially ones directed specifically to him. Upon closer reading, Minker learned the supreme court had just appointed him as presiding judge of the Little Colorado River adjudication.
Minker, who had been on the bench for only a few years following
a predominately criminal law practice in the Tucson area, had not a
clue what the Little Colorado River adjudication was-much less why
the supreme court had appointed him as the presiding judge. The
case, docketed in another county, would require him to travel 350
miles roundtrip to hold hearings. Was he being rewarded or punished
by those justices down in Phoenix?
Over the next twelve years, Minker often pondered the same question as he attempted to steer a case that seemed always to have a life
and pace of its own. The supreme court assigned Minker to a general
stream adjudication, already underway for eight years, involving 3,000
parties who filed 11,000 claims to the scarce waters of a pitifully small
river system. So small indeed that the Little Colorado River itself could
be hurdled in many of its upper reaches and was often dry in many of
its lower stretches. However, the river basin itself is enormous, encom-
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passing most of northeastern Arizona and including the Navajo Indian
Reservation (largest in the United States), the Hopi Reservation (oldest continuously inhabited community in the United States), and several important national monuments (Painted Desert, Petrified Forest).
The parties themselves ranged from a "who's who" listing of Arizona
movers and shakers-Salt River Project, Arizona Public Service Co.,
Southern California Edison, Peabody Coal Co., Santa Fe Railroad,
Phelps Dodge Corporation, Stone Container Corporation, Aztec Land
& Cattle Company-to individual farmers, ranchers, and homeowners.
Throughout the years, as he learned water law, Indian law, hydrology, western history, techniques for managing complex cases, and settlement strategies, Minker also mulled another question often shared
by judges assigned to comparable stream adjudications in other parts
of the West: what is the reason for these cases?

A majority of the western states participate in general stream adjudications. Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, and Washington are undertaking comprehensive, basin wide adjudications of water rights.
California, Colorado, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah are
presently determining water rights on a more piecemeal basis, either
because they previously adjudicated most of their streams, or because
they deemed more expansive general adjudications unnecessary.
North Dakota has not attempted adjudication, and South Dakota and
Alaska have abandoned their efforts. Only Texas has completed statewide general stream adjudication; its success is due in large part to the
absence of federal and tribal lands in that state, which eliminates the
need to adjudicate the water rights associated with such holdings.
However, Texas grapples even more desperately with groundwater issues.
Modem general stream adjudications, most of which have been
filed since the 1970s, are characterized by their enormity and longevity.
These complex lawsuits are among the largest civil proceedings ever
litigated in state or federal courts. For instance, 28,500 persons have
filed more than 100,000 claims to water rights in the Arizona general
1. SeeALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.060, .065, .165- .169 (Michie 2004); ARIz. REv. STAT.
§§ 45-251 to -264 (West 2003); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2000-2900 (West 1971 &
Supp. 2005); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2004); IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1401 to 1428 (Michie 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-201 to -243(2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§
46-226 to -231 (2002); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 533.090-.320, 534.100 (Michie 1995 &
Supp. 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-4-13 to -19 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1997); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 61-03-15 to -20 (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §§ 105.6- .8 (West
1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 539.010-.350, 541.310-.320 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§
46-10-1 to -13 (Michie 2004); TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 111.301-.341 (Vernon 2000);

ANN.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-4-1 to -24 (1989 & Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
90.03.110-.245 (West 2004); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-301 to -331 (Michie 2003).
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stream adjudications.! Parties have filed over 150,000 claims for water
Also, in Montana, aprights in Idaho's Snake River adjudication.'
proximately 80,000 persons have filed 218,000 water rights claims in
the statewide adjudication.4
These proceedings are tied closely to state government, since the
state attorney general, state engineer, or water resources department
frequently files them under a specialized statute. These state agencies
remain active participants in the litigation: they propose decrees, generate technical reports, and supply other information to the court.
The participation of the federal government and Indian tribes, however, is the unique feature of modern general stream adjudications and
sets them apart from earlier water rights litigation. Federal agencies
and tribes prefer not to engage in these massive proceedings, so their
presence is most often involuntary.' The 1952 McCarran Amendment,'
known as "the Magna Carta of state water rights adjudication, " ' mandated their participation. With the McCarran Amendment, Congress
waived federal sovereign immunity whenever comprehensive stream
adjudications arise in state or federal court.'
Due to the McCarran Amendment, the federal government and
the Indian tribes became the most significant parties in most stream
adjudications. With federal land ownership exceeding 50 percent of
the landmass in seven western states alone, and tribal lands comprising
nearly 52 million acres, the water rights claims of these parties are
2. Arizona Supreme Court, Arizona's General Stream Adjudications: Overview of
at
Questions,
Asked
Frequently
Adjudications,
http://supreme.state.az.us/wm/bulletin/Overview.htm (last modified May 4, 2004).
3. Snake River Basin Adjudication, Informational Brochure, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.srba.state.id.us/DOC/BROCHI.HTM (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
4. WATER RIGHTS BUREAU, STATE OF MONTANA - DEP'T OF NATURAL RES. &
2004),
(Apr.
9-10
MONTANA
IN
RIGHTS
WATER
CONSERVATION,
http://www.dnrc.state.mt.us/wrd/WaterRights/WaterRightsWeb. htm.
5. Both before and after the McCarran Amendment, the federal government
selectively brought water rights adjudications in troublesome western watersheds. In
the 1970s, however, as several western states moved toward beginning comprehensive
proceedings in state courts, the United States, both in its proprietary and trust capacities, filed federal court adjudications in an effort to secure what the federal government perceived to be a favorable judicial forum.
6. Act ofJuly 10, 1952, ch. 651, § 208, 66 Stat. 549, 560 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 666 (2000)).
7. A. Dan Tarlock, The Illusion of Finality in General Water Rights Adjudications, 25
IDAHO L. REV. 271,272 (1988-9).
8. The McCarran Amendment waived only the sovereign immunity of the United
States in comprehensive stream adjudications. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a). While this waiver
put both the water rights of federal agencies and the water rights of tribes (held in
trust capacity by the United States) before the courts, tribal governments themselves
were not subject to the jurisdiction of the court. In recent years, tribal governments
have frequently intervened in general stream adjudications in order to protect more
directly tribal water rights and, in the process, they have placed themselves under the
jurisdiction of the court.
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enormous. ' Consequently, in many stream adjudications, federal and
tribal parties are pitted against all other water claimants.
General stream adjudications have become a principal forum for
the clash of legal rights and values concerning water. Much is at stake;
general stream adjudications reflect the importance of water to the
residents of the western states. Since rainfall is unpredictable in many
parts of the West, water users rely on rivers and streams, as well as the
commonly interconnected groundwater with those rivers and streams.
These sources of water are critical to the fanning, ranching, and mining economies of the western states. Urban expansion and recreation
also depend on those sources. For many Indian tribes, water has provided spiritual sustenance along with promise of future economic development. Environmental advocates likewise seek to protect the riparian ecology of western watersheds. Since many western rivers are overappropriated, the battle intensifies.
I. THE WEST BEFORE GENERAL STREAM ADJUDICATIONS
More than one hundred years separate the first mining uses of water by the Forty-niners of the California mountains from the passage of
the federal McCarran Amendment in 1952, which made modern general stream adjudications possible. During this period, the West
changed fundamentally. The nature and extent of these changes are
evident from a study of western lands policy, demographics, Indian
policy, and the development of regional water law and institutions.
Many able historians have passed this way before us and we urge
the reader to refer to these scholars for a more comprehensive render0
We seek only to relate the context in which the
ing of western history."
9. The Public Land Law Review Commission described the impact of federal
landholdings upon western water in 1970, as follows:
Federal lands are the source of most of the water in the 11 coterminous westem states, providing approximately 61 percent of the total natural runoff occurring in the region. Most of this runoff comes from land withdrawn or reserved for specific purposes. Forest Service and National Park Service reservations contribute about 88 and 8 percent, respectively, of the runoff from public lands and more than 59 percent of the total yield from all lands of those
states. Other public lands, such as the vast acreages administered by the Bureau of Land Management, do not contribute much to the overall yield of
western streams, but are so situated that they influence water quality.
U.S. PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, A REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION 141

(1970).
10.
See, e.g., ROBERT C. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS
(1983);PATRICIA NELSON LIMERICK, THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST: THE UNBROKEN PAST OF

THE AMERICAN WEST (1987); DONALD J. PISANI, To RECLAIM A DIVIDED WEST: WATER,
LAW, AND PUBLIC POICY, 1848-1902 (1992) [hereinafter 1 PISANI ]; DONAIDJ. PISANI,
WATER, LAND AND LAW IN THE WEST: THE LIMrrs OF PUBLIC POLICY, 1850-1920 (1996)
[hereinafter 2 PISANI].
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adjudications of western rivers and streams began. Hence, we present
a profile of the West as it was when the first water rights adjudications
emerged in the hope of revealing some of the important reasons why
these cases arose.
A. ACQUIRING THE AMERICAN WEST
The acquisition of most of what we now know as the American West
came from the major European powers, who won these lands by conquest from the indigenous people. Mexico and Russia ceded the remainder of the western territory.
The first major western acquisition occurred when the United
States purchased the Louisiana Territory from France at the urging of
Thomas Jefferson in 1803. Napoleon offered the territory for sale to
fund France's military initiatives in Europe. The Louisiana Purchase
included over 523 million acres of land in what are now fourteen
states, including eight of the western states studied here (Montana,
Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Colorado,
and Oklahoma)."
Texas, which gained its independence from Mexico in 1836,joined
the Union in 1845. In an effort to pay its own revolutionary war debt,
Texas sold 79 million acres of its territory to the federal government in
1850. " These lands later became parts of New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Kansas, Colorado, and Wyoming.
The Oregon Compromise of 1846 averted a war with Great Britain,
and settled the northern American boundary. The Compromise also
brought another 181 million acres of Pacific Northwest Territory (now
part of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana) under the United
States' dominion. 3
The United States used less noble means to acquire territory from
its southern neighbor. In 1848, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
ended the Mexican-American War. Mexico agreed to recognize the
Rio Grande as the boundary between Texas and Mexico and consented
to sell almost 335 million acres to the United States.'4 These lands later
formed all or significant parts of California, Nevada, Wyoming, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico.
With the 1853 Gadsden Purchase, the United States acquired an
additional 19 million acres from Mexico.'" This purchase added to the
New Mexico territory. As a result of the purchase of Alaska from Rus-

11.

PAUL W. GATES, PUB. LAND LAw REVIEW COMM'N, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW

DEVELOPMENT 76, 86 (1968).
12. Id. at81-82.
13. Id. at 76, 86.
14. Id. at 83.
15. Id. at 86.
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sia in 1867, the United States annexed over 365 million more acres."
Alaska was also the last land acquisition to bring public land into the
United States. This purchase essentially completed the western land
base studied here.
All told, the Untied States fueled its drive westward by acquiring 1.7
billion acres of land west of the Mississippi River." Of course, the federal government would not keep all of this land for long.
B. GIVING THE LAND AWAY: THE HOMESTEAD MOVEMENT

Even as the United States was busy acquiring the western lands,
Congress enacted a series of measures to "privatize" or otherwise dispose of much of the public domain east of the Mississippi River. These
privatization measures included military land bounties for soldiers and
sailors who had served during the Revolutionary War, cash and credit
sales of land, special laws legalizing the practice of squatting to acquire
public lands, and a "preemption" program that allowed settlers to purchase up to 160 acres of land after living upon and improving it for
one year."
Congress disposed of other lands for public purposes. Most notable of these efforts was the Land Ordinance of 1785, which, in addition
to establishing the rectangular survey system that exists today, reserved
section 16 in every township "for the maintenance of public schools,
within said township."'" The Land Ordinance of 1785 became the
Morrill Act, which granted public lands to states so they could establish
colleges of agriculture and mechanical arts (this program was the land
grant college system). 0 Other land grants provided st-cs with a
source of funds for other permanent improvements, and divested the
federal government of some swamplands.
Although the California gold rush greatly heightened Americans'
interest in the West, the Civil War delayed public land disposal in the
region. Once the hostilities ended, settlement of the western public
domain began in earnest under the older statutes, as well as under new
legislation specifically fashioned by Congress to expedite western development.
Although federal assistance to railroads in the East existed as early
as 1835, development accelerated with major grants made in 1862 to
support transcontinental railroad constructionY. On each side of the
16.
17.

Id.
Id. See also SAMUEL TRASK DANA & SALLY K FAIRFAx, FOREST AND RANGE POLCY:
ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter DANA & FAMIFAx].
18. SeeGATES, supra note 11, at 121-284.
19. 28JouRNALs OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 378 (1785).
20. Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§
301-08 (1994)).
21.
GATES, supra note 11, at 357, 364.
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proposed track, the United States gave alternate sections of land to the
Union Pacific and Central Pacific railroads, the companies that completed the transcontinental route in 1869. Eventually, the United
States granted more than 131 million acres from the public domain to
support railroad construction.' The United States conveyed almost 94
million acres directly to the railroad companies while the United States
conveyed the remaining 37 million acres to the states for the benefit of
the railroads."
Also in 1862, Congress passed the Homestead Act.2 ' The Act allowed any person older than twenty-one years of age to settle and cultivate up to 160 acres.' The statute contained numerous weaknesses,
however. For instance, its acreage allowances were too small to foster
productive farming in the arid West. For this and other reasons, lawmakers revised the homesteading program over the years. Eventually,
the United States patented 285 million acres under these laws. 6 Similar laws followed.
Among such legislation was the Timber Culture Act," which Congress passed in 1873. Before its repeal in 1891 (because its growth quotas were unrealistic in light of the West's arid climate), this law granted
160 acres of public land to any person who planted trees on forty acres
and kept them growing for ten years. " Other land grant legislation
included the 1877 Desert Land Sales Act.' The Act granted 640 acres
of land to anyone who agreed to irrigate otherwise unproductive land
within three years.' In addition, the Mining Act of 1866,1 Placer Act of
1870," and General Mining Act of 1872" created a system for locating
minerals on both public lands and the lands patented to prospectors.
Under these various auspices, the federal government gave away
over one billion acres, which constituted over 70 percent of the original public domain. Public lands scholar Sally K. Fairfax reports that of
this total, some 69 percent went to individuals and institutions, 22 percent to the states, and 9 percent to railroads. '
The divestiture of the public domain continued into the twentieth
century. Congress passed several acts that liberalized homestead poli22. Id. at 379.
23. Id. at 385, 805.
24. Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862).
25. Id.
26. DANA & FAiRFAX, supra note 17, at 24.
27. Timber Culture Act, ch. 277, 17 Stat. 605 (1873).
28. Id.
29. Desert Land Sales Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 32123 (2000)).
30. Id.
31. Mining Act of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251.
32. Placer Act of 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217.
33. General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91.
34. DANA & FAIRFAx, supra note 17, at 29.
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cies.5 Indeed, homestead entries during the movement's first two decades proceeded at a higher rate, and involved more acreage, than in
any time before. 6
C. THE GIVEAWAY

ENDS

The late 1800s and the first decades of the twentieth century
brought a turnabout as the first efforts to retain the remaining federal
public lands began. John Wesley Powell, whose travels made him extremely knowledgeable about the West, urged the government to take
a more scientific approach to land disposition. As director of the
United States Geological Survey (USGS), Powell argued that watersheds, not 640-acre rectangular sections, should be the basic planning
unit in the West. 7 He also believed that these lands should be surveyed, classified, and disposed of based on their best potential use, and
that the western lands should be withdrawn from entry until they could
be surveyed and classified. Although Congress authorized the land
withdrawal and surveys in 1888, pressure from western boosters and
potential settlers led Congress to reopen the public domain in 1890,
long before Powell and his agency finished their work."
1. Federal Withdrawals and Management
The use of federal domain for parks began in 1864 when Congress
transferred Yosemite Valley and Mariposa Big Tree Grove to California
for its use as a public park." Likewise, Congress reserved 2 million
acres in Wyoming, Montana, and Idaho in 1872 to create the first national park, Yellowstone.'
After a time, California clearly could not
administer the Yosemite grant properly, so the federal government
reclaimed the land in 1906 and formed its own park. That same year,
Congress passed the Antiquities Act, allowing the President of the
United States to withdraw lands to protect areas with historic, prehistoric, or scientific values." Under this law, Congress reserved twenty-

35. See, e.g., Enlarged Homestead Act of 1909, ch. 160, 35 Stat. 639 (repealed by 43
U.S.C. § 218 (2000) (increasing homestead size to 320 acres); Three-Year Homestead
Act of 1912, ch. 153, 37 Stat. 123 (repealed by 43 U.S.C. § 218 (2000) (reducing the requisite residency period on the land from five to three years); Stockraising Homestead
Act of 1916, ch. 9, 39 Stat. 862 (repealed by 43 U.S.C. § 291-298 (2000) (providing 640acre homesteads on nonirrigable land).
36. GATES, supra note 11, at app. A at 799-800.
37. WALLACE STEGNER, BEYOND THE HUNDREDTH MERIDIAN: JOHN WESLEY POWELL
AND THE SECOND OPFNING OF THE WEST 322 (1954).
38. See id. at 316-24.
39. GATES, supra note 11, at 566.
40. Id.
41. Antiquities Act, ch. 3060, 34 Stat. 225 (1906) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 431-433 (2000)).
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three national monuments in eleven states and Alaska by 1910.2 Congress subsequently expanded several national monuments to form national parks." Today, over 564 million acres of land reside in federal
ownership."
Growing public concern over the rapid and frequently wasteful depletion of the nation's natural resources prompted decisive action in
the field of forestry in the 1890s: the Forest Reserve Act."5 Although
Congress already created a Division of Forestry within the Department
of Interior in 1876, that agency's only function was research. The Forest Reserve Act served as an early indication that the federal government would not shy away from holding on to significant amounts of
land to accomplish its goals. ' This legislation authorized the President
to withdraw timbered public lands from homestead and other types of
entry and set those lands aside as forest reservations. Presidents Grover
Cleveland and Theodore Roosevelt vigorously wielded the Act's authority to create a system of forest reserves. 7 In time, the government
created 155 national forests, with 101 located in the West. 8 These reservations totaled approximately 156,274,000 acres. 9
With the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act" in 1934, the federal
government committed itself to actively managing much of the remaining public domain. The Act empowered the Secretary of the Interior
to establish grazing districts. The grazing districts currently encompass
141 million acres of public land for grazing and forage crops."
The Department of the Interior created an elaborate leasing system
for these lands, since the Act barred homestead entry upon them, except in Alaska. In many respects, the Taylor Grazing Act marked the
closing of the public domain." The Taylor Grazing Act demonstrated
42. DANA & FAiRJAx, supra note 17, at 78.
43. Id.
44. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS
2003 5, 7 tbl.1-1, 1-2 (Apr. 2004) [hereinafter PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS].
45. Forest Reserve, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891), repealed by 16 U.S.C. § 471 (2000).
See also DANA & FAIRrAX, supra note 17, at 55.
46. DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 55.
47. "On February 22, 1897, [Cleveland] issued proclamations creating thirteen new
reserves with a gross area of 21.3 million acres, which more than doubled the existing
area of reserves. His action came without warning .... and without consultation with a
single governor or elected representative from the affected areas." Id. at 60.
FORESTRY SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., LAND AREAS OF THE NATIONAL FOREST
48.
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30,
2004
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SYSTEM:
LAND
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REPORT

http://www.fs.fed.us/land/staff/lar/LAR04/table 1.htm.
Id.
49.
50. Taylor Grazing Act, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §

315 (2000)).
51.

PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 44, at 13-15 tbl.1-4.

52.
See generally E. LOUIsE PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMIN: DISPOSAL
AND RESERVATION POLICIES 1900-50 (Stuart Bruchey & Eleanor Bruchey eds., Arno Press
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that the federal government was much more inclined to keep its land
than give it away. This policy culminated in the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act (FLPMA) in 1976." Under FLPMA, the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM), a division of the Department of the Interior, managed approximately 262 million acres of western public domain. 4 The BLM leased much of the land to ranchers and farmers for
livestock grazing.
To facilitate its western expansion, the United States eventually acquired approximately 1.7 billion acres of land in the area west of the
Mississippi River, including Alaska, but not including Hawaii." The
federal government's disposition policies resulted in the permanent
transfer of nearly 1.2 billion acres of this land to states, corporations,
and private persons. At present, 564.5 million acres of land remain in
federal ownership as national parks and monuments, forests, wildlife
preserves, BLM public lands, and military installations. 6
Congress acted frequently to assist agricultural settlement in the
West. In addition to the Homestead Act and Desert Land Sales Act of
1877, the Carey Act of 1894 7 provided incentive to western states (up
to one million acres of federal land) to reclaim the land through irrigation. 8 While agriculture was wildly successful in lush pockets of the
West, farming was usually a hard and unpredictable enterprise for most
western agrarians. Locally sponsored irrigation projects simply proved
economically impractical. In addition, widespread drought during the
1890s convinced many westerners they could not do it alone. The federal government needed to help.
With water came thousands of settlers who poured into the searing
desert where only three inches of rain fell each year on average, and
summer temperatures frequently climbed to 120 degrees. 9 The population of the West grew from just over 4 million in 1900 to more than 9
million in 1920." In California's Imperial Valley alone, the population
reached 15,000 in 1909 with 160,000 acres irrigated." At the same
time, the urban areas of Los Angeles and southern California burgeoned. In fact, growth pressures in California helped push the fed53. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat.
2743 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2000)).
54. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICs, supra note 44, at 13-14 tbl-4.
55. GATES, supra note 11, at 86; DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 17, at 11.
56. PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS, supra note 44, at 5-7 tbl.1-1, 1-2.
57. Carey Act, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 372 (1894) (current version at 43 U.S.C. § 641

(2000)).
58. Id. at 422.
59. PHILIP L. FRADKIN, A RIVER No MORE: THE COLORADO RIVER AND THE WEST 186
(1981).
60.
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STATISTICS].
61. FRADKIN, supra note 59, at 186.
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eral Reclamation Service (renamed the Bureau of Reclamation in
1923) to plan the Hoover Dam and develop the Colorado River for
western growth. 2
2. The Lure of the Mines
The glitter of gold, not the agrarian dream, was responsible for the
bulk of the dramatic population increases in the western region. Fortyniners left the eastern states in droves for California after the discovery
of gold. The City of Denver sprang up practically overnight when miners found gold traces in the mountains of Colorado in the late 1850s.
Discovery of silver in Colorado and Arizona also brought settlers to the
mountain West.
Not surprisingly, Americans and immigrants flowing west to seek
their fortunes in gold and silver mines provided a powerful catalyst for
growth in the western states. The mines of the West provided a large
increase in the gold and silver output of the United States, which
stimulated the economy of the northern states during the Civil War. 3
The mining rushes also helped divide the West into political territories.
The demand for increased food markets resulted from the proliferation of mining camps." The wealth generated by the mining fields
contributed to the completion of railroads as the demand for passage
to the mountains and the coast increased.
As the population surged westward, this influx increased the pressure on the sovereignty and territories of Native Americans. These
pressures prodded the federal government to move the Indian tribes
and the original inhabitants out of the way for non-Indian fortune
seekers.65
The potential to make it big in the West had a snowball effect. The
population of the region grew at a greater rate than the rest of the nation during the last two decades of the nineteenth century. During this
time, the United States' population growth exceeded that of all other
industrialized nations.' Furthermore, the large influx of foreign-born
inhabitants who came to work on the railroads and in the mines added
to the already unique western culture.

62.

Id. at 187.

FREDERICK MERK, HISTORYOF THE WESTWARD MOVFMFNT 418 (1978).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Keith L. Bryant, Jr., Entering the Global Economy, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 195, 232 (Clyde A. Milner I et al., eds. 1994) [hereinafter OXFORD
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3. "Show me a rich country and I'll soon give you a large town" 7
As Americans moved west in the 1800s, following gold, timber, and
the plough, the virgin character of the region began to change. Fueled by the gold rushes of the 1840s and 1850s, city populations sprung
up and flooded the frontier with would-be millionaires. City centers
replete with trade, government, culture, and countless promoters generated a constant demand for metals, wood, and food. Even from the
earliest settlement days, the West was surprisingly urban.
At the turn of the twentieth century, western population figures revealed fairly dramatic changes beginning in the 1850s. To illustrate, in
1850, the regional population of the West amounted to 0.6 percent of
the total population in the United States.' "By 1890, the proportion of
residents of the western states who lived in towns of ten thousand or
more was larger than that of any other U.S. region except the Northeast."" By 1900, the western population comprised almost 6 percent of
the total population in the United States."0 Nearly 40 percent of all
westerners lived in urban areas.'
Growth of the frontier regional
economy occurred in tandem with large mineral discoveries, because
the need to supply goods and equipment to the mining economy hurried increases in urban growth.
In 1860, San Francisco stood alone as the only true urban center in
the West. By 1900, however, "Houston, Dallas, Denver, Seattle, Portland, Los Angeles, and other urban areas boasted large populations
and complex economies. "7
What drove this period of increasing
growth in western urban centers? In part, the arid geography of the
region encouraged urban growth because the dry, harsh climate made
living in many rural parts of the West virtually intolerable.' The oasis
of the city helped soften the dry reality. Much of the West was too arid
to support successful farms.
Western migration also coincided with the industrial revolution,
another factor that encouraged urban grown in the West. As the profitability of growing food for subsistence abated, the market for exchange goods and services developed. Still, this market depended
upon access to a concentrated population. '
One precious commodity helped fuel the growth of the West: water. Cities, mines, and farms alike relied on it. Yet, as John Wesley
67. Carol A. O'Connor, A Region of Cities, in OxFoRD HisTORY, supra note 66, at 535
(citing a Western pioneer proverb).
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Powell argued in 1879, strong federal intervention would be required if
communities were to continue growing.75 The federal government
faced the challenge of harnessing this vital resource.
4. Boom and Bust Cycles
Abundant natural resources in the largely undeveloped West
spawned extractive industries including mining, timber, and ranching.
The ability to harness western watercourses facilitated growth in many
sectors of the western economy. The West's dual dependence on its
natural resources and eastern capital made the region particularly vulnerable to boom and bust cycles.
For instance, Edmund Morris described the devastating winter of
1886-87 that almost annihilated ranching in the Northern Great Plains
and ended Theodore Roosevelt's years as a cattleman in the Bad Lands
6
Ranchers lost 75 to
near Medora, Dakota Territory in financial ruin."
herds.
As
Morris
recounted,
"When
the last drifts
85 percent of their
of snow melted away, and the flood abated, cowboys went out onto the
range to look for survivors [among the cattle]. Bill Merrifield was
among them. 'The first day I rode out,' he reported, 'I never saw a live
animal.""
The Depression of 1893 was another harsh blow to western fortunes. The economic downturn was more severe than any since the
Revolutionary War, with unemployment higher than 10 percent for
half of the decade.' Uncertainties about the gold standard and monetary policy, poor agricultural prices, and reduced railroad investment
unduly burdened the West.'
Despite the swings in economic fortunes, the population in the
western region persisted in growing during the first few decades of the
twentieth century. From 1917 to 1919, the West shared in the postWorld War I boom. However, the drought years escalated the Great
Depression of the 1930s in all western states (except perhaps California, where the climate remained more sound). "[L]ow prices, and
drought were driving people from their land and into other parts of
America."' Historian Robert Athearn reported that during this period,
the Southwest lost between 5 and 10 percent of its population." The
75.

JOHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED

STATES: WITH A MORE DETAILED AccouNT OF THE LANDS OF UTAH 3-5,

Stegner ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press) (1879).
76. EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 373 (1979).
77. Id. at 366.
78. See NEIL IRVIN PAINTER, STANDING AT ARMAGEDDON: THE UNITED
1919, at 116, 295 (1987).
79. See generally id. at 110-140 (describing the depression of the 1890s).
80.
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tier of states from the Dakotas to Oklahoma suffered from similar
losses in population.'
As the depression deepened, the western population became less
rural." In 1900, over 50 percent of western citizens lived in a rural
area."4 Yet, by 1940, nearly 60 percent of residences lived in an urban
setting.8 This change occurred despite the federal government's continuing provision of ample opportunities to acquire homestead property. Indeed, homestead land was available until 1934.' Athearn hypothesized that farmers just could not make a go of it in rural areas,
gave up, and moved on to neighboring towns and cities."
In 1933 the New Deal programs, spearheaded by President Franklin Roosevelt and driven by large public water works projects such as
Boulder Canyon Dam on the Colorado River and Fort Peck Dam on
the Missouri River, began to turn the western economy around. Thus,
as America entered World War II, prosperity was gradually returning to
the country and to the West.
D.

INDIAN POLICYAND THE END OF TRIBALISM

Manifest destiny, or the opening of the western frontier to settlement, depended on a particular federal policy. One major challenge
was termed the "Indian problem." Commentators frequently criticize
American Indian policy for its ambiguous and unstable history. In its
service of manifest destiny, however, American Indian policy consistently produced one result important to Anglo-Americans moving west
during the 1800s: making more land available for settlement. The
United States accomplished this by removing Native Americans from
their ancestral homelands. Even when the United States did not physically remove entire tribes, the government significantly reduced or
parceled tribal lands. One side effect was clear: the reduction of the
Indians' land base diminished their military and political power.
The framers of the United States Constitution placed Indian policy
in the hands of Congress. The Constitution mandated that Congress
should regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, while it empowered
the President to make treaties, necessarily including Indian treaties,
given the consent of the Senate.'
The United States generally treated Indian tribes as foreign sovereign nations and often considered them enemies. The federal gov82,
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ernment initially orchestrated the commerce between tribes and the
growing territories. Before 1815, most "Indians negotiated treaties
from a position of some power, for the tribes had the option of allying
with either the United States or the British." 9
Despite the tribes' powers, by the 1820s, non-Indian settlers continued west for new land. They demanded stronger policies to facilitate favoring Anglo expansion. The federal government heeded their
call. Thus, the United States implemented a removal policy.
1. Removal Policy (1830-1871)
Though it had its genesis much earlier, Presidents Monroe, Adams,
and Jackson most ardently championed the executive policy of removal.' Jackson was especially supportive of removal, because he
fought in many Indian wars. In 1830, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act,' which expressed the goal of removing the Indian population from the eastern United States and gave the President power to
accomplish the removal. 2
The Act's intent was to force tribes from their eastern homelands
to areas west of the Mississippi. The United States had a number of
methods to accomplish the removal of Indian tribes from tribal lands.
The United States used one option, war, liberally. Whether or not preceded by bloodshed, the government's relations with the tribes typically culminated in a treaty. Inevitably, treaties required tribal governments to forfeit some portion of their land. The United States held
the remainder in reserve.
The United States often forced treaty negotiations upon tribes who
did not understand English. Further, some tribal spokespeople did
not really represent the tribes they purported to represent." Often,
the United States imposed treaties upon tribes, even without their consent."9
After 1871, the United States renounced treaty-making, and bilateral agreements arose as the negotiation method of choice. 5 Like treaties, these agreements reserved and ceded portions of land to tribes.
89.

Charles F. Wilkinson &John M. Volkman,judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abroga-
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Both houses of Congress ratified these agreements. Other methods
accomplished the same goals: unilateral congressional statutes, Interior
department actions, and executive orders. All continued to draw
boundary lines around the many varied tribes of the West. Treaties
and treaty substitutes"' worked to form today's Indian reservations.
These documents recognized tribes under the emerging United States
government and eventually established a reservation system.
The removal policy, which was essentially "the purchase of Indian
lands and the transposition of their former owners to new territories to
the [W]est," resulted in many treaties. 7 Through this policy, the
United States created reservations for many eastern Indian tribes on
lands west of the Mississippi. The non-Indian Anglo world intended to
impose its culture upon the new Indian reservations, changing Indian
warriors and hunters in the abundant new world into benign American
farmers. Yet, these ideals could not quite succeed. The United States
initiated numerous attempts at creating boundaries, but those attempts
then failed. As western expansion continued and whites increasingly
crossed the boundaries set by treaties, the government broke the treaties, and reservations diminished."
The United States gave tribes a choice of sorts: keep the homeland
and be overrun by white settlement, or move west. President Jackson
remained committed to removal of all Indians. He did not hesitate to
use force if needed, but the United States Supreme Court sometimes
refused to uphold such strong-arm tactics. Though the Court could
only deal with particularized situations, the judiciary in the early days,
led by Chief Justice John Marshall, rendered legal decisions that ran
against the currents of removal.'

96.
97.

A term coined by Professor Wilkinson. Id. at 8.
BENJAMIN CAPPS, THE INDIANS 157 (Time-Life Books ed. 1973).
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Id. at 157-69.

99.

First, in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823), a case about the

validity of a tribe's land grant to non-Indian individuals, the Court ruled such a conveyance was invalid. Id. at 543, 604-05. The doctrine of occupancy (sometimes called
Indian title, aboriginal title, and original title) was created for tribes in their aboriginal
lands after European discovery. "The result of this decision was to recognize a legal
right of Indians in their lands, good against all third parties but existing at the mere
sufferance of the federal government." CANBY, supra note 90, at 15.
In the early 1830s, Justice John Marshall penned two more cases involving the
Cherokee nation. The young state of Georgia gave up western land claims in return
for a federal promise to extinguish Indian title in Georgia. Georgia did not wait for
the federal government to make good on its promise. Instead, it passed legislation that
divided Cherokee land between Georgian counties and invalidated Cherokee law. The

Cherokee sued in the Supreme Court, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1
(1831), where Justice Marshall determined the Cherokee tribe demonstrated some
level of sovereignty, though not as formidable as that of a foreign state. Id. at 17. Instead, Marshall created the concept of the "domestic dependent nation" and determined the United States was to Indian tribes like "a ward to his guardian." Id.
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More telling than the treaties that began to form the Indian reservation system was the impact of broad policies Congress adopted that
left implementation to later legislative or administrative action. The
policy of allotment, discussed in the next section, played as large a role
as removal policy in determining the character of today's Indian reservations.
2. Allotment and Assimilation (1871-1928)
Eventually, Indian wars enforcing removal policy became far less
popular, less successful than planned, and enormously expensive."
The United States needed more effective tactics to terminate Indian
tribal societies and open lands inhabited by the tribes for settlement.
Toward that end, the effort to "assimilate" Indian people into the
American culture developed. The first major indication that the federal government was serious about assimilation occurred when the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) moved from the War Department to the
Department of the Interior."'
The favored assimilation tool was the allotment program. Congress
passed the General Allotment Act (also called the Dawes Act) in
1887."' The government's new mandatory initiative resembled the
homestead program in that it allotted parcels of reservation land to
individual tribal members. These individuals became yeoman farmers-full participants in American capitalism. Once the government
allotted tribal land, it opened surplus reservation land to Anglo settlement. Perhaps for this reason, some advocates of assimilation argued
allotment promoted the best interest of the whites as well as those of
Indians.'3° Others regarded allotment as a destructive force, because it
The next term, Marshall opined Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832),
where Georgia authorities arrested non-Indian missionaries living in Cherokee country
and accused them of violating state law requiring a state license or sworn allegiance to
Georgia. Id Marshall upheld the sovereignty of the tribe and ruled that jurisdiction
over the Cherokees "belonged exclusively to the federal government, and that Georgia
had no power to pass laws affecting the tribe." ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR., 500 NATIONS: AN
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 328 (1994). The Court stated "[t] he
Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force....
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
Despite the Court's language, the sovereignty of Indian tribes was difficult to
protect without the support of Congress and the executive. Indian tribes were armed
only with the words of the Supreme Court and had no political power. After the
Worcester opinion, Jackson is thought to have remarked "John Marshall has rendered
his decision, now let him enforce it." JOsEPHY, supra, at 328.
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imposed individual property ownership on members of a culture that
believed in communal ownership."n
Under allotment, heads of families initially received 160 acres,
while other family members received 80 acres."'° If the land was suitable merely for grazing, these acreages doubled.'" Title to the allotted
land remained with the United States in "trust" for twenty-five years
(longer, if the President extended the time). Once twenty-five years
passed, the land became unencumbered and freely sold."7
After the federal government finished meting out reservation land
to tribal members, it opened the remainder, or "surplus," to others.
Thus, allotment policy put more land into Anglo hands. The policy
also reduced total Indian landholdings by 35 percent, from
138,000,000 acres in 1887 before the Dawes Act to 48,000,000 acres in
1934.10 The gross statistics underestimate the losses of tribal landholdings due to the allotment policy. Tribes were left with lands of lesser
quality, where almost half of the land was either desert or semidesert." All told, tribes lost over 80 percent of the value of their lands
due to the allotments.""
Ensuing events were equally harsh. Allottees frequently lost their
land due to state tax foreclosures."' "Grafters" made things worse.
They specialized as dealers of Indian lands, monopolizing the best
tracts and leasing them out to tenant farmers."' They also appropriated the land of recalcitrant Indians who refused to accept allotments
in their surplus holdings. In addition, grafters plundered the assets of
Indian children by seeking appointment as guardians of young allottees and using the allotment for the grafters' benefit."' Those benefits
were potentially huge: in the Five Tribes area of Oklahoma alone,
there were 60,000 Indian minor children."4 The agricultural value of
their allotted estates equaled approximately $130,000,000 and that
value was growing due to increasing oil prices."' Unscrupulous dealers
would even have adult Indians declared incompetent to gain guardianship and, thus, control the land owned by their "charges." Grafters
collected lease money and royalties, but rarely distributed it to the
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landowning Indians, or heirs."6 Grafters even employed murder to
channel allotments into conspirators' hands; tribes reported twentyfour unsolved cases, some involving shooting, poisoning, and arson.""
More passive forces, like those of agricultural economics, gave allotment policy another unfortunate dimension. As allottees died, their
estates were broken into small portions and distributed among heirs.
Beneficiaries frequently leased out the land, but increasing parcel
fragmentation generated proportionately smaller income. '
If the goal was to assimilate Indians into mainstream society, allotment failed. By eroding tribal lands and aboriginal governments, and
splitting tribal members up, allotment policy corroded the political
power of tribes. The Indian Task Force of the Hoover Commission
summed up:
The practice of allotting land and issuing fee patents obviously did
not make the Indians competent. It proved to be chiefly a way of getting Indian land into non-Indian ownership ....
The rationalization
behind this policy is so obviously false that it could not have prevailed
for so long a time if not supported by the avid demands of others for
Indian lands. This was a way of getting them, usually at bargain
prices." 9

3. Winters v. United States
A United States Supreme Court opinion issued during the allotment period ran contrary to the general destruction of tribal property
that characterized that era. In Winters v. United States,"0 Indians on the
Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana asserted they were entitled to
"reserve" water in the Milk River for future purposes, even though they
had no need for the water at the time of the case. The Court agreed
and held the tribe was entitled to enough water to enable it to accomplish the reservation's original purpose. The Court reasoned the
United States surely would not give the Indians a reservation for farming purposes, but no water for farming. "It was the policy of the Government, it was the desire of the Indians, to change those [uncivil]
habits and to become a pastoral and civilized people."'2' The holding

116. Id.
117. Id. at 333.
118. Cohen predicted "the allotment system, working down through the partitionment or sale of the land of deceased allottees, mathematically insures and practically
requires that the remaining Indian allotted lands shall pass to whites. The allotment
act contemplates total landlessness for the Indians of the third generation of each
allotted tribe." COHEN, supra note 103, at 216.
119. DEBO, supra note 112, at 331 (internal quotations omitted).
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of Winters gave the federal government the power to "reserve" water
when it entered into treaties with Indian tribes exempt from state law.
For more than fifty years there was little government reaction to
the Winters holding and the reserved rights doctrine lay dormant.'"
Perhaps this was because the government policy of western expansion
persisted in largely disregarding Indian rights. For instance, the
United States engineered huge water projects into western riverbeds,
2
The tribes themselves
often in complete derogation of Indian rights."
had little ability to stop this. Allotment so isolated and impoverished
tribes that they lacked the political power and resources to pursue the
water rights recognized by Winters.
4. Reform Period (1928-1945)
The end of the allotment period coincided with the final closing of
the American frontier. Allotment ended with the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),' passed after the election of President Franklin Roosevelt. The IRA prohibited further allotments and froze previously allotted land still in trust status. The IRA allowed some surplus lands, not
'
Congress also
yet claimed by third parties, to be returned to tribes.
authorized the Secretary of the Interior to acquire new lands and water
rights for tribes."6
Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, pursued new educational, economic, and administrative reform and encouraged Indian tribes to form self-governing tribal societies under the
IRA.' Tribes had the option to reorganize their governments under
IRA provisions, though a vote by the tribe in favor was required. 8 As a
result, ninety-five tribes adopted constitutions, and seventy-four formed
corporations for conducting their business. Some relatively undisturbed tribes declined such changes. They continued to manage their
affairs in ways dictated by their own custom. 29'
Critics of the IRA believed it merely imposed Anglo institutions on
Indian people.'" They noted that many tribes adopted constitutions
modeled on Anglo-American institutions. 131 While critics debate the
legacy of the IRA, John Echohawk, executive director of the Native
122.

GETCHES,

supra note 89, at 782.

123. THORSON, supra note 92, at 80-83.
124. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 461 (2000)) (also called the Wheeler-Howard Act of 1934).
125. Id. at 984 (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 462-63 (2000)).
126. Id. at 984-86 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2000)).
127. LIMEIcK, supra note 10, at 202.

128.

Id.

129.

Id. at 202-03.

130.

VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYILE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICANJUSTICEI

(1983).
131.
Id.

5

Issue 2

DIVIDING WESTERN WATERS

American Rights Fund, reached an interim assessment shared by many:
"The Indian New Deal wasn't perfect...but its results were fundamentally beneficial for Indian people. The Indian Reorganization Act reversed the direction of American Indian policy. The pattern of history
changed from the erosion of Indian sovereignty to its restoration and
revival." 32
Although reform came, the extent of the damage allotment caused
was painfully evident by the 1920s. In 1928, the federal government
published the Meriam Report. The report clearly documented the
failure of the allotment policy and described extreme poverty and despair on divided reservations. ' This report, written under contract by
Interior Secretary Hubert Work, compiled the results from an in-depth
social and economic survey of American tribes and found "deplorable
conditions of poverty, disease, lack of social and economic adjustment,
suffering, and discontent," on reservations, citing the allotment policy
as its main cause."' The report also suggested various solutions to the
devastating consequences of allotment.
Some reformers wanted to divest tribes of all their remaining land
by liquidating the reservations. The Harding administration proposed
paying the Indians the cash value for their remaining assets.' One bill
unified the Pueblo people by recognizing the rights of squatters who
invaded Pueblo property in New Mexico. Pueblo people united statewide for the first time in 242 years. Seventeen Pueblo representatives
traveled to Washington D.C. to protest the bill, declaring, "[t]he time
has come when we must live or die.""'
Another sign of the renewal of tribalism came during the 1930s
and 1940s. Legal scholarship focused on Indian sovereignty, thereby
lending it some support.13 7 For instance, Indian scholar Felix Cohen
wrote his Handbook of FederalIndian Law and used the doctrine of tribal
sovereigntyJohn Marshall originally postulated as his thesis.' Cohen's
scholarship became the leading authority courts used to address Indian
issues, thereby encouraging more judges to issue decisions respecting
Indian sovereignty.
By the end of World War II, however, the spirit of reform lost
ground. New political forces ruled the day, and tribal interests were
not among them. In the end, the power the tribes regained proved
limited and was not enough to make reform a permanent feature on
the federal agenda or the political horizon.
132. LIMERICK, supra note 10, at 209.
133. COHEN, supra note 103, at 26-27.
134. DEBO, supra note 112, at 336.
135. Id. at 334. In 1934 Congress also passed the Taylor Grazing Act, officially ending the homesteading era. MErx, supra note 63, at 611.
136. DEBO, supra note 112, at 335.
137. WILKINSON, supra note 95, at 57.
138. Id. at 56-57.
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E. TERMINATION ERA

The IRA and Collier's policies produced a resurgence of social,
spiritual, and political power for Native Americans, but the advent of
the Termination Era in the 1950s halted such gains. Just eleven years
after Congress passed the IRA, Collier's reforms began fading into the
past. In 1949 the Hoover Commission issued its Report on Indian Affairs
suggesting a return to assimilation policy: "[C] omplete integration of
Indians should be the goal so that Indians would move into the mass of
the population as full, taxpaying citizens." ' 9 Social forces of the times,
coupled with the desire to abate federal funding to tribes, brought
termination policy to the forefront of Indian policy debates. ,
F. SUMMARY
As previously discussed, a series of land settlement initiatives, principally the Homestead Act of 1862 and the Desert Land Sales Act of
1877, parceled out the public domain for the benefit of individual family farmers. Federal land tenure in the West was important to water
adjudications because it determined the type and magnitude of water
rights claimed for these lands. Often, the same individual or family
leased these lands for decades. They constructed stockponds, ditches,
wells, and other water improvements. As for lands that remained in
federal control, the government intensified its interest in these holdings, because the land could support recreation, environmental protection, and other governmental initiatives. Tribal lands present a
more challenging prospect after the advent of Winters rights and the
associated questions surrounding the quantification of tribal water
rights. General stream adjudications currently face the daunting task
of defining water rights for this patchwork of western lands, and the
lands and water are enmeshed in an intense value struggle over the
future of the West.
H. THE SEARCH FOR WATER LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS
SUITABLE FOR THE WEST
By the 1860s, Manifest Destiny accomplished its principal tenet: to
secure under the American flag all of the territory between the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans. After the Civil War, the nation's attention turned
toward settling this vast terrain for the dual purposes of developing
western lands and protecting them from foreign threats. At the beginning of this settlement era, western rivers and streams sufficiently accommodated the water needs of new settlers. After the first wave of
settlers acquired prime riparian lands and diversion points, it became
139.
140.

GETCHES, supra note 89, at 229 (internal quotations omitted).
DEBO, supra note 112, at 349-53.
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apparent that new water laws and institutions would be necessary if
remaining arid lands were to support a growing population and economy in the ensuing years.
The first wave of settlers adopted a legal regime for the future and
called it "prior appropriation." To administer the doctrine, they created local institutions to develop and allocate water resources. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, the federal government assumed
an active role in western water issues with federal reclamation legislation and funding. The combination of water law and local involvement, coupled with federal support, facilitated the development of the
American West. Ultimately, this combination placed a premium on
ascertaining existing water rights, providing the impetus for the general stream adjudications.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE

The eastern riparian water rights doctrine, which limits water use
to those persons with lands bordering a river or lake, eventually proved
ill-suited for the arid West. Beginning in the late 1840s, custom and
tradition determined water allocation policies in many parts of the
West. The prior appropriation doctrine, which embodied the principle "first in time, first in right," arose in response to western needs to
suit the aridity and geography of the region.'' The doctrine treated
each of the following as property: priority, place of diversion, quantity,
transfer rights, and the owner's status in the hierarchy of users.' Early
miners first applied prior appropriation principles to the use of surface
water, and eventually western territories and states adopted the doctrine in their statutes as well.' 2
At first, the federal government responded in a deferential manner
by recognizing past and even future appropriations of water on public
lands, which were based on local customs and traditions. The government's deference was particularly evident in the Mining Act of 1866
and the Desert Land Sales Act of 1877.
Even the federal judiciary deferred to state law in the appropriation and use of water in a series of court cases, which bestowed each
state with broad regulatory authority over water rights on public lands
141.
See, e.g., Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882) ("Imperative
necessity, unknown to the countries which gave [the riparian doctrine] birth, compels
recognition of [the prior appropriation doctrine] in conflict therewith.").
Mark W. Tader, Reallocating Western Water: Beneficial Use, Property, and Politics,
142.
1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 277, 284.
143. John D. McGowen, The Development of PoliticalInstitutions on the PublicDomain, 11
Wyo. L.J. 1-14 (1956). Later, western state legislatures required that the state itself
concur with the appropriation. This policy required appropriators to apply for permits
before constructing the works or using the water. A state agency then decided whether
unappropriated water was available for the use, and whether that use was beneficial.
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and gave each the exclusive right to choose its own system of water
law.'" During this period, territorial and state governments' were the
primary drivers of water rights and water use control. Congress remained content to defer to state or territorial law on such matters.'46
B. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL INSTITUTIONS

The need for water also presented organizational challenges as
communities realized they needed some sort of structure to oversee
the movement of water. As a solution, Mormons in the Salt Lake Valley pioneered the first communal irrigation organizations.' This cooperative movement also took hold in irrigation-based colonies, which
some touted as experimental utopian communities. These included
Anaheim, California, where in 1857; individuals formed the Los Angeles Vineyard Society for the purpose of cultivating grapes and producing wine.' 8 Settlers established one of the most famous initiatives, the
Union Colony, in 1870 near the confluence of the Cache la Poudre
and Platte rivers in Colorado. "9 They named the community "Greeley,"
after Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune, who sponsored the
community in its early days. The Chicago-Colorado Colony established
a similar settlement near Longmont, Colorado."
More formal, corporate organizations evolved as citizens realized
that mere cooperative efforts would be insufficient to settle the entire
West. Private canal companies organized in many states, including the
Highland Ditch Company of Colorado in 1871."' The Boise City Land
& Irrigation Company in Idaho followed, as did the Pecos Irrigation &
Investment Company of New Mexico.'
The financial returns from
144. See California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 152,
154-56 (1935) (holding Congress had recognized the validity of local customs related
to the appropriation of water); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907) ("It may
determine for itself whether the common law rule in respect to riparian rights or that
doctrine which obtains in the arid regions of the West of the appropriation of water for
the purposes of irrigation shall control. Congress shall not enforce either rule upon
any state."); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 704
(1899).
145. State powers to legislate in the field of water rights arose from the general sovereignty reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The power to create property rights and the police power to regulate those rights
stems from this reserved sovereignty. The Tenth Amendment provides, "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
146. Ernest A. Engelbert, Federalism and Water Resources Development, 22 LAW &
CONTMP. PROBS. 325, 329 (1957).
147. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 18.
148. Id. at 20-21.
149. Id. at 22.
150. Id. at 23.
151.
Id.
152. Id. at 24, 26.
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these companies, however, could not sustain the day-to-day cost of operating the irrigation projects. As one historian concluded: "In general, the canal corporation as an institution could construct irrigation
projects, but could not successfully operate them."'
Progress continued nonetheless. Mutual ditch or irrigation companies formed in many states, with the assistance of state or territorial
legislatures."' The companies required farmers to pool their resources
in exchange for stock, and assigned them a proportionate share of irrigation water. One such mutual irrigation company was the Hardy Irrigation Canal Company, which six Arizona pioneers organized in 1870
along Arizona's Salt River near Tempe.' In 1900 farmers organized a
similar mutual ditch company, the Big Ditch Company, in the Yellowstone Valley near Billings, Montana. '
Another corporate form, the development corporation, which was
a hybrid between the private corporation and the mutual irrigation
company, allowed developers to create a mutual corporation, build
irrigation facilities, and divide and sell the land and stock to individual
farmers. These corporations became a predominant settlement pattern in southern California in cities such as Pomona, Pasadena, and
Redlands.'"
In 1887 California's Wright Act,' further enhanced the financial
capacity of local irrigation efforts. The Act enabled a county board of
supervisors to create irrigation districts that could assess agricultural
land, issue bonds, and construct irrigation projects. Eventually, sixteen
other western states adopted variants of the Wright Act.'" New Mexico
further refined the irrigation district concept by authorizing water conservancy districts that allowed communities to assess both urban and
agricultural lands to support multi-purpose projects.'"
C.LIMITS OF LOCAL EFFORTS

By the late 1800s, however, many westerners realized that the region's rives needed large storage facilities if the reclamation and settlement of the West were to proceed. The private canal companies and
153. Id. at 27.
154. Among the forms of legislative support irrigation districts enjoyed were exemption from state and territorial taxation, exclusivity rights (with which some companies
held exclusive rights to particular service areas), and the power of eminent domain to
acquire rights of way and purchase land through condemnation. IPIsANI, supra note
10, at 98-99.
155. DUNBAR, supranote 10, at 29.
156. Id. at 30.
157. Id. at 32.
158. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 20500-29975 (West 1984) (officially named the Irrigation
District Law, but commonly known as the Wright Act).
159. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 33.
160. Id. at 34-35.
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irrigation districts had already overextended themselves"' and lacked
the financial capacity and engineering expertise to construct large
storage projects. Gradually, eyes turned toward Washington to provide
assistance.
Congress responded in 1888 by mandating a survey of possible
storage sites on western rivers. 6 The United States Geological Survey
(USGS), which John Wesley Powell headed at the time, conducted the
survey with Arthur D. Foote and Edwin S. Nettleton as supervising field
engineers." Powell recommended, and Congress agreed, the government should close the public domain to settlement until the USGS
completed the survey and Congress had the opportunity to act. The
closing led to such an outcry from the western states and territories
that Congress reversed itself in 1890.1' By that time, however, "Powell,
with his topographical mapping, stream gauging, and reservation of
reservoir sites, had laid the foundation for national reclamation.'6 5
D.NATIONAL RECLAMATION

In 1894, Congress enacted the Carey Act.'66 Considered to mark a
crossroads in the history of western reclamation, this Act authorized
the transfer "of one million acres within each state's public lands for
irrigation, reclamation, settlement, and cultivation []",
The Act responded to the expectation that states would contract with private development corporations to undertake the reclamation work. Only
Montana, Washington, Idaho, Colorado, Wyoming, and Idaho capitalized on the Carey Act."n William "Buffalo Bill" Cody led Carey Act reclamation efforts in several states; his grand visions for developing irrigated commonwealth communities stood in stark contrast to the "Wild
West" he so fervently peddled years before.' 9 The Carey Act was ultimately deemed ineffective because of a lack of private financing.'7" One
commentator observed, "[t]he Carey Act development corporations
161. Many irrigation corporations ignored the reality that they could only meet
interest and maintenance costs of building their canals if their service areas settled
rapidly and densely. When droves of settlers failed to materialize, these costs crushed
some companies. In Arizona's Salt River Valley, companies built eight canals at a cost
of nearly one million dollars, but only approximately twenty percent of the lands that
the canals were capable of serving actually became cultivated. 1 PISANI, supra note 10,
at 106.
162. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 47.
163. Id. at 47-48.
164. Id. at 48.
165. Id.
166. 43 U.S.C. § 641 (2000).
167. KAREN L. SMiTH, THE MAGNIFICENT EXPERIMENT: BUILDING THE SALT RIVER
RECLA.MATION PROJECT 1890-1917, at 8 (1986).
168.
1 PISANI, supra note 10, at 261.
169. Id. at 254-55.
170. SMITH, supra note 167, at 8.
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faced the same problems as the earlier corporations-miscalculation of
costs, overestimation of the water supply, and a dearth of settlers to
purchase water rights.""' In the end, the Carey Act did little to cultivate or reclaim the public domain. '
During the 1890s, support increased for a strong federal role in
western reclamation. Captain Hiram M. Chittenden of the Army Corps
of Engineers, who surveyed and located five possible reservoir sites in
Colorado and Wyoming, recommended Congress fund the construction of these projects.' However, he proposed states build the water
distribution facilities themselves.'
In addition, in 1899, California attorney George Maxwell organized the National Irrigation Association,
an organization devoted to national reclamation. 7 ' By 1902, the national reclamation movement crested with the support of President
Theodore Roosevelt. With Roosevelt's assistance, Senator Francis
Newlands of Nevada succeeded in urging Congress to pass his reclamation act.'
The Reclamation Act of 1902' was a strategic federal instrument to
further settlement and economic development of the West. The Act
authorized federal funds for the construction of reservoirs and water
distribution facilities in sixteen western states and territories.' Farmers
would construct projects with federal loans, which the farmers would
repay within ten years." The federal government entrusted responsibility for the program to the Reclamation Service, housed within the
Department of the Interior's United States Geological Survey. This
configuration of authority circumvented regional policies and traditions, and created a more closed system of decision-making." With this
171. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 40.
172. SMITH, supra note 167, at 8.
173. 1 PIsANi, supra note 10, at 276-77. With the states responsible for the distribution system, Chittenden estimated the federal government could provide enough water
storage to reclaim the entire and West for $5.37 per acre, or approximately $1,430,031
each year for a century. Id. at 278.
174. Id. at 278.
175. Id. at 287.
176. Id. at 317-18.
177. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 390 (codified as amended at 43
U.S.C. § 372 (2000)).
178. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 51. These states are Washington, Oregon, California,
Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and Oklahoma. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch.
1093, 32 Stat. 388. Congress added Texas in 1905 as the seventeenth reclamation state.
DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 51.
179. DuNBAR, supra note 10, at51.
180. SMITH. supra note 167, at 21. Note that section 8 of the Act declared, "nothing
in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended to affect or in any way interfere
with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water used in irrigation...." Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, § 8, 32
Stat. at 390. According to historian Donald J. Pisani, the Reclamation Act "pandered
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enactment, Congress gave private rights prevalence, and directed the
Secretary of the Interior to proceed in conformity with state laws.''
The federal government deemed all water rights delivered by federal
irrigation projects "attached" to the land watered. This precluded any
entity from selling, purchasing, or monopolizing water rights as a
from the land, a factor that restricted state admincommodity separate
82
istrative control.
On March 14, 1903 Secretary of the Interior Ethan Allen Hitchcock
authorized reclamation projects on five rivers: the Salt River in Arizona, Truckee-Carson River in Nevada, Uncompahgre River in Colorado, North Platte River in Wyoming and Nebraska, and Milk River in
Montana." By 1907, twenty-four such reclamation projects were underway in fifteen states.'84 By 1929, more than one hundred federal
projects were complete, bringing irrigation to about 1,500,000 acres."'
The proponents of these projects hoped they would finance themselves over time, but the federal projects did not live up to that expectation. Congress responded by passing multiple relief measures, which
extended repayment dates or reduced the amounts due. ' The Secretary of the Interior's Committee of Special Advisers on Reclamation in
1924 concluded it was a fundamental error to believe the construction
of irrigation projects alone would foster vigorous agriculture. "7 Part of
the problem was the inordinate amount of energy the government devoted to engineering without regard to the dynamics of human interaction. The federal water subsidy contributed to the western migration
of many would-be farmers, but not all had the capital or experience
needed to succeed. Farmers were simply not organized enough to
help each other."
As homesteading diminished the supply of public land, and Reclamation Service funds dried up, the Reclamation Service turned to Into home

rule and institutionalized fragmentation." 1 PISANI, supra note 10, at 325. He
noted that "Section 8 of the act ratified a medley of state and territorial water laws that
crippled coordinated planning in its infancy." Id.
43 U.S.C. § 383.
181.
182. Historians actively debate the centralization of water resources. See, e.g.,
SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 1999) (1959) (applauding centralization's benefits) but cf DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER,
ARIDITY, .ND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985) (warning of the dangers of
centralization).
183. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 51-52.
184. Id. at 52.
185. MERK, supra note 63, at 509.
186. Id. at 510.
187. See generally. COMM. OF SPECIAL ADVISERS ON RECLAMATION, FEDERAL
RECLAMATION BY IRRIGATION, S. Doc. NO. 68-92, at 36-39 (1st Sess. 1924) (discussing
the weaknesses and failures of the Reclamation Act).
188. SMITH, supra note 167, at 155.
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dian lands. In 1904 Congress gave the Reclamation Service the right to
"reclaim, utilize, and dispose of any lands" within the reservation, as
long as each Indian received an irrigated farm."' As the Reclamation
Service began taking over Indian Bureau water projects that the Dawes
General Allotment Act of 1887 originally founded, Indian water rights
became captive to experiments in federal reclamation."n
Indian tribes even helped subsidize federal reclamation through
the sale of "surplus" land, or land the federal government deemed unnecessary for tribes. For example, on the Flathead Reservation in Montana, surplus land sold to white settlers at $4 to $7 an acre rapidly became worth $100 to $500 an acre when settlers irrigated. Yet, the allotment policy offered few benefits for Indians, because they owned
only small percentages of the irrigated land. According to the Report of
Advisors on Irrigationon Indian Reservations,many of the so-called Indian
irrigation projects were not Indian projects at all. ' Historian Donald
J. Pisani perhaps summed it up best: "In any contest between whites
and Indians, political expediency, if nothing else, dictated that the
The 1902 act, after all,
Reclamation Service support white farmers.
92
had been written for those homesteaders."
E. PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION ERA AND NEW DEAL POLICIES

The Reclamation Act was a manifestation of the progressive conservation movement, which became the basis of President Theodore
Roosevelt's national resource policies. One of the principal tenets of
the progressive conservation movement was that the federal government should retain ownership of western public lands and the government should use revenues from these lands to support public land
management. Further, progressives believed resource management
should benefit from scientific principles. Most notably, progressives
thought society should develop western arid lands "for the nation as a
whole, not [solely] for local interests."'93 This emerging national policy
also sought stewardship of the nation's water resources to support
navigation, irrigation, hydroelectric power, and construction of reservoirs to prevent flooding.'4
Proponents of progressive conservationism, however, soon ran
afoul of the capitalists on Wall Street over the issue of hydroelectric
189. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch.1402, § 25, 33 Stat. 224.
190. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
331-334, 339, 341, 342, 345, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1994)). The act is commonly known as
the "Indian Allotment Act."
191. 2 PISANI, supra note 10, at 177-78.
192.
Id. at 168. See also DANA & FAMiRFAx, supra note 17, at 69.
193. SMrrH, supra note 167, at 22.
194. MARK D. O'KEEFE ET AL., BOUNDARIES CARVED IN WATER: AN ANALYSIS OF RIVER
AND WATER MANAGEMENT IN THE UPPER MissouRi BASIN 11 (1987).
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power. In 1906 the Roosevelt administration championed an amendment to the Reclamation Act, which enabled the federal government
to sell surplus hydroelectric power generated by reclamation projects.
Although President Roosevelt called for some form of federal power
commission to regulate the distribution of this power, it was not until
after he left office that Congress finally passed the Federal Power Act of
1920.96 Even then, the commission the statute created was ineffectual
during much of the 1920s. Despite the Act, three major oligarchies,
the Morgan-Bonbright-National City group, the Chase National-Forbes
group, and the Insull group, controlled almost 60 percent of the electric power in the country.'97
Ultimately, public and congressional fears about the private monopolization of hydropower and hydropower sites provided support for
the comprehensive river basin planning and development concept.
Large main stem dams, many of which the Reclamation Act authorized, were important components of this multi-purpose policy.
The government undertook comprehensive plans for the Colorado
River that led to the Colorado River Compact of 1922 and the Boulder
Canyon Project Act of 1928. In 1933 comprehensive river basin development also gave birth to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), considered the model for management proposals on other river systems.9
President Franklin Roosevelt predicted, "[i]f we are successful here
[with TVA] we can march on, step by step; in a like development of
other great natural territorial units within our borders." "
During the Depression years, the TVA and other large multipurpose water development projects spurred national economic recovery. The Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams on the Columbia River
began in 1933 and 1935, respectively."'0 Congress slated similar largescale projects for central and southern California. In 1935 Congress
also approved the Fort Peck Dam on the Missouri River.Y' By 1940,
with the public domain closed, and government dams provided cheap
power to fuel an economic "takeoff' in the West."'2 Federalism scholar
Daniel Elazar described the time as one of continued collaboration
between the federal and state governments, albeit with the balance of
power on the federal government's side: "[Although] [t]he great acceleration of the velocity of government made cooperative federalism
SMITH, supra note 167, at 96.
196. THORSON, supra note 92, at 60.
197.
Id.
198. Id.
199. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress Suggesting the Tennessee Valley
Authority (Apr. 10, 1933) (transcript available in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential
Library and Museum), http://www.fdlrlibrary.marist.edu/odtvacon.htm.
200. THORSON, supra note 92, at 60-61.
Id. at 61.
201.
202. 2 PisANI, supra note 10, at 197.
195.
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all-pervasive ....The co-operative system was subtly reoriented toward
Washington."" '
The West benefited from federal reclamation policy because it
meshed well with the prior appropriation doctrine by supporting the
capture and storage of water for state water users. From the western
perspective, the federal government made cultivation possible by providing the capital for construction and distribution systems, yet allowed
western states to maintain control over the actual distribution of water
through prior appropriation."°
This partnership between the federal government and western
states worked so well because it was consistent with state and federal
land settlement and disposal policy."' The United States Supreme
Court confirmed such an arrangement in California Oregon Power Co. v.
Beaver Portland Cement Company."s The Court recognized Congress relinquished property rights in western waters to the states when it
passed the Desert Land Sales Act of 1877.207 Western states would later
point to language from that case to argue the Court meant to recognize state ownership and control over all non-navigable waters.
After Calfornia Oregon Power, western state citizens and politicians
assumed the federal government would refrain from infringing on
state primacy in water allocation, unless it was acting within its powers
Eventually, westerners were disto regulate commercial navigation.'
appointed, for the large water development projects of the New Deal
exerted a great deal of influence. Still, given the economic importance
of these projects, federal interference was a price that most westerners
were willing to bear.
F. INTERSTATE COMPETITION FOR WATER

By the turn of the twentieth century, demands on interstate stream
water had increased so much that conflicts arose between neighboring
states. Over the next fifty years, these tensions frequently erupted in
cycles of federal court litigation.

203. DanielIJ. Elazar, The Shaping of IntergovernmentalRelations in the Twentieth Century,
359 ANNALSAM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 10, 18-19 (1965).
204. Charles T. DuMars & A. Dan Tarlock, Symposium Introduction: New Challenges to
State WaterAllocation Sovereignty, 29 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 331, 332-33 (1989).
205. Id. at 333.
206. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 164
(1935).
207. Id. at 163-64 ("What we hold is that following the act of 1877, if not before, all
non-navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publicijuris subject to
the plenary control of the designated states.... ."); see also Desert Land Act of 1877, ch
107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 321 (2000)).
208. DuMars & Tarlock, supra note 204, at 334.
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In 1902, for instance, Kansas sued Colorado in the United States
Supreme Court. °9 Kansas argued Colorado's diversions from the Arkansas River damaged downstream riparian rights." '° Colorado contended it was a sovereign state and, as such, it had the right to use its
water as it saw fit, even if doing so damaged downstream states."'
To address the dispute, the Court acknowledged the principle of
equitable apportionment as the arbiter for interstate disputes over water. ' The Court compared the equities of both states, and found the
value of established upstream irrigation in Colorado outweighed the
limited injury it might inflict on Kansas. The Court denied Kansas any
relief, but left open the possibility of Kansas renewing its suit if circumstances changed.
This open-ended decision to weigh the equities
engendered a series of interstate lawsuits over rights along the Arkansas River that continue to this day.
By the 1920s, other states began litigating over western rivers. Water users in Nevada successfully sued upstream irrigators in California
along the Carson River.1 4 In similar litigation lasting almost a decade,
an irrigation company in Nebraska sued the State of Colorado over
uses on the Republican River." ' Other states also sued their neighbors
in the United States Supreme Court. Wyoming sued Colorado and
other parties to prevent a proposed diversion of Laramie River water
through a tunnel into the Cache la Poudre, which detrimentally effected water users in Wyoming. Wyoming filed the case in 1911, argued it in 1916, and reargued it in 1918 after the United States intervened to claim ownership of the unappropriated water in the Laramie
River, a non-navigable stream." 6 The parties reargued again and ultimately the Court ruled in 1922."17 Similarly, on two occasions, Arizona
unsuccessfully attempted to sue California over the Colorado River. '
Arizona's chief obstacle was the Supreme Court's holding that because
Congress had authority to build Boulder Dam .9 no court could apportion the river without the federal government joined in the litigation."'

209. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
210. Id. at 142.
211. Id. at 143.
212. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 104-05 (1907).
213. Id. at 117.
214. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bassman, 140 F. 14 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1905); Rickey Land &
Cattle Co. v. Miller& Lux, 152 F. 11 (9th Cir. 1907).
215. Weiland v. Pioneer Irrigation Co., 259 U.S. 498, 499 (1922).
216. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 455-56 (1922).
217. Id. at419.
218. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558
(1936).
219. Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. at 455-56.
220. Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. at 571.
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G.SUMMARY
The water use customs and patterns developed during the earlier
gold rush periods and agricultural settlement established prior appropriation as the legal regime for the settlement of the American West.
The prior appropriation doctrine led to the creation of new local institutions, including canal and irrigation companies. As these efforts
proved unsatisfactory, the federal government took a more active role.
National involvement appeared inevitable, as "neither private enterprise nor the states could reclaim the West alone.""' Broader Progressive Era and New Deal efforts, coupled with increased interstate competition for water, helped solidify a federal role in water. By the 1940s,
the federal government had ascended to become the dominant player
in western water resource management and appropriation.2
Despite the great strides achieved in western water development
from the 1860s to the 1940s, two critical factors remained unaddressed:
groundwater rights and Indian rights. Prior appropriation, originally
designed to allocate surface water, failed to incorporate groundwater
under its legal regime even though surface water largely depends on
the flows of tributary groundwater in many western watersheds. The
law also appeared to leave Indian rights out of the prior appropriation
equation.
As populations increased, so too did demands for water. In light of
this growth, the questions prior appropriation left unanswered soon
haunted federal-state relations and western water allocation decisions.
As the western frontier vanished, Americans could no longer ignore
the pressures that arise when great numbers of people live in close
General stream adjudications commenced with high
proximity."
hopes of providing the one fornm in which parties could resolve these
conflicts.
III. THE GENEALOGY OF WESTERN WATER ADJUDICATIONS
Conflicts over scarce water resources are not a modern malady; indeed, they are endemic to the western United States. For many of the
pre-Columbian cultures, this problem was mitigated by seasonal migration in pursuit of better forage and water. For agrarian indigenous
groups and the Hispanic and Anglo cultures that followed them, how1 PISANI, supra note 10, at 327.
221.
222. Much of the relevant literature of the time supports this assessment. Scholars
presented papers at a 1940 symposium on federalism giving significant attention to the
roles of state and local governments. Yet, in other papers concerning the use of federal grants-in-aid, the use of federal regions, and the deference accorded congressional
enactments by the Supreme Court, it is clear that the federal government was emerging as the dominant party in the federal scheme. See generally Symposium, Intergovernmental Relations in the United States, 207 ANNALSAM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCi. 1 (1940).
223.

See, e.g., DANIEL KEMMIS, COMMUNITYAND THE POLITICS OF PLACE (1990).
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ever, water shortages posed serious challenges that spawned creative
solutions. Historic methods for water management and conflict resolution continue to inform and mold our current practices. In some
cases, the tendency toward precedent, stability, and familiarity preserve
old ideas, while in other cases, the old ideas have enduring vitality because they capture common sense solutions. This section addresses
traditional methods of resolving water disputes, emergence of the
common law, statutory development, and the emergence of water right
adjudications as unique property law proceedings. This family tree of
cultures, laws and traditions has evolved into our current water right
adjudication processes, and like a genetic code, holds some important
keys to adapting our processes in the future.
A. TRADITIONAL METHODS OF RESOLVING WATER DISPUTES

Westerners rely on formal legal institutions to resolve water right
conflicts along the region's rivers and streams. The statutory general
stream adjudication is the most complex type of these formal methods
of dispute resolution. In earlier times, however, other cultural institutions exercised social control over water. Indian, Hispanic, and Mormon approaches to water management exemplify some of these more
traditional methods.
1. The Ancients

For the early inhabitants of the American West, water embodied
spiritual, cultural, and utilitarian values."' These individuals based
their religious ceremonies, community organization, and economic
practices on a hydrologic cycle that swung seasonally between scarcity
and abundance. Particularly in the Southwest, the rain god, rain lord,
or rain magician controlled clouds, springs, lightning and thunder,
and rain." The rain god, even if capricious, was the giver of life and a
force the ancients were loath to offend." 6
As early as 2000 B.C.E., the inhabitants of the Southwest gradually
progressed from a subsistence based on hunting and gathering to an
economy based on domesticated agriculture.227 The introduction of
maize and squash from Mexico, first as a seasonal dietary supplement,
eventually led to permanent settlements along the Gila and Salt rivers

224- MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE HISPANIC SOUTHWEST: A SOCIAL AND LEGAL
HISTORY, 1550-1850, at 10-11 (1st paperbound prtg. 1996).
225. Id.atll.
226. Id.
227. Richard B. Woodbury & Ezra B.W. Zubrow, Agricultural Beginnings, 2000 B.C.A.D. 500, in 9 HANDBOOK or NORTH AMERiCAN INDIANs 43, 43 (William C. Sturtevant &
Alfonso Ortiz eds., 1979).
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in present-day Arizona, and organized irrigation appeared by about
300 B.C.E.
The Hohokam, the desert farmers of the American Southwest, organized the irrigation along the Gila and Salt rivers.2' These master
engineers eventually irrigated more than 100,000 acres of land in the
Phoenix area alone."' They built an impressive 135-mile system of canals and lined portions of the canals with clay to reduce seepage.nl
The Hohokam grew maize, beans, and cotton, often producing two
crops per year.12 The canals also provided domestic water although
the Hohokam also used wells, in order to ensure a more stable supply.2"
By approximately 550 C.E., the Hohokam culture extended into
tributary drainages of the Gila River system. ' Villages along the Santa
Cruz, San Pedro, Verde, and Agua Fria rivers supported variations on
the main Hohokam cultural theme.5 During this expansionist period,
the Hohokam deepened and lengthened canals in widespread locations. By about 1450 C.E., however, the Hohokam culture began declining. "6 Many contributing factors could possibly explain the failure
of the irrigation system, including poor maintenance, climate change,
and salinization of soils."7

228.
229.

Id. at 43-44.
George J. Gumerman & Emil W. Haury, Prehistoiy:Hohokam, in 9 HANDBOOK OF
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANs 75, 75 (William C. Sturtevant & Alfonso Oritz eds., 1979).
230. 2 PisANI, supranote 10, at 165.
231.
Id. The largest canal was thirty feet wide, seven feet deep, eight miles long, and
could irrigate 8000 acres. WORSTER, supra note 182, at 34. "The gradients were carefully designed, as Hohokam agriculturalists knew that too slow a rate of flow encouraged excessive evaporation in the canals and too fast a rate induced erosion of the
banks." MEYER, supra note 224, at 12.
232. Gumerman & Haury, supra note 229, at 78.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 75, 77 tbl.1.
235. Id. at 75.
236. Id. at 88.
237. Historian Donald Worster argued that the Hohokam's inability to exercise
regional social control caused the decline:
[L]ocal self-management very soon did not suffice; downstream villages had
to establish control over those living upstream if they were to get any water at
all. The outcome [would have been] a more efficient utilization of rivers--if
efficiency means complete, total use-and a more elaborate legal framework
to resolve conflicting interests.... The Hohokam did not in fact have the full
infrastructural base, nor perhaps did they have the intention, to go that far
toward the consolidation of power.
WORSTER, supra note 182, at 34-35.
The destiny of the Hohokam is unknown. Some authorities feel the Hohokam
became the present-day Pima who were utilizing irrigation when the Spanish arrived in
the sixteenth century. Others believe the Pima were the original inhabitants of the
region who returned after the departure of the Hohokam. Gumerman & Haury, supra
note 229, at 88.
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The later stages of the Hohokam overlapped with the Anasazi culture in the Four Corners region. At sites such as Mesa Verde and
Chaco Canyon, the Anasazi developed their own forms of irrigation
At Chaco
using check dams and diversion structures with canals."
Canyon, the irrigation system helped support a population of 10,000
people."9 As in the case of the Hohokam, soil salinization and climate
change may have contributed to the Anasazi decline, forcing them to
abandon their elaborate rock-formed communities in the 1400s. They
gradually dispersed among the Hopi and Zuni people in the West and
among the Rio Grande valley pueblos to the East.4 '
The first Spanish adventurers, who arrived in 1542, found a simpler
but more widespread irrigation culture along the Gila 41 and Rio
Grande river systems:
The chroniclers of Coronado's expedition refer to the cultivation of
cotton and corn by the Pueblo Indians of the Middle Rio Grande Valley, New Mexico; Espejo, writing of his explorations of 1582-3, speaks
approvingly of the irrigation ditches supplying the pueblos in the
general region of Socorro and above, and refers to irrigation by the
inhabitants of Acoma "with many partitions of the water" in a marsh
two leagues from the pueblo; Father Kino found the Sobaipuris engaged in irrigation at their rancherias in the San Pedro and Santa

Cruz valleys and other tribes elsewhere in Arizona, and relates the use

238.
239.

MEYER, supra note 224, at 12.
Id.

240. Fred Plog, Prehistoty: Western Anasazi, in 9 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN
INDIANS: SOUTHWESr 108, 129-30 (William C. Sturtevant & Alfonson Oritz eds., 1979).
241. In the late twentieth century, the peoples of central and southern Arizona began to call themselves by the name O'odham. When the Spaniards first entered the
region they called Papagueria (lands of the Papago) and Pimeria Alta (upper lands of
the Pima), they gave the speakers of the O'odham language different names. STEPHEN
TRIMBLE, THE PEOPLE: INDIANS OF THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 357-58 (1993).

Sobaipuris lived along the Santa Cruz and San Pedro rivers; Pimas lived along
the Gila River (allied with the Yuman-speaking Maricopa); Papagos lived in
the desert away from the rivers; and Sand Papagos lived in the western and
most arid parts of the Sonoran Desert. Pima and Papago were Spanish[Who] themapplied names that had no meaning to the... O'odham....
selves speak of Akimel O'odhan (River People), whom outsiders call Pimas;
Tohono O'odham (Desert, Country, or Thirsty People), the Papago; and Hia
C-ed O'odham (Sand People), or Sand Papago.... Another analysis of the
O'odham neatly divides them into One Villagers, the Pima, farmers who lived
in permanent villages along rivers with permanent water; Two Villagers, the
Tohono O'odham, who divided their time between a summer village where
they irrigated fields with seasonal floodwaters and a winter home higher in
the mountains near a permanent spring; and No Villagers, the Sand Papago,
many of whom moved through the year, through the most extreme desert,
farming a little, but gathering and hunting for most of their food.
Id. at 358-59.
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of irrigation ditches in providing water for preparing mortar for the
foundations of the church at San Xavier del Bac. .. "'
The southern Arizona Papago developed modest floodplain irrigation on river edges or the mouths of ravines or arroyos, called "akchin" or arroyo-mouth farming. 4 ' Rio Grande valley pueblos utilized
more extensive systems, which continued larger and more complex
ditch systems.
Historians know little about how these traditional Indian communities resolved water rights conflicts. For the pueblos, at least, historical evidence shows they preferred communal undertakings, and built
and managed their irrigation systems as community affairs. 4 ' "The
character and exigencies of their pueblo life led inevitably to public
regulation of irrigation matters; therefore, taking care of the ditches
became one of the important traditional community tasks." '
For other tribes, such as the Hopis, family groups or clans made
decisions about water." Along the Rio Grande, however, " [t] he river
was too powerful for any small clan, or even single pueblo, acting
alone, to tame." 47 Cooperation began to develop among the pueblos,
leading to more centralized authority in the defense of the community
against intruders and for control of water."
Historians know even less about agrarian culture in other parts of
the West during this time. Archaeological evidence suggested that
Coastal and Basin Northwestern tribes did not adopt extensive irrigated agriculture.2 "' In several ways, however, their dispute-resolution
processes reflected a communal sense of property. While prime fishing, hunting and gathering areas might have belonged primarily to
one person, family or clan, the group leader settled conflicts with the
interests of the group as the foremost concern.

242. Wells A. Hutchins, The Community Acequia: Its Origin and Development, 31 Sw.
HIsT. Q. 261, 262 (1928).
243.

WORSTER, supra note 182, at 33-34.

244.

Hutchins, supra note 242, at 263.

245.
246.

Id. at 263. See also MEYER, supra note 224, at 18.
WORSTER, supra note 182, at 33.

247. Id. at 33. See also MEYER, supra note 224, at 18 ("[W] hen water was summoned
to the pursuit of political or military goals, it is likely that this action was tribal or
communal, rather than individual.").
248. WORSTER, supra note 182, at 33.
249. Douglas Cole & David Darling, Himtoiy of the Early Period, in 7 HANDBOOK OF
NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS: NORTHWEST COAST 119, 131 (William C. Sturtevant & Wayne

Suttles eds., 1990) (noting that Northwest Coast Indians did not engage in true agriculture); Catherine S. Fowler, Subsistence, in 11 HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN
INDIANS: GREAT BASIN 64, 94 (William C. Sturtevant & Warren L. D'Azevedo eds., 1986)

(stating that Great Basin peoples only used some brush dams and ditches to irrigate
wild plants).
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2. The Hispanics
New Spain's northern frontier included lands that today comprise
California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.2" In addition, New Spain
encompassed the area six Mexican states now occupy, giving New
Spain a total of more than 960,000 square miles." ' The Spanish commenced their conquest of this region in 1542 and soon began to develop the water.5 The Spaniards valued water highly. Throughout
history, Spaniards used water "to bargain, to raise funds, to apply subtle
pressure, and to haughtily coerce. 2

11

In New Spain, water became an

even more central means for sustenance and social control. The early
explorers used major river corridors, such as the San Pedro River in
present-day Arizona, as pathways into unknown territory."' During the
Colonial period, Spaniards used water to pursue social goals including
defense, agriculture, mining, the domination and religious conversion
of the Indians, and protecting Indian populations from the excesses of
individual Spaniards.
As soon as the Spanish conquistador Juan de Ofiate arrived at the
Pueblo of San Juan near the confluence of the Rio Grande and Rio
Chama in 1598, he constructed an irrigation canal with the assistance
of 1500 Indians."' The Spanish also used a sophisticated legal regime
to divide the Southwest's waters. The Spanish water law systems remained in place following the Mexican Republic's creation in 1821
and endured through Texas's independence in 1836, its statehood in
1845, and the cession of New Mexico and California territories in 1848
(formalized in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo).258
Spanish water law was not indigenous to the New World, but developed in Spain over centuries. The Spanish legal regime had layers of
Roman, Germanic, and Moorish influences. 7 This compound legal
system demonstrated remarkable tolerance for diversity. "[T]he rulers
of Spain, long before the discovery of America, were familiar with the
problems inherent in trying to reconcile the interests of different races
and different cultures, as well as in juxtaposing the demands of conquerors with the concerns of the conquered." 58
250. MEYER, supra note 224, at 6.
251. Id. at 3.
252. Id. at 25-26.
253. ld. at 21.
254. Id. at 26.
255. This area, near San Juan Pueblo, locus of the first Spanish settlement within the
present boundaries of the United States, remains under adjudication in a case filed in
1968. See New Mexico ex rel. Reynolds v. Abbott, Nos. CIV-7488 SC & CIV-8650 SC (D.
N.M. 1968).
256. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Feb. 2-May 30, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo].
257. MEYER, supra note 224, at 106.
258. Id. at 108.
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In an effort to unify his diverse realm and standardize the disparate
legal practices, King Alfonso X ordered a major codification of Iberian
law. Completed in 1265, this codification is known as the Las siete partidas del rey don Alfonso el Sabio (commonly known as Las siete partidas).9
This codification reflected the strong influence of ecclesiastical law and
Roman Emperor Justinian's CorpusJurisCivilis.2"
After the settlement of the New World was well underway, Spain
faced the vexing problem of how to administer its colonies, which were
half a world away. Toward that end, the Spanish government drafted
the Recopilaci6n de leyes de los reynos de lts Indias ("the laws of the Indies")
in 1681, a compendium of 6,377 individual laws and directives. 6 ' They
completed a supplemental compilation, the Novisima recopilacidn de las
leyes de Espafia, by 1805, and it constituted the complete articulation of
Spanish law at the end of the Colonial period.262
Spain supplemented these major legal principles with more specific ordinances, royal decrees, and individual cases. Spain issued important decrees regulating water use in 1761.6' Spain promulgated
instructions on water law civil procedure in 1786." The Plan de Pitic
of 1796 also set forth rules for water management.5 The rules applied
in Hermosillo and other new communities throughout the northern
frontier of New Spain.2"
In the colonies, officials emphasized finding judicial solutions to
governmental problems. One scholar concluded Spain focused primarily on the "adjudication between competing interests, rather than.
deliberately planning and constructing a new society. " "
Spanish water law paralleled some community practices of Southwestern Indians, but placed a greater emphasis on land and water as
private property. Although the Spanish Crown claimed all the land
and water in these new territories, the government also employed a
system of complex land and water grants to settle and exploit these
lands, and Christianize the inhabitants. The Crown made land grants
to individual Spaniards, clerical groups intent on building missions
and supporting communities, groups of individuals who sought to establish towns or rural agricultural clusters, and the Indians themselves.

259. Id. at 21.
260. "The system of Roman jurisprudence compiled and codified under the direction of Emperor Justinian, in A.D. 528-534. This collection comprises the Institutes,
Digest (or Pandects), Code, and Novels." BLACK'S LAw DicuToNARY 344 (6th ed. 1990).
261.
MEYER, supra note 224, at 109.
262. Id. at 111.
263. Id. at 112.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 113 (quotingj.H. PARRY, THE SPANISH SEABORNE EMPIRE 194 (1967)).
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The Crown did, however, retain much of the most valuable land for
itself.
Whether these land grants also carried water rights with them was
unclear. Grantees could claim and beneficially use the springs or wells
located on their property." Whether they also had rights to other surface water sources within or bordering on their grants was less certain.
Some scholars argued that explicit grants of water rights were required,
and others believed that both express and implied grants were valid.
Still others argued that a form of prescriptive rights developed, at least
in practice. The predominant view was somewhere in the middle: explicit grants were required in most instances, and the type of land
grant influenced the result."s
Grants of land for grazing purposes included conveyed water
rights, as "Spanish law provided that animals could be watered without
special permission in common water. ' The Crown intended other
grants for farming purposes, so the implication was that the grants contained water rights sufficient to support intensive agriculture and orchards. Spaniards and Indians also used water on Crown lands for
modest domestic purposes and even agriculture. Water on, or appurtenant to, Crown lands was also available for common navigation, embarkation, and fishing purposes, uses similar to those contemplated by
today's public trust doctrine."' A leading authority indicated that there
were no riparian water rights under Spanish law27 although certain
California courts disagreed, indicating that such rights did exist in the
colonies.27
Like the American government several centuries later, the Spanish
Crown "privatized" New Spain lands in a strategic effort to encourage
settlement. Elements of the Spanish legal regime also emphasized
community and the common good. Spanish land grants frequently
268.
269.

Id. at 120.

It is clear; however, that water was granted or withheld on the basis of land
classification. The case for implied water right can be carried too far. The
absence of water provisions in certain land grants cannot be attributed simply
to oversight. Not all land grants, not even all farming grants, were intended
to convey water rights.
Id. at 131.
270. Id. at 125.
271.
See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (explaining the application of the public trust doctrine in the context of the Mono Lake dispute); Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. Riv. 473 (1970).
272. MEYER, supra note 224, at 119-20.
273. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674, 724-30 (Cal. 1886). See also Samuel C. Wiel, Fifty Years
of Water Law, 50 HARV. L. REV. 252, 256-59 (1936) (describing the story in Lux v. Haggin, which resulted in limiting California's appropriative doctrine to public lands still
in federal ownership, but recognizing a riparian doctrine in lands privately held where
appropriation occurred before reservation by patent terms or statute).
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included a "set-aside" of sufficient water for future growth. Rural water
associations, known as acequias (literally, "irrigation canals"), received
easements in order to bring water by ditch to members' fields.
In northern New Mexico and southern Colorado, community
acequias successfully distributed water from the Rio Grande system for
hundreds of years before the region became American territories and
then states. Through the process of mancomunicaci6n, rural irrigators
(parciantes) formed associations to build, maintain, and administer
ditches, usually no more than one to five miles in length. These irrigators elected a ditch supervisor, known variably as the mayordomo or zanjew, who, in some areas, represented the only semblance of government to the rural residents.
Among his many duties of maintaining the ditches and supervising
diversions, the mayordomo adjudicated disputes between parciantes.
When disputes arose between different acequiaswithin the same watershed, the mayordomos from these associations sat together in an effort to
mediate the dispute. Other means of resolving local disputes included
the temporary purchase of water rights or the use of sobrante compacts
between individuals. In these informal agreements, senior users often
pledged to forbear using their surplus water. The beneficiaries of
these sobras frequently constructed reservoirs to store surplus waters.
Priorities thus arose between the sobrante users.
Spanish law also provided more formal methods of resolving water
disputes. One method, the composici6n, was a complicated method
used to cleanse, authenticate, and even modify original grants, 7' often
implemented to define the rights associated with vague land grants. A
governmental authority appointed a commission or an individual to
examine claims and documents and render a decision. A favorable
decision usually cleared the water rights titles in dispute,"6 and the decision could be used in subsequent litigation to prove ownership, if
necessary. The composici6n was thus a one-sided variant of the modern
declaratory judgment action.
The other, more formal method of dispute resolution was the repartimiento de aguas,2'" which resembled modern water rights litigation.
These proceedings were common in the northern frontier, where
274. For more information on the structure and terminology of Spanish water adjudication see generally Hutchins, supra note 242 (discussing Spanish-American irrigation
law); PHIL LOvATo, LAS AcEQUIAS DEL NORTE (1974) (explaining the laws of Acequias);
STANLEY CRAWFORD, MAYORDOMO (1988) (recounting a year in the life a small acequia
in northern New Mexico); Charlotte Benson Crossland, Acequia Rights in Law and Tradition, 32J. Sw. 278 (1990) (analyzing the roles of acequias and questioning whether
modern hierarchical institutions have since replaced them as the most powerful irrigation organizations in New Mexico).
275. MEYER, supra note 224, at 133-34.
276. Id. at 134.
277. Id. at 135.
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drought constantly provoked water right disputes."8 Litigants submitted these conflicts to a waterjudge or appropriate court, where officials
utilized a well-defined set of legal principles embodied in the RecopiThe judicial officer had wide latitude to apply and
laci6n of 1681."
customize these equitable principles. The same set of rules guided the
mayordomos when they conducted the mediations. The most important
elements of these equitable principles were:
1. Land and water tile. The disputing parties had to produce their
tide documents for land and water, and the officials would examine
these titles in a hypertechnical way, even to the point that parties had
to print their tides on paper embossed with the royal seal. The Spanish Crown intended this insistence on formality to protect Indian
property interests, but often the Indians suffered since they could not
produce the proper documents. In the case of the New Mexican
Pueblos of San Ildefonso, Tesuque, Pojoaque, and Nambe, the residents lost their title documents to Spanish officials who borrowed
them for copying and other official purposes and never returned the
originals.2 m
2. Prior appropriation. The judicial officer regarded prior usage as
an important factor in water allocation (although not to the extent it
is in today's western water law). As one official expressed in 1842,
"[pirior use contrary to reason or to good custom can never acquire
the force of law, because in such a case it can be considered no more
than an28old mistake, being less a use than an abuse and an infraction
of law." 1
3. Need. A person's need for water greatly influenced whether the
official would assign him a water right in a repartimiento. Officials
might even award individuals without plausible claims to water some
nominal water usage if they could prove need. By contrast, the officials could revoke explicit grants, if the individual was not using the
water or others needed it. Once, a widow prevailed even without any
title because the investigating official confirmed that her need for water was so great. Her crops had dried up to the point "that not even if
she irrigated them with Holy Water could they be saved." 82
4. Injury to third persons. These equitable principles contained protections for the rights of third parties. If there was a question that a
water right might damage others, the official could appoint an inspector to report on potential impacts (vista de ojos). The inspector's findings could prompt modification of a water right grant. Furthermore,

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 146-47.
Id. at 150 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 151-52 (internal citation omitted).
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although Spanish law allowed ditch diggers to construct ditches across
another's property, they had to route8 3the ditches in such a way to
cause the least injury to the landowner.
5. Intent. The outcome of a repartimientoalso depended on the disputants' intent for their water and the extent to which those intentions satisfied or contravened the Crown's overall purposes for the region. Thus, the official considered water destined for mining, cultivation of wheat, or for the use of presidios (forts) more valuable
4 and useful than water intended for other less utilitarian purposes.
6. Legal right. As previously mentioned, proof of legal title was an
important requisite of repartimiento; however, not all legal tiles bore
equal rights. The official deemed water rights for corporate communities, for instance, more important than water rights for individuals.
The judicial officer could even rescind or modify early grants if they
damaged the community. While Spanish law often favored the community over individual rights, it did not do so when community claims
were unjustifiable."
7. Equity and the common good. Fundamentally, the reparlimiento
sought the greatest good for the greatest number. Often, this meant
the corporate community would prevail over individuals. Other
times, individual interests that promised greater benefit to society
won out. Spanish judges had the discretion to balance such factors to
86
achieve ajust result."
As the result of a typical repartimiento, the official might produce a
resolution stated in general terms or award the parties specific quantities of water for rotating periods of use. On occasion, the official divided water into separate channels."
While the repartimientos had legal status, they were not permanent
decrees "as Spanish jurisprudence appreciated that few conflicts were
resolved so wisely that future abuse could not stern from a decision at

283. Id. at 152-53.
284. Id. at 154-55.
285. This is the basis for the much-debated Pueblo Rights Doctrine that has had a
confusing history in southwestern state courts. While some courts recognized the
Pueblo Rights Doctrine as giving certain communities a prior and paramount right to
water necessary for present or future purposes, other courts and authorities have argued that the doctrine is more a preference than an absolute entitlement. Compare City
of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975) (disapproved on
other grounds), City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000)
(adopting the doctrine), and Cartwright v. Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico, 343 P.2d 654
(N.M. 1958) (adopting the doctrine), with State ex rel. Martinez v. City of Las Vegas, 89
P.3d 47 (N.M. 2004) (rejecting doctrine).
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one time just. '8 Thus, the repartimientos,like the original grants, were
elastic and the officials could modify them based on individual or
community need. Through this elasticity, officials could also reserve
water for future growth. Many of these methods of dispute resolution
were available to the pueblos and individual Indians. 9
The Spanish water law system described above continues to impact
water adjudications in the American Southwest.29 This is in part due to
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which the United States and Mexico
entered in 1848."' The Treaty required that the United States respect
property rights acquired under Spanish and Mexican law. Some confusion about the application of this "law of state succession" resulted
from the United States Senate's failure to ratify Article X of the Treaty,
which dealt specifically with land grants. Many authorities argued
other provisions of the Treaty did protect Spanish and Mexican water
rights, such as Article VIII, which protected Mexican property "of every
kind." They also argued that the later Protocol of Quer6taro, which
explained and amplified some Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty provisions,
sheltered these rights."'
All said, in addition to a well-defined regime of water rights, the
Spanish left us with an important legal tradition still acknowledged
today:
Fortunately for the courts that would be called upon to apply Hispanic water law.. . , the Hispanic water regimen rested on a rich philosophical foundation, one designed to serve broad individual and
community goals and one which challenged judges to be guided by
what was right and proper, ex aequo et bono.2
3. The Mormons
Even before departing their religious community of Nauvoo in
western Illinois during the winter of 1846, leaders of the Church of
Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints knew their migration would settle
itself in the Great Basin. These Mormon leaders also knew they
288.
289.

Id.
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needed to rely upon irrigation to sustain crops in their new home.
They gained this intelligence through the reports of John Fr~mont,
whose expeditions from 1843 to 1845 familiarized him with this territory. 4 Other sources of information about farming in arid lands included Apostle Orson Hyde, who knew of irrigation from his visits to
the Holy Land, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt." Other Mormons such as
members of the Mormon Battalion, who visited the Southwest, knew of
Mexican irrigation from their time spent in the Rio Grande valley. 9 '
When the advance column of the migrating Mormons reached the
Salt Lake valley in July 1847, members began the task of diverting water
from what is now known as City Creek to irrigate their freshly scratched
soils."9 7 Erastus Snow, one of the first settlers, recalled, "We found the
land so dry... that to plough it was impossible, and in attempting to do
so some of the ploughs were broken. We therefore had to distribute
the water over the land before it could be worked."" By the time
Brigham Young arrived on July 24, 1847, the settlers had planted six
acres of potatoes and vegetables.'
The Mormons laid out the plan for the City of Zion, now Salt Lake
City, in a four-square grid pattern, with nineteen wards, each consisting
of nine ten-acre blocks and each block subdivided into eight building
lots. Southeast of the city, the Mormons set aside approximately 8000
acres of land as the "big field," an area for farming in five- to twentyacre parcels.'
During the remainder of the summer of 1847, the Mormons built
diversion dams across City Creek and Big Cottonwood Creek to deliver
water by canals and ditches to individual home lots and farming parcels. For each of the nineteen wards, the citizens appointed a bishop.
The bishop's many duties included assuring the proper construction of
the ditches and the equitable division of the water for culinary, agricultural, and industrial purposes. As described by one historian,
When a group of families found themselves in need of water (or addi-

tional water) to irrigate their farms and gardens, the bishop arranged
for a survey and organized the men into a construction crew. Each
man was required to furnish labor in proportion to the amount of
land he had to water. Upon completion of the project the water
294.
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would be distributed by a ward watermaster in proportion to this labor.!"

Originally, families flood-irrigated these fields once or twice a week.'
Each project's goal emphasized the equitable division and the maximum use of available water.8°3
The church High Council appointed Edson Whipple to the post of
first watermaster in 18 4 7."0 The bishops in each of the nineteen wards
then appointed other watermasters." 5 Thereafter, the bishop's court,
composed of the bishop and two counselors, decided disputes over
water use in a ward. The losing party could always appeal the decision
to the High Council.u6
The Mormon leadership obviously anticipated some political affiliation with the United States. After debating several strategies, elders
decided to organize the State of Deseret as a political entity;"' thereafter, they petitioned Congress for its admission into the Union. From
1849 to 1851, the State of Deseret was the civil authority in the region,
although the lines between civil and church law always remained uncertain. During this period, the General Assembly passed many waterrelated measures. Most of these were financial appropriations for the
construction of dams,"s funding for municipal water resources development,"a and exclusive grants or licenses to waters of specified
streams and rivers." ' In February 1851 the General Assembly author301.
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ized county judges to grant mill and waterpower privileges on any river
or creek. The caveat was that "said privileges do not interfere with the
rights of the community, for common uses, or irrigation,
or any privi3 1
leges heretofore granted by this legislative body."
While the United States Congress rejected the State of Deseret's
overtures for admission as a state, the compromise between slave and
anti-slave forces in Washington, which Illinois Senator Stephen Douglas brokered, allowed the passage of the Utah Territorial Organic Act
in September 1850.1 At that point, Utah created a bicameral territorial legislature, and the President of the United States appointed a
governor.!"3 The Utah Territorial Legislature soon codified many of
the water practices that had existed since the first days of migration
into the Salt Lake valley. The legislature thus legitimized public ownership of water.
Historian Robert Dunbar evaluated early Mormon water management institutions as follows: "These institutions may be best understood by a realization that as members of the Church of the Latter-Day
Saints the colonialists believed that they were participating in a revival
of egalitarian primitive Christianity, with its emphasis on the sharing of
goods."" ' Accordingly, Brigham Young declared on September 30,
1848, "[t]here shall be no private ownership of the streams that come
out of the canyons, nor the timber that grows in the hills. These belong to the people: all the people."" ' Another historian noted that
colonial practices "Ld]eveloped to bring a raw environment into harmony with God's will on the one hand, and to protect the independence that its rawness permitted on the other .
3.1.."6
In these early
years, the Mormons worked cooperatively to develop the maximum use
of water and other natural resources. They cultivated the land individually, but fenced and irrigated it cooperatively. 7
Principles of stewardship, productive use, and small holdings governed land distribution in the Salt Lake valley. The Mormon leadership already decided the basin's natural resources were for public
rather than private use. The community rejected the doctrine of riparian rights, which would have benefited landholders along rivers and

supra note 301, at 54 (internal citations omitted).
311.
Ordinance Authorizing the Judges of the Several Counties of this State, to
Grant Mill, and Other Water Privileges, and to Control the Timber in their Respective
Counties (Feb. 4, 1851) (on file with authors).
312. THOMAS G. ALEXANDER, UTAH: THE RIGHT PLACE 118 (Richard W. Sadler ed.,
1995).
313. Id.
314. DuNBAR,supra note 10, at 13.
315. Id.
316. PETEP.SON, supra note 300, at 36.
317. Id.at37.

ARRINGTON,

WATER LAWREV1EW

Volume 8

streams. Public ownership and management of water led to widespread irrigation in the valley.
The influence of the Mormon experience with water and irrigation
spread in many directions from the Salt Lake valley. Individuals established similar water management institutions in Idaho, Arizona, Nevada, and southern California-particularly within Mormon communities. In Idaho, for instance, Mormon missionary Henry H. Spalding,
who diverted water from the Clearwater River to water his garden near
Lapwai, established the first recorded irrigation right.'
His efforts
were followed by Mormon irrigation in the Lemhi, Cache, Bear Lake,
Malad, and Boise valleys."' Thus, from 1855 to 1875, the Mormons
worked cooperatively to build the earliest pioneer canal systems."'
In Arizona, the Mormons were the first non-Indian irrigators in the
northern part of the state."' During 1864 and 1865, Henry W. Miller
began irrigating fruit trees, grapevines, wheat, corn, and other vegetables.'
Members of William C. Allen's company, who settled on the
lower Little Colorado River in 1876 at present-day Joseph City, secured
2
their water rights by agreeing to form an irrigation company."
The St.
Joseph United Order, which handled the irrigation matters within its
jurisdiction, soon supplanted this agreement. 4 Thus, informal associations among Mormons persisted and ruled the day.'3'
By 1880, however, this communitarian use of water began to give
way in the Mormon heartland. Brigham Young died in 1877, and with
him, some measure of the communitarian utopia passed on as well."'
The transcontinental railroad arrived just seven years earlier. 7 A
building boom occurred in the Salt Lake City area in the late 1800s."
Rich mines, bustling commerce, and a booming urban populace put
pressure on existing water supplies. The Utah territorial legislature
passed legislation authorizing county officials to grant water rights to
individuals. " The legislation required that counties record water
rights; it also authorized adjudications to determine superior and infe-
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rior rights."0 Individual property rights in water rapidly replaced community need and the general welfare in the allocation of water rights."'
B. COMMON LAW APPROACHES

Throughout the West, territorial and state courts eventually assumed the role of resolving water right disputes. Despite Hispanic and
Mormon influences, courts applied the rules and procedures of the
Anglo-American legal tradition. In that tradition, courts initially applied common law principles of equity to water conflicts. "
The most basic disputes over water were two-party suits in equity,
seeking injunctive relief, or suits at law for damages. As western water
users soon found out, water litigation was rarely an isolated dispute
between two water users. More frequently, such disputes cascaded
throughout a watershed, ultimately implicating most of the water users
on the river. Here too, the courts attempted to use equitable principles to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits when many people claimed rights
in the same property. For instance, bills in equity were sometimes used
to enable a court to acquire jurisdiction of all the rights involved, and
of all the owners of those rights, to allow the permanent adjudication
of rights and responsibilities in a simple proceeding."'
Western courts gradually developed refined procedures, similar to
"quiet title" actions, to address multi-party litigation over water. These
proceedings originated in the court's general equity power, but were
gradually modified to better suit water rights adjudication. Some of
these modifications enhanced the judicial role, and others vested dispute resolution authority in administrative agencies.
The place of water use dictated jurisdiction in these early equitable
proceedings. In cases of a river or a stream running through different
counties, each county court had jurisdiction. "4 Generally, only a person with an actual right or legal claim to the use of water could bring a
basic adjudication suit against contestants.. The law required parties
to join all other parties with a valid claim. The rights of the defendants, however, were not subject to adjudication unless the defendant
The
affirmatively asserted rights hostile to those of the plaintiff."
330.
331.
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335.
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336. KINNEY, supra note 332, § 1545, at 2782. See also id. § 1550, at 2795("In a suit in
equity to determine water rights, as the rights of all parties to the action may be adju-
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plaintiff, and all other persons asserting a claim to a water right, bore
the burden of proving the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
The plaintiff was obligated to show every element necessary to establish
a legal basis and prevail."7
In states that recognized both prior appropriation and riparian
doctrines, an adjudication in equity determined the respective rights
33
Thus, even conflicting
between these appropriators and riparians.
legal regimes did not diminish an action in equity. Courts could also
determine tides to ditches, canals, and easements in these proceedings.3 9
In response to the workload generated by the constant conflict
over water rights, common law courts developed procedures tailored
for trying these unusually complicated cases. Some courts used referees or commissioners to hear and summarize evidence for the court's
benefit before trial.' Judges often left the bench to make personal
examinations of the water source so they could develop better information to support their findings.' In the majority of the cases, the judge
also could submit questions of fact to ajury to solicit advisory opinions,
although some jurisdictions disfavored this practice.'
The goal of these proceedings was a court decree that would stand
the test of time and definitively award respective rights to the parties in
the action. "
Unfortunately, this goal persistently eluded western
common law courts. Some decrees lacked specificity, with the court
postponing the actual determination of the rights to a future date.'"
Some courts were even unsuccessfully called upon to undertake the
These
especially difficult task of apportioning subterranean waters.'
heavy tasks inevitably generated unsatisfactory results.
The principal and predictable shortcoming of these procedures
was that they failed to produce final results.' For instance, the lack of
finality in an 1898 adjudication between the southern New Mexico
town of Alamogordo and a neighboring community perpetuated redundant litigation even twenty-five years later." 7 Also, despite their
dicated in the same action, defendants are entitled to set up their claims inter se in their
answers, and have the same adjudicated on such notice as the law and the Court may
prescribe.").
337. Id. § 1554, at 2802-03.
338. Id.§ 1540, at 2771.
339. Id. § 1541, at.2771.
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341.
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success in obtaining an injunction against a junior upstream acequia,
the result disappointed seven senior acequias in northern New Mexico.
The decree could not be enforced, causing the parties to engage in
further litigation, almost twenty years later."'
Law professor Albert W. Stone vividly documented the lack of finality in Montana's early adjudications. They were conducted under a
bare-bone, 1885 stream adjudication statute that only slightly modified
Stone summarized the litigation on
common law procedures.
Dempsey Creek, a small stream less than twenty miles in length, as follows: "fourteen lawsuits [extending from 1891 to 1966,] with eight decisions by the Montana Supreme Court. In nearly every one of these
lawsuits, all or substantially all of the people in the community of
Dempsey Creek were litigants. " " Continuing his lament, Stone observed that repetitive adjudications also bedeviled other Montana watersheds." °
While quiet tide actions could decree absolute rights to a specific
piece of real estate, water right actions assigned merely relative, conditional rights, as they were linked to a constantly changing resource. In
order to forestall an endless stream of parties suing one another to
assert rights to the same water source, all parties affected by a given
water supply were required to join the litigation. With such a bulky list
of participants, it was simply too difficult and expensive for parties to
bring the issue before the court. The inability of private parties to secure jurisdiction over the United States government and its large portfolio of water claims only compounded the problem.
Another recurrent problem with the adjudication of appropriative
rights was notice. In the mining camps of California and elsewhere in
the West, an appropriator gave notice of priority and ownership to
others through the customary requirement of a posting at the point of
diversion. This method, of course, provided notice only in a limited
area and did little to bar competing claims. Mere notice also failed to
produce a reliable record to assist parties in later resolving conflicts."
When addressing this deficiency in 1872, the California legislature
required that, in addition to posting notice at the site of diversion, appropriators must record the notice with the county clerk or recorder,
within ten days of posting." While this statute seemed like a solution
and many other western states emulated it, the requirement did not go
far enough. Many pioneers planned projects and filed notices, but

348. Acequia del Llano v. Acequia de las Joyas del Llano Frio, 179 P. 235, 235-36
(N.M. 1919).
349. Albert W. Stone, The Long Count on Dempsey: No FinalDecision in Water Right Adjudication,31 MoNT. L. REv. 1, 11-12 (1969)
350. Id. at 12.
351. Tarlock, supra note 7, at 276; DuNBAR, supra note 10, at 86.
352. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 86-87.

WA TER LA W REVIEW

Volume 8

nonetheless failed to complete them."m Water users and state officials
could not determine the number and priorities of the appropriations
on a stream without resorting to an expensive and often inconclusive
adjudication."
As the nineteenth century closed, the West was changing rapidly.
Population grew in urban centers, fueled by prosperity from mining,
ranching, and railroads. Water disputes among neighbors escalated.
The courts were increasingly called upon to resolve them and, although the litigation rarely exceeded a dozen parties, the frequency of
conflicts continued to erode the security of all water users along a river
system.
C.DEVELOPMENT OF STATUTORY ADJUDICATION PROCEDURES

As young western states gradually increased their governmental
competence, they continued to strengthen their authority over their
water resources. They did so in one of three ways. First, states sought
to regulate the initial appropriations of water. Second, states supervised the diversion, distribution, and use of water. Third, states began
adjudicating existing water rights.
One of the major water policy issues in the West during the last one
hundred thirty years has been whether the executive or the judicial
branch of government should control these water management functions. A few states chose to entrust these matters primarily to the judiciary. Other states chose to have an administrative agency handle all
three functions. Still other states fell between these extremes, but often with a strong preference for administrative authority over water
rights.'
The neighboring states of Colorado and Wyoming, which have very
different systems for managing water rights, illustrate this diversity of
choices. Colorado relies almost entirely on an adjudicatory system,
while Wyoming uses an administrative approach. What accounts for
this difference between neighboring states with a common heritage
and so many shared waterways?
To answer this question, one might consult Robert G. Dunbar's history of western water law, Forging New Rights in Western Waters.'m One
thing is certain: the reasons for the different approaches are also the
persistent root causes for many of the problems in western stream adjudications, some enduring more than a century later.
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1. Colorado System
The struggles between rival irrigation colonies in the 1870s along
Colorado's Cache la Poudre River made clear the need for a more expedient means for resolving conflicts between competing appropriators. An irrigation convention held in December 1878 sought to develop legislation to end these disputes."7 The convention proposed an
administrative system of water commissioners empowered to determine
and enforce water rights inside each irrigation district. Legislation
empowered a water commissioner "to call for persons and papers, administer oaths, take testimony and [render decisions] in regard to the
[rights of claimants to] the use of water."" 8 Parties could appeal to
district court. " Some water users were pleased because they believed
that such administrative determination would be more expedient than
the courts.
When the proposed bill reached the irrigation committee of the
Colorado House of Representatives, however, the lawyer-members of
the committee took a different approach. The committee rewrote the
bill, believing the determination of property rights, including water
rights, was the proper domain of the courts. Colorado's General Assembly passed this version into law.3"
The 1879 law authorized district judges to appoint a water referee
who would hear evidence on water claims." ' Each claimant was to present proof of the dates ditches were constructed or enlarged, the capacity of those ditches, and the amount of water they carried. After the
referee gathered evidence and presented a report, the judge issued a
decree establishing the priorities of each ditch within the district."2
Water commissioners enforced these decrees. By choosing this approach, Coloradoans made a commitment to quantify and allocate
water rights in ajudicial setting.
Not everyone was satisfied with this approach. A workable solution
agreed to by all continued to elude the state for several more years.
For instance, during 1879 and 1880, one water referee gathered evidence of water rights on the controversial Cache la Poudre. When the
resulting report reached District Judge Victor Elliott, he refused to
render a decree." The judge criticized the system because it required
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the judiciary itself to initiate contested proceedings while bypassing the
customary complaint and summons requirement:
I cannot bring myself to depart from the English and American systems of jurisprudence. In the administration of justice in an English
court there are always parties, and sometimes four: the actor, the
plaintiff; the reus, the thing; the judex, the court; and the juratta,the
jurors; and each have their separate and proper functions to perform.
I cannot consent... to bring myself to leave the judicial position in
which I have been placed by the constitution... and take the position
of any actor, to go around to determine, without being solicited, what
are the rights of the respective owners of ditches in these several water
districts.3

A petition to the Colorado Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to
force Judge Elliott to issue a decree was unsuccessful. 6
Colorado's 1881 legislative session passed several bills in an attempt
to remedy the deficiencies Judge Elliott identified. The resulting legislation required adjudication proceedings to be initiated by petition.'
After the filing of such a petition, the district judge appointed a referee, and issued notice to all claimants within the district. After holding
hearings, the referee prepared a draft decree and submitted it to the
judge. The judge then conducted hearings on the proposed decree
and issued the decree, after any necessary modifications. The clerk of
the court then provided each successful claimant with a certificate
awarding an appropriation date and setting a quantity of water to
which the holder was entitled. 7
After these modifications, one flaw still persisted: the law did not allow the state engineer, who represented the public granting the water
right, to participate in the adjudication or question the accuracy of
364. Id. (quotingJudge Ellis in No. 320 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1880) (emphasis added)).
The judge also indicated:
I shall... insist that someone who may desire to have a decree entered in any
particular water district, shall become an actor by serving out process, and
bringing others in to answer; and that when that shall have been done ...
and the case shall then be regularly before the court upon the testimony
taken by the referee . .. together with a simple complaint and a simple answer, the court shall then enter upon the investigation of the rights of the
parties at their solicitation and enter a decree determining their rights in the
premises.
Id. at 94-95. This decision resulted in severe criticism of the legal professionl
criticisms that have echoed since in other states: "[M en of hidebound precedents...
of blind conservatism ... looking ahead to endless fat jobs about to come to them from

the wasting and ceaseless litigation likely to arise in reference to the establishing of
priority of claims to the use of water." DAVID BoYD, A HIsToRY; GREELEY AND THE
UNION COLONY 128-31
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claims.s" As a consequence, the courts operated without vital hydrologic information and awarded water rights that exceeded the capacity
of the streams." ° A worried state engineer reported in 1886:
So great was this in some instances [the discrepancy between decreed
and actual carrying capacity of many ditches] that the results of the
gaugings and the decreed capacity seemed to have no connection
with each other. Ditches were met with having decreed capacities of
two, three and even five times the volume they were capable of carrying .... It needs no argument to show the worse than uselessness of

these decrees as a guide to the Water Commissioner in the performance of his duties.3'70
Despite these administrative flaws, Colorado's water legislation of
1879 and 1881 firmly established the judicial adjudication of water
rights. This preference continues in Colorado today.
2. Wyoming System
The hard lesson of over-appropriation under Colorado's judicial
decrees was not lost on Elwood Mead, one of the deans of western water law. Mead came to Colorado to teach mathematics at Colorado
Agricultural College in Fort Collins in 1882.' He affiliated with Bryant
La Grange, the first water commissioner on the Cache la Poudre
River. 7 ' Mead came to share La Grange's concern about the overappropriation of streams that overly optimistic court decrees caused.
La Grange argued for a "Board of State Control" which, by using a water permit system, would issue water privileges while remaining mindful of stream capacity."
Mead observed the pattern of overappropriation during summers when he gauged irrigation ditches for
the state engineer. From 1886 to1887, Mead helped the Colorado
State Grange and state engineer promote legislation to create a Board
of Control that would govern all water diversions in the state. "7 ' The
measure did not reach the house floor for debate.
A year later, Wyoming appointed Mead its first territorial engineer.17' Because Wyoming replicated many of Colorado's water laws,
368. Id. at 98.
369. Id.
370. Id.at 101.
371. Id.at 99.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 100.
374. Id. at 102-03. Mead was influenced by a reading of IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT
(1886) by William Hammond Hall, the California state engineer, who investigated the
irrigation institutions of France, Italy, Spain, and ancient Rome. Id. at 103. Hall reported on the tribunal de aguas in Valencia which allocated and enforced rights on
streams-apparently another source for Mead's concept of a board of control. Id.
375. Id. at 105.

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 8

Mead found many over-appropriated streams and a lack of adjudication 6
In 1889, Wyoming was on the verge of statehood. The deliberations of the constitutional convention afforded an opportunity to rewrite the water laws of the jurisdiction. With Mead in attendance, the
irrigation and water rights committee of the convention drafted an
article declaring that streams were the property of the state, therefore
placing streams under the supervision of a Board of Control, dividing
Wyoming into four water divisions, and creating the office of state engineer."s The convention approved these measures, and they became
part of the state's constitution."'
In 1890, other legislation provided the only means of obtaining
new water rights: by applying to the state engineer.' Also, the Board
of Control oversaw the adjudication of existing rights. Pursuant to this
legislation, the state engineer could initiate adjudication by measuring
the flow of a stream and gauging the capacities of the ditches it
A divisional superintendent conducted hearings and comserved.'
piled evidence on existing uses. The engineer and superintendent
then submitted their reports to the Board, which made the final quantification and set priority dates. The legislation added a statutory
quantification limit of one cubic foot per second for each seventy acres
of irrigated land. 8 '
The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this
legislation in Farm Investment Company v. Carpenter,where the plaintiff
challenged, among other things, the Board of Control's function,
claiming it violated the separation of powers doctrine."2 The court
found the Board "act[ed] judicially; but the power exercised [was]

376. Id. at 105-06. Dunbar also quotes from a letter from Mead to Senator William
M. Stewart of Nevada: "The public waters of our streams... are conferred upon parties
who . . . build ditches regardless of its [sic] effect on the conservation of the water
supply or the expense of regulating its distribution." Id. at 106.
377. Id. at 107.
378.

Id. at 108. The convention added the proposal into the Wyoming Constitution

as follows:
There shall be constituted a board of control, to be composed of the state engineer and superintendents of the water divisions; which shall, under such
regulations as may be prescribed by law, have the supervision of the waters of
the state and of their appropriation, distribution, and diversion, and of the
various officers connected therewith. Its decisions to be subject to review by
the courts of the state.
Id. (quoting Wvo. CONST. art. VIII, § 2).
379. Id. at 109.
380. Id. at 110.
381. 1890 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 25 (codified at WvO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-322 (Michie
2003)).
382. Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 259 (Wyo. 1900).

Issue 2

DIVIDING WESTERN WATERS

may
quasi judicial only, and [as] such, under proper circumstances,
3 83
appropriately be conferred upon executive officers or boards.
Nebraska.. and Alaska... replicated the Wyoming system. Alaska
statutes owe their parentage to the then-Dean of the Wyoming Law
School, Frank Trelease, who advised Alaska as it developed its Water
Code.
Historian Dunbar concisely portrayed the philosophy behind the
Wyoming approach, in contrast with that of Colorado:
[T]he essence of [the Wyoming system] lay in the subordination of
the appropriator to the welfare of the state. The interest of the state
or the community came first, that of the individual irrigator second.
Gone were the days in Wyoming when an appropriator, without anybody's leave, could post a notice, dig a ditch, install a dam, and divert
the waters of a stream. Water was too limited a resource to be diverted and wastefully used without regard for the rights of others.
Since it was the property of the state, rights to its use were to be
granted by the state, adjudicated by the state, and protected by the
state. 116
Despite the distinctions between their water rights systems, Colorado
and Wyoming had something in common: as their systems matured,
core controversies emerged. The proper scope of authority of the
newly founded administrative agencies was unclear. The states also
struggled to balance the public's need to regulate water rights with
private property interests in water. These controversies endure today.
3. Hybrid Approaches: the Bien Code
Given the differences between the Colorado and Wyoming approaches, it was natural for intermediate methods to develop. One
approach was based on the so-called "Bien Code" while another resulted from Oregon's adjudication statute.
Soon after Congress passed the 1902 Reclamation Act, many western states were eager to secure federal funding to build reservoirs and
canals. "7 The Reclamation Service, however, had conflicting concerns.
The agency feared riparian rights and undocumented appropriative
rights might siphon large amounts of project water to riparian or appropriative users outside those projects.
States also were concerned that inadequacies in their water laws
would be an impediment to obtaining federal reclamation projects.
383. Id. at 267.
384. See NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-226 to -231 (Michie 2002).
385. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.060, .065, .165- .169 (Michie 2004).
Trelease, Alaska's New Water Use Act, 2 LAND & WATERL. REv. 1, 29 (1967).
386. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 109.
387. See discussion concerning Reclamation Act supraPart II.D.

See Frank J.
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Recognizing the need for a workable adjudication system in their
states, the governors of Oregon and Washington requested assistance
from the United States Reclamation Service in 1903." Morris Bien, a
Reclamation Service lawyer-engineer, drafted a model code for state
administration of water in 1904.'
Under the Bien Code, a state administrative agency made hydrographic surveys and developed related data.' Upon completion of the
survey, the agency delivered its information to the state attorney general, often in the form of a proposed determination."' The state attorney general then brought suit within a specified period, usually sixty
days, and made all water users in the basin parties to the action. 92 The
Code also gave the attorney general the authority to intervene in pending private water adjudications. After a mandatory period for objections had elapsed, and the court completed hearings on the objections,
the court issued a final decree. Throughout the proceedings, the
court could call upon the administrative agency to provide it with hydrological facts.
The Bien Code also vested the state engineer with the authority to
issue permits for new water uses. Once a user established beneficial
use under the permit rules, the state engineer issued a certificate of
water right. The Code served as a hybrid model for general stream
adjudications and North Dakota," ' South Dakota,39 New Mexico,"' and
Oklahoma.'
Oregon's system, formulated in 1909, also blended these judicial
and administrative procedures. 97 As in Wyoming, the Oregon adjudication process began with the state engineer, who undertook a hydrographic survey and prompted water users to complete filings to secure
their claims. With this information in hand, the state engineer developed a proposed order of determination specifying water rights and
their priority. The proposed order was then filed with the appropriate
district court, which held hearings on objections to the proposed order. If no party objected, the district court was required to affirm the
"
proposed order. Arizona, California,"' Nevada,' Texas,' Utah,4
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 119-20.
Id. at 120.
Id.
Id.
Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-03-15 to -20 (2003).
S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 46-10-1 to -13 (Michie 2004).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-4-13 to -19 (Michie 1985 & Supp. 1997).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §§ 105.6-.8 (West 1991).
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 539.010-.350, 541.310-.320 (2003).
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-251 to -264 (West 2003).
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2000-2900 (West 1971 & Supp. 2005).
NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 533.090-.320, 534.100 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 2003).
TEx. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.301-.341 (Vernon 2000).
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Washington, "3 and Idaho 4 followed the Oregon-hybrid approach substantially.
4. Statutory Efforts to Assist Private Litigation
By the middle of the twentieth century, western states enacted further refinements, usually to assist parties in small, private water rights
cases. Private litigants were allowed to request assistance from administrative agencies. They could also request the court to refer matters to
administrative agencies for investigation and reporting. For instance,
in the 1940s, Idaho courts could request reports from the State Department of Reclamation regarding any water source involved in litigation."5 Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota also
Those states
embraced this kind of judicial/scientific method.
adopted legislation that requiredstate agencies to draft a hydrographic
survey report for every suit involving water rights.
Likewise, California and Kansas adopted reference procedures.
These allowed the court to refer factual issues and legal issues in some
cases to an administrative agency for a report. Once the agency submitted its report to the court, the litigants could file exceptions to it.
These procedures the western states adopted frequently reflected the
scientific management movement of the time by routing scientific information into these cases.
Finally, Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah empowered their
courts with even more flexibility. Those states adopted legislation in
the 1950s that allowed courts to broaden private water rights litigation,
shaping the cases into more comprehensive proceedings where appropriate.
D.

SPECIAL CHALLENGES FACING STATUTORY ADJUDICATIONS

In the first-half of the twentieth century, water right adjudications
responded to the rapid economic growth of the West and filled the
need for certainty about water supply. Stream adjudications assisted
western economic development by resolving the ownership of water
rights and setting the parameters of those rights.
Routinely, adjudications faced special challenges. For instance,
some states integrated rights with origins in two disparate legal regimes, the riparian and appropriative rights doctrines, which compli-

402. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-4-1 to -24 (1989 & Supp. 1996). See generally Robert W.
Swenson, A Primerof Utah Water Law: PartII, 6J. ENERY L. & POL'Y 1 (1985).
403. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 90.03.110-.245 (West 2004).
404. IDAHO CODE §§ 42-1401 to -1428 (Michie 2003).
405. Id. § 42-1404.
406. See, e.g., CAL. WATERCODE §§ 2000-2017 (West 1971).
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0 7
In some cases, the need to reconcile
cated the adjudication effortY
the dichotomy between the entrenched and utterly different laws gov-

erning surface water and groundwater posed the biggest task. Some
states engaged in adjudications to shore up municipal water supplies,
forced to balance their own future against the practices of the past.
Other states directed great effort at inventorying water uses to capture
the prize of federally supported reclamation projects. Statutory adjudications proved a useful approach to these water management problems.
1. Integration of Riparian and Appropriative Rights
While some states, such as Colorado, abolished riparian rights at an
early date, other states acquiesced to the creation of water rights under
both doctrines and could no longer easily resort to the "abolition" solution. In many Great Plains and Pacific Coast states, the riparian water rights doctrine was seen as a threat to economic development. Although many state courts relaxed some of the riparian doctrine's more
rigid aspects, many people still regarded it as a limitation to water uses,
confining them to the narrow bands of riparian lands adjacent to state
waterways. Even in states that tolerated both the riparian and appropriative doctrines, the uncertainty of downstream riparian demands
hampered the economic activity of appropriators. Future accelerated
riparian uses on a seemingly water-abundant stream could jeopardize
irrigation and storage projects built in reliance on appropriative rights.
Such uncertainties made the need to integrate the riparian and
prior appropriation rights very clear. General stream adjudications in
several states became the means to integrate the two doctrines. Nebraska, Texas, and Kansas serve as examples.
a. NebraskaIntegrationEfforts
Nebraska, transected by the hundredth meridian, has a humid region in the eastern part of the state adjoining the Missouri River and a
more arid region to the west. Its territorial legislature adopted the
riparian doctrine to manage these resources in 1855."°* As irrigation
called for more water, the legislature and courts developed a more
flexible doctrine of water distribution. The first vestiges of appropriation principles appear in Nebraska statutes passed in 1877' that authorized the transport of water across the lands of other persons, and

407. DUNBAR, supra note 10, at 67.
408. THORSON, supra note 92, at 36.
409. NAT'LWATER COMM'N, A SUMMARY-DIGESTOF STATEWATER LAWS461 (Richard L.
Dewsnut et al. eds., 1973).
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in 1889 statutes that authorized the appropriation of surface water by
posting and recording a notice of appropriation.",
The 1895 irrigation law built upon these initial steps and delineated a comprehensive statutory scheme for adjudicating existing appropriative rights and permitting appropriative rights in the future."'
The 1895 statute also eliminated any new riparian rights after its passage.
In the decade following the 1895 statute, the Nebraska Board of Irrigation proceeded to adjudicate pre-existing water rights on all of Nebraska's streams."' In 1911, the Nebraska legislature directed the State
Board of Irrigation, Highways and Drainage to completely adjudicate
any rights remaining in question."4 These proceedings substantially
completed the adjudication of existing rights. Statutory adjudications
still occur on a periodic basis to reexamine appropriative permits in
cases where parties allege possible abandonment or forfeiture. Most
holders of pre-1895 riparian rights either have given them up or replaced them with new appropriative rights. One feature of Nebraska's

system is unique: its state agency does not take into account riparian
uses when it issues new appropriative permits. Nebraska has no explicit method for registering riparian uses and converting them into
appropriative rights.
b. Texas IntegrationEfforts
Like Nebraska and other Great Plains states, Texas faced the challenge of reconciling water rights based on the riparian doctrine with
those based on the prior appropriation doctrine. From 1840 to 1895,
Texas recognized riparian water rights under the English common law,
but limited withdrawals to quantities needed for reasonable use."'
Following the lead of other states, Texas passed irrigation acts in
1889, 1895, and 1913.4" The acts interjected the prior appropriation
doctrine into surface water management. The 1895 and 1913 statutes
also included a statewide permitting program. Legislation in 1917"'L set
up an adjudication procedure; one of its goals included phasing out
riparian rights. In Board of Water Engineers v. McKnight, the court declared this adjudication process unconstitutional as an improper exer-

410.

Id. at 461-62. See aLsoJames A. Doyle, Water Rights in Nebraska, 29 NEB. L. REv.

385, 386-87 (1950) ("In 1889, by an act popularly known as 'The Rayner Irrigation

Law,' the legislature expressly adopted the principle of prior appropriation.").
411. Id. at 387-88.
412.

THORSON, supra note 92, at 36.

413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

DOYLE, supra note 410, at 388.
Id. at 389.
NAT'L WATER COMM'N, supra note 409, at 700.
Id. at 701.
Revision of Irrigation Laws, ch. 88, 1917 Tex. Gen. Laws 237.
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cise of judicial powers by an administrative agency. "8 The state undertook a similar adjudication system in 1951, but it, too, was declared
unconstitutional in 1958. 4' 9
With no statutory mechanism to conduct an adjudication, the
Texas Water Commission and water users experimented with other
procedures in an attempt to address the conflicts between riparian and
appropriative users, as well as other water management problems facing the state. Federal court class actions involving rights along the Rio
Grande were one such mechanism, but they ultimately proved unsuccessful.
For instance, in Martinez v. Maverick County Water Conservation &
Improvement District,a class comprised of riparian plaintiffs attempted to
sue a class of appropriators." 0 They failed; the court held that the lawsuit constituted a spurious class action.'

Later, in Miller v. Jennings,"

the federal appellate court ruled that a class action involving the upper
portion of the Rio Grande did not satisfy the federal McCarran
Amendment," which provided a limited basis for waiving federal sovereign immunity, because the class action failed to not join all the
claimants possibly affected by the outcome. Class actions in Texas state
court were more successful,2 4 but they too ultimately proved unsatisfactory. These cases failed to determine the water rights of individual
class members."5
Finally, some success: the State of Texas, acting through its water
commission, filed a declaratory action involving all water rights, both
riparian and appropriative, in the Rio Grande below Falcon Reservoir." ' A court of appeals decision finally resolved conflicting water
claims in the lower valley by utilizing an "equitable water rights doctrine." However, "the case took over thirteen years to decide, involved
roughly 3,000 parties, and cost an estimated $10 million in court costs
and attorneys fees."4"7
418. Bd. of Water Eng'rs v. McKnight, 229 S.W. 301, 307 (Tex. 1921).
419. S. Canal Co. v. State Bd. of Water Eng'rs, 318 S.W.2d 619, 621, 625 (Tex. 1958).
420. Martinez v. Maverick County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 219 F.2d 666,
667 (5th Cir. 1955).
421. Id. at 672.
422. Miller v.Jennings, 243 F.2d 157, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1957).
423. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000)). See discussion of the McCarran Amendment infra section V.
424. See Hidalgo County Water Improvement Dist. v. Cameron County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 253 S.W.2d 294, 296, 301 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Valmont
Plantations v. State, 355 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. 1962).
425. See Corwin W. Johnson, Adjudication of Water Rights, 42 TEX. L. REv. 121, 122-23
(1963) (detailing the problems with general stream adjudications).
426. State v. Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 443 S.W.2d 728,
730-31 (Tex. Civ. App.1969).
427. Doug Caroom & Paul Elliott, Water Rights Adjudication - Texas Style, TEX. BARJ.
1183, 1184 (Nov. 1981 ) (explaining Texas' continual struggle with regulating ground-
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c. Kansas IntegrationEfforts
Territorial Kansas, another example, applied the riparian law doctrine to surface water and used the English "absolute ownership" doctrine for groundwater. While this approach worked successfully for the
humid eastern portion of the state, it proved less desirable in the more
aridwestern areas.
Like Nebraska and Texas, Kansas faced the difficult problem of
competing riparian and appropriative law. The downfall of the riparian doctrine in Kansas occurred in the 1880s and took approximately
ten years.2 8 Agricultural expansion in the western portion of the state
prompted the decline of the doctrine. The legislature passed new irrigation laws that authorized water diversions from streams to nonriparian fields, " a practice not previously allowed under the traditional
riparian doctrine. Legislation passed in 1917" and 1919431 allowed
permits for water appropriation. By the 1940s, state political leaders
and water law experts feared that the ability of inactive riparian owners
to later claim the water stored or diverted in reclamation projects
would jeopardize anticipated Bureau of Reclamation projects in the
state.432
Nebraska, Texas, and Kansas, experienced a difficult transition
from riparian doctrine to the appropriative doctrine, The fundamental philosophical bases of the two approaches were hard to reconcile.
Riparianism put a premium on reasonable use and social responsibility, but stymied the march of irrigation science and economic development. Prior appropriation rewarded risk takers and encouraged
development, but often at the expense of the "commons." Adjudications effectively imposed metrics on inchoate uses, but time and the
inexorable pressure of growth in the West finally became the most effective agents in the abolition of riparianism.
2. Integration of Surface Water and Groundwater Laws
Some states unified the laws that governed surface water and
groundwater through general stream adjudications. Kansas again
serves as an example. In the 1930s, the City of Wichita earmarked
groundwater sources in order to augment its burgeoning municipal

water use, and the failure of the adjudicatory effort to include federal reserved rights
for Native Americans or other public lands). Also, in comparison to some of the general stream adjudications described in this article, this was a modest case.
428. John C. Peck, The Kansas Water AppropriationAct: A Fifty-Year Perspective,43 KAN.
L. REv. 735, 737 (1995).
429.
Id.
430. Act of Mar. 13, 1917, ch. 172 § 4, 1917 Kan. Sess. Laws 218, 218-19.
1919 Kan. Sess. Laws.
431.
432.
See Peck, supra note 428, at 740.
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water system. ' Wichita explored promising sites in rural areas surrounding the city and, by the early 1940s, leased land twenty miles
north of the city to sink wells and divert water."' Wichita's campaign
accentuated the weaknesses inherent in the absolute ownership doctrine, as it pertained to groundwater.
Landowners overlying the Equus Beds, fed from the stream Wichita
sought to use, resisted Wichita's efforts to obtain an appropriation
permit from the state's chief engineer."' The dispute resulted in a decision by the Kansas Supreme Court that defeated Wichita's overtures
because of the impingement on vested water rights. 3 That opinion
sounded the death knell for both the absolute ownership doctrine and
riparian law in Kansas. In the aftermath of the decision, a gubernatorially appointed water study commission recommended major changes
in Kansas' water law adopted by the 1945 legislature."7
The resulting Water Appropriation Act of 1945" eliminated any future distinction between surface and groundwater by requiring that
users obtain a permit for all future uses. The legislature addressed the
problem of pre-1945 riparian uses and groundwater rights by directing
the chief engineer to undertake the determination of those rights and
give them legal definition under prior appropriation principles. Thus,
the legislature recognized and gave priority to any pre-1945 water use,
defined as water beneficially applied some time in the three years prior
to the Act. As for quantity, such vested rights were determined based
on their "maximum quantity and rate of diversion for the beneficial
use made thereof." ' The legislature refused to expansively determine
domestic uses.
Using these guidelines, the chief engineer systematically identified
and investigated existing uses in each Kansas county. By 1956, the state
engineer substantially completed this adjudication and recommended
the establishment of approximately 5000 water rights."
3. Municipal Growth
Municipal growth pressures prompted major adjudications in several states, including Oklahoma. In 1905, the Oklahoma territorial
legislature adopted an adjudication and permitting system"' based on
the model code prepared by Reclamation Service's Morris Bien. The
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id. at 738.
Peterson v. Kansas State Bd. of Agric.,149 P.2d 604, 605 (Kan. 1944).
Id. at 605-06.
Id. at611.
Peck, supra note 428, at 739-41.
Act of'June 28, 1945, ch. 390, 1945 Kan. Sess. Laws 665, 666.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-701(d) (2004).
Peck, supra note 428, at 744.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 105.6-.8 (West 1990).
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system contemplated water rights adjudications covering the entire
state, but the court only completed four regional adjudications. The
water supply needs of major municipalities prompted these adjudications. The adjudications produced the Tulsa Decree of 1938;44 the
Oklahoma City-Canadian Decree of 1939;"" the Durant Decree of
1955;... and the Oklahoma City-Atoka Decree of 1958."'
The court dismissed and reinstated a fifth adjudication, involving a
Bureau of Reclamation project on the Washita River aimed at supplying municipal water, however, the court failed to complete the adjudication."' Similarly, the court ultimately dismissed a final adjudication,
involving a Bureau of Reclamation project to supply municipal water to
Norman, Midwest City, and Del City."'
4. Reclamation and Determination of Existing Rights
At the turn of the century, several themes coalesced in a more rational, science-based approach to public affairs. Businesses from assembly lines to retail stores embraced the popular scientific manageGovernment, too,
ment techniques pioneered by Frederick Taylor.'
tried scientific management techniques by using professional managers and employees selected and promoted on the merit basis, in an
attempt to sidestep the favoritism and inefficiency inherent in politics.
The natural resource management field adopted these principles
with even more enthusiasm. In response to the forceful promotion by
President Theodore Roosevelt and his chief forester Gifford Pinchot,
bureaucrats applied progressive scientific management principles to
forest and river systems. Multiple use development, with its goal of
extracting maximum benefits from natural resources, became the
watchword of federal land management agencies. The Reclamation
Act of 1902, sponsored by Senator Francis G. Newlands of Nevada, typified the federal government's commitment to helping local communities develop their watersheds to yield maximum benefits for all.'"
As the United States Reclamation Service implemented the Reclamation Act, it became apparent that tattered and uncertain water right
records in many states created a situation with the potential to hamper
The federal government could conceivably
reclamation projects.'
442. City of Tulsa v. Grand-Hydro No. 5263 (D. Okla. Feb. 14, 1938).
443. Oklahoma City v. City of Guymon, No. 99028 (D. Okla. Dec. 20, 1939).
444. City of Durant v. Pexton, No. 19662 (D. Okla. 1955).
445. Oklahoma City v. State Bd. of Pub. Affairs, No. 10217 (D. Okla. Oct. 28,1958).
446. Oklahoma v. City of Anadarko, No. 18450 (D. Okla.).
447. City of Norman v. Schwartz, No. 18409 (D. Okla. June 30, 1959).
448. See generally FREDERICK WINSLow TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENrIFIC
MANAGEMENT (originally published in 1911) (1998).
449. Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388.
450. WIEL, supra note 332, § 1428, at 1331.
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spend millions of dollars on a project, only to have most of the necessary water claimed by undocumented senior appropriators or holdout
riparian users refusing to join in the pledge to pay for the project. To
prevent this risk, the Secretary of the Interior instituted a contractual
requirement requiring the local water users association to "take
prompt action to secure the determination by the courts of the relative
rights of its shareholders to the use of the water for said lands ....
While the Secretary of the Interior easily issued mandates for the
quantification of existing rights, the Secretary had a much harder time
specifying how the quantification should occur. Common law judicial
remedies proved inefficient, and the administrative adjudication developed by Elwood Mead became the best alternative available. Many
state leaders, however, were unwilling to bestow their administrative
agencies with the powers called for by Mead's system. Some leaders
even questioned the constitutionality of doing so.
In 1903 at the behest of the governors of Washington and Oregon,
the Reclamation Service addressed these doubts. The Service developed a guide that detailed the ways in which western states could better
manage their water and thereby ensure state receipt of reclamation
funds. Morris Bien, the Reclamation Service lawyer-engineer, authored this model water code, as previously discussed.
In response to this model and Reclamation Service requirements,
several states undertook large water rights determinations. These cases
were part of the price the states paid to enjoy the promise of reclamation. Adjudications were required to obtain reclamation projects in
Oregon, New Mexico, and other states. Nevada, Arizona, and Washington also commenced such adjudications, and their experiences are
discussed in the following.
a. Nevada Adjudications
The prospect of reclamation funding to support local water development gave impetus to Nevada's stream adjudications. Nevada was
the site of one of the first reclamation projects, the Newlands Project
on the Truckee and Carson Rivers near Reno.
In 1903, the state legislature noted that the proposed reclamation
project could increase irrigated farmlands from 432,000 acres to over
1.4 million acres, vastly increasing the state's population and wealth."
The laws enacted toward that end reflected a clear understanding of
what was at stake: "[T] he Secretary of the Interior, before proceeding
to actual construction on any river in Nevada, shall be informed as to
the extent of the present actual appropriation and beneficial use of
water by existing communities .
The legislature also authorized
451.

Id. at 1322.

452.

Act of Feb. 16,1903, ch.4, 1903 Nev. Stat. 18, 23.

453.

Id. at 24.
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the state engineer to prepare a list of appropriations from the claims
required of all users.
Nevada's efforts failed to completely satisfy federal officials. Soon
after construction of the Newlands Project, the United States initiated
adjudications to protect water users in the Project from upstream diversions on the Truckee and Carson rivers. This litigation culminated
in the Orr Ditch Decree,5' issued by a federal court in 1944. While the
water rights of the Pyramid Lake Indian Tribe were also at issue in this
litigation, the United States more actively protected its own interest in
the project than the fishing needs of the tribe. 5'
b. Arizona Adjudications
By the early 1880s, Anglo settlers in the Phoenix Basin relied on
Salt River water for irrigation but with chronic summer shortages. In
1903 the Water Storage Conference Committee formed the Salt River
Valley Water Users Association to provide funding and an organization
structure required under the provisions of the 1902 Reclamation Act. 5'
Soon thereafter, the Secretary of the Interior approved construction of
Roosevelt Dam project at the Tonto Basin site on the Salt River. As
construction began in 1904, the Association worked out differences
among its members, or shareholders. When that proved impossible,
57
the Association filed a legal action, Hurley v. Abbott,"
at the urging of
the Department of the Interior. The United States government intervened in the case.
Settled in 1910, the decision became known as the Kent Decree in
recognition of the presiding judge, Edward H. Kent 9 The Kent Decree
still governs water management in the Salt and Verde River systems of
Arizona today.
The Department of the Interior completed the Roosevelt Dam in
1909 and many people considered the Salt River Project a huge success. The government again failed to fully consider Indian interests
during the construction of the Project and the allocation of its water.
For example, only 1300 class A irrigation acres were allocated to the
displaced Fort McDowell Indians under the Project.'

454. United States v. Orr Water Dist. Co., No. A-3-LDG (D. Nev. 1944).
455. SeeNevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
456. SMITH, supra note 167, at 38-39.
457. Hurley v. Abbott, 259 F.Supp. 669 (D. Ariz. 1966).
458. Id. at 670.
459. See id.at 669 (referring to the decree entered on Mar. 1, 1910, commonly
known as the "Kent Decree").
460. James Q. Jacobs, Water Politics and the History of the Fort McDowell Indian Community (1999), at http://www.jcjacobs.net/southwest/fort mcdowell.html.
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c. Washington Adjudications
The reclamation experience in Washington took a slightly different
track. Learning from its experiences in Arizona and Nevada, the Reclamation Service in 1904 struck a deal with the Washington legislature,
which desperately wanted to capture the federal development opportunity available under the 1902 Act. The state legislature in 1905
passed what is still the law:
Whenever the secretary of the interior of the United States ... shall
notify the commissioner of public lands of this state that . . . the
United States intends to make examinations or surveys for the utilization of certain specified waters, the waters so described shall not
thereafter be subject to appropriation under any law of this state for a
period of one year... .461
By simply notifying the state of its intent to build a project, the Reclamation Service could freeze all appropriations in a watershed. The
Reclamation Service readily extended the time for the examinations.
After filing its intent, the Reclamation Service gained control over all
the basin's unappropriated water for Project development. For example, the Reclamation Service performed its own survey of the Yakima
watershed where "paper" claims to water completely precluded development. Reclamation calculated the necessary amount of water to operate the planned Yakima Basin Project. The Service then negotiated a
deal with the residents of the Yakima Basin. If the existing users in the
basin agreed to limit themselves to an aggregate amount of diversions,
which left 2000 cubic feet per second in the Yakima River in September, the Secretary of the Interior would build the Yakima Project.
In an unprecedented flood of community boosterism, coercion,
and appeals to the common good, the citizens of the Yakima basin obtained promises from the existing appropriators to limit their claims
and let the project proceed. These limiting agreements, secured in
1905 through 1911, continue in force and are now, nearly 100 years
later, being reaffirmed in the Acquavella adjudication" as binding limits on the signatories' water rights.
E. SUMMARY
Post-1900 adjudications arose from reasons closely tied to the climate and economic needs of the states. In the Great Plains region,
states struggled to determine whether eastern or western water law and
institutions would prevail. Adjudications served as a tool for recognizing existing riparian property rights, while introducing prior appropriation principles for the future. In the more arid West, the appro§ 90.40.030 (West 2004).
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priation doctrine was comparatively well-established, but adjudications
were necessary to secure the federal funding needed to realize the major benefit of the appropriation doctrine: the transport of water to distant places. To a lesser extent, adjudications helped to facilitate urban
growth, integrate surface and groundwater rights, and generate official
lists of water rights, thereby making water management more efficient.
By mid-century, western states had come a long way in developing
methods for adjudicating their water. None of these basic approaches,
however, contemplated the adjudication of federal reserved water
rights. Those rights would be strongly asserted later in the twentieth
century and cast a long shadow over state water rights and pending
general stream adjudications.
IV. THE POST-WORLD WAR II WEST
During the post-World War II era, states and localities expanded
their duties and accepted some of the functions, usually with federal
grant assistance, the federal government performed during the depression and the war. This trend toward decentralization to state and localities reversed slightly in the 1960s. According to federalism scholar
Daniel J. Elazar, the 1960s were a period of "concentrated cooperation," with "[i] ncreased federal activity in a number of fields ... coupled with an intensification of the debate over 'states rights' on one
hand and widespread acknowledgment of intergovernmental collaboration on the other." 3
The public land, Indian, and water policies of the post-World War
II era manifested increased federal activity. Federal-state relations in
these policy areas must be understood in the context of the significant
demographic changes that characterized these times.
A. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS

World War II brought population and economic growth to the
American West. Population in the seventeen western states was slightly
over 14 million in 1940. ' By 1950, the region grew by 30 percent, to
20.1 million." These increases were particularly apparent in coastal
states where major defense plants were found; California, Oregon, and
Arizona grew over 50 percent, while Nevada and Washington grew by
approximately 40 percent.46

463. Elazar, supra note 203, at 21. Elazar refers to the New Deal and World War II
as a period of "crisis-oriented centralism" and in contrast, the post-World War II era is
considered to be an era of "non-centralist restoration." Id. at 18, 20.
464. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 60, at 22.
465. Id.
466. SeeMEEK, supra note 63, at 567.
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Perhaps the 1940s was the most significant decade because it sealed
the urban destiny of the West. At the beginning of the decade, western
population was evenly distributed between urban and rural areas. Only
four states had greater than 50 percent of their population living in
cities and towns." By the end of the 1940s, eight other states' charac'
ter shifted from predominately rural to predominantly urban. One
sociologist observed, "It was only at the conclusion of World War II that
the West began to acquire an urban and industrial base. The West's
economy and population, which had expanded but changed relatively
little in essential character for more than 100 years, now began to alter
at an increasing rate."'
In human terms, these demographic changes were at first accompanied by waves of Americans securing jobs at defense plants, military
bases, and support industries. Later in the decade, veterans returned
to western cities close to their stations. Many solders and sailors raised
on farms opted for urban areas upon their return home, in pursuit of
the greater employment, educational, and romantic opportunities.
The end of World War II did not stop the flow of federal dollars
that supported the military bases and defense contracts. The Cold
War, Korean War, and later, the Vietnam conflict continued the flow of
cash to the West."'" Other benefits of western living became more apparent to American companies and their workers. With improvements
in telephone communication and travel technology, and the advent of
computer technology, the benefits of the information age made western cities much more accessible. The comparatively less concentrated
population of the West made it more desirable to companies and retirees, as did lower rents and mortgages. Advances in air conditioning
technology made the West even more livable. By 1965, air conditioning opened the metropolitan areas of the Southwest to unstoppable
growth. Finally, the spectacular western outdoors with its wide open
spaces drew people who yearned for more leisure time. The region
also drew thousands of tourists, once wartime gasoline rationing
ended. Thus, the trail westward attracted all comers. These trends
drew Americans to live in the West: industry, finance, electronic media,
petroleum, and the weather.

467. These states are California (71 percent urban), Colorado (53 percent urban),
Washington (53 percent urban), and Utah (55 percent urban).
468. Admittedly, the United States Census Bureau's redefinition of the term urban
to include some less-populated areas than qualified previously boosted statistical reporting of this trend.
469. PAMELA CASE & GREGORY ALWARD, REPORT TO THE W. WATER POLICY REvIEw
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Two Wests emerged from World War II, economically speaking.'
One West focused on service industries, tourism, and high-technology
growth, while the other still depended on the use and extraction of
natural resources. Both stimulated the continued growth of metropolitan areas. Timber, agriculture, and mining (hard rock and oil) continued to boom after World War II right up until the 1970s, when a
collapse occurred that lasted through the next decade. 4n
By 1970, with a population of 34.8 million, the West accounted for
17 percent of the United States population, 83 percent of western residents lived in urban areas. 47 ' Los Angeles, the largest western city, had
nearly two million residents in 1950, but by 1970 the city sprawled and
became home to an additional 800,000 persons, reaching a total population of 2.8 million.4 7' The expanding boundaries of western cities
illustrated this phenomenal urban growth. From 1950 to 1990, "San
Antonio added 264 square miles to its municipal boundaries, Houston
380, Phoenix 402, and Oklahoma City 557. " "47 Developments in public
land, Indian, and water policy occurred in the context of these demographic shifts.
B. PUBLIC LAND POLICY
Before the World War, federal public lands outside the national
parks and monuments were typically utilized by the traditional parties:
loggers in forest lands, miners locating and developing a claim, and
ranchers with grazing allotments in both the national forests and on
the unreserved public domain. Because the natural bounty was so vast
and the western population so small, these lands easily accommodated
modest numbers of hunters and fishermen. Since the 1930s both the
Forest Service and the Grazing Service, then a bureau within the Department of the Interior, assumed a more active role in preventing the
misuse of these resources, but these measures were undertaken to save
the logging and grazing industries from themselves, and promote the
general public interest in healthy lands. For this reason, minimal conflict between user groups existed. While multiple-use had been in the
lexicon of federal land managers for decades, single use of the then-

471. In a recent book, economist Thomas Michael Power examined the current
economic trends of the American West and concludes that the West is less reliant today
on extractable industries than in past years.
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472. See O'Connor, supra note 67, at 460-65.
LANDSCAPES AND FAILED ECONOMiEs: THE SEARCH FOR A VALUE OF PLACE

473.

HisToRicAL STATISTICS, supra note 60, at 22.

474.
475.

See O'Connor, supra note 67, at 554.
Id.

WATER LA WREVIEW

Volume 8

abundant public lands was the predominant practice. 6 Only after
World War II did federal land managers began to face resource conflicts in which all of the competing parties could not be accommodated.
These resource conflicts developed as a result of the growing national interest in outdoor recreation and the efforts of a small group of
resource preservationists who fought development, as it might cause
the destruction of pristine resources. As some commentators noted,
"By the end of the Second World War, expanding population combined with rising disposable income, longer paid vacations, retirement
programs, and increased mobility ushered in an era of mass recreation."' 7 This recreating public wanted automobile access to developed
campsites, trailheads, and lakeside docks. The Forest Service and the
National Park Service scrambled to meet this growing demand and, in
turn, to engender support from this emerging political force. In 1958
Congress authorized the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission. ' Chaired by Lawrence Rockefeller, this commission undertook a study of the demand for, versus the availability of recreational
resources through the year 2000."
The Forest Service, in particular, was hard-pressed to juggle the
competing interests of the new recreating public, the National Park
Service's bold initiatives to control prime forest lands, and the growing
suspicions of the Forest Service's traditional resource constituency,
which wondered about the agency's predilections. The timber industry
fundamentally changed after World War II, maturing from a series of
logging companies to a more complex wood products industry with
greater interest in long-term profitability, revegetation technologies,
and the permanent availability of public timber lands to fill the growing demands of the industry. The Forest Service faced another challenge in trying to meet the demands of this evolving constituency.
Two instances prompted the public to question the federal agencies' commitment to their propounded public land management philosophy. These suspicions fueled the resentment of traditional commodity users against unwelcome interference by agencies and the public. During the "great land grab" of 1946 to 1947, western stockmen
pushed legislation that allowed them to acquire fee interest in the grazing allotments they held under the Taylor Grazing Act."' Under a similar proposal, grazing land administered by the Forest Service would
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also be transferred to the federal Grazing Service for similar disposition to the permittees"'
Other stockmen's proposals included automatic grazing permit renewal if a permittee pledged livestock as security for a loan (a frequent
occurrence), and a measure that granted permittees tide to any improvements they made on the land. These proposals, roundly criticized by author Bernard DeVoto in his regular Harper's Magazine column, "From the Easy Chair," ultimately failed."
Then, a decade later, the Bureau of Reclamation proposed to build
a major dam on Utah's Green River."' The dam would have flooded a
scenic canyon area within Dinosaur National Monument in Utah.4
The proposal led to the Echo Park controversy. While Congress defeated the measure in 1956, it provoked serious doubts within the
emerging conservation community. That community wondered if valued public lands could be entrusted for the long term to the federal
land management agencies. '
While the Forest Service had an administrative program in place
since 1929 to protect primitive areas, areas considered safe from harm
8
The danger
in the 1920s and 1930s suddenly became endangered."
stemmed from their rising commercial value. Rising land prices, road
system expansion, and technological advances in mineral extraction
and harvest made them extremely attractive. Thus, " [t] he Forest Service was under tremendous pressure from industry not to 'lock the resources up."' 7 Fearing that the agencies planned to serve up pristine
lands to traditional commodity groups, some conservation groups
sought permanent congressional protection for these areas. In this
climate, conservation groups introduced the first wilderness bill in
Congress in 1956."
Internal disarray and interagency conflict also hampered federal
public land management during the post-War period. The Grazing
Service within the Interior Department sought to increase grazing fees
before the war, but Democratic Senator Patrick McCarran.. from Nevada obtained the Department's commitment not to increase fees until
congressional hearings could be held. Surrounded by the "scattered
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remnants of the states' rights factions of the West,"' 9 McCarran successfully stalled the proposal until 1947. Public land historian E.
Louise Peffer notes that McCarran was the "most belligerent fighter in
the seven-year war of attrition which he waged ...
By the end of World War II, the Grazing Service's proposal to hike
its fees was caught between McCarran's wrath and that of congressional
committees, which bemoaned how little grazing revenue the Grazing
Service collected. By 1946, Congress gutted the Grazing Service's
budget.' In that same year, the Secretary of the Interior abolished the
Grazing Service and the General Land Office (GLO), combining their
functions into the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). As two public
land historians indicated, "[t]he effect of the reorganization was to
grant authority over most of the federal lands and all of the federal
mineral estate to an uneasy collection of Grazing Service range managers and political hacks and the GLO's Washington-based clerks, bookkeepers, and paper shufflers. 9 3 With the Interior Department's bureaus weakened in this fashion, western stockmen maintained the
status quo on their allotments.
While the Grazing Service withered away in the late 1940s, its much
stronger sister agency, the National Park Service, represented a constant thorn in the side of the Forest Service. The National Park Service
attempted to portray itself as the premier federal agency for providing
recreational opportunities to the public. To perpetuate that perception, the National Park Service stepped up its long-term practice of
raiding the public land resources of the Forest Service. Between 1902
and 1960, the National Park Service obtained almost five million acres
of forestland in seventy separate transactions with the Forest Service. '
In the 1960s, the critics of the federal land agencies became
louder. Their tone echoed the civil rights and anti-war rhetoric of the
decade. Those concerned about more recreational opportunities on
federal lands and preserving pristine areas increasingly looked to Congress, rather than the agencies, for help. In 1964, Congress established
the Land and Water Conservation Fund, 9 ' which allowed the purchase
of additional lands by federal agencies and assistance to state and local
parks systems. This legislation resulted in a modest reversal of the
long-term public land disposition trend that started almost two centuries before.
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In 1964 Congress also passed the Public Land Sale Act, "'which facilitated the disposal of modest amounts of land for community residential and agricultural purposes. The Classification and Multiple Use
Act49 provided BLM and its predecessors with the first authority ever to
inventory the land and resources under its jurisdiction. The National
Park Service also utilized legal authority obtained in 1954498 to acquire
private lands with appropriated funds. As a result of purchases and
transfers from other agencies, the National Park Service added ten
natural areas, forty-seven historical areas, one recreation area, eleven
lakeshores and seashores, eight recreation reservoirs, three scenic rivers, and one cultural area during the decade. Perhaps most important,
Congress passed the Wilderness Act in 1964 and set aside some pristine lands as "instant wilderness," and authorized the study of an even
larger amount of federal land for potential wilderness area status.
This same year, Congressman Wayne Aspinall, a Democrat from
Colorado and chair of the House Interior Committee, secured funding
for a multi-year study of the public lands. The Public Land Law Review
Commission, ' with Aspinall as chair, studied public land tenure and
management for the next six years. When it filed its final report in
1970,"' the Commission recommended continuing disposition of federal lands. The Commission also pointed out the need for greater
congressional authority over public land management, measures to
help traditional commodity users, and a commitment to dominant use,
rather than multiple uses, of public lands.
While Aspinall's Commission undertook the most thorough and
systematic review ever of public land issues, the attention generated by
the emerging environmental movement overshadowed its report and
recommendations. Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act5 2 in 1969. The Act established the Council on Environmental
Quality"' and set forth criteria for evaluating the environmental impacts of all major federal actions. Earth Day, celebrated throughout
the country in April 1970, marked the commencement of the first
broad environmental movement in the United States.
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C.INDIAN POLICY: THE TERMINATION PERIOD

The severe backlash against communism was an important current
in American politics during the late 1940s and 1950s. This charged
atmosphere had important ramifications for federal Indian policy. To
some, the communal lifestyles of American Indians evoked fears of
communism. The immediate solution seemed to be the elimination of
tribalism. Accordingly, conservative congressmen began to advocate
smaller budgets and bureaucracies, and some looked to the BIA as an
appropriate target."'
As a result, leading tribal advocates departed; John Collier resigned
as Commissioner of the BIA in 1945 and attorney and Indian legal
scholar Felix Cohen resigned from the Interior Department in 1948."°
In 1949 the Hoover Commission recommended "complete integration" of Indians into the American population."' In 1950, President
Truman appointed Dillon S. Myer, a Collier opponent, as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. As historian Angie Debo writes,
He [Myer] had been in charge of the internment camps in which persons of Japanese ancestry were placed in the panic following Pearl
Harbor, and had carried out a vigorous, even coercive, policy of resetling them throughout the general population. Now he showed the
same intention of breaking up the Indian reservations and scattering
the people, and he used the same coercive methods.f7
The Bureau abandoned reform policies in favor of "withdrawal programming" and Myer dictated his policies without Indian input."'
Debo writes of one example, which provides a clue to the sentiment of
the times:
Reform administrators in the Indian Bureau resigned or were discharged. There were complaints of administrative actions here and
there favoring white appropriation of Indian property. Certainly this
happened to the Paiutes of the Pyramid Lake Reservation in Nevada,
where white trespassers were using their grazing lands. The Indians
took their case to court and won. Their superintendent supported
their rights, and Myer moved him to another reservation at the demand of the trespassers' counsel, Senator Pat McCarran. Then the
trespassers remained, and the Indians could not dislodge them.! a
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When Dwight Eisenhower became President in 1952, the prevailing
philosophy, which advocated terminating federal assistance to tribes
and a returning to assimilationist policies, gained even more support.
Eisenhower appointed Glenn Emmons, who was a banker, not an In5
Emmons embraced termination
dian affairs expert, to head the
5 BIA.
'
policy."
his
of
"keynote
as the
By 1953, Congress officially adopted termination in House Concurrent Resolution (HCR) 108:
"

[Ilt is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the
same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as
are applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end their
status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of the rights
and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship." 2
Within days of this resolution, Congress passed a law based on HCR
108; Public Law 280 authorized five states to enforce their criminal and
civil laws on Indian reservations."' Other states were free to accept the
same authority. Even though Eisenhower recommended that states
obtain tribal consent before acting, he signed Public Law 280 without
this condition."4
This "new" federal policy of termination, which denied political
power and federal protection to Indian tribes, marked a reversion to
old attitudes of assimilation and resentment toward federal subsidies to
help impoverished tribes. Under this policy, progress only occurred
through removing the supervision responsibilities of the federal government, with all of its attendant costs. Even amid the backdrop of
abject failure of allotment policy and its failed attempts to assimilate
the Indian tribes, Congress proceeded nonetheless to adopt the termination policy." '
HCR 108 only expressed congressional policy; it was not law. Congress passed several individual acts to implement the termination policy. One study by lawyers Charles F. Wilkinson and Eric R. Biggs of the
legislation passed between 1955 and 1970 posited the results of termination: escalating losses of Indian land to non-Indian ownership (at
least 1,362,155 acres) and displacement of Native Americans (at least
11,466 individuals)."' These authors identified exacerbating elements
supranote 63, at 601.
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of the termination plans. Termination policy resulted in fundamental
changes in land ownership patterns, an end to the trust relationship,
imposed state legislative jurisdiction and state judicial authority, an
end to all exemptions from state taxing authority, and a discontinuation of all special federal programs to tribes and individual tribal
members. According to Wilkinson and Biggs, these factors destroyed
tribal sovereignty."
Ultimately, through termination tribes also lost their natural resources. Termination acts generally took reservation lands and tribal
funds out of the federal trusteeship. The government sold the land or
paid modest compensation, and distributed the funds directly to tribes
or tribal members."'
Two tribes, the Menominee in Wisconsin and the Klamath in Oregon, lived on proceeds from valuable stands of timber."' After termination, the sawmill on the Menominee lands subsidized most reservation services that the federal government paid for previously. This
burden turned a profit center into a failing business. The Klamath
Tribe lost ownership of their timber stands." The effects of the federal
government's termination policy became painfully obvious to tribes
like these.
D.WATER POLICY AND SHIFrlNG FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS

In the years after World War II, many of the tensions between the
federal government and the states over water law and policy came to
the forefront. The friction had started with the Progressive Conservation Era and continued well into the twentieth century. Varied reasons
for the federal-state conflict existed, but fall into three categories: (1)
continued expansion of federal water management activities, (2) federal actions taken in disregard of state regulation and control, and (3)
federal interference with state-recognized property rights.'
In addition to these state-federal tensions, growing interstate conflicts along
major river systems contributed to the uncertainty that burdened water
rights during this period.
1. Continued Expansion of the Federal Government's Role
Congress originally possessed unbridled control over the vast lands
the nation acquired from France, Mexico, and Great Britain before the
Civil War. Congress gradually ceded land and authority to states, terri517.
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tories, and individuals through a series of enactments during the last
half of the nineteenth century. In the area of water, Congress relinquished paramount control over water resources to westerners by enacting the General Mining Act of 186622 and the Desert Land Sales Act
of 1877."'
As previously discussed, this laissez-faire approach shifted dramatically during the Theodore Roosevelt administration, prompting the
withdrawal of many federal lands for forests and other specified purposes and the struggle to maintain federal control over promising hydropower sites on major rivers. Congress passed the Federal Power
Acte" in 1920, which allowed the federal government to control the
licensing of private power projects on navigable rivers. The concept of
multiple use natural resource management encouraged the development of the "308 Reports" 25 that provided Congress with information
on how to develop river basins comprehensively.
Many of the projects originally conceived in the 308 Reports were
realized during the Depression. These undertakings provided work for
thousands of people during the lean years of the 1930s. These projects
also changed forever the economies and ecologies of large regions of
the country. They included Fort Peck Dam on the Missouri River,
completed in 1940; Hoover Dam on the Colorado River, finished in
1935; Wilson Dam (part of the Tennessee Valley Authority), completed
in 1924; Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River, completed in
1941; and the Bonneville Dam, completed in 1938.
Although World War II interrupted this bold engineering mandate, it renewed itself with vigor after the war. For instance, the PickSloan Plan, authorized by the Flood Control Act of 1944, " set into motion the construction of five other major dams and related channel
improvements on the Missouri River. The St. Lawrence Seaway underwent extensive navigation improvements. In retrospect, of the
$16.3 billion spent by Congress on water and power projects between
1824 and 1955, Congress spent 88 percent of that money between 1930
and 1955. "
By the 1950s, westerners were somewhat taken aback at the scope
of activities undertaken by the national government. As one commentator recalled, the federal government became
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actively engaged in extensive reclamation work, power development,
transmission and sale of power, flood control, navigation improve-

ment, river basin planning, pollution control, and even municipal
and industrial water supply. With each federal increase in control

there was inevitably a decrease in state control and a consequent
strain on federal-state relations. 8
Many of the agencies seemed to lose sight of the original purposes of
their work: "They occasionally [became] so absorbed in the thrill of
building bigger and better dams that they want[ed] to build and manage for the sake of the project rather than for the interest of those to
be served thereby.""' The federal role in water policy received increasing scrutiny. The second Hoover Commission documented the number of overlapping agencies with no unified mission, inventoried twelve
federal agencies with responsibilities for flood control, nine involved in
irrigation, seven with responsibilities for navigation improvement, nine
agencies involved in pollution control, ten interested in watershed development, fifteen involved in hydropower, and thirteen involved in
water supply issues." °
2. Federal Disregard of State Regulation and Control
In several areas, Congress utilized its constitutional powers to authorize federal agency actions that disregarded or preempted state
regulation and authority. The federal navigation power and servitude
provided the basis for this activity.
As early as 1899, the United States Supreme Court prevented the
private development of a dam at Elephant Butte on the Rio Grande in
New Mexico because the obstruction on a non-navigable portion of the
river would effect downstream navigation."' Decades later, Congress
justified the building of Hoover Dan on the Colorado River as an exercise of the federal navigation power, and the Supreme Court rebuffed Arizona's attempt to require the dam and accompanying water
rights be permitted under state law.53
The United States Supreme Court also rejected the attempt of
Oklahoma to enjoin federal construction of a dam and reservoir on
the Red River. The United States intended for the dam to facilitate
navigation on the Arkansas and Mississippi Rivers, and provide flood
control and power production. Oklahoma had a land use plan for that
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portion of the state and complained that federal activities would inundate 100,000 acres of land, displace 8,000 people, destroy productive
farmland, prevent oil and gas development, reduce tax values, and distribute the hydropower only in Texas. Still, the Supreme Court based
its decision on the dam's propensity to improve navigation on the Arkansas and Mississippi rivers."'
In a similar vein, President Roosevelt vetoed the original Republican River compact among Colorado, Nebraska, and Kansas. He cited
possible interference with the federal navigation power and the federal
power to develop irrigation." ' Congress used the navigation power to
justify other large basin projects, such as some of the TVA dams and
tributary projects on the Missouri River under the 1944 Flood Control
Act, even though these improvements only tangentially related to actual navigation. As one commentator surmised, "These multi-purpose
dam projects, by encompassing reclamation, flood control, power generation, and recreational interests, necessarily cut across many areas of
state control and state law, with the resultant federal-state conflict. "5 '
The Federal Power Act of 1920 and the regulatory activities of the
Federal Power Commission (FPC) became a special point of contention between the federal government and the states. The United States
Supreme Court recognized the federal navigation power as sufficient
justification for the sweeping authority granted to the FPC under the
Power Act." While always controversial, the FPC outraged western officials further still with a series of decisions between 1946 and 1955.
In FirstIowa Hydro-electric Cooperative v. FederalPower Commission,"' an
electric cooperative sought to build a dam on Iowa's Cedar River, a
navigable waterway. Iowa denied the applicant a permit because the
project diverted water into another basin, a transfer that violated Iowa
policy. The Supreme Court upheld the FPC's authority to license the
project over state opposition, because the project furthered the federal
objective of comprehensive development of natural resources."
The FPC again ignored state authority in 1954, when it licensed
two tall dams in conflict with state law that established a Columbia
River sanctuary and prohibited dams over twenty-five feet in height on
tributaries in order to protect anadromous fish. The City of Tacoma
on the Cowlitz River, a navigable waterway entirely within the state,
proposed dams much higher than any previously built structures, 500
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Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 511-13, 524, 532-33 (1941).
H.R. Doc. No. 77-690, at 1-2 (1942).
King, supra note 521, at 18.
See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 380, 383
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
Id. at 181-83.
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and 240 feet respectively. " The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the FPC's decision." The United States Supreme Court declined to review the case. 541
The Supreme Court directly considered similar state fishery concerns a year later in Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, the well-known
"Pelton Dam" case.54 A private power company sought to build a dam
across Oregon's Deschutes River, a non-navigable river that served as
an important breeding area for salmon and steelhead. The state objected based on the dam's interference with the migration of the anadromous fish.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld
the FPC's license, over the state's objection, holding that "[i]f the dams
will destroy the fish industry of the river, we are powerless to prevent
it." 43 The court did not justify the FPC's authority over the project
based on the federal navigation clause, but still found that the commission had jurisdiction, based on the fact that one end of the dam rested
on an Indian reservation held in trust by the United States, and the
other end rested on a site previously reserved by the United States as a
hydropower site. The decision immediately alarmed westerners because it suggested that federal lands of all types had paramount water
rights overriding state-recognized water rights.
3. Federal Disregard of State-Recognized Property Rights
Increased activity along western waterways, coupled with the more
frequent exercise of the federal navigation power to construct dams
and other projects, raised concerns of many western water users about
the security of their water rights. One commentator noted that "the
recent malignant expansion of federal power [has come] at the expense of state prerogatives and private appropriation and riparian
Many of the western states successfully nurtured the prior
rights."'
appropriation doctrine and resisted efforts by the federal government
to claim ownership of unappropriated water on non-navigable streams.
Perhaps the United States Supreme Court allayed their fears when
it largely ignored the United States' efforts to claim such rights in Wyoming v. Colorad 5 in 1922. Later, in California-OregonPower Company v.
Beaver Portland Cement Company, Justice George Sutherland indicated
"[w]hat we hold is that following the act of 1877 [Desert Land Sales
539. See Washington Dep't of Game v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 207 F.2d 391, 395 (9th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
540. Id. at 398.
541. Washington Dep't Game v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
542. Fed. Power Comm'n v, Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
543. Washington Dep't of Game, 207 F.2d at 398.
544. Martz, supra note 529, at 631.
545. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
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Act], if not before, all non-navigable waters then a part of the public
domain became publicijuris,subject to the plenary control of the desOnce again, in the Supreme Court's 1945 deciignated states .... .
sion in Nebraska v. Wyoming, Justice William 0. Douglas rejected federal
claims to title of unappropriated western water by calling the argument
"largely academic."" 7
While private rights and state regulation seemed more secure on
non-navigable waterways, the reverse was true for navigable rivers. In
1945 the Supreme Court held that property owners were not entitled
to compensation when the navigational servitude encumbered land
below the high water mark, due to the construction of dams.' " While
holding that the specific state statute required compensation for private property loss due to reclamation projects, the Court suggested that
the Constitution might not require such compensation." 9
The Federal Power Act also had consequences for property ownership in the West. Regarding the FPC, one western water law attorney
argued,
[i]n the accomplishment of its important mission... the Commission
has ridden rough shod over state laws and policies on water resource
development and has not only taken private rights for public projects
without compensation, but may even have authorized private licensees to take the velocity and flow of streams and the economic value
of dam sites for private power use without compensation. It has extended its jurisdiction to streams that are not navigable in fact and to
projects that have no measurable effect upon navigation.w
Western congressional representatives, some of whom had firsthand experiences with federal agency activities in the West, undertook
a series of legislative initiatives to curtail federal power. The most controversial of these was the Barrett Bill, introduced in 1956. ' The Bill
required federal agencies to conform to state law and obtain necessary
state permits; however, Congress introduced and modified this Bill
several times but never passed it.

546. Id. at 163-64. This sentence "is used to argue that the case recognized state
ownership, or at least control, of all nonnavigable waters. And indeed, taken out of
context and isolated from the issues, that is not a totally unreasonable assertion. But
the controversy in Beaver Portland Cement involved only private parties, none of whom
claimed a federal right other than their patents." Eva Hanna Morreale, Federal-State
Conflicts Over Western Water-A Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RUTGERS L.
REv. 423, 436-37 (1966).
547. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 616 (1945).
548. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510-11 (1945).
549. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 754-55 (1950).
550. Martz, supra note 529, at 637.
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In the ensuing decade, Congress introduced and debated fifty such
"settlement bills," but passed none. In 1961, law professor Frank Trelease calmly reviewed these upheavals and concluded: "[t] he American
federation of states is a fairly good compromise for achieving the
greatest freedom for states to deal with local problems while at the
same time reserving to the federal government power to accomplish
national objectives.""'
4. Increased Interstate Competition Over Major Rivers
Beginning in the 1920s, many of the southwestern states pioneered
the use of the interstate compact as a means to resolve disagreements
over interstate streams. While these agreements did much to resolve
tensions, they typically took many years to negotiate and litigation frequently preceded, accompanied, or followed. While the participating
parties signed the Colorado River Compact in 1922, Arizona did not
ratify it until 1944. In the interim, on two occasions Arizona unsuccessfully sought to relitigate the issues before the United States Supreme
Court."' In 1952, Arizona sued California for a third time, seeking to
divide the waters of the lower basin. The lawsuit led to a decision generally in Arizona's favor in 1963."'
Similarly, in the Rio Grande basin, Colorado, New Mexico, and
Texas began negotiating a compact in 1923. A temporary, status quo
agreement was in place from 1929 to 1934 when Texas sued New Mexico in the United States Supreme Court and claimed that the construction of El Vado Dam in New Mexico on the Chama River interfered
with Texas' water entitlement below Elephant Butte Dam. At the urging of the federal government, the states returned to the negotiating
table and concluded the Rio Grande Compact in 1938. Texas sued
New Mexico when that state began falling behind in its deliveries to
Texas in 1940. The Court dismissed that case in 1957 when the Court
recognized the United States' sovereign immunity and the federal government refused to join the litigation.'' Texas and New Mexico sued
Colorado in 1966, accusing that state of failing to make the deliveries
called for by the compact."' The states agreed to postpone that case
pending negotiation. 7
Disagreements over the Pecos River, another shared waterway between Texas and New Mexico, led to threats of litigation as early as
552.

Frank J. Trelease, Federal Limitations on State Water Law, 10 Burr. L. REv. 399,
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553. See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931); Arizona v. California, 298 U.S.
558 (1936).
554. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963).
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1924. Negotiations, however, produced an interim agreement in 1935
and a formal compact in 1948."' Texas sued New Mexico when that
state proposed the construction of the Brantley Reservoir in 1974."
Some of these interstate disputes, such as the Arizona v. Californialitigation over the Colorado River, might be seen as colossal forms of general stream adjudications.
Along other western rivers, interstate tensions motivated the states
to attempt to write compacts, but did not cause actual litigation. While
South Dakota and Wyoming agreed in 1948 on a compact for the
Cheyenne River, Congress rejected it because of its possible impact on
Indian tribes. Between 1925 and 1966, the northwestern states of
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana, sometimes joined by Wyoming, Utah, and Nevada, attempted to write a compact concerning the
Columbia River." All or some of those states rejected compacts proposed in 1955, 1961, and 1963." The states abandoned the effort in
1966. Similarly, states proposed a compact for the Missouri River basin
in 1952, and then again in 1953. However, the basin states did not
adopt that compact.
While none of these interstate disputes was directly responsible for
a state initiating a general stream adjudication, the ongoing troubles
over interstate waters no doubt contributed to a climate that supported
such proceedings. As early as Kansas v. Colorado in 1907,6 the United
States Supreme Court signaled that it would weigh the relative existing
uses of water in each of the litigating states. State engineers and attorneys general understood that their position would improve if they
showed the extent of actual use of water along a contested interstate
stream, evidenced by a judicial decree in a general stream adjudication.
Elwood Mead and Morris Bien, joined by Oregon State Engineer
John H. Lewis, were so disturbed by the potential of interstate conflicts
they suggested to the National Irrigation Congress the application of
Wyoming's administrative water right determinations to interstate conflicts. They proposed the creation of a federal administrative agency
with the authority to determine the water rights of interstate streams,
when the states along those streams had not previously adjudicated
their rights."' 3 Such a federal solution to this problem was not well re-
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ceived in the West. Rather it provided further impetus for states to
determine or adjudicate their own water rights.
E. SUMMARY
If one can regard natural resource management authority as a triptych in which states, the federal government, and tribal powers each
comprise a scene, one image clearly dominated the post-World War II
era. The federal government seized the strongest role in western resource management during this period.
By contrast, the Indian tribes' authority progressively faded. Federal movements, such as assimilation and termination, thwarted tribal
power by the diminishment of Indian land ownership and tribal sovereignty, thereby erasing tribal participation in natural resource matters.
State power also dwindled, not so much because of state passivity,
but because federal strength grew unabated. Congress undertook bold
new initiatives that served to enhance federal agency power. Federal
reclamation projects consistently prevailed over state conservation and
management efforts.
States used the interstate compact negotiations most vividly to reassert primacy over their natural resources. These succeeded for the
most part, despite lengthy time lines and occasional outbreaks of litigation. Prompted in part by these successes, states began to commence
with general stream adjudications. As the era closed, a new kind of
state mobilization began. That mobilization culminated with the enactment of the McCarran Amendment.
V.PASSAGE OF THE MCCARRAN AMENDMENT
After World War II, western states, while still asserting state primacy
in water allocation, began to fear that federal reserved rights would
interfere with the water rights of junior appropriators based on state
law. Federal sovereign immunity prevented the reserved rights of federal agencies and Indian tribes from involvement in state general
The United States compounded the problem
stream adjudications.'
by often claiming its water rights as paramount and superior to other
water users. 65 In claiming these superior rights, rather than eminent
564. For example, when Arizona sought an adjudication before the United States
Supreme Court among basin states of Colorado River water rights in 1936, the Court
dismissed the case because the federal government claimed sovereign immunity. Without determining the extent of federal navigation rights to the river, the Court could
not establish rights to water impounded above Hoover Dam. Arizona v. California, 298
U.S. 558, 571-72 (1936).
565. Federal courts appeared open to such arguments. See, e.g., United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950); Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773, 786 (S.D. Cal.
1950) (discussing the "paramount" rights claimed by the federal government related to
the power to regulate navigation). The so-called "tidelands litigation" also revealed the
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domain power, the federal government avoided the requirement to
pay damages to junior appropriators. Federal reserved water rights
created an unknown "wild card" for western states, which prevented
them from planning for the future management of their waters.
Western states, under the leadership of Patrick McCarran, adamantly opposed the Department of Justice's staunch federal supremacy
position regarding western water rights. In 1952, this United States
Senator from Nevada successfully achieved passage of the McCarran
Amendment," which waived federal sovereign immunity and provided
the United States' consent to be joined in general stream adjudications. The legislative history of the McCarran Amendment indicated a
congressional willingness to tolerate diverse state proceedings. This
waiver, however, was valid only for judicial adjudications and not for
adjudication procedures undertaken exclusively by administrative
agencies. This waiver made modem general stream adjudications possible.
The passage of the McCarran Amendment did not clarify all the
uncertainties about quantifying federal water rights. Procedural issues
remained, such as what processes constituted a general stream adjudication and whether the amendment really waived immunity as to the
federal government's legal reliance on the threatening concept of "paramount" rights.
In these cases, the United States Supreme Court denied several coastal states, including California, of revenue from the valuable offshore oil leases in the marginal sea, the
three-mile zone seaward of the low-watermark. See United States v. California, 332 U.S.
19, 35-36 (1947); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950); and United
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1950).
566. The amendment was enacted as section 208(a)-(c) of the Department ofJustice
Appropriation Act. Act of July 10, 1952, Pub. L. No. 945, 66 Stat. 560 (current version
at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000)). It reads as follows:
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1)
for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the
United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and
the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a
party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead
that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable
thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments,
order, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review
thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in any such suit.
(b) Summons or other process in any such suit shall be served upon the Attorney General or his designated representative.
(c) Nothing in this section shall he construed as authorizing the joinder of
the United States in any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the
United States involving the right of States to the use of the water of any interstate stream.
Id. § 666(a)-(c). See generally David W. Edwards, Comment, McCarranAmendment: General Adjudications in Wyoming: Threshold Problems, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 53 (1981).
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reserved rights of federal agencies. In Arizona v. California, the United
States Supreme Court issued a powerful enunciation of Indian reserved
rights. "' With this opinion a new set of legal questions arose that
threatened to undo the McCarran Amendment. Must tribes litigate
Indian reserved water right claims in federal court? Did the McCarran
Amendment waive sovereign immunity as to these rights so that a state
court might also adjudicate these rights? Many state decision makers
believed these questions could be answered by modern general stream
adjudications.
A. FEDERAL RESERVED WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINE

The federal reserved water rights doctrine began with the controversy over the building of Elephant Butte Dam on the Rio Grande in
New Mexico. In the 1890s, private developers had sought to build a
dam on the river, but the United States opposed the project. In a case
reaching the United States Supreme Court, United States v. Rio Grande
Dam & Irrigation Company, the Court found that the federal government properly vetoed the project based on its land ownership along
the river. " The Court held that "a [s] tate cannot by its legislation
destroy the right of the United States, as owner of lands bordering on a
stream, to the continued flow of its waters; so far at least as may be
necessary for the beneficial uses of the government property.""9
The origins of the reserved right doctrine, in an Indian law context, began in a fishing controversy along Washington's Columbia
River soon after the turn of the twentieth century. Non-Indian fishermen utilized fish wheels to catch large amounts of salmon, and landowners denied the Yakima Indians access to customary fishing locations along the river. The United States sued on behalf of the Yakimas,
and the Supreme Court held in United States v. Winans that, pursuant to
their 1859 treaty with the United States, the Indians reserved their fish' With Justice McKenna speaking for the majoring and access rights. 70
ity, the Court held that "the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those not
granted." 7
1. The Winters Doctrine

Many consider the case of Winters v. United States to be the Court's
first full expression of the federal reserved rights doctrine as it pertains
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Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
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to water."2 In the 1880s, settlers pressured the federal government to
open the vast Great Blackfeet Reservation, established in 1855 in the
Montana Territory for non-Indian homesteading and other economic
activities. Indeed, Congress eventually reduced the reservation by
17,500,000 acres and divided it into three individual reservations, Fort
Peck, Blackfeet, and Fort Belknap. The negotiations with the Gros
Ventre and Assiniboine tribes, which eventually occupied the Fort
Belknap Reservation, occurred at the Fort Belknap Agency in January
1887. After three days of negotiations in extremely cold weather, the
Indians agreed to reserve for themselves 600,000 acres, a small fraction
of their original holdings, in exchange for the federal government's
promise of homes, livestock, farm equipment, and other aid. Congress
ratified the agreement between the tribes and the United States on
May 1, 1888; while the agreement did not specifically mention water
rights, the text indicated that the reservation's purpose was to encourage the Indians to abandon their nomadic way of life and adopt agriculture as a "pastoral and [civilized] people."57 The newly drawn reservation boundaries of the Fort Belknap Reservation included the
middle of the Milk River as the northern boundary74
Settlers immediately flowed into the area, aided by the Great
Northern Railroad, newly completed in 1893."' Many settlers established farms and new communities, such as Havre, Harlem, and Chinook, upstream of the Fort Belknap Reservation and began using Milk
River water. However, the government delayed irrigation on the new
reservation. Finally in 1898, the reservation superintendent filed a
state notice of appropriation for a flow rate of 10,000 miners' inches
(250 cubic feet per second)Y"
In spring 1905, drought conditions, compounded by upstream diversions, created a difficult situation for Indians on the Fort Belknap
Reservation:
We have had no water in our ditch whatsoever. Our meadows are
now rapidly parched up. The Indians have planted large crops and a
great deal of grain. All this will be lost unless some radical action is
taken at once to make the settlers above the Reservation respect our
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rights. To the Indians it either means good crops this fall, or starvation this winter.57'
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs authorized legal action, and

the federal attorney for Montana sued in federal court for an injunction against twenty-one defendants, including two irrigation companies
and a cattle firm.
While the United States Attorney based his case both on prior appropriation and riparian principles, United States District Court Judge
William H. Hunt based his decision to issue an injunction on the rights
the Indians reserved when they signed the 1889 treaty. In Judge Hall's
judgment, when the Indians signed the treaty granting rights to the
United States, they reserved "the right to the use of the waters of Milk
River, at least to the extent reasonably necessary to irrigate their
lands." 78 After the settlers appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, a three-judge panel of that court upheld
the injunction in February 1906 and elaborated further on Judge
Hunt's reservation doctrine. The court stated "[w]e must presume
that the government and the Indians, in agreeing to the terms of the
treaty... knew that 'the soil could not be cultivated' without the use of
water to 'irrigate the same. ' '""a The court affirmed that the doctrine of
reserved rights existed against the United States and its grantees, as
well as against the state and its grantees. The Ninth Circuit apparently
determined that the United States reserved the water right, based upon
its previous sovereign ownership of the lands in question, and that the
tribes also reserved water rights, based upon their right of occupancy
of the land."'
In January 1908, the United States Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed the issue in a decision written by Justice McKenna.' The Court
utilized the same basic reasoning set forth by Judge Hunt and the
Ninth Circuit, although the Court's opinion less clearly stated whether
the United States, tribes, or both "reserved" the necessary water for the
reservation. The Court held "[t]he power of the [g]overnment to reserve the waters and exempt them from appropriation [cannot be de-

577. Letter from William R. Logan, Superintendent, Fort Belknap Indian Agency, to
Francis E. Leupp, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Uune 3, 1905) (on file with authors).
578. Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 749 (9th Cir. 1906) (describing the district
court holding). As historian Norris Hundley indicates, while Judge Hunt and later the
court of appeals refers to the 1888 agreement as a treaty, it did not have that stature
since Congress had abandoned the treaty-making system in 1871. See Hundley, supra
note 576, at 26.
579. Winters, 143 F. at 745.
580. Hundley, supra note 576, at 30.
581. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 574, 578 (1908).
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nied] . .. [t]hat the government did reserve them we have decided,
and for a use which would be necessarily continued through years. "5 2
The Ninth Circuit again applied the reserved water rights doctrine
in a case also decided in 1908, Conrad Investment Company v. United
States." In this dispute, once again arising in Montana, the court held
that the Blackfeet Indians had a paramount right to water for irrigating
and for other useful purposes. 84 While the court specified the amount
of water for the tribe, it expressly indicated that the tribe could modify
the decree by application to a court as uses increased."' Thus, the
court emphasized the open-ended nature of the reserved rights doctrine, which signaled the great uncertainty of the doctrine for western
states and territories and their non-Indian citizens.
2. Post-WintersDecisions
In the years following the Supreme Court's Winters decision, the reserved rights doctrine developed haphazardly. While acknowledging
the "Montana cases," an Indian Bureau agent entered into a limitation
agreement with white settlers giving them 75 percent of the waters of
Ahtanum Creek to the detriment of the Yakima Tribe. " This strange
act, flatly contradictory to the spirit of Winters, caused future litigation
over the respective water rights in this area of central Washington.
In Arizona, the district court entered the Kent Decree in 1910 to apportion Salt River."? While the decree granted rights to Indian tribes
in the Phoenix area, the decree failed to mention the reserved water
right doctrine. In another Arizona case, the court held that the United
States did not possess reserved spring water that, if developed, provided no significant benefit to the Indian reservation.8 Similarly, the
Oregon Supreme Court held in 1917 that the 1855 treaty with the
Walla Walla, Cayuse, and Umatilla Indians contained no implied grant
of water rights to the Umatilla River for the benefit of the Indians. The
court awarded water only for actual beneficial uses."
In the 1920s, the reserved water right doctrine received indirect
support from the United States Attorney General, Harlan F. Stone,
582. Id. at 577 (internal citations omitted).
583. Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 831-32, 835 (9th Cir. 1908).
584. Id. at 831.
585. Id. at 832.
586. See United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 329, 336 (9th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957) (concluding that the United States as trustee for
Indian tribes was authorized to grant non-Indian landowners a right to use Indian
water but that right could not exceed landowners' actual needs at time of grant); In re
Water Rights in Ahtanum Creek, 245 P. 758, 760 (Wash. 1926).
587. Hurley v. Abbott, 259 F.Supp. 669, 669 (D. Ariz. 1966) (referring to the 1910
case commonly known as the Kent Decree).
588. United States v. Wrightman, 230 F. 277, 282-83 (D. Ariz. 1916).
589. Byers v. Wa-Wa-Ne, 169 P. 121, 128 (Or. 1917).
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later a member of the United States Supreme Court, who ruled that
the Indians' right to water was an incident of occupancy, that is, a
"right to the hidden or latent resources of the land, such as minerals or
potential water power." 590 Also, during the 1930s, courts continued to
address the rights of Indians to some important western rivers. Arizona's federal court entered a consent decree in 1935, quantifying water rights along the Gila River system. Known as Globe Equity No. 59, the
decree quantified specific rights for the Gila River Indian Reservation,
with an immemorial date of priority, and the San Carlos Apache Tribe,
with a priority date of 1846."' The decree, however, made no mention
of the reserved water rights doctrine or the Winters decision."'
The question arose in Nevada as to whether reserved water rights
could exist for a reservation created by statute or executive order,
rather than by treaty or agreement between the United States and a
tribe. On two occasions, the federal district court refused to recognize
reserved water rights for the Paiute Tribe, distinguishing the Winters
decision by finding that the Indians were at war with the United States
when their reservation was created,"9 ' and later indicated, "this court is
not moved to give a decree destroying the rights of the white pioneers."" 4 On review, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a statute or executive order, as well as a treaty or agreement could
evidence an intention to reserve water. The court noted, "The intention had to be arrived at by taking account of circumstances, the situation and needs of the Indians and the purpose for which the lands had
been reserved." 9
3. Allotment Issues
What water rights, if any, followed an allotment of Indian land occupied the courts most frequently between 1908 and the 1950s. In
Skeem v. United States, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined
that non-Indian lessees of Indian allotments could utilize the Indians'
water rights as "neither the actual leasing of their lands under the authority to lease nor the surrender of possession to the lessees operated
to relinquish any water rights in the lands which they [the Indians] so
choose to retain." ' 6 Also, in United States v. Hibner, the court extended
590. Executive Order Indian Reservations-Leasing Act, 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 171, 178
(1924).
591. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., No. E-59-Globe, at 86 (D. Ariz.
1935) (commonly known as the Globe Equity Decree).
592. See id.
593. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 11 F. Supp. 158, 163 (D. Nev.
1935)
594. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 14 F. Supp. 10, 11 (D. Nev. 1936).
595. United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334, 336 (9th Cir. 1939).
596. Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93, 96 (9th Cir. 1921).
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this same principle to the sale of Indian allotments within the Fort Hall
Reservation in Idaho.5"7 The court held that a purchaser of an Indian
allotment acquired the same water rights and priority date of the Indian allottee although the buyer must put the water to beneficial use
with reasonable diligence or risk abandonment.
These Indian allotment issues continued in the 1930s. In United
States v. Powers, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the nonIndian assignees' water rights constituted a continuation of the Indian
allottees' rights. "' The Secretary of the Interior was not authorized to
deprive any allottee or patentee of his 'just and equal right" to the use
of the water. The United States Supreme Court sustained the decision
in 1939 and interpreted the Treaty of 1868 as implying water rights for
individual allottees for farming purposes."'
In a case involving Montana's Flathead Reservation, the Ninth Circuit also determined that an individual Indian had no water rights until the selection of an allotment, but after the allotment, the allottee
was entitled to a 'just and equal distribution" of the water.' The Montana Supreme Court also recognized the basis of the reserved water
rights doctrine. In a 1938 case arising on the Crow Indian Reservation,
the court held the United States reserved water for the use of the Indians; that a portion of the reserved water right was appurtenant to allottees' lands; and when allotments are sold or leased, a portion of the
reserved water right goes with the land unless a contrary intention appears."
B.ADJUDICATION OF FEDERAL AND TRIBAL RIGHTS BEFORE MCCARRAN
AMENDMENT

Prior to passage of the McCarran Amendment in 1952, most western states did not contemplate the adjudication of federal or tribal reserved water rights. In states with large amounts of federal agency or
tribal land, the adjudications ultimately were inconclusive undertakings.0 ' The United States almost always succeeded in avoiding involvement in litigation by asserting sovereign immunity." Since the
United States served as trustee for most tribal land and water, these
tribal water rights also benefited from immunity.
597. United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909, 912 (D. Idaho 1928).
598. United States v. Powers, 94 F.2d 783, 786 (9th Cir. 1938).
599. United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 533 (1939).
600. United States v. McIntire, 101 F.2d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 1939).
601. Anderson v. Spear-Morgan Livestock Co., 79 P.2d 667, 669 (Mont. 1938).
602. See, e.g., In re Water Rights in Ahtanum Creek, 245 P. 758 (Wash. 1926) (involving a state court adjudication of which United States was aware but did not participate).
603. See, e.g., Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 610, 626, affd in part sub nom. City of
Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627, 629 (1963) (dismissing suit against the United States
for lack ofjurisdiction).
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State or federal court proceedings progressed in locations not implicating federal or tribal lands and the court issued relatively stable
resulting decrees. Where disputes involved federal interests, the
United States sued other water users in state or federal court or consented to be joined in individual state or federal lawsuits. If the federal
government chose not to become involved in an adjudication, however, the litigation would likely not be final or meaningful. A persistent problem, particularly under both the Colorado and Wyoming adjudication models, was that no adjudication could truly be general if it
involved the federal government and the United States asserted sovereign immunity."
The federal government initiated suit or consented to be joined in
adjudications on several important western rivers resulting in decrees
such as Arizona's Globe Equity decree,"5 Nevada's OrrDitch decree," and
Washington's consent decree in the Yakima River basin," as well as the
foundational Winters v. United State?" case on the Milk River in Montana. Still, the large amount of federal and tribal land in the West,
comprising 50 percent of the land mass in seven states, set the stage for
continued conflict between federal agencies and the owners of statebased water rights.'
The ubiquitous presence of federal and tribal lands in the West,
many with potential federal reserved water rights, thus cast a shadow
on many private and state resource management decisions. Private
landholders and permittees of state lands might not appreciate that a
nearby federal parcel carried with it a potentially senior water right.
Even if private landholders and permittees appreciated this possibility,
they had no certain way of calculating the extent or priority of this
right. These individuals could not look to the courts for an answer
604. See WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 356, § 106, at 106.
605. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., No. E-59-Globe, at 86 (D. Ariz.
1935).
606. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 113 (1983) (describing the history of
the Orr Ditch decree).
607. Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 626 F.2d 95, 97
(9th Cir. 1980).
608. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
609. In 1970, the Public Land Law Review Commission described the impact of
federal landholdings upon western water:
Federal lands are the source of most of the water in the 11 coterminous western states, providing approximately 61 percent of the total natural runoff occurring in the region. Most of this runoff comes from land withdrawn or reserved for specific purposes. Forest Service and National Park Service reservations contribute about 88 and 8 percent, respectively, of the runoff from
public lands and more than 59 percent of the total yield from all lands of
those states. Other public lands, such as the vast acreages administered by
the Bureau of Land Management, do not contribute much to the overall yield
of western streams, but are so situated that they influence water quality.
ONE THIRD OF THE NATiON'S LAND, supra note 9, at 141.
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either, since the United States could not be involuntarily brought into
state or federal court to participate in an adjudication of its water
rights.
Thus, many individuals formed the perception that unascertained
federal and tribal water rights clouded the value and utility of all other
water rights in the major watersheds of the West. Whether this perception was mostly truth or myth remains difficult to ascertain. In the
early 1950s, however, California altered its proposed California Water
Plan to avoid the need for an adjudication of the Sacramento River
basin." '° The Colorado Supreme Court stated "[o]ur situation with respect to water rights [where] priorities are decreed under state laws,
but any water rights of the United States in Colorado remain mysterious, largely unknown, uncatalogued and unrelated to decreed rights.
This creates an undesirable, impractical and chaotic situation.""' One
federal attorney described the concerns:
There is perhaps no topic in the field of state-federal relations which
raises the hackles of westerners more than the issue of the federal
government's acquisition of water rights. As a result of the size of the
United States' landholdings, in addition to its broad constitutional
authority, the states fear that the federal government will disrupt their
already over-appropriated systems for water allocation and usurp their
scarce supply."'
]
Senator Patrick McCarran argued "[h undreds of cases.. .have been
left 'hanging in the balance, because the federal government has adamantly blocked the path of justice' by not consenting to be sued in
Nothing in the official McCarran
water right adjudications.""

610. Vincent Ostrom, State Administration of Natural Resources in the West, 47 AM. POL.
Sc. Rav. 478, 479 n.2 (1953).
611. United States v. District Court in and for Eagle County, 458 P.2d 760, 765
(Colo. 1969). This language, coining more than fifteen years after the passage of the
McCarran Amendment, may not be an entirely accurate assessment of pre-McCarran
circumstances.
I am coming to believe that "the Feds" were right all along. In 1964, at the
height of the debates over the "Western Water Rights Settlements Acts," it was
pointed out that "not a single case of harm has been reported," that "for all of
the outcry... not one state, not one county, not one municipality, not one irrigation district, not one corporation, not one individual has come forward to
plead and prove that the United States . .. has destroyed any private right."
Twenty-two years after PeltonDam this is still true.
Frank J. Trelease, FederalReserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DENY. L. J. 473, 491-92
(1977).
612. Sandra Dunn, Cooperative Federalism in the Acquisition of Water Rights: A Federal
Practitioner'sPoint of View, 19 PAC. L.J. 1323, 1323 (1988).
613. Catherine Anne Berry, The McCarran Water Rights Amendment of 1952: Policy Development, Interpretation, and Impact on Cross-Cultural Water Conflicts 134
(1993) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Colorado) (on file with the University
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Amendment's legislative history, however, enumerated all these cases.
When the legislative history is examined, it is apparent that the difficulties in just one small adjudication provided the catalyst for the McCarran Amendment, and major southern California water controversies
that had litde to do with the stated purposes of the McCarran Amendment soon overshadowed this adjudication.
C.STATED AND BACKGROUND REASONS FOR THE MCCARRAN
AMENDMENT

The original, specific impetus for the McCarran Amendment was
the lack of progress in a small Nevada adjudication" 4 that continued to
distress one of the participating lawyers. Attorney J. D. Skeen represented the Ellison Ranch Company, which owned a large ranch in the
Quin River basin in northern Nevada. After the BIA purchased additional land and water rights on the Quin River in 1939, neighboring
water users sought to reopen a 1919 decree in order to resolve disputes
over water use. The United States objected to state court jurisdiction
and removed the case to federal court. The federal court held sovereign immunity precluded suit against the United States. To remedy
the situation, Skeen prepared the first draft of what became the
McCarran Amendment in 1949, written in broad universal terms, but
designed primarily to secure state court jurisdiction over the United
States in the Quin River adjudication. 1 '
Skeen then found a very receptive United States Senator in Nevada's Patrick McCarran."' Early in his career, McCarran represented
some litigants in the Orr Ditch litigation on the Truckee River and
strongly allied himself with the Italian-American irrigators, who homesteaded along the tributaries to Pyramid Lake, against the Indians of
the Pyramid Lake Reservation. McCarran's r~sum6 included service on
the Nevada Supreme Court where he authored several important water
law decisions.
McCarran's central belief in state authority over water resources
probably prompted his introduction of Skeen's bill. While on the
bench in 1924, McCarran stated, "[t]he theory that the [federal] government has control over all unappropriated waters, as laid down in
of Colorado) (quoting Press Release, Patrick McCarran July 6, 1952). Berry is the
source for much of the following history on the origins of the McCarran Amendment.
614.
Pac. Live Stock Co. v. Ellison Ranching Co., 192 P. 262 (Nev. 1920), appeal dismissed, 286 P. 120, 125 (Nev. 1930).
615. In part, the United States sought to avoid state courtjurisdiction over an appeal
from a state engineer's decision favorable to the federal government. United States v.
District Court, 238 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1951).
616.
See generally MICHAEL J. YBARRA, WASHINGTON GONE CRAZY: SENATOR PAT
McCARRAN AND THE GREAT AMERICAN COMMUNIST HUNT (2004) (providing a recent
biography on McCarran who was nationally known as a Red-scare, anti-Communist
crusader).
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the [Orr] decree, is, in my opinion, and it is shared by others, revolutionary."' 7 Fellow Senator Arthur Watkins of Utah, also active in securing passage of the McCarran Amendment, shared McCarran's sentiments. Watkins had been a farmer, an attorney for a water users' association, ajudge, and a newspaper editor. He had been involved in the
Provo River adjudication where the United States would not agree to
state court jurisdiction."' Watkins "believed that reclamation was the
'foundation stone' of the modern economic structure in the western
,
69
United States and, indeed, the entire country ....
Senator McCarran introduced the original version of the McCarran
Amendment as Senate Bill 2305 on July 20, 1949.Y While much of the
original language eventually became law, Senate Bill 2305 varied in
one important respect from the final legislation: while waiving the
sovereign immunity of the United States, the 1949 version provided
that the United States had the right to remove to federal court an adjudication commenced in state court."'
Both the United States Departments of Justice and Interior opposed the proposed legislation. The Justice Department, in particular,
noted that Congress had the ability to waive sovereign immunity on a
case-by-case basis and that the proposal subjected the United States to
"a piecemeal adjudication of water rights, in turn resulting in a multiplicity of actions.""' The Interior Department suggested that the
waiver only extend to water rights established under state law by the
United States and specifically exclude any water rights held by the
United States on behalf of Indians. Senate Bill 2305 died in the Judiciary Committee at the end of the 81st Congress in 1950.
McCarran re-introduced his Bill in January 1951 as Senate Bill 18.
Congress assigned the Bill to the Judiciary Committee and thence to a
617. Berry, supra note 613, at 82.
618. See United States v. District Court, 238 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1951) (providing a
chronology of this litigation).
619. Berry, supra note 613, at 91.
620. Id. at 107.
621. The 1949 version read as follows:
That consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any
suit for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source or for the administration of such rights where it appears that the
United States is the owner or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, exchange, or otherwise and that the
United States is a necessary party to such suit: Provided, That the United
States shall have the right of removal to the Federal court of any such suit to
which it is a party: Provided further, That no judgment for costs shall be entered against the United States in any such suit. Summons or other process in
any such suit shall be serviced upon the Attorney General or his designated
representative.
Id. at 107 n.48 (quoting S.2305, 81" Cong. (1949)).
622. Id. at 108 (quoting Letter from P. Ford, Ass't U.S. Attorney General, to P.
McCarran (Feb. 27, 1950)).
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subcommittee consisting of "McCarran, as chairman, Watkins, and
Warren Magnuson of Washington." "' The Judiciary Subcommittee held
hearings in April and August 1951 presided over by Watkins, the only
Senator present. Many representatives of western water resource organizations testified in support of the bill. In particular, Glen Saunders, a Colorado water attorney, argued that the bill did not go far
enough and Congress should eliminate the possibility of removal to
federal court."' No tribal representatives attended the hearings. William Veeder, then a Department of Justice attorney, was the sole witness against the bill. He argued that state law inadequately protected
the United States' interests and that the legislation resulted in prolific
litigation and "the forward progress of the West, for which we are all
fighting, would be impeded tremendously.'"...
During this period, the fate of McCarran's proposed legislation became fatefully intertwined with two major California water controversies. Neither of these controversies directly related to the purpose of
McCarran's Bill; but, once the controversies and the Bill became
slightly linked, McCarran received considerable support for his legislation from the large and powerful California delegation.
The earlier of the two controversies involved California's Central
Valley Project, a reclamation project originally commenced by the state
but taken over by the federal government during the hard times of the
1930s. The project diverted water from the Sacramento River delta
and transported it to the west side of the San Joaquin Valley. In turn,
water from the San Joaquin River was impounded at Friant Dam and
diverted into canals, thereby drying up the San Joaquin River for 60
miles downstream of the dam (an area near Fresno). While the United
States bought out many water users in the dewatered reach, some
landowners filed suit in state superior court in 1947 seeking to enjoin
the federal officials from storing water at Friant Dam. The United
States removed this litigation to federal court. Years later, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that this litigation constituted an essentially private action and not a comprehensive proceeding under the
McCarran Amendment. 62
The second, more controversial proceeding that assisted in the passage of the McCarran Amendment was the Santa Margarita water conflict near San Diego. In 1940 the Vail Company, an upstream riparian
user of the Santa Margarita River in San Diego County, and Rancho
623. Id. at 110.
624. Id. at 112.
625. Id. at lll.
626. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618 (1963).Judge Lawrence K. Karlton recently
granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding the Bureau of Reclamation
liable under the Reclamation Act for damage done to the San Joaquin River fishery
due to the dewatering caused by Friant Dam. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Patterson,
333 F. Supp. 2d 906, 925-26 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
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Margarita y Las Floras, a downstream riparian reached a stipulated
agreement. The judgment stipulated that Vail received almost onethird of the river's flow, the Rancho received almost two-thirds, and
four small landowners received very small amounts. 7
In 1941, the United States Navy purchased Rancho Margarita to establish Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base. At about the same time,
Fallbrook Public Utility District, a supplier of municipal and irrigation
water for valuable citrus and avocado crops, started using water in the
middle of the Santa Margarita watershed. Fallbrook based its claim on
appropriative rights, and Fallbrook argued that a reservoir upon the
river, if built with federal reclamation funds, would provide enough
water for all. Discussions between the United States and Fallbrook resulted in a preliminary agreement to build the reservoir for both Fallbrook and the Navy. William Veeder, the same Justice Department
attorney, objected to this agreement on the basis that the United States
already had water rights under the 1940 judgment. Thus, in January
1951, the Department ofJustice filed suit in federal court to adjudicate
its water rights on the Santa Margarita, naming as defendants hundreds of individuals in the vicinity. "'
While the United States had a strong legal position, as it advocated
the 1940 stipulated judgment, its suit to enforce the judgment was an
unmitigated public relations disaster. The public perceived the lawsuit
as a hindrance to economic growth. California officials, including
then-Governor Earl Warren and then-Senator Richard Nixon, denounced the suit. In "December 1951, Readers Digest ran a story condemning the lack of moral sensitivity in our Government which has put
into jeopardy thousands of our small landowners; their property,
homes, savings and their future."'"
Using a common form of pleading in riparian rights litigation, the
Justice Department alleged "paramount rights" to the Santa Margarita
based on the 1940 court judgment. Opponents immediately linked
this term with the concept of "paramount rights" in the tidelands litigation brought by the United States against California, Texas, and Louisiana. In these cases, the United States Supreme Court denied the
627. Berry, supra note 613, at 125.
628. United States v. Fallbrook Pub. Util. Dist., 101 F. Supp. 298, 300 (S.D. Cal.
1951). The litigation has gone on for years. After one interim victory, one of the parties is reported to have said, "One more such victory for either of us and we will both
be in the poorhouse. Let's shake the lawyers and get in a room and make a decision,
one way or the other, on this matter." Carl G. Mueller, Jr., Comment, FederalOwnership
of Inland Waters: The Fallbrook Case, 31 TEX. L. REv. 404, 409 n.34 (1953). On October 4,
2004, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution which authorized
$60 million for groundwater-surface water conjunctive use facilities in the watershed.
H.R. 4389, 108th Cong. (2004). The Bush Administration opposes the legislation because of the uncertain affect the project would have on the water rights of the
Pechanga, Cahuilla, and Romona tribes, which are still pending in the adjudication.
629. Berry, supra note 613, at 127 (internal quotations omitted).
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states revenue from valuable offshore oil leases in the marginal sea, the
three-mile zone seaward of the low-water mark."' Thus, the public
viewed the Santa Margarita litigation as another front of an unrelenting federal campaign to diminish state responsibility over local natural
resources.
The Santa Margarita conflict helped the McCarran Amendment
secure a powerful alliance between Senator McCarran and Senator
William F. Knowland of California and other members of the California delegation because California also wanted state control of its water
resources. While Senate Bill 18 passed the Senate on June 21, 1952,
McCarran, who also served on the Joint Senate-House Committee on
Appropriations, saw the opportunity to include the language of his bill
as an amendment to the 1953 appropriations bill. Senator Knowland
further amended the appropriations bill to prohibit the Department of
Justice from spending funds for the water rights adjudication of the
Santa Margarita River. Senator Knowland's amendment apparently
created a powerful engine, linked in the legislators' mind with McCarran's proposal, which resulted in both houses rapidly approving both
provisions. While several executive agencies counseled President
Harry Truman to veto the appropriations bill due to these add-ons,
Truman reluctantly signed the legislation onJuly 9, 1952."'
Ironically, in September 1951, attorney J. D. Skeen reported to
Senator McCarran that the resolution of the problem of securing the
Justice Department's participation in the Quin River adjudication had
occurred. Although the issue that prompted the legislation had been
resolved, the proposed McCarran Amendment now had a life of its
own. California's Central Valley Project and Santa Margarita water
conflicts sufficiently enraged western politicians and led to the necessary mobilization to secure passage of the McCarran Amendment.
D.WHAT TYPE OF ADJUDICATION DID CONGRESS HAVE IN MIND?

Passage of the McCarran Amendment did not immediately resolve
all federal-state tensions over western water, but instead left state officials wondering how to proceed. Courts and lawyers were unsure how
to interpret the congressional waiver of immunity that applies "in any
suit... for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system
or other source ...."32 Would adjudication proceedings continue as
they had in the early 1900s, as illustrated in the following discussion of

630.

United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 23, 41 (1947); United States v. Louisi-

ana, 339 U.S. 699, 701, 706 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 709, 720
(1950).
631.

Berry, supra note 613, at 134.

632.

43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2000).
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cases in Oregon and Nevada, or would a substantial modification be
required in how states adjudicated water rights?
The United States Supreme Court's important Pacific Live Stock v.
Lewis decision, written by Justice Willis Van Devanter from Wyoming,
described the pre-McCarran Oregon adjudication system. "' A California corporation, which owned land along Oregon's Silvies River,
brought suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of Oregon's 1909 (amended in 1913) adjudication statute. In the process of
sustaining the adjudication statute against challenges of due process
and Fourteenth Amendment violations, the Court described the features of this adjudication.
Under the Oregon statute, the three-member Oregon Water Board
(OWB) can begin an adjudication based upon a petition of a water
user. Notice is provided to all water users at every material step.
Claimants file their claims with the division superintendent, and then
the state engineer makes measurements and observations and prepares
a report. Claimants may contest the claim of any other claimant. Objectors receive a hearing before the OWB division superintendent
where they may introduce evidence and subpoena witnesses. Thereafter, the evidence, sworn statements of witnesses, and the engineer's
observations and measurements are submitted to the board. The
board makes findings of fact and a provisional order of determination.
The board transmits the evidence and provisional order of determination to the court. The court hears exceptions to the board's findings
or proposed order. The court may hear further evidence or the matter
may be resubmitted to the board for additional hearings. The court
enters a final order that may be appealed to the state supreme court.
At the conclusion of the adjudication, assuming adequate proof,
claimants received a certificate of water right. The United States Supreme Court upheld this statutory arrangement in its 1916 decision."
Two years later, in 1918, litigants challenged Nevada's adjudication
statute, substantially similar to Oregon's.1 5

Patrick McCarran, then

ChiefJustice of the Nevada Supreme Court, dissented in that case, and
the length and complexity of both majority and dissenting opinions
indicated the court's working knowledge of all aspects of the adjudication. The court sustained Nevada's statute over challenges that it violated the separation of powers doctrine. The court also held that the
state engineer exercised only quasi-judicial powers. Justice McCarran,
in his dissent, indicated his belief that the statute invaded the judiciary's province. "The district court assumes to take jurisdiction of this
matter after determination by a ministerial officer, and can only review
to ultimately affirm or modify that determination. In this it permits
633.
634.
635.

Pac. Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440 (1916).
Id. at 454-55.
See Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. District Court, 171 P. 166 (Nev. 1918).
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itself to be divested of original jurisdiction and assumes an appellate
jurisdiction forbidden by the Constitution.""u
During the 1951 hearings on the proposed McCarran Amendment,
several witnesses also described the adjudications in their states. Denver water attorney Glen Saunders provided a detailed description of
the Colorado system, which is much more a judicial process than Oregon's. The Colorado process was an ongoing adjudication that decreed all significant state law water rights. Courts also adjudicate new
water uses and add them to existing decrees.
The senators supporting the McCarran Amendment did go to
some lengths to ensure that one type of state litigation would not qualify for a waiver of federal sovereign immunity. In particular, Senator
Warren Magnuson of Washington was concerned that some water users, frustrated with the federal reclamation program, might use the
waiver provided to frustrate progress on federal reclamation projects in
western states. In correspondence between the senators, McCarran
assured Magnuson that the bill was not meant to authorize such suits.
Federal courts faithfully refused to recognize a waiver of sovereign immunity in such instances.
We cannot know exactly what type of adjudication McCarran or
Congress intended when enacting the McCarran Amendment. McCarran and Watkins, who were primarily involved in the amendment, no
doubt knew of the many approaches used by western states in adjudicating water. Pacific Live Stock, Vineyard Land, and the testimony of Senate witnesses portrayed the adjudication processes underway when the
McCarran Amendment passed. Certainly, Oregon and Colorado represented polar opposites on the spectrum of approaches. Although
McCarran appeared to personally oppose an administrative adjudication like Oregon's, 7 he probably tolerated the diversity of state adjudications if his amendment restored control of water resources to the
western states.
Most other western senators were probably more interested in the
amendment as a way to prevent perceived federal over-reaching in
cases like Santa Margarita. Members of the House of Representatives
likely gave the matter little thought as the provision sped through that
chamber, without hearings, as part of an appropriations measure.
E. IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF McCARRAN AMENDMENT

The passage of the McCarran Amendment did not clarify all the
uncertainties about quantifying federal water rights. Procedural issues
remained, such as what processes constituted a general stream adjudi-

636.
637.

Id. at 186.
See id. at 175-85.
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cation and whether the amendment really waived immunity as to the
reserved rights of federal agencies.
The federal government continued to frustrate state efforts to adjudicate rights even after passage of the federal McCarran Amendment
in 1952. In several important conflicts, the United States routinely
asserted sovereign immunity. Examples included: United States v. United
States District Court,'" which challenged the administration of the Central Valley Project in California; a claim that the United States
breached its contract by delivering water from the Rio Grande Project
to a non-Project irrigation district;-," an appropriator's suit to prevent
the diversion of water to New Mexico's Bosque del Apache Wildlife
Refuge;' and Texas' effort to enforce provisions of the Rio Grande
Compact.64 1
The United States Attorney General ordered some of the federal
attorneys to withdraw from pending stream adjudications on the basis
that these were not comprehensive proceedings and did not afford
jurisdiction for the courts to adjudicate federal paramount rights:
Accordingly, the United States withdrew from Denver v. Northern Colorado Conservancy District [pending before the Colorado state court],
adjudicating the transwatershed diversion rights of Denver and the
Bureau of Reclamation, and from Rank v. Krug [pending before the
California federal district court], adjudicating the rights of the United
States and San Joaquin water users to the Central Valley Project water.
In the latter case nine years of testimony, at tremendous expense to
the litigants, has very probably been wasted by the refusal of the government to submit its claims to litigation in the Central Valley case.64'
Similarly, in Nevada, the commanding officer of the Hawthorne Naval
Reserve withdrew applications for drilling permits from the state of
4
Nevada, indicating that state approval was not necessary."
Despite the federal government's challenge to many state adjudicative proceedings, the McCarran Amendment laid the foundation for
modern general stream adjudications beginning in the 1970s.
F. ARIZONA V. CAUFORNIA AND THE REEMERGENCE OF FEDERAL RESERVED

RIGHTS
With the passage of the McCarran Amendment, western states
freely pursued different approaches to stream adjudications with the
638. United States v. United States District Court, 206 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1953).
639. Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclamation Dist. v. Robbins, 213 F.2d 425,
428 (5th Cir. 1954).
640. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Gatlin, 294 P.2d 628, 628-29 (N.M. 1956).
641. Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 991 (1957).
642. Martz, supra note 529, at 644.
643. Nevada v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 600, 603 (D. Nev. 1958).
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promise that the federal government could no longer assert sovereign
immunity. In reality, states had little incentive in the early 1950s to
undertake large-scale, basin-wide or statewide adjudications. State officials focused on the potential impact of large federal agency projects,
such as Camp Pendleton. States were less concerned with Indian water
rights since they were based on that largely forgotten, half-century old
Winters case-and, in any event, the tribes lacked the financial ability to
develop their water."
Western state officials were familiar with the judicially created federal reserved rights doctrine, but in reality this doctrine proved not to
be an obstacle in adjudications. For fifty years, officials recognized
federal Indian reserved water rights in the abstract but ignored them
on the land. Western illusions would soon be shattered.
The realities of western water fundamentally changed in 1963 with
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. Calfornia.
In recognizing a congressional apportionment of the Colorado River
among basin states, the Court also examined the water rights of the
lower Colorado River Indian reservations. In its decision, the Court
reaffirmed the reserved rights doctrine of the Winters case but also extended the doctrine to include other federal reservations, such as wildlife refuges. The Court affirmed the special master's recognition of
reserved water rights for five Indian tribes along the river and also to
various national forests and monuments. Most importantly, the Supreme Court approved the standard of "practicable irrigable acreage,"
clarifying how Indian reserved rights might be quantified based on
how much reservation land could be successfully irrigated. The Court
also held that the Secretary of the Interior, as the river master, could
apportion and distribute Colorado River water among the users within
each state without regard to state permitting procedures.
The potential of large Indian reserved water right claims on all of
the West's major rivers sent shock waves through the region. The Supreme Court also extended the reserved rights doctrine to public lands
reserved for a particular governmental purpose, including national
parks and forests. Today if Congress creates a park, national forest,
wildlife refuge, military base, or other use of public land without explicitly addressing water, the reservation of land implies Congress' intention to reserve water sufficient to accomplish congressional purposes. As is the case with Indian water rights, the priority date for the
federal water right is the date Congress withdrew the public land from
the public domain or reserved the land for a particular purpose. The
water need not actually be put to use; but, when it is, the use has prior644. See generally DANIEL MCCOOL, COMMAND OF THE WATERS: IRON TRIANGLES,
FEDERAL WATER DEVELOPMENT, AND INDIAN WATER (1987) (discussing the federal government's failure to develop Indian water).
645. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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ity over intervening rights created under a state system of prior appropriation. As water law professor Frank Trelease commented, "the worst
fears of the westerners had come true; federal administrative control of
water... [had been] substituted for the appropriation system of...
[water] ... rights." '
VI. CONCLUSION
After Arizona v. California, Winters was no longer a dusty turn-of-the
century novelty but a powerful legal doctrine. With Arizona v. California came a new set of legal questions that threatened to undo the
McCarran Amendment. Must Indian reserved water right claims be
litigated in federal court? Did the McCarran Amendment waive sovereign immunity as to these rights so they might also be adjudicated in
state court? As explored in a forthcoming article, twenty more years of
costly and divisive litigation would be required before the United States
Supreme Court answered these questions. Western states soon faced a
mature and expanded reserved rights doctrine, prompting state officials to view modern adjudication proceedings as a means for finality.

646. Mark Basham, Note, In re Water of Hallett Creek System, 30 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 187,
193 (1990) (internal citations omitted).
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With the growing demand for water-based recreational opportunities,
conflicts over the right to use the surface of artificial watercourses
likely will arise with increasing frequency in the future.'
I. INTRODUCTION
With regard to the recreational opportunities provided by Lake
Lure, Professor James N. Corbridge, Junior's 1984 prophecy was precisely on point. Increasing use of the lake for a wide variety of activities, ranging from canoeing and fishing to pleasure boating and water
skiing, resulted in increasing conflict between these uses. Left unregulated, a classic "tragedy of the commons" will inevitably result.'
To avoid such a tragedy, the Town of Lake Lure (Town) and the
Lake Lure Marine Commission (LLMC) must regulate activities occurring both on Lake Lure and on shoreline areas. Following a review of
the history of the lake in Part II of this article, Parts III and IV, respectively discuss the regulatory authorities of the Town and the LLMC.
1. James N. Corbridge, Jr., Surface Rights in Artificial Watercourses, 24 NAT.
REsoURCESJ. 887, 927 (1984) (internal citations omitted).
2. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243-48 (Dec. 13,
1968). In this seminal work, Garrett Hardin noted that it was not in the economic best
interest of any single user of a common range to preserve the range. Id. at 1244. Any
preservation of the range resulting from the actions of a single user would result only
in more of the range remaining available for others to use. It was in the economic best
interest of every user of the common range to maximize utilization before other users
consumed the resources of the range. Id. The result, a "tragedy of the commons,"
could only be avoided if use of the range by all users was regulated. See id. at 1247-48.
Hardin's conclusions are as applicable to Lake Lure as they are to the range that was
the subject of his article.
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The recommendations of the Lake Advisory Committee, established by
the Town in 1992 regarding the regulatory needs of Lake Lure, are
discussed in Part V.
Promulgating such regulations has and will result in numerous objections and criticisms. Given that the Town owns Lake Lure, nonresidents may object to any lake use limitations favoring recreational use
by residents of the Town. Such objections may arise under the Privileges and Immunities, Equal Protection, or Commerce Clauses of the
United States Constitution. As discussed in Part VI, it is highly unlikely
that any such objections would be successful.
Lakeside property owners may object to such regulations as violating the littoral rights normally associated with the ownership of lakeside property. However, as discussed in Part VII, the unique legal history of Lake Lure precludes the assertion of littoral rights.
Finally, some argue that any assertion of regulatory authority by either the Town or the LLMC violates North Carolina's public trust doctrine. Part VIII refutes this spurious argument. Part IX presents conclusions.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. CREATION OF LAKE LuRE

Dr. Lucius B. Morse envisioned a world-class resort in western
North Carolina developed by Chimney Rock Mountains, Incorporated.' A lake created by impounding the Rocky Broad River at Tumbling Shoals formed the centerpiece of this resort. This lake became
Lake Lure.!
As a first step in the development of the resort, Chimney Rock
Mountains, Incorporated spent approximately $600,000 to acquire 220
tracts of land! In total, Chimney Rock Mountains, Incorporated acquired "about 8000 acres or twelve square miles, including the valley in
which Lake Lure lies and the hills and mountains above."'
3.

Dr. Morse served as the President of Chimney Rock Mountains, Incorporated.
(stock prospectus, circa
1925) [hereinafter LAKE LuRE DEVELOPMENT].
4. Elizabeth Parkenson (Betty) Morse, Dr. Morse's wife, named the lake "Lake
Lure". Memoirs, Lee L. Powers, The Development of Chimney Rock Park and Lake
Lure 1 (Sept. 1988) (on file with author).
5. Lee L. Powers, Development of the Lake Lure Summer Resort in 1923 and
Purchase of the Lake and Hydro-Electric Plant by the Town of Lake Lure, July 26,
1965, at I (n.d.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Powers, Development of Lake
Lure]. Acquisition of this acreage, facilitated by Guilford Nanney, a local resident,
took more than a year to complete. Powers, supra note 4, at 1. See also Lee L. Powers,
Development of Chimney Rock Park, Bottomless Pools and Lake Lure 1 (Nov. 1988)
(on file with author).
6. LAKE LuRE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 5.
THE LAKE LURE DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA 11
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Carolina Mountain Power Company constructed the dam that impounded Lake Lure, "all of whose common stock [was] owned by the
Chimney Rock Mountains, Incorporated."7 In return for this stock,
Chimney Rock Mountains, Incorporated "deeded to the Power Company the land and easements for the site of the dam and power house
all of the inundated area of Lake Lure and ground for transmission
lines to Turner's Dam.'8
The remainder of the 8000 acres or twelve square miles continued
in the ownership of Chimney Rock Mountains, Incorporated.9 A
$1,000,000 first mortgage with the Bird Mortgage Company of Ashe0
ville, North Carolina funded development of the resort."
The United
States and Guaranty Company of Baltimore, Maryland ' acquired this
mortgage, secured by the remaining property.'"
The Carolina Mountain Power Company financed construction of
the dam that impounded Lake Lure through a $550,000 first mortgage
with Stroud & Company of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania." Property
owned by the Carolina Mountain Power Company, including the land
on which the dam was constructed as well as the land inundated by
Lake Lure secured the mortgage."

7. Id. at 22.
8. Id. at 23. The property conveyed included "all property which will be submerged by the erection of a dam across the Broad River at a site known as Tumbling
Shoals, Chimney Rock Township, Rutherford County, North Carolina lying below 995
feet above sea level as based upon the official bench marks of the United States Geological Survey." Deed, State of North Carolina, County of Rutherford: Office of the
Register of Deeds book 134, at 115 (June 6, 1925) (on file with author).
9. Despite offers ranging from $1000 to $4000 per acre, Chimney Rock Mountains, Incorporated does not appear to have sold any of the remaining property at the
time. As noted in the stock prospectus, "[ift is the policy of the Company not to accept
such offers as it wishes to complete plans for the development of its entire estate before selling any land." LAKE LuRE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 22. It is Powers' recollection, however, that at the time of the stock market crash on October 24, 1929,
"[s]ome lots were sold and ten or twelve new houses were under construction or completed." Powers, Development of Lake Lure, supra note 5, at 1. Nonetheless, it is also
Powers' recollection that "no lake front property was sold with the privilege of using
the lake." Letter from Lee Powers, to Francis J. Heazel, Attorney at Law 2 (Mar. 9,
1936) (on file with author).
10. Powers, supra note 4, at 2. The Standard Mortgage Company of Asheville,
North Carolina may have held this mortgage. Powers, Development of Lake Lure,
supra note 5, at 1.
11. Powers, The Development of Chimney Rock and Lake Lure, supra note 4, at 2.
See also Lee L. Powers, Lake Lure Acquires the Hydroelectric Power Plant and the Lake
1 (Feb. 1989) (on file with author); Lee L. Powers, Lake Lure's Purchase of the Electric Power Facility and the Lake 1 (Dec.1988) (on file with author).
12. Powers, Development of Lake Lure, supra note 5, at 1.
13. Powers, Lake Lure's Purchase of the Electric Power Facility and the Lake, supra
note 11, at 1.
14. Powers, Development of Lake Lure, supra note 5, at 1-2.
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Construction of the dam was completed in late 1926"' with the full
impoundment of Lake Lure completed in 1927.6 At ordinary water
levels, Lake Lure 7covers approximately 720 acres with a shoreline of
less than 20 miles.'
B. SEPARATION OF PROPERTY INTERESTS

As discussed in the preceding section, the Carolina Mountain
Power Company developed Lake Lure. Chimney Rock Mountains,
Incorporated conveyed the land on which the dam was constructed as
well as "all of the inundated area of Lake Lure" to the Carolina Moun-

tain Power Company.'" From the very beginning, ownership of the bed
of Lake Lure was separate from ownership of upland, littoral properties."
The stock market collapse of October 24, 1929 reaffirmed this

separation when both the Standard Mortgage Company and Stroud &
Company foreclosed their mortgages. Following the foreclosures, the
Standard Mortgage Company established the Lureland Realty Com-

pany to dispose of the property secured by Chimney Rock Mountains,
Incorporated's property. One of the first acts of the Lureland Realty
Company was an unsuccessful attempt to purchase the bed of Lake
Lure." By January 1942 the Lureland Realty Company disposed of all
of the property owned by Chimney Rock Mountains, Incorporated."'

Stroud & Company continued to operate the Carolina Mountain
Power Company. On August 12, 1931, the Carolina Mountain Power

15. "The contractors have undertaken to complete the dam by September 11,
1926...." LAKE LURE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 9.
16. PowERs, DEVELOPMENT OF LAKE LuRE,supra note 5, at 1.
17. TowN OF LAKE LURE, LAKE ADVISORY COMM., LAKE USE SURVEY (unpublished
survey 2001), at http://www.ci.lake-lure.nc.us/lake-use-sur%ey.htm.
18. See supratext accompanying notes 5-8.
19. An attempt to reconcile the different ownership interests may have occurred in
1927. On February 7, 1927, the Carolina Mountain Power Company conveyed a portion of its property interests back to Chimney Rock Mountains, Inc. This conveyance
included "[tjhe right to use the lake impounded by the dam of the Power Company
located upon the said real estate for boating, bathing, fishing, hunting, skating and all
aquatic sports and amusement purposes." Deed, State of North Carolina, County of
Rutherford: Office of the Register of Deeds book 135, at 30 (Feb. 7, 1927) (on file with
author). The validity of this conveyance is open to question. As noted above, the
property owned by the Carolina Mountain Power Company had been used to secure a
$550,000 first mortgage with Stroud & Company of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Absent
consent by Stroud & Company as the lien holder, the Carolina Mountain Power Company lacked the authority to transfer any of the property covered by the mortgage.
The record contains nothing to suggest that Stroud & Company consented to the
transfer. Letter from Jim Proctor, Mayor, Town of Lake Lure, to Sandra King, Russell,
King &Johnson, P.A., (Mar. 14, 2003) (on file with author).
20. Powers, Development of Lake Lure, supra note 5, at 1-2.
21. Id. at2.
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Company transferred its assets to the Carolina Mountain Corporation."
William C. Rommell, President of Stroud & Company, operated the
Carolina Mountain Corporation from 1931 until the Town acquired
Lake Lure in 1965."
C.AcQuISITION OF LAKE LURE BYTHE TowN OF LAKE LuRE

The Town operated recreational facilities located at the lake for
almost thirty years before the Town acquired Lake Lure from the Carolina Mountain Corporation.2 4 Legislation enacted by the North Carolina General Assembly in 1963 authorizing the Town to issue revenue
bonds for the purpose of acquiring Lake Lure facilitated this acquisition."
Keeter v. Town of Lake Lure challenged the authority of the Town to
issue such revenue bonds. On April 28, 1965, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the authority of the Town to issue revenue
bonds for the purpose of acquiring Lake Lure. 6 The Town issued
bonds immediately thereafter, and completed acquisition of the lake
on July 26, 1965."
Property that once belonged to the Carolina Mountain Corporation now belonged to the Town. This included:
all of that property which has been, or at any time hereafter may be,
submerged by the dam erected across the Broad River at the site
known as Tumbling Shoals, Chimney Rock Township, Rutherford
County, North Carolina, lying below 995 feet above sea level, as based
upon the official bench marks of the United States Geological Sur28
vey.

22. Letter from Jim Proctor to Sandra King, supra note 19. Stroud & Company
possibly established the Carolina Mountain Corporation, a Delaware corporation, as a
mechanism to allow continued operation of the hydroelectric generating system.
23. See Powers, Development of Lake Lure, supra note 5, at 2. In his memoirs, Mr.
Powers remembers Mr. Rommell as operating the Carolina Mountain Power Company.
In fact, it appears that Mr. Rommell operated the Carolina Mountain Corporation.
Given both the similarity of names and the fact that the Carolina Mountain Corporation continued the operations of the Carolina Mountain Power Company, the error in
Mr. Powers' recollection is understandable.
24. These operations were based on a year-to-year lease arrangement between the
Town of Lake Lure and the Carolina Mountain Corporation. Id.
25.
1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 437, reprinted in Keeter v. Town of Lake Lure, 141 S.E.2d
634, 640 (N.C. 1965).
26. Keeter, 634 S.E.2d at 645.
27. Powers, Development of Lake Lure, supra note 5, at 7.
28. Deed & Bill of Sale, State of North Carolina, County of Rutherford: Office of
the Register of Deeds book 283, at 651 (July 22, 1965) (on file with author).
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This property, which comprises the bed of Lake Lure, lies within the
limits of the Town. 9
III. AUTHORITY OF THE TOWN OF LAKE LURE, NORTH
CAROLINA
The Town incorporated in 1927. As incorporated, the boundaries
of the Town included the entirety of Lake Lure. In addition to being
located entirely within the Town, the lake became the property of the
Town in 1965."0
In order to comprehend the regulation of activities occurring on
Lake Lure, an understanding of the authority that the North Carolina
General Assembly vested in the Town is necessary. As a political subdivision of the State of North Carolina, the Town "is a creature of the
legislature and has only those powers delegated to it by statute or in its
charter. " " On this point, the Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded: "[i] t is a well-established principle that municipalities, as creatures of the State, can exercise only that power which the legislature
has conferred upon them."" The court went on to note:
[t]he authority of municipalities has been described as: (1) the powers granted in express terms; (2) those necessarily or fairly implied in
or incident to the powers expressly granted; and (3) those essential to
the accomplishment of the declared objects of the corporation-not

29. There is one possible exception to this conclusion. Littoral property presently
used as a recreational vehicle park was included originally within the limits of the
Town of Lake Lure but subsequently excluded following the initiation of litigation. Email from Jim Proctor, Mayor, Town of Lake Lure, to George Sherk, the author (July
30, 2004, 11:17AM) (on file with author).
30. See discussion infra Part II C.
31. Advisory Opinion 458: Town of Highlands - Proposed Agreement for Condemnation of Bowery Road (SR 1604, Macon County) (Apr. 10, 2000), 2000 N.C. AG
LEXIS 28, at 3 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion No. 458]. "It is a well-established rule
that a municipal corporation, being a political subdivision of the state, can exercise
only such powers as are granted in express terms, or those necessary or fairly implied
or incident to the powers expressly conferred, or those essential to the declared objects
and purposes of the corporation." Id. at 3, (citing Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, 59
S.E.2d 195, 199 (N.C. 1950)) "Local governments in North Carolina are creatures of
the state legislature. ... North Carolina is not a 'home rule' state: its local governments
exist by legislative benevolence, not by constitutional mandate." A. FLEMING BELL, II,
DILLON's RULE Is DEAD; LONG LIvE DILLON'S RuLE!, at I (Local Gov't Law Bulletin No.
66, Institute of Gov't, Univ. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Mar. 1995)
32. Bowers v. City of High Point, 451 S.E.2d 284, 287 (N.C. 1994). "The law is wellsettled that 'a municipality has only such powers as the legislature confers upon it.'"
Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 49 (N.C. 1994)
(internal citations omitted).
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simply convenient, but only those which are indispensable, to the accomplishment of the declared objects of the corporation."
Express powers
Of particular relevance to Lake Lure, North Carolina Law authorizes the Town to acquire and hold real property.' Of greater importance to the regulation of activities occurring on Lake Lure is the General Assembly's delegation of "a part of its police power which may be
exercised 'to protect or promote the health, morals, order, safety and
general welfare of society.""' These police powers include the following:
. The authority to "define, prohibit, regulate, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions, detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its
peace and dignity of the city, and [to] define and
citizens and the 36
abate nuisances."
* The authority to "impose fines and penalties for violation of its ororders to furdinances, and [to] secure injunctions and abatement
7
ther insure compliance with its ordinances."1
The authority to "restrict, regulate or prohibit the sale, possession,
storage, use, or conveyance of any explosive, corrosive, inflammable,
or radioactive substances.""
*

33. Bowers, 451 S.E.2d at 287-88 (internal citations omitted).
34. In relevant part, North Carolina General Statute section 160A-11 provides as
follows:
The inhabitants of each city heretofore or hereafter incorporated by act of
the General Assembly or by the Municipal Board of Control shall be and remain a municipal corporation by the name specified in the city charter. Unmay acquire and hold any property, real and personal,
der that name they ...
devised, bequeathed, sold, or in any manner conveyed, dedicated to, or otherwise acquired by them, and from time to time may hold, invest, sell, or dispose of the same....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-11 (2003) (General Corporate Powers). This authority is restated in North Carolina Statute § 160A-240.1:
A city may acquire, by gift, grant, devise, bequest, exchange, purchase, lease,
or any other lawful method, the fee or any lesser interest in real or personal
property for use by the city or any department, board, commission or agency
of the city. In exercising the power of eminent domain a city shall use the
procedures of Chapter 40A.
N.C.GEN. STAT. § 160A-240.1 (2003) (Power to acquire property).
35. Town of Atlantic Beach v. Young, 298 S.E.2d 686, 690 (N.C. 1983) (internal
citations omitted).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-174(a) (2003).
37. Id. § 160A-175(a).
38. Id. § 160A-183.
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* The authority to "regulate, restrict, or prohibit the production or
emission of noises or amplified speech, music, or other sounds that
tend to annoy, disturb, or frighten its citizens." s
a

The authority to:

regulate, restrict, or prohibit the emission or disposal of substances or
effluents that tend to pollute or contaminate land, water, or air, rendering or tending to render it injurious to human health or welfare,
to animal or plant life or to property, or interfering or tending to interfere with the enjoyment of life or property.'
e The authority to "regulate, restrict, or prohibit the discharge of
firearms at any time or place within the city except when used in defense of person or property or pursuant to lawful directions of lawenforcement officers, and may regulate the display of firearms on the
streets, sidewalks, alleys, or other public property.""
* The "authority to summarily remove, abate, or remedy everything
in the city limits, or within one mile thereof, that is dangerous or
prejudicial to the public health or public safety." 4 2
& The authority to "regulate and license occupations, businesses,
trades, professions, and forms of amusement or entertainment and
prohibit those that may be inimical to the public health, welfare,
safety, order, or convenience." "
* The authority to "impose a curfew on persons of any age less than
18."
*

The authority to

(2) Set apart lands and buildings for parks, playgrounds, recreational
centers, and other recreational programs and facilities;
(3) Acquire real property, either within or without the corporate limits of the city ...for parks and recreation programs and facilities by
gift, grant, purchase, lease, exercise of the power of eminent domain,
or any other lawful method;

39. Id. § 160A-184.
40. Id. § 160A-185.
41. Id. § 160A-189. In addition, the Town has the authority to "regulate, restrict, or
prohibit the sale, possession or use within the city of pellet guns or any other mechanism or device designed or used to project a missile by compressed air or mechanical
action with less than deadly force." Id. § 160A-190.
42. Id. § 160A-193(a).
43. Id.
§ 160A-194.
44. Id. § 160A-198.
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(4) Provide, acquire, construct, equip, operate, and maintain parks,
playgrounds, recreation centers, and recreation facilities, including
all buildings, structures, and equipment necessary or useful in connection therewith;
(5) Appropriate funds to carry out the provisions of this Article;
(6) Accept any gift, grant, lease, loan, bequest, or devise of real or
personal property for parks and recreation programs."
9 Finally, to exercise "all municipal powers, functions, rights, privileges, and immunities of every name and nature whatsoever."
Necessarily implied powers
With regard to necessarily implied powers, two provisions of the
North Carolina General Statutes are of particular relevance. North
Carolina General Statute sectionl60A-12 provides that:
All powers, functions, rights, privileges, and immunities of the corporation shall be exercised by the city council and carried into execution as provided by the charter or the general law. A power, function,
right, privilege, or immunity that is conferred or imposed by charter
or general law without directions or restrictions as to how it is to be
exercised or performed shall be carried into execution as provided by
ordinance or resolution of the city council.47
North Carolina General Statute section 160A-177 contains similar authority that states, "[t]he enumeration in this Article or other portions of this Chapter of specific powers to regulate, restrict or prohibit
acts, omissions, and conditions shall not be deemed to be exclusive or
a limiting factor upon the general authority to adopt ordinances conferred on cities by G.S. 160A-174."4
As noted above, political subdivisions of the State of North Carolina
possess the authority to exercise those powers that are "necessary or
fairly implied or incident to the powers expressly conferred."49 In essence, "the provisions of chapter 160A and of city charters ... shall be
construed to include any additional and supplementary powers that

45. Id. § 160A-353. "Recreation" is defined as "activities that are diversionary in
character and aid in promoting entertainment, pleasure, relaxation, instruction, and
other physical, mental, and cultural development and leisure time experiences." Id. §
160A-352.
46. Id.§ 160A-11.
47. Id. § 160A-12.
48. Id. § 160A-1 77.
49. Advisory Opinion No. 458, supra note 31, at 3 (internal citations omitted). In
addition, political subdivisions are authorized to exercise those powers that are "essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation." Id.
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are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution
and effect. ",o
Rule of construction
In North Carolina General Statute section 160A-4, the General Assembly established a rule of construction for the authority delegated to
cities and towns:
It is the policy of the General Assembly that the cities of this State
should have adequate authority to execute the powers, duties, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To this end, the
provisions of this Chapter [51] and of city charters [521 shall be broadly
construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to carry them into execution and effect: Provided, that the
exercise of such additional or supplementary powers shall not be contrary to State or federal law or to the public policy of this State."
The provisions of North Carolina General Statute sectionl60A-4
led the North Carolina Supreme Court to conclude: "[w] e treat this
language as a 'legislative mandate that we are to construe in a broad
fashion the provisions and grants of power contained in Chapter
160A.'" 4 The Office of the North Carolina Attorney General agreed:
"the powers granted to municipal corporations in Chapter 160A are to
be broadly construed to include any additional or supplementary powers that are necessary or expedient to carry them into execution, and
that are consistent with state or federal law and the State's public policy. ,5
Furthermore, cities and towns have broad discretion in determining how to exercise their statutory authority. "The courts will not interfere with the exercise of discretionary powers unless the action is so
clearly unreasonable as to amount to an oppressive and manifest abuse

50.

HomebuildersAss'n of Charlotte,Inc., 442 S.E.2d at 50.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-1 to 160A-676 (2003).
52. The Charter for the Town of Lake Lure was ratified by the North Carolina
General Assembly in 1987. See An Act to Revise and Consolidate the Charter of the
Town of Lake Lure, H.B. 282, 1987 Leg. Sess. ch. 194 (N.C. 1987),
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/ 19871988/SL1987-194.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005).
53. Id. § 160A-4.
54. HomebuildersAss'n of Charlotte,Inc., 442 S.E.2d at 50 (internal citations omitted).
55. Advisory Opinion No. 458, supranote 31, at 2. The provisions of North Carolina
General Statute section 160A-4 "require that grants of powers to cities and counties be
construed to include other powers that are 'reasonably expedient' to exercise those
grants." Bell, supra note 31, at 2.
51.
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of discretion." 6 With regard to the exercise of such discretionary powers, the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded:
[i]n reviewing the validity of [an] ordinance this Court will look to
see if the police power has been exercised within the constitutional
limitations imposed by both the state and federal constitutions. This
review will not include an analysis of the motives which prompted the
passage of this ordinance because, "so long as an act is not forbidden,
the wisdom of the enactment is exclusively a legislative decision." "
In essence, the Town maintains express authority to regulate activities occurring on Lake Lure as well as any additional and supplementary powers that are reasonably necessary or expedient to the exercise
of the Town's express authority. Furthermore, the Town has significant discretion in the exercise of its authority. Actions taken to protect
or promote the health, morals, order, safety and general welfare of the
Town will not be set aside unless they are so clearly unreasonable as to
amount to an oppressive and manifest abuse of discretion.
IV. AUTHORITY OF THE LAKE LURE MARINE COMMISSION
A.THE LEGISLATIVE MANDATE
The North Carolina General Assembly authorized establishment of
the LLMC with Senate Bill 89, introduced in the North Carolina Gen8
eral Assembly by Senator Walter H. Dalton on February 18, 2003."
After Senator Dalton introduced the bill, it was referred to the Senate
Committee on State Government, Local Government, and Veterans'
9
Affairs, which reported favorably on the bill on May 14, 2003."
Senate
Bill 89 was then referred to the Senate Committee on Finance, which
reported favorably on the bill on May 28, 2003.' The North Carolina
Senate unanimously approved the bill was approved on May 29, 2003.1
56. Advisory Opinion No. 458, supra note 31, at 2 (citing Sykes v. Belk, 179 S.E.2d
439, 449 (1971)).
57. Town of Atlantic Beach v.Young, 298 S.E.2d 686, 690 (N.C. 1983).
58. An Act to Establish the Lake Lure Marine Comm'n, S.89, 2003 Leg. Sess. ch. 77
(N.C. 2003),
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/Sessions/2003/Bills/Senate/PDF/S89v4.pdf.
59. North Carolina General Assembly, 2003-2004 Sess., Senate Bill 89, Lake Lure
Marine Comm'n: History,
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BilLookUp/BilLookUp.pl?Session=2003&BillI
D=$89 (last visited May 1, 2005).
60. Id
61. Forty-six Senators voted in favor of Senate Bill 89, one Senator did not vote and
there were three excused absences. North Carolina General Assembly, 2003-2004
Sess., North Carolina Senate, Roll Call Legislative Sess. Day 70 (May 29, 2003),
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/voteHistory/RollCallVoteTranscript.pl?sSession
=2003&sChamber=S&RCS=532 (last visited May 1, 2005).
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Senate Bill 89 was then sent to the North Carolina House of Representatives where it was referred to the House Committee on Finance.
The House Finance Committee reported favorably on the bill on June
24, 2003 and the House of Representatives unanimously approved the
bill on July 8, 2003.62 The ratified bill was then sent to Governor Michael F. Easley who signed the bill into law on July 20, 2003."
A content analysis of the language of Senate Bill 89 indicates no
substantive changes in the language of the bill between the time it was
reported by the Senate Committee on State Government, Local Government, and Veterans' Affairs (May 14, 2003) and the time Governor
Easley signed it into law (July 20, 2003).'
Senate Bill 89 added to Article 6A to Chapter 77 (Rivers, Creeks
and Coastal Waters) of the North Carolina General Statutes. Section
77-81 authorizes the Board of Commissioners of the Town to create the
LLMC. Once created by the Town, the LLMC "shall enjoy the powers
and have the duties and responsibilities conferred upon it by the Lake
Lure municipal ordinance, subject to the provisions of this Article and
the laws of the State of North Carolina." 5 The Lake Lure Board of
Commissioners is the governing board of the LLMC absent action by
the Board of Commissioners to the contrary.' Article 6A contains typical administrative provisions regarding compensation, budgetary, and
accounting procedures,67 organization of the LLMC and LLMC meetings,' the administrative powers of the LLMC, 9 filing and publication
requirements,' and enforcement of the regulations promulgated by
the LLMC.71
B. REGULATION OF ACTIVITIES OCCURRING ON IAKE LURE

North Carolina General Statute section77-87 defines the regulatory
authority of the LLMC. In general, the LLMC is authorized to "make
62. One hundred sixteen Representatives voted in favor of Senate Bill 89, three
Representatives did not vote, and there was one excused absence. Id. at Roll Call, Legislative Sess. Day 93 (July 8, 2003), at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/voteHistory/RollCallVoteTranscript.pl?sSession
=2003&sChamber=-H&RCS=898.
63. North Carolina General Assembly, 2003-2004 Sess., Senate Bill 89, Lake Lure
Marine Comm'n: Vote History, at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2003&Billl
D=S89 (last visited Apr. 29, 2005).
64. The initial bill introduced by Senator Dalton contained no substantive provisions. Consequently, the bill was not included in the content analysis.
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 77-81 (2003).
66. Id. § 77-82.
67. Id. § 77-83.
68. Id. § 77-84.
69.
Id. § 77-85.
70. Id. § 77-86.
71. Id. § 77-88.
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regulations applicable to Lake Lure (721 and its shoreline area "" concerning all matters relating to or affecting the use of Lake Lure."7"
This broad grant of authority is subject to certain limitations.' With
regard to the operation of vessels on Lake Lure (and apparently only
with regard to the operation of vessels), the LLMC is authorized to
"request that the Wildlife Resources Commission pass local regulations
...
in accordance with the procedure established by appropriate State
law." 6
Article 6A contains specific procedural requirements applicable to
the LLMC.77 LLMC may not enforce regulations "unless adequate notice of the regulation has been posted in or on Lake Lure or its shoreline area." 8 Notices, signs, or markers "communicating the essential
provisions" of regulations applying generally to the "waters of Lake
Lure or its shoreline area, or both" must be posted "inat least three
different places throughout the area [as well as being] printed in a
newspaper of general circulation in Rutherford County.""9 LLMC must
adhere to somewhat more stringent notice requirements when it
promulgates regulations affecting only a portion of Lake Lure." Any72. Defined as "the body of water along the Broad River in Rutherford County,
impounded by the dam at Tumbling Shoals, and lying below the 995-foot contour line

above sea level." Id. § 77-80(4).
73. Defined as "the area submerged by the dam at Tumbling Shoals, lying below
995 feet above mean sea level of the normal full pond elevation of 992 feet above mean
sea level, on Lake Lure." Id. §77-90(5).
74. Id. §77-87(a). The terms matters, relating, affecting and use are not defined in
Article 6A.
75. The regulatory authority of the LLMC is limited by "restrictions in any municipal ordinance, and by other supervening provisions of law" and by the "provisions of
general or special acts or of regulations of State agencies promulgated under the authority of general law." Id.§ 77-87(a). Furthermore, the authority of the LLMC to
[I]ease, rent, purchase, construct, otherwise obtain, maintain, operate, repair,
and replace ...any of the following: boat docks, navigation aids, waterway
markers, public information signs and notices, and other items of real and
personal property designed to enhance public recreation, public safety on the
waters of Lake Lure and its shoreline area, or protection of property in the
shoreline area subject, however, to the provisions of Chapter 113 of the General Statutes and rules promulgated under that Chapter as to property within
North Carolina.
7
Id.§ 7 -85(a)(6). Chapter 113 (Conservation and Development) establishes the North
Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources and defines the authority
of both the Department and its subdivisions. See id. § 113-8.
76. Id. § 77-87(a).
77. These provisions do not apply to rules and regulations promulgated by the
LLMC relating to the internal governance of the LLMC. Id. § 77-87(f).
78. Id. § 77-87(c).
79. Id.
80.
When an ordinance providing regulations for a specific area is proposed,
owners of the parcel of land involved as shown on the county tax listing, and
the owners of land within 500 feet of the proposed area to be regulated, as
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one challenging a regulation of the LLMC on the basis of inadequate
notice bears the burden of proving lack of adequate notice.'
Copies of regulations promulgated by the LLMC must be filed with
the Secretary of State, the clerk of the superior court of Rutherford
County, the Executive Director of the North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
licensee for Lake Lure (if other than the Town)." This provision only
imposes a filing requirement. The provision does not require the Secretary of State, the Superior Court of Rutherford County, the Executive
Director of the North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission, or the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to review LLMC regulations.
As noted above, the LLMC has broad authority to promulgate
"regulations applicable to Lake Lure and its shoreline area concerning
all matters relating to or affecting the use of Lake Lure."83 A violation
of these regulations results in a Class 3 misdemeanor.84
V.THE LAKE USE STUDY - LAKE USE CRITERIA, FINDINGS AND
PROPOSALS
The Town established the Lake Advisory Committee (LAC) on
March 24, 1992. The resolution establishing the LAC authorized the
Committee to "advise and make recommendations" regarding six issue
areas:
1. Revisions to policy regulating the construction and use of structures on Lake Lure.
2. Enforcement of regulations to create a safer environment for all

who use the lake.
3. A community network that could handle warning and clean-up
operations before and after major storms.

4. The various ways of improving fishing on Lake Lure.
5. Silt removal, dredging and other methods that could be used to

improve the eco-system of the lake.
shown on the county tax listing, shall be mailed a notice of the proposed classification by first-class mail at the last addresses listed for such owners on the
county tax abstracts. ... Notice shall also be given by a sign, uniform waterway
marker, posted notice, or other effective method of communicating the essential provisions of the regulation in the immediate vicinity of the location in
question.
Id.
81.
82.

Id. § 77-87(f).
Id. § 77-87(d)(1)-(4).

83.

Id. §77-87(a).

84.

Id. §77-87(b).
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6. Boat use regulations, no-wake zones and navigational aids.8 5
Advice and recommendations regarding these issue areas increased
in importance in proportion to the increased popularity of Lake Lure.
As both commercial and noncommercial use of the lake by residents
and visitors alike increased, the importance of these issue areas also
increased, particularly with regard to the potential liability of the Town
for injuries occurring on Lake Lure.
With regard to the first issue area, the Town adopted the Lake
Structures Regulations (Regulations). In general, the Regulations apply to the construction or alteration of lake structures, defined as a
"pier, dock, boathouse, slip, ramp, swimming float, sea wall or similar
facility whether fixed or floating or a combination thereof, used primarily as a stationary facility.""6 The Regulations establish both permit
requirements and standards for the construction of such structures.
The Regulations also prohibit a number of activities including "[a]ny
activity such as dredging or filling which alters the shoreline other than
as required by action of the Town Council." 7 As discussed in greater
detail in Part VII, some argue that these Regulations impermissibly
burden lakeside property owners' littoral rights.
The sixth issue area identified in the 1992 resolution (boat use
regulations, no-wake zones, and navigational aids) has been the subject
of ongoing study. The 2001 Lake Use Study prepared by the LAC addressed the carrying capacity of Lake Lure in terms of the number of
acres of lake required for the operation of different types of watercraft."8
In determining the carrying capacity of Lake Lure, the LAC received guidance from studies and recommendations made by both the
United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The Corps recommends the
following minimum lake area acreage per boat: 9
Low Power Craft (less than 10 horsepower)
High Power Craft (more than 10 horsepower)
Boats towing water skiers or other devices

4 acres per boat
9 acres per boat
12 acres per boat

Lake Advisory Comm. ,at
Lure, North Carolina,
85. Town of Lake
http://www.ci.lake-lure.nc.us/LakeAdvisoryComm.htm (last visited May 1, 2005).
LAKE STRucTuREs ORDINANCE § 94.02 (2004),
86. LAKE LURE, N.C.,
http://www.ci.lake-lure.nc.us/LakeStructureOrd.htm (last updated Dec. 2004).
87. Id. § 94.15(A). See also id. § 94.12 (stating "[n]o dredging or filling of the lake
shall be allowed except by specific authorization of Town Council.").
88. See TOWN OFLAKE LURE, LAKEADviSORyCOMM., LAKE USE SURVEY, supra note 17.
89. See generally id.
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For planning purposes, the Corps recommends a generalized minimum area of six acres per boat." Applying this generalized minimum
area recommendation to Lake Lure's 720 acres yields a maximum carrying capacity of 120 boats.
Data from EPA suggest that private owners use their boats approximately 10 percent of the time while commercial operators (including boat rental facilities) use their boats approximately 50 percent
of the time.9 Based on the Corps' recommendations noted above, the
LAC proposed to limit the number of boats in use at any given time to
120.92 Applying EPA's boat use projections, implementation of a permit allotment plan based on time of use would achieve this limit:
ITypc (f
Individual
Commercial
Commercial
Commercial
Commercial
TOTAL

I~ae
V
2"
39"
499

BoaIt P'ennyits
1,000

TFiic in) Is
10%

Bo~ti in tU,,
100

36

50%

18

12

20%

2
120

With regard to the issuance of such permits, the LAC also proposed
(a) that residents of Lake Lure have a preference, (b) that permits for
residents be less expensive than permits for nonresidents, and (c) that
nonresident permits be limited during peak use periods. In addition,
the LAC recommended that permit costs increase on a boat-by-boat
basis for individuals seeking multiple permits.
Proposed Ordinance No. 01-12-11 embodies many of the recommendations of the LAC. Section one of the proposed Ordinance
amended section 85.61 of the Lake Lure Code of Ordinances by adding the following provisions:
(B)

Commercial Operations

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Livery - boat rentals with on operator provided - marinas, house rentals with
boats, realtors that rent boats and resorts/inns.
94. Resort/Camp - boats at lodging or camp facilities available to patrons for some
or no additional charge that are operated by trained staff that would need an operator's license.
95.
Ski Schools/Fishing Guides - boats that shall not be associated with a specific
camp resort public or private and are used to provide a service to transients and residents.
96. Service/Realtor - boats used by contractors, real estate brokers, boat repair
companies.
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(1)Commercial water vessels shall be defined as all water vessels used
in connection with any type of business, trade or commerce. Includes
but not limited to: boat rentals, marinas, house rentals (that are required to pay occupancy tax) with boats, realtors, resorts, inns, camps,
ski schools, fishing guides, contractors, boat repair companies, etc.
(2)There will be four categories of commercial operations. Applicants will state which category applies.
(a) Livery - boat rentals with no operator provided - marinas, house
rentals (that are required to pay occupancy tax) with boats, real estate
agents that rent boats and resorts/inns. All commercial operations in
this category must have its home base of operation within the corporate limits of Lake Lure or on the shoreline of Lake Lure. The real
estate property value (as listed by the Rutherford County Tax Dept.)
of the commercial operation must be in excess of $100,000 or in an
area zoned for commercial use. [97
(b)Resort / Camp - boats at lodging or camp facilities available to patrons for some or no additional charge that are operated by trained
staff. All commercial operations in this category must have its home
base of operation within the corporate limits of Lake Lure or on the
shoreline of Lake Lure. The real estate property value (as listed by
the Rutherford County Tax Dept.) of the commercial operation must
be in excess of $100,000. [981
(c) Ski Schools / Fishing Guides - boats that are not associated with a
specific camp or resort (public or private) and are used to provide a
service not otherwise listed to the public. Boat owner must be a resident or a business with the controlling partner or president of a corporation that is a resident. '99'
(d) Service / Realtor - boats used by building contractors, real estate
agents and boat repair companies. Boat owner must be a resident or
a business with the controlling partner or president of a corporation
that is a resident. Nonresident contractors and boat repair companies
hired by residents of Lake Lure may apply to the Lake Lure Town
Council for conditional use permits. t00
(3)All commercial operators must complete a boating safety class.
(web course approved - six months grace period the first year). For
this purpose commercial operators shall include all boat operators
that use boats for a business, but not boat operators using rental boats
for their personal use.

97.
98.
99.
100.

See
See
See
See

infratext accompanying
infra text accompanying
infra text accompanying
infra text accompanying

note
note
note
note

93.
94.
95.
96.
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(4) Commercial operations must acknowledge that they have at least
$500,000.00 of liability insurance.
(5)All commercial water vessels more than 100 horsepower must have
either a cell phone or 2-way radio on board. Commercial operators
shall report to authorities violations of state and local regulations as
well as any disabled vessel or accident.01
Section Two of the proposed ordinance would amend section
85.51, Paragraph (2) of the Lake Lure Code of Ordinances by adding
the following provision:
(E)

Permits

(4)Town council may establish peak periods of the year during which
restrictions may be placed on the issuance of certain classes of water
vessel permits. Peak periods will be listed in the schedule of permit

fees. 102
The recommendations of the LAC and the provisions of Proposed
Ordinance Number 01-12-11 have been the subject of considerable
debate. Some argue, for example, that permit fee requirements and
issuance priorities favoring residents of Lake Lure over nonresidents
may violate constitutional equal protection and due process requirements. Some also argue that permit fee requirements and issuance
priorities favoring noncommercial uses of Lake Lure over commercial
uses may impose impermissible burdens on interstate commerce. The
following section addresses these issues.
Others argue that regulating boat use on Lake Lure either impermissibly interferes with the littoral rights of lakeside property owners or
violates North Carolina's public trust doctrine. Parts VII and VIII respectively address these issues.
VI. DIFFERENTIAL REQUIREMENTS
A. BACKGROUND
The carrying capacity of Lake Lure requires limiting the number of
boats using the lake at any given time to 120. To achieve this goal, the
LAC recommended limiting the total number of both commercial and
noncommercial permits. The LAC also recommended affording residents of the Town a preference in obtaining available commercial and
noncommercial permits and restricting nonresident use of Lake Lure
during peak use periods by nonresidents.

101.
102.

Proposed Ordinance Number 01-12-11.
Id.
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In essence, the LAC recommendations impose differential requirements on (a) commercial and noncommercial users of Lake Lure
and (b) residents and nonresidents of the Town. Those who oppose
such differential requirements raise a number of objections. With regard to the requirements of the United States Constitution, opponents
of the LAC recommendations argue that such differential requirements violate both the Equal Protection Clause and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and also impose impermissible burdens on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause.' °3
These objections are without merit. As discussed more fully below,
no requirements or limitations arising under the United States Constitution prohibit the implementation of the LAC recommendations.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The Privilegesand Immunities Clause
The Privileges and Immunities Clause contained in Article IV,
clause 2 of the United States Constitution states, "[t] he Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States."' °4 Does this clause prohibit the Town from favoring
residents over nonresidents in the issuance of permits to operate boats
on Lake Lure?. 5
Other constitutional provisions may apply. The Connecticut Supreme Court
103.
ruled that nonresident beach access restrictions violated both the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution and parallel state constitutional provisions. Leydon v.
Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552, 573, 575 (Conn. 2001). Other courts addressing
the issue reached precisely the opposite conclusion. For example, in Daly v. Harris,
the court rejected a First Amendment challenge to differential fees charged for entrance to the Hanauma Bay Conservation District, concluding that "[t]he contemplated conversation and association for the purposes of engaging in such conversation,
though literally speech and association, do not advance 'knowledge, the transformation of taste, political change, cultural expression, and the other objectives, values and
consequences of the speech that is protected by the First Amendment.'" Daly v. Harris,
215 F.Supp.2d 1098, 1106 (internal citations omitted). See also Susan M. Cordaro, A
High Water Mark: The Article IV, Section 2, Privilegesand Immunities Clause and Nonresident
Beach Access Restrictions, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 2525, 2526, 2534 (2003) (discussing the
Leydon and Daly cases). In addition, the Due Process Clause may be applicable to state
regulatory functions. See Pa. Game Comm'n v. Marich, 666 A.2d 253, 257 (Pa. 1995)
(holding that even though "hunting is not a property or liberty interest to which the
full panoply of due process protections attach ... the Commission [does not have] absolute discretion in revoking hunting and trapping licenses.").
104. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
105.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause ... speaks in terms of state citizenship.
While this wording may seem to mean that cities escape the strictures of the
Clause, the Supreme Court has cleared up any confusion on this matter, and
has held that the Clause indeed does apply to cities. ... A potential Privileges
and Immunities violation by a city is therefore legally equivalent to a violation
by a State.
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A 1978 United States Supreme Court case involving differential fee
requirements for Montana elk hunting licenses provides an answer to
this question.' °° Nonresident hunters challenged the fee differential on
the grounds that it violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. In
Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission, ' the Court rejected this challenge. The Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Court ruled, was
intended to protect fundamental rights, those rights "which are, in
their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments.""in Recreational hunting of elk in Montana by nonresidents did not fall into the category of "fundamental rights" intended to be protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause.i" In
Patrick Sullivan, In Defense of Resident HiringPreferences: A Public Spending Exception to the
P ivileges and Immunities Clause 86 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1337 n.5 (1998) (internal citations
omitted) (citing United Bldg. &Consr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 214 (1984) (rejecting a NewJersey Supreme Court ruling that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause does not apply to municipal ordinances)). Richard H. Seamon,
Note, The Market ParticipantTest in Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis - ProtectingProtectionism?, 1985 DUKE L.J. 697, 724-28 (1985) (discussing the United Buildingdecision).
106. For the 1975 season, residents of the State of Montana could obtain an elk
hunting license for $4.00. The only license available to nonresidents cost $151.00. For
the 1976 season, the resident and nonresident license fees increased to $9.00 and
$225.00, respectively. Gene Matthew Eckel, Note, The New Standard Applicable to State
Taxation of a Nonresident - An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Treatment of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause in Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV.
1311,1321 n.101-02 (1999).
107. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comns'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
108. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). As Foutz noted, in
deciding Corfield,
Justice Washington declined to enumerate these rights, but placed them under the following headings: Protection by the government; enjoyment of life
and liberty; right to acquire, possess, and sell property; right to pursue and
obtain other happiness and safety; right to travel; right to claim benefit of writ
of habeas corpus; right to institute court actions; right to an exemption from
higher taxes than are paid by citizens of other states; right to vote.
Thomas Keasler Foutz, Note, ConstitutionalLaw - Privilegesand Immunities Clause, Article
IV Section 2 - Nonresidentsare not GuaranteedEqual Access to a State's RecreationalResources,
53 TUL. L. REv. 1524, 1525 n.9 (1979) Because of the limitation of the Privileges and
Immnities Clause to fundamental rights, "[t]he relatively few cases invalidating state
laws under the clause have thus tended to involve restrictions on out-of-state access to a
state's domestic private economy." Bryan H. Wildenthal, Note, State Parochialism, the
Right to Travel, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1557,
1561 (1989).
109. "Whatever rights or activities may be 'fundamental' under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, we are persuaded, and hold, that elk hunting by nonresidents in
Montana is not one of them." Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388. See also Sarah H. Davis, Note,
Carlson v. State and the Privilegesand Immunities Clause: The Alaska Wrinkle in Nonresident
FishingFee Differentials 21 ALASKA L. REV. 91, 102 n.67 (2004) (stating "sport hunting is
not sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the nonresident to merit protection under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause."); Miller noted that "[a] majority of jurisdictions
have held that elk hunting is merely a recreational activity rather than a fundamental
right." Michael Miller, Note, Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning: When Hunting
Means Business, 7 GREAT PLAINs NAT. REsoURCESJ. 71, 76 (2003).
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fact, recreational activities of all types do not appear to fall within the
"fundamental rights" category.10
In reaching its decision, the Court ruled that differential requirements based on residency fall into two categories, those that merely
reflect individual differences between states (permitted) and those that
"hinder the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single
Union of those States" (prohibited absent substantial justification).'
Differential residency requirements regarding recreational elk hunting
fall into the first category. After all, the Court ruled, states have no
obligation to share with other states natural resources such as wildlife
held in trust for the state's own citizens."' Access by nonresidents to
such recreational activities is "not basic to the maintenance of wellbeing of the Union.".. In fact, a state might justify a total exclusion of
nonresident hunters."4 One commentator characterized the holding
in Baldwin as follows:

110. Foutz, supra note 108, at 1531 n.51. See also Corfield, 6 F.Cas. at 552, 554;
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (sustaining prohibitions on noncommercial
harvesting of oysters from state waters by nonresidents). See also Haw. Boating Ass'n v.
Water Transp. Facilities Div., 651 F.2d 661, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating, "[t]he district court's conclusion-that the right of access, at equal rates, to mooring privileges at
a recreational boat harbor is not 'fundamental'-is supported by the case law." The
"case law" to which the court of appeals referred to was Baldwin, which the court
deemed to be "equally applicable to, and dispositive of, the instant case.").
111.
Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383. See also Davis, supra note 109, at 101 ( stating:
[a] state's restriction of nonresident activity uiggers the Privileges and Inmunities Clause if "the activity in question is sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the nation as to fall within the purview of the clauses, and if it is not
closely related to the advancement of a substantial state interest." The first
part of the test looks at the fundamental nature of the activity; once the activity has been determined to be fundamental, the state has the burden of showing a substantial interest and a reasonable fit.).
See also Wildenthal, supra note 108, at 1592.
112. As the Court stated in Baldwin:
[i] n more recent years, however, the Court has recognized that the States' interest in regulating and controlling those things they claim to "own," including wildlife, is by no means absolute. States may not compel the confinement
of the benefits of their resources, even their wildlife, to their own people
whenever such hoarding and confinement impedes interstate commerce....
Nor does a State's control over its resources preclude the proper exercise of
federal power .... And a State's interest in its wildlife and other resources
must yield when, without reason, it interferes with a nonresident's right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than his own, a right that is protected by the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 385-86 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
113. Id. at 388. As Miller noted, "[a] state may prefer its own residents over nonresidents or condition the enjoyment of nonresidents as it sees fit when it is regulating a
recreational activity." Miller, supra note 109, at 76.
114. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 387.
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[als natural resources in this country become increasingly scarce, the
Court's holding in Baldwin that access to recreational activity is not
protected by the privileges and immunities clause may take on added
significance. ... states may not only charge nonresidents a higher fee,
they may someday, as the majority has implied, even exclude nonresidents from access to state recreational resources.
The Equal Protection Clause
In relevant part, the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution, amendment XTV, section 1, states: "[n]o State shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." '
The plaintiffs in Baldwin also challenged the Montana elk
hunting license fee differential as violating this provision.
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge as
well, concluding that recreational elk hunting was not a basic right
requiring equal regulation of residents and nonresidents."7 To withstand an Equal Protection Clause challenge such as the one raised by
the plaintiffs in Baldwin, a state statute need only satisfy the rational
basis test. ' In Baldwin, the Court saw no irrationality, concluding that
the Montana statute was "not unreasonably related to the preservation

115. Foutz, supra note 108, at 1531-32 (emphasis in original) (internal citations
omitted). For example, in his analysis of Baldwin, Foutz noted the decision of the Supreme Court in Doe v. Bolton, a case in which the Court struck down a Georgia statute
that prohibited nonresidents from obtaining abortions in public hospitals. The basis
for the Court's decision was Georgia's inability to demonstrate that use of public hospitals by nonresidents resulted in overcrowding of those facilities. Id. at 1527. Presumably, the restriction on use by nonresidents could have been sustained if Georgia had
been able to demonstrate that overcrowding resulted.
116. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
117. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 389.
118. Exceptions to this rule involve certain "suspect classifications" that are subject
to "strict scrutiny" (or some other type of heightened analysis) and that the court will
sustain only upon a showing of substantial justification. "Suspect classifications" include: race (Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); sex (Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)); alienage (Bernal v.
Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984), Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)); and legitimacy (Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983),
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Foutz,
supra note 108, at 1572. With regard to the distinction between residents and nonresidents in the regulation of boating on Lake Lure, however, "state residency is not a
'suspect classification' such that it would trigger strict scrutiny review. ... Accordingly,
cities may enact resident preferences without violating the Fourteenth Amendment as
long as the preferences are rationally related to a legitimate state interest...." Sullivan,
supra note 105, at 1338 n.14. See also Haw. Boating Ass'n v. Water Transp. Facilities
Div., 651 F.2d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting "strict scrutiny" in favor of a rational
basis test in challenge to resident/nonresident differential regarding mooring fees);
Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1580 (10th Cir. 1995) (sustaining a challenge to state regulation of nonresident hunters under a rational basis review).
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of a finite resource."" 9 Furthermore, given the plaintiffs' argument
that the legislature could have written the statutory scheme to better
reflect actual costs to the State of Montana resulting from recreational
elk hunting by nonresidents, the Court responded that "a statutory
need not be
classification impinging upon no fundamental interest ...
legitimate
purposes.....10
drawn so as to fit with precision ... [its]
In a decision of particular relevance to the LAC recommendations,
the court in The Great American Houseboat Company v. United States addressed the distinction between commercial and noncommercial use
of a water.' The plaintiff challenged the United States Forest Service
regulations applicable to the operation of houseboats on Lake Shasta.
The plaintiff argued that the regulatory distinction between commercial and noncommercial houseboats constituted a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.
The plaintiffs Equal Protection Clause challenge did not succeed.
"The distinction between commercial and personal use for purposes of
permit issuance on its face is rational and not a violation of equal proThe court of appeals went on to rule that the "commertection."'
119. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 390. "[B]ecause Montana's efforts to allocate access to
hunting were rationally related to a substantial regulatory interest of the state, the
licensing scheme did not violate the equal protection clause. Foutz, supra note 108, at
1524-25. With regard to fee differentials applicable to boating, the decision in Hawaii
BoatingAssociation is of particular relevance:
[t]he district court found no evidence supporting the conclusion that the
[resident/nonresident mooring fee] cost differential was "arbitrary" or "irrational." The court found that the fee structure was rationally related to a
equalizing costs attendant to maintaining and convalid legislative goal, i.e.
structing small boat harbors and noted that "Residents have recently contributed to the state's economy through employment and state taxes, while nonresidents have not." As the Supreme Court has stated: "Weperceive no duty
on the State to have its licensing structure parallel or identical for both residents and nonresidents, or to justify to the penny any cost differential it imposes in a purely recreational, noncommercial, nonlivelihood setting. Rationality is sufficient..." We agree with the trial judge that Hawaii's classification is not "irrational."
Haw. BoatingAss'n, 651 F.2d at 666. See also Red River Serv. Corp. v. City of Minot, 146
F.3d 583, 590 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating "legislation is presumed valid if the classification
drawn by the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
120. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 390.
Moreover, the state need not articulate its actual objective behind the scheme
or submit evidence to support the rationality of the regulation, provided that
we can conceive of facts which reasonably justify the classification at issue....Under this deferential standard of review - which is a "paradigm of judicial restraint,"- we have no difficulty in upholding the judgment of the district court.
Clajon Prod. Cop., 70 F.3d at1580.
121. Great American HouseboatCo. v. United States, 780 F.2d 741, 748 (9th Cir. 1986).
122. Id. at 748, (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (a statutory
classification will not be set aside "ifany state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it"); Parsons v. County of Del Norte, 728 F.2d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 1984) ("where
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cial/personal use distinction served the legitimate statutory purpose of
allowing the Forest Service to regulate and accommodate multiple uses
on Shasta Lake and to avoid overcrowding of the Lake and a degrading
of the quality of the recreational experience there.""'
The Commerce Clause
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution authorizes Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'24 Those who
oppose the LAC recommendations argued that differential treatment
of residents and nonresidents imposes an impermissible burden on
interstate commerce.
To understand the invalidity of this argument, one must understand the limitations imposed by the "dormant" Commerce Clause."'
Wildenthal explains the scope of the "dormant" Commerce Clause as
follows:
[t]he term "dormant commerce clause" has been used to distinguish
the clause's impact as a bar to burdensome state regulation of commerce from its facial purpose of conferring on Congress the power to
regulate commerce. Once Congress has validly enacted a law regulating commerce, any conflicting state legislation obviously must fall as a
When Congress has not acted,
result of the supremacy clause. ...
however, the congressional commerce power, in its "dormant" state,
state-imposed "burdens" on the
has still been construed as limiting
6
free flow of interstate commerce.1

An initial question is whether the Commerce Clause applied to any
challenge resulting from implementation of the LAC recommendations. A number of commentators pointed out that the decisions of
the Supreme Court are both unclear and inconsistent. With regard to
resident/nonresident fee differentials for hunting and fishing licenses,
this lack of clarity and inconsistency led one commentator to conclude:
the Court's prior decisions do not conclusively establish the constitu-

tionality or unconstitutionality of discriminatory hunting and fishing
license fees under the dormant Commerce Clause ... Perhaps the
Court will find the Commerce Clause wholly inapplicable in some or

flndamental fights are not substantially burdened [a] regulation will be upheld unless
there is no rational basis for its enactment")).
123.
124.

Id. See also Haw. BoatingAss'n, 651 F.2d at 666.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

125.

Chief Justice John Marshall "coined the term 'dormant' to describe the power

of the clause, even in the absence of conflicting federal statutes, to preempt state regulation affecting interstate commerce." Seamon, supra note 105, at 699-700 (citing Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 253 (1829)).
126. Wildenthal, supra note 108 at 1564 n.45.
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might conclude that the Priviall of these cases. For example, the Court ...
leges and Immunities Clause provides the exclusive basis for challenging all
state laws that overtly discriminate between individualresidents and nonresidents, including those laws that concern recreational hunting and fishing
fees... If the Court did find such laws subject to only Privilegesand Immunities Clause challenge, it presumably would uphold them on the ground that
7
they do not infringe "fundamental"interests."
The Court also "might sidestep application of the dormant Commerce
Clause to recreational hunting or fishing fee differentials on the theory
that hunting and fishing does not involve 'commerce' within the
meaning of the Clause."128
Assuming that the "dormant" Commerce Clause applies, it is important to remember that the LAC based its recommendations on residency in the Town, not residency in the State of North Carolina. As a
result, the differential requirements apply equally to both intrastate
commerce and interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court confronted a similar situation in litigation involving airports handling both intrastate and interstate flights that
charged per-passenger fees. In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority
Districtv. Delta Airlines, Incorporated,the Court upheld such fees because
they were imposed for use of a "facility provided at public expense""
and concluded that "a charge designed only to make the user of stateprovided facilities pay a reasonable fee to help defray the costs of their
construction and maintenance may constitutionally be imposed on
Of particular relevance, the
interstate and domestic users alike.""
Court concluded that the fees did not raise "dormant" Commerce

127. Dan T. Coenen, State User Fees and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 VAND. L. REV.
795, 805 n.57 (1997).
128.. Id. at 806 n.57 (citing cases in which courts have concluded that unharvested
game is not an article of commerce). Coenen also notes that "the holdings of some
courts suggest that state discrimination in fixing fees for even commercial fishing licenses is immune from commerce clause attack" because the setting of such fees does
not involve economic activity subject to regulation pursuant to Congress's commerce
power." Id (citing Tangier Sound Watermen's Ass'n v. Douglas, 541 F.Supp. 1287,
1306 (E.D. Va. 1982) ("[T]he Court is not convinced that the Commerce [Cllause
reaches a State law whose effect is to prohibit a nonresident commercial crabber from
catching crabs in Virginia. Plaintiffs have not established that unharvested crabs are
articles of commerce."); Davrod Corp. v. Coates, 971 F.2d 778, 790 (1st Cir. 1992) (upholding state statute restricting commercial fishing boat length against commerce
clause challenge); McCready, 94 U.S. at 396; Carlson v. State, 798 P.2d 1269, 1277
(Alaska 1990)). But see Atlantic Prince, Ltd. v. Jorling, 710 F.Supp. 893, 902-03
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (invalidating state statute restricting commercial boat length on dormant commerce clause grounds).
129. Evansville-VanderburghAirport Auth. Dist v.Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 714
(1972).
130. Id."A permissible charge to help defray the cost of the facility is therefore not
a burden [on interstate commerce] in the constitutional sense." Id.
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Clause issues because "both interstate and intrastate flights are subject
to the same charges." '
Furthermore, even if the differential requirements had greater impacts on interstate commerce than on intrastate commerce, such impacts would not violate the "dormant" Commerce Clause per se. In
such situations, the Court utilizes a "two-tiered" approach.'
Under this mode of analysis, the court first determines whether the
challenged policy "regulates evenhandedly with only 'incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate
commerce. After the court has made this initial characterization
choice, it then applies the operative legal test: "If a restriction on
commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid. By contrast,
nondiscriminatory regulations that have only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid unless 'the burden imposed on such
commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene,3 3
fits. '"

Consequently, the differential requirements would not appear to
violate the "dormant" Commerce Clause since the requirements apply
equally to both intrastate commerce and interstate commerce.
Even if regulations created an "incidental effect" on interstate commerce, such an effect would not violate the "dormant" Commerce
Clause. Coenen draws an analogy between "charges" or "prices" for
use of publicly-owned recreational facilities (including camp site rentals) and the tuition differential between in-state and out-of-state students at publicly-funded institutions of higher education. As with tuition, "charges" or "prices" for recreational activities are "traditionally
thought to be fixable in ways that favor state residents."' 4
131.
Id. at 717. See also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, Mich., 510 U.S.
355, 369 (1994) (stating "[t] o recapitulate, a levy is reasonable under Evansville if it (1)
is based on some fair approximation of use of the facilities, (2) is not excessive in relation to the benefits conferred, and (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce."). In an analogous case, the court rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to
certain Ohio fishing regulations in part because "the statute does not distinguish instate fishermen from out-of-state fishermen." Reynolds v. Buchholzer, 87 F.3d 827, 830
(6th Cir. 1996) (holding "[t]he statute and regulations in issue here cannot be interpreted as favoring local enterprise and intentionally discriminating against interstate
commerce.").
132. Coenen, supra note 125, at 808.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 814-15. Coenen cites Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 333 (1983) (the
"Constitution permits a State to restrict eligibility for tuition-free education to its bona
fide residents"); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980) ("Commerce Clause's
preclusion of discrimination in sales of state-made cement would logically undermine
state discrimination in other areas including education"); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441, 453-54 (1973) ("[t]he State can establish such reasonable criteria for in-state
status as to make virtually certain that students who are not, in fact, bona fide residents
of the State, but who have come there solely for educational purposes, cannot take
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C.EXAMPLE: FEE DIFFERENTIALS IN NORTH CAROLINA

There are multiple examples of resident/nonresident fee differentials implemented in North Carolina. The Wildlife Resource Commission, for example, charges nonresidents twice as much as residents for
a state fishing license. 3 ' Furthermore, certain types of fishing licenses
are not available to nonresidents.' 6
With regard to use of Lake Lucas, the City of Asheboro, North
Carolina has imposed the following fee differentials:'"

Annual Fishing Permit
Annual Launch Fee
Boat Rental Spaces

City Resident
$35.00
$100.00
$60.00

Non-Resident
$50.00
$135.00
$110.00

VII. DO LAKESIDE PROPERTY OWNERS POSSESS RIGHTS TO
ACCESS AND USE LAKE LURE?
Those who oppose the recommendations of the LAC have argued
at various times that implementation of the recommendations would
violate the riparian or littoral rights of the owners of property adjoining Lake Lure. As discussed herein, those who asserted these arguments appear unfamiliar with the law applicable to riparian and littoral

advantage of the in-state rates"); Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F.Supp. 38, 42 (W.D. Wash.
1973) ("upholding ... higher tuition for nonresident students of a public university");
Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.Supp. 234, 241 (D. Minn. 1970) (upholding higher tuition
for nonresident students of a public university). Id at 807, n.1. Coenen also notes that
"lower courts have concluded without difficulty that discriminatory policies in charging
tuition pose no dormant commerce clause problems." Id. at 807. See also Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 217, 258 (1995) (stating that "[t] he
benefits of public institutions such as schools, universities and libraries ... have all,
traditionally and uncontroversially, been distributed according to place of residency");
Fenster v. Schneider, 636 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Federal courts ... have used
a rational basis standard of review in cases, like this one, where higher tuition is
charged to non-residents attending local schools.").
135. The Wildlife Resource Commission charges residents $15.00 and charges nonresidents $30.00. For short term fishing licenses, the Wildlife Resource Commission
charges residents $5.00 and nonresidents $10.00. North Carolina Wildlife Res.
Comm'n, Hunting/Trapping/Fishing Licenses for Residents, at
http://www.ncwildlife.org/pg01_License/pgl al-view&print.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2005).
136. Combination hunting and fishing licenses, county fishing licenses, comprehensive fishing licenses, and sportsman fishing licenses are not available to nonresidents.
See id.
2003),
(June 19,
1
§
ORDINANCE
BUDGET
N.C.,
137. ASHEBORO,
(last visited
http://www.ci.asheboro.nc.us/Budget/budget-ordinance_20034.htmlI
Mar. 25, 2005).
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rights. They also appear unfamiliar with the unique legal history of
Lake Lure.
Though the terms are frequently substituted for one another, a distinction needs to be drawn between "riparian" rights and "littoral"
rights." Both relate to the common law right of landowners whose
property adjoins a water resource to make a "reasonable use" of the
resource. Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries on American Law, pro-

vided an excellent summary of riparian rights:
Every proprietor of lands on the banks of a river has naturally an

equal right to the use of the water which flows in the stream adjacent
to his lands, as it was wont to run (currere solebat) without diminution

or alteration. No proprietor has a right to use the water, to the
prejudice of other proprietors, above or below him, unless he has a
prior right to divert it, or a title to some exclusive enjoyment. He has
no property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes
along. Aqua currit et debet currere [water runs, and ought to run, as it
has used to run] is the language of the law. Though he may use the
water while it runs over his land as an incident to the land, he cannot
unreasonably detain it, or give it another direction, and he must return it to its ordinary channel when it leaves his estate. i9
In essence, riparian rights are rights associated with the use of water in rivers or streams adjacent to a landowner's property. "Littoral"
rights refer to similar rights associated with the use of water contained
in lakes or ponds adjacent to a landowner's property.'40 Littoral rights
in general include:
(1) The right to have the water remain in place and to retain, as
nearly as possible, its natural character.
(2) The right of access...
(3) Subject to reasonable restrictions, the right to wharf out to the
navigable portion of a body of water.

138. Weeks v. North Carolina Dep't of Natural Res. & Cmty. Dev., 388 S.E.2d 228,
229 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (stating "[a]lIthough the terms 'riparian' and 'littoral' are
often used interchangeably, plaintiff is a littoral proprietor.").
139.

JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 45 (1828).

As restated by Sir

William Blackstone, "water is a moveable, wandering thing, and must of necessity continue common by the law of nature; so that I can only have a temporary, transient,
usufructuary property therein...." SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 18 (Harper & Brothers 1858).

140.

The term derives from the Latin litvs meaning shore.
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(4) The right of free use of the water immediately adjoining the
property for the transaction of such business associated with his
wharves or other such structures."'

In terms of the management of Lake Lure, it is important to understand that lakeside property owners do not possess littoral rights.
As discussed below, littoral rights in general do not attach to artificial

lakes. Furthermore, the unique legal history of Lake Lure precludes
the assertion of littoral rights. Finally, assuming arguendo that littoral

rights might exist, such rights are subject to regulation by both the
Town and the LLMC.
A. LITTORAL RIGHTS DO NOT ATTACH TO ARTIFICIAL LAKES

"It is almost axiomatic that riparian [and littoral] rights do not at'
This conclusion reflects the general
tach to artificial waterbodies.' 42
rule that neither14 riparian
nor littoral rights "attach to artificial courses
3
and conditions."
Reaching a similar conclusion, Corbridge cites the decision of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Mayer v. Grueber
Affirming a trial court holding for the plaintiff, the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted, "in the case of artificial bodies of water, all of the
incidents of ownership are vested in the owner of the land. An artificial lake located wholly on the property of a single owner""' is his to use as he
seesfit, provided, of course, that the use is lawful." In order to obtain surface rights, the neighboring [littoral] land owner would have to acquire them
by grant orprescription,neither of which was present in this case. In fact

Mrs. Mayer had advised the defendants, prior to their purchase of the
property, that the Mayers asserted the rights to exclusive use of the
land. Other courts have reached the same conclusion in these circumstances, relying on the principle that "[a]s a general proposition,
it has been held that riparian[and littoral] rights do not ordinarily attach
145
to artificialwater bodies or streams...

141. JOSEPii KALO ET AL., COASTAL AND OcEAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIAis 4243 (2d
he littoral
ed. 2002). See also West v. Slick, 326 S.E.2d 601, 617 (N.C. 1985) (stating "[t]
owner may, however, in exercise of his right of access, construct a pier in order to pro-

vide passage from the upland to the sea.").
142. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Chapter 6, Introduction to RiparianRights, in 1 WATERS
WATER RIGHTS 6-§ 6.02(e) (Robert E.Beck ed., 1991).
143.

AND

Alvin E. Evans, RiparianRights in Artificial Lakes and Streams, 16 Mo. L. REV. 93,
PROPERTY §767 (3d ed. 1939); 2 WASHBURN, REAL

106 (1951) (citing 3 TWEANY, REAL
PROPERTY §1294 (6th ed. 1902)).

144. See discussion of the importance of the single owner rule, infra text accompanying notes 109 and 110.

145. Corbridge, supra note 1,at 907 (citing Mayer v. Grseber, 138 N.W.2d 197 (1965)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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Given that all land use decisions are factually specific, exceptions to
this rule have emerged." For example, lakeside property owners successfully asserted littoral rights in artificial lakes when they contributed
47
Lakeshore property owners
land for the construction of the lake."
also successfully asserted littoral rights if the parties expected to create
such rights at the time they constructed the artificial lake. "8 In other
cases, courts precluded owners of dams from removing them or from
draining an artificial lake on a variety of legal theories including (a)
detrimental reliance and estoppel, (b) easement (or quasi-easement)
by implication, and (c) reciprocal rights.' 9 Finally, plaintiffs successfully asserted littoral rights when defendants impound navigablewatercourses to create artificial lakes.' 8
None of the exceptions to the general rule appears applicable to
Lake Lure.'5' As discussed below, no expectation existed that littoral
rights attached to lakeside properties when Carolina Mountain Power
Company built Lake Lure. Sale of lakeside properties did not include
rights to the use of Lake Lure. Furthermore, upland landowners contributed no land for the construction of Lake Lure, and the Rocky
Board River was not navigable prior to construction of the lake.'59

146. Many of these exceptions are discussed in Dellapenna, supra note 142, § 6102(e); see also Royal C. Shannonhouse, Some Principles of Water Law in the Southeast, 13
MERCER L. REv. 344, 349-50 (1962). See generally Evans, supra note 143 (citing case law
through the middle of the 20th century).
147. Evans, supra note 143 at 94-96 (discussing Krayv. Muggli, 86 N.W. 882 (1901)).
148. Dellapenna, supranote 142, § 6.02(e).
149. See Roy H. Andes, Divvying Atlantis: Who Owns the Land Beneath Navigable Man7
made Reservoirs , 15 UCLAJ. OF ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 83, 98-100 (1996). See also Evans,
supra note 143, at 93-99.
150. Corbridge, supra note 1, at 910, 912-14. When a non-navigable watercourse is
impounded, however, littoral rights do not attach to the resulting artificial lake. Id, at
918-19, (citing Fairchild v. Kraemer, 11 A.D.2d 232, 204 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (An
artificial boat basin on Long Island, "having been artificially created out of the private
lands of plaintiff and his predecessors in title, and having been made navigable by
artificial means, would remain private property, and the waters thereof would not be
subject to any public right or easement thereon [citations omitted].")).
151. As discussed in supra note 29, an exception to the exceptions may be property
presently used as a recreational vehicle park located where the Rocky Board River flows
into Lake Lure.
152. The Supreme Court determined the test for navigability in The DanielBall
hose rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are
[t]
navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary
modes of trade and travel on water.
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870). Because the federal government has paramount authority over navigation, the navigability test is a question of federal, not state
law. Utah v. UnitedStates, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971).
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UNIQUE LEGAL HISTORY OF LAKE LURE PRECLUDES THE ASSERTION
OF LITTORAL RIGHTS

As more fully discussed in Part II, Chimney Rock Mountains, Incorporated conveyed all of the land to become the bed of Lake Lure to
the Carolina Mountain Power Company on June 30, 1925.' Carolina
Mountain Power Company completed construction of the dam in late
1926, and completed the full impoundment of Lake Lure in 1927."M
On August 12, 1931, the Carolina Mountain Power Company transferred both the land and the lake to the Carolina Mountain Corporation (following foreclosure by Stroud & Company), the land and the
lake remained the property of the Carolina Mountain15 Corporation
until July 26, 1965 when the Town acquired the property. 1
This history, particularly the fact that a single owner has always
owned Lake Lure, is of particular importance to the alleged existence
of littoral rights. As Corbridge noted regarding artificial waterbodies,
assertions of both riparian and littoral rights are "commonly denied"
based on "one or more" of three rationales:
(1) the state only recognizes riparian [or littoral] rights where bottomland is owned; (2) no riparian [or littoral] rights are recognized
in artificial water; and (3) it would amount to trespass to allow ripar-

ian [or littoral] rights when the bottom of the artificial waterbody is

wholly owned by one person. This last approach is consistent with the6
treatment accorded by the courts to similarly situated naturalwaters.1

In his summary of the case law applicable to artificial waterbodies,
Dellapenna discusses the importance of "a single owner" in determin-

ing whether littoral rights exist:
Whether to recognize riparian rights in an artificial lake or reservoir
has proven more troublesome to courts than whether to recognize riparian rights in an artificial watercourse. If the artificial lake is entirely
on the land of a single owner, courts have little hesitancy in treatingit as entirely the property of that owner, even ifthe take abuts, but does not encroach
upon, the land of neighbors."7

153. See LAKE LuRE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 19-22. See also supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
154. See Powers, Development of Lake Lure, supra note 5, at 1.
See Letter from Jim Proctor to Sandra King, supra note 22; Powers, Develop155.
ment of Lake Lure, supra note 5, at 7.
156. Corbridge, supra note 1, at 915 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
157. Dellapenna, supra note 142, § 6.02(e)(internal citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
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Corbridge's and Dellapenna's conclusions directly apply given that a
single owner has always owned Lake Lure, first the Carolina Mountain
Power Company (1925-1931), then the Carolina Mountain Corporation (1931-1965), then the Town of Lake Lure (1965 to present).' '8
In terms of the assertion of alleged littoral rights, one cannot overstate the importance of Lake Lure having a single owner throughout its
history. As Shannonhouse noted, the owner of the entire bed of a lake
"has the exclusive right to use the water overlying his land and to exclude therefrom all others, including other littoral owners."' 9
As noted above, littoral rights may attach if that was the expectation
of property owners during the construction of the artificial lake. With
regard to such expectations when Lake Lure was created, however, it is
important to note that the prospectus for Chimney Rock Mountains,
Incorporation included as a source of income "[tlhe concessions from
various amusement enterprises of the better sort, such as public bathing beaches, fishing and boating privileges, etc."' It appears that an
expectation that lakeside property owners would possess a littoral right
to access or use Lake Lure never existed. Any such use would constitute a privilege afforded (upon payment of an appropriate fee) by the
Carolina Mountain Power Company, a subsidiary of Chimney Rock
Mountains, Incorporated. 6' In essence, "private ownership of the lake
...
deprived the abutting land of any lake privileges.""
In 1963, the North Carolina General Assembly reaffirmed this conclusion when it enacted legislation that authorized the Town of Lake
Lure to issue revenue bonds for the purpose of acquiring Lake Lure.
Section 1(c) of House Bill 588 noted "[t]hat many homes are located
on the shores of the lake and have docks and boathouses but the deeds
to such homes convey no right to use Lake Lure and the docks and boathouses are subject to removal upon the request of the private owner of
the lake.""' Furthermore, immediately after the Town acquired Lake

158. LAKE LuRE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 21; Powers, Development of Lake
Lure, supra note 5, at 3, 7; Letter from Jim Proctor to Sandra King, supra note 22.
159. Shannonhouse, supra note 146, at 354 (citing 93 C.J.S. Waters §105 (1956) (emphasis added)).
160. LAKE LuRE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 21. See also Powers, Development of
Lake Lure, supra note 5, at 3 ("[p]rivileges for using the lake in any capacity depended
entirely upon the cooperation of the Carolina Mountain Power Company").
161. As noted in Part II, C, the Town of Lake Lure operated the recreational facilities located at the lake for the Carolina Mountain Power Company. The 1936 agreement between the Town and the Power Company provided for the payment of fees
'for fishing and also for operating a private boat or boats on the lake." Powers, Development of Lake Lure, supra note 5, at 10 (summarizing events following a letter of
Mar. 9,1936 from Lee Powers to FrancisJ. Heazel, Attorney at Law).
162. Id. at 9.
163.
1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 437 §1 (c) (emphasis added), quoted in Keeter, 141 S.E.2d at
640. The court included the following language as a factual finding:
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Lure, Mayor J. Paul Wilson announced that "[t]he long established
policy of the Carolina Mountain Power Company requiring signed application permits for the erection of docks and boathouses will be continued and fully enforced by the Town."'"
C.LAKE ACCESS AND USE RIGHTS MAY BE ACQUIRED THROUGH ADVERSE
POSSESSION

It does not appear from the historic record that owners of littoral
properties were ever granted rights to access and use Lake Lure. From
its inception, use of Lake Lure was allowed only when the Carolina
Mountain Power Company (1927-1931), the Carolina Mountain Corporation (1931-1965)6. or the Town of Lake Lure, following acquisition of the lake by the Town in 1965, granted permission. '
Against this background, it is important to note that individuals

could acquire littoral rights by adverse possession. In Lake Drummond
Canal and Water Company v. Burnham, the North Carolina Supreme
Court concluded that a use easement for an artificial waterbody may be
"established by reason of adverse possession or continuous invasion of

another's rights." '67

The court summarized the requirements previ-

ously articulated in Felton v. Simpson:
When one continues in the uninterrupted possession of land for 30
years, or enjoys the use of a franchise for 20 years, a grant is presumed. So if one erects a dam and ponds back water upon the land
of another, and is allowed to keep it there for 20 years, a grant of the

[f] rom the unchallenged findings of fact by the trial judge, and from the declarations by the General Assembly in Ch. 437, 1963 Session Laws, it is shown
that the town of Lake Lure is a sui generis municipality. The judge's findings of
fact are to this effect: A privately owned lake known as Lake Lure is situate
within its corporate boundaries. The town and surrounding area are primarily
resort and recreational in nature. Many houses are located on the shores of the take
with docks and boathouses which are located there by permission of the private owner of
the take, and are subject to removal upon request by the private owner of the lake. The
ownership of the lake carries with it the right to regulate the level of the waters of the lake, and it seems by an appreciable lowering of the waters of the
lake the docks and boathouses could be left some distance from the waters of
the lake, and their use and the recreational use of the houses on the shores of
the lake could be gravely impaired, if not destroyed.
Keeter 141 S.E.2d at 644 (emphasis added).
164. Press Release, J. Paul Wilson, Mayor of Lake Lure, Statements to the Press Regarding the Town Buying the Lake (July 26, 1965), reprinted in Powers, Development of
Lake Lure, supra note 5, at 8.
165. The Town of Lake Lure, which operated the recreational facilities located at
the lake from 1936 until the Town acquired the lake in 1965, essentially acted as an
agent of the Carolina Mountain Corporation during this period. See Powers, Development of Lake Lure, supra note 5, at 2-6.
166. Id. at 8.
167. Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co. v. Burnham, 60 S.E. 650, 652 (N.C. 1908).
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easement or privilege of doing so is presumed, and so in many similar
cases. But to make this doctrine applicable two things are necessarythere must be a thing capable of being granted, and there must be an
adverse possession or assertion of right, so as to expose the party to an
action, unless he had a grant; for it is the fact of his being thus exposed to an action and the neglect of the opposite party to bring suit,
that is seized upon, as the ground for presuming a grant in favor of
long possession and enjoyment, upon the idea that this adverse state
been a
of things
6 s would not have been submitted to, if there had not
grant.
In essence, claims of adverse possession are defeated if the owner
allowed use of the property at issue (e.g., "granted"). ' On this point,
the court in Lake Drummond Canal and Water Company quoted the decision in Mason v. Railway for the proposition "[t]he equitable doctrine
of prescription depends upon the presumption of a grant, and equity
will only presume a grant when certain well-defined conditions are present, one of which is an adverse claim to the property of which the
right is alleged to have risen. '
North Carolina, however, presumes that use is permissive. This
"permissive presumption rule ...
creates a presumption that use is permissive until the contrary is shown."'7 ' Because of this presumption, it
is "difficult to establish adverse use" in North Carolina.'2
Nonetheless, it is conceivable that owners of property adjoining
Lake Lure could establish littoral rights if: (a) the property owner used
Lake Lure continuously for twenty years; (b) the Carolina Mountain
Corporation (1931-1965) or the Town of Lake Lure (1965-1985) knew
of the adverse use; (c) neither the Carolina Mountain Corporation
nor the Town of Lake Lure did anything to prevent the adverse use;
and (d) either the Carolina Mountain Corporation or the Town did
7
something to indicate that the adverse use was not permissive.' ' However, as discussed below, the existence of such rights is of little consequence given the authority of both the Town and the LLMC to regulate any littoral rights established through adverse possession.
168. Id. at 652-653 (quoting Felton v. Simpson, 11 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 84, 85 (1850)).
169. Id. at 652.
170. Id. at 653.
171. Alice Gibbon Carmichael, Comment, Sunbathers Versus Property Owners: Public
Access to North CarolinaBeaches, 64 N. C. L. REV. 159, 166 (1985) (citing Dickinson v.
Pake, 201 S.E.2d 897, 900 (1974); Speight v. Anderson, 39 S.E.2d 371 (1946); Darr v.
Carolina Aluminum Co., 3 S.E.2d 434 (1939); Perry v. White, 116 S.E. 84 (1923); Nash
v. Shute, 114 S.E. 470 (1922); State v. Norris, 93 S.E. 950 (1917);Snowden v. Bell, 75
S.E. 721 (1912)).
172. Id.
173. The twenty year period could only run during ownership of the Lake by the
Carolina Mountain Corporation or the Town of Lake Lure. Ownership of Lake Lure
by the Carolina Mountain Power Company ended long before a twenty year period
could run.
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D.

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT LIT[ORAL RIGHTS WERE ACQUIRED
THROUGH ADVERSE POSSESSION, SUCH RIGHTS ARE SUBJECT TO
REGULATION BY BOTH THE TOWN AND THE LLMC

Those who oppose the recommendations of the LAC assert that
any regulation of littoral rights could constitute a taking of those
rights, requiring payment of compensation. Simply stated, such assertions are without merit. As discussed in Parts III and IV, respectively,
both the Town and the LLMC have sufficient authority to regulate any
littoral rights that might exist. Furthermore, because of the nature of
both riparian and littoral rights, such regulation almost never results in
a "taking" of those rights.
Initially, it must be understood that both riparian and littoral rights
are types of property rights. As noted above, these rights are usufructuary rights, in that the owner holds a right to the use of the water but
not the water.11

As property rights, however, both riparian and littoral rights are
"Water rights are property, but they
"incomplete" types of rights:
have no higher or more protected status than any other sort of property.... In fact water rights have less protection than most other property rights" for at least three reasons. 7' First, "because their exercise
may intrude on a public common, they are subject to several original
public prior claims, such as the navigation servitude and the public77
trust, and to laws protecting commons, such as water pollution laws."
115

Second, "their original definition, limited to beneficial or reasonable
and non-wasteful uses, imposes limits beyond those that constrain most
property rights." 7' Third, "insofar as water rights (unlike most other
property rights) are granted by permit, they are subject to constraints
articulated in the permits. ""' In essence, "water is not like real prop-

174. Both riparian and littoral rights can be defined as a right in the water rather
than as ownership of the water as such. Such rights are "a kind of real property right,
termed an incorporeal hereditament rather than a corporeal right because the flow of
water itself cannot be owned or possessed." Dellapenna, supra note 142, § 7.02(a). (
internal citation omitted). See also 0. Paul Matthews, Water is not "Real" Property, 85 J.
(1991),
19,
19
EDUC.
RES.
&
WATER
CONTEMP.
http://www.ucowr.siu.edu/updates/85/index.html (citing K.M. O'Brien, New Conditions for Old Water Rights: An Examination of the Sources and Limits of State Authority, 31
ROcxy MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 24-1 to 24-35 (1988)).

175. See Robert E. Beck, Chapter 4, The Legal Regimes, in WATERs AND WATER RIGHTS§
4.01 (Robert E. Beck ed. 1991) (discussing water rights generally).
176. Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U.
COLO. L. REv. 257, 260 (1990).
177. Id. North Carolina case law also reflects this limitation. See, e.g., Weeks, 388
S.E.2d at 234 (holding littoral rights are "subordinate to public trust protections").
178. Sax, supra note 176, at 260. See also Matthews, supra note 174, at 19-20.
179. Sax, supra note 176, at 260 (internal citation omitted). See also Matthews, supra
note 174, at 20.
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erty, and using traditional property rights concepts should be avoided
when discussing water."' 8
Nonetheless, as with the taking of a corporeal property right, the
taking of riparian or littoral rights may require the payment of compensation.'8 ' The obligation to provide compensation arises when the
exercise of a state's police power constitutes "a taking in the constitutional sense."'85 As discussed by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South
55
there are two situations where this obligation
CarolinaCoastal Counci4'
arises: 1) in situations where regulations "compel the property owner
to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his property .... ([Alt least with regard to permanent invasions), no matter how minute the intrusion,
and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required compensation,"18 ' and 2) compensation is also required when
the effect of a governmental regulation "denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land."'
In the second situation, diminution of value cases, the courts have
been "extremely deferential" to state regulators in determining each
case's merits."' Courts found that diminution in value of up to ninety
180. Matthews, supra note 174, at 19. See also Theodore E. Lauer, The RiparianRight
as Property, in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 211 (1958).
181. "[T]he state cannot take vested property rights, whether corporeal or incorporeal, without paying 'just compensation.'"
Dellapenna, supra note 142, §
8.03(a) (internal citations omitted). See also Matthews, supra note 174, at 20 (citingJ.L.
Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust
and Reserved Rights Doctrineat Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 171-212 (1987).
182. Sax, supranote 176, at 261.
183. Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1991).
184. Id. at 1015, (citing Loretto v. Telepromoter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 434-35 (1982) (holding that permanent physical occupation authorized by government is taking without regard to public interests that it may serve); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979) (finding that the imposition of navigation
servitude on privately owned marina will result in actual physical invasion of marina
and requires the government to pay compensation); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 264-65 n.10 (1946) (concluding that the physical invasion of airspace may constitute taking); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987) (determining
that a taking occurs when the extent of occupation without regard to whether action
achieves important public benefit or has only minimal impact on the owner)). See also
Sax, supra note 176, at 262-63.
185. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (emphasis added) (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (sustaining local efforts to protect open space); Nollan, 483 U.S.
at 831-32; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987)
(making its determination of whether compensation is required, Court will consider
several factors including economic impact of regulation, extent to which regulation
interferes with investment backed expectations, and character of government action)
;Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-97 (1981)
(sustaining legislation requiring amelioration of impacts of strip mining)). The Court
concluded that "the Fifth Amendment is violated when land-use regulation 'does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable
use of his land.'" Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260).
186. Sax, supranote 176, at 263.
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percent of the value of the property does not require payment of comAfter Lucas, the percentage may have increased to ninetypensation.'
In essence, "when the
five percent of the value of the property.'
owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave
his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.....
Regulation of both riparian and littoral rights may be essential in
order to protect public health and safety, to protect the environment
and to conserve natural resources. Such regulation is consistent with
the police power found in the Constitution' and with North Carolina
case law. 9' Any number of cases has upheld the constitutionality of
legislation regulating water rights to protect natural resources. As Sax
noted, "legislation that constrains uses of property to achieve environmental protection goals is firmly within the police power, as is legisla-

187. Id. at 263 n.18 (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 126-27 (1985) (sustaining provisions of Clean Water Act intended to protect wetlands, Court concluded that "the mere assertion of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a regulatory taking. ... Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent 'economically viable' use of the land in
question can it be said that a taking has occurred."); Keystone Bituminous CoalAss'n, 480
U.S. at 513-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (suggesting that test should be whether regulation completely extinguishes value of property)).
188. As the Court stated:
[i]t is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get
nothing, while the landowner with total loss will recover in full. But that occasional result is no stranger than the gross disparity between the landowner
whose premises are taken for a highway (who recovers in full) and the landowner whose property is reduced to 5% of its former value by the highway
(who recovers nothing). Takings law is full of these 'all-or-nothing' situations.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-20 n.8.
189. Id. at 1019 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original). North Carolina
courts have reached the same conclusion. See Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v.
Tomlinson, 517 S.E.2d 406, 415 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding plaintiffs' complaint
did no "allege that plaintiffs have lost all economically beneficial or productive use of
their property; rather, plaintiffs have merely asserted that they have 'experienced a
significant reduction in use/value of the Hotel,' which is insufficient to support a taking claim."); JWL Inv., Inc. v. Guilford County Bd. of Adjustment, 515 S.E.2d 715, 719
(N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding the proposition that "[a]n interference with property rights amounts to a taking where the plaintiffs are deprived of 'all economically
beneficial or productive use.'"); Williams v. Town of Spencer, 500 S.E.2d 473, 475
(N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (holding a taking of property had not occurred where "petitioners are not deprived of 'all economically beneficial or productive use' of their land").
190. "[N]o property right can be exempted from the full exercise of the police
power." Sax, supra note 176, at 261, n.7 (citing L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw§ 9-10, at 618 (1988)).
191. As noted in Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, "the North Carolina Supreme Court
[has] stated that a littoral property owner's right of access to adjacent water is 'subject
to such general rules and regulations as the Legislature, in the exercise of its powers,
may prescribe.'" Slavin v. Town of Oak Island, 584 S.E.2d 100, 102 (N.C. Ct. App.
2003) (quoting Capure v. Robbins, 160 S.E.2d 881, 886 (N.C. 1968)).
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tion that constrains property use in order
9 to conserve scarce natural
resources by requiring more efficient use.' 1
Courts seldom find such regulation of water rights (in general) and
of both riparian and littoral rights (in specific) to constitute a "taking"
Courts routinely deny
requiring the payment of compensation.'99
claims of water rights owners for compensation and appellate courts
Furthermore, unlike many other
sustain such denials upon appeal.'
laws, regulation of water rights may be applied retroactively: "[il t is not
unconstitutional for regulation to constrain pre-existing uses or rights
that were legal when initiated. Retroactivity is not the test of compensability." '
The distinction between reasonable regulation of the use of property (not requiring compensation) and the taking of property (requiring compensation) is not readily discernible. "There is no set formula
to determine where regulation ends and taking begins." 196
Given the limitations on water rights discussed herein, particularly
the "incomplete" nature of such rights, it may be more difficult for a
claimant to sustain a claim for the taking of a water right because of
192. Sax, supra note 176, at 262, n. 12 (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at
121; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 264; Agins, 447 U.S. at 255; State v. Dexter, 202 P.2d 906, 908
(Wash. 1949), affd, 338 U.S. 863 (1949) (sustaining a mandatory reforestation requirement, the court concluded that a state is not "required by the constitution of the
United States to stand idly by while its natural resources are depleted. ... [Wlhere natural resources can be utilized and at the same time perpetuated for future generations,
what has been called 'constitutional morality' requires that we do so.")).
193.
"[I]t is well-established that the littoral right of access to adjacent water is a
qualified right. Plaintiffs' contention that the Town [of Oak Island] may not, without
compensation, in any way limit their right to access to the ocean is inconsistent with
the qualified nature of that right." Slavin, 584 S.E.2d at 102.
194. "[T)he United States Supreme Court has been deferential toward state regulation that adversely impacts on property rights, routinely denying the owners compensation. Every major change in western water law, despite adverse effects on existing
claims of right, has been sustained as valid, non-compensable regulation." Sax, supra
note 176, at 259 n.4. See a/soJoseph L. Sax, Property Rights in the U.S. Supreme Court: A
Status Report, 7 UCLAJ. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 139, 145-47 (1988).
195. Sax, supra note 176, at 260. With regard to land use cases, for example, "[v]alid
preexisting uses have been subject to rezoning and owners have been required to
change their use to conform to the new law." Id. at 265 (citing Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (sustaining an ordinance regulating dredging
and pit excavations; the Court concluded that "every regulation necessarily speaks as a
prohibition. If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police powers,
the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional."); Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80, 83 (1946) ("[In no
case does the owner of property acquire immunity against exercise of the police power
because he constructed it in full compliance with existing laws ...The police power is
one of the least limitable of governmental powers, and in its operation often cuts down
property rights."); Erie R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm'n, 254 U.S. 394, 409-14
(1921) (requiring the balance of public and private rights when regulations were challenged; public rights should prevail).
196. Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594.
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the "public servitudes" (such as the public trust) that existed prior to
the initiation of the right. As Sax noted, "[t]here is a tradition that
recognizes a pre-existing right of the State in the flow of its rivers. Private diversions, at least those in tidal or navigable waters and affected
tributaries, have always been subject to servitude and a trust in favor of
the public."' 7 Specifically with regard to the regulation of riparian water rights, Dellapenna concluded that the public trust might itself be
enough to uphold almost any conceivable regulated riparian statute.9
The following section discusses the application of the public trust doctrine.
E. EXAmPLE: SLAVIN V. TowN OF OAK ISLAND

The decision in Slavin v. Town of Oak Island provides an excellent
example of the limited nature of littoral rights."n In Slavin, owners of
oceanfront properties located within the municipal boundaries of the
Town of Oak Island challenged the Beach Access Plan that the Town
adopted in order to protect both turtle habitat and newly replenished
sand dunes.' One provision of the Beach Access Plan restricted beach
access to "designated public access points.""0 ' Plaintiffs challenged this
provision, arguing that their littoral rights afforded them "a right of
direct access to the ocean.""' Plaintiffs also argued that the Beach Access Plan "constituted a taking of [plaintiffs' littoral rights] in violation
of the federal and state constitutions."' °"
In a decision of relevance to Lake Lure, should a court find that littoral rights exist, the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the
plaintiffs' arguments:
[w] hile we agree that North Carolina law recognizes a littoral property owner's right of access to adjacent water, plaintiffs misinterpret
the nature of that right. A littoral property owner's right of access to
the ocean is a qualified one and is subject to reasonable regulation.

Plaintiffs, however, do not argue that the Access Plan is an unreasonable regulation of their littoral property rights. Rather, plaintiffs in-

sist that defendant may not limit their right of access to the ocean at
all without compensating plaintiffs.

197. Sax, supra note 176, at 269 (internal citation omitted).
198. Dellapenna, supra note 174, § 7.05(b).
199. See generally Brian C. Fork, A First Step in the Wrong Direction: Slavin v. Town of
Oak Island and the Taking of Littoral Rights of Direct Beach Access, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1510
(2004) (discussing the qualified nature of littoral rights).
200. Slavin, 584 S.E.2d at 101.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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In Capune, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that a littoral
property owner's right of access to adjacent water is "'subject to such
general rules and regulations as the Legislature, in the exercise of its
powers, may prescribe for the protection of the public rights in rivers
or navigable waters.'" In Weeks, this Court held that appurtenant littoral rights are "subordinate to public trust protections." Thus, it is
well-established that the littoral right of access to adjacent water is a
qualified right.
Plaintiffs' contention that the Town may not, without compensation,
in any way limit their right of access to the ocean is inconsistent with
the qualified nature of that right. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law, and the trial court's
order granting
summary judgment in favor of defendant was
204
proper.

VIII. DO EITHER THE PUBLIC (IN GENERAL) OR LAKESIDE
PROPERTY OWNERS (IN SPECIFIC) HAVE A RIGHT TO USE
LAKE LURE UNDER THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE?
In 1995, the North Carolina Supreme Court addressed the public
5
trust doctrine in Gwathmey v. North Carolina."'
Certain individuals who

oppose implementation of the LAC recommendations argue that those
recommendations are inconsistent with both the public trust doctrine
and the Gwathmey decision. As discussed below, such opposition is
groundless. In fact, the LAC recommendations fulfill the requirements of the public trust doctrine and are entirely consistent with the
Gwathmey decision.
A. BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE

The public trust doctrine developed primarily from Roman Law."
Gaius included a discussion of rights in his Institutes. " Some rights,
204.

Id. at 102 (internal citations omitted).

205. Gwathmey v. North Carolina,464 S.E.2d 674, 688 (N.C. 1995).
206. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 429 (1989). (noting that

the concept of public waters being reserved or protected for public use has numerous
historic antecedents including Spanish law, the thirteenth century codification LAS
SIETE PARTmrAS seen as the "Spanish antecedent for the public trust doctrine;" French
law, an eleventh century French law provided that "the public highways and byways,
running water and springs, meadows, pastures, forest, heaths and rocks ... are not to be
held by lords, ... nor are they to be maintained ... in any other way than that their peo-

ple may always be able to use them;" Chinese law, the codification of water laws prepared during the Ch'in Dynasty, 249-207 B.C., included the statement that "private
water ownership never appeared and the individual duties in water undertakings would
eventually lead to and enhance public welfare;" African law, Nigerian law provides that
"[a]ll inhabitants of Nigeria ... enjoy a right of free navigation in tidal and other large
inland waterways;" Islamic beliefs, "the fundamentals of Islamic water law purport to
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Gaius wrote, are of divine right (divinijuris) and some are of human
(humani juris); of those that are of human right, some things are of
public right (publicijuris),and some things are things of individuals (res
singulorum)."

The concept of public right contained in the Institutes ofJustinian °
was based in part on the Institutes of Gaius. According to Justinian,
written law was composed of ius civile (the "law of [Roman] citizens")
and ius gentium ("the law of nations"). Civil law was divided into "public law" (publicijuris)when it related to the state or official worship and
"private law" (jurisprivat) when it dealt with the legal interrelations of
the citizens. With regard to development of the public trust doctrine,
Justinian concluded in Institutes Book II that "the following things are
by natural law common to all - the air, running water, the sea, and
consequently the sea-shore.""'°
In 1215, the Magna Charta incorporated principles of Roman Law
propounded by both Gaius and Justinian"' and became a part of the
ensure to all members of the Moslem community the availability of water;" and American Indian beliefs). Geoffrey Scott noted that "the seminal principles from which the
doctrine is derived purport to date to ancient Greece and Rome." Geoffrey R. Scott,
The Expanding Public Trut Doctrine: A Warning to Environmentalists and Policy Makers, 10
FoRD-iAM ENvTL. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1998).
207. Gaius wrote the Institutes around 161 A.D. ALAN WATSON, THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN
LAW 42 (1995).
208. See FRANCIS DE ZULUETA, THE INSrITUTES OF GAius 67 (1946). Publicijuris, "as
applied to a thing or right, means that it is open to or exercisable by all persons. It
designates things which are owned by 'the public;' that is, the entire state or community, and not by any private person. When a thing is common property, so that anyone
can make use of it who likes, it is said to be publicijuris,as is the case of light, air, and
public water." BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNARv 1397 (4th ed. 1968). "The word 'public' in
this sense means pertaining to the people, or affecting the community at large; that
which concerns a multitude of the people; and the word 'right,' as so used, means a
well-founded claim; an interest; concern; advantage; benefit." Id.
209. JUSTINIAN, THE INSTITUTES OFJUSTINtAN, at B2 (J.B. Moyle, trans., Oxford Univ.
Press 5th ed. 1913).
210. Id. at D2. "Roman law held the seashores to be publicly owned, open to the
common use of all citizens with the government being the supervisor or trustee for
these public rights. Much the same concept was adopted by the English courts well
prior to the American Revolution." DAVID J. BROWER, UNC SEA GRANT PUBL'N No.
UNC-SG-77, AccEss TO THE NATION'S BEACHES: LEGAL AND PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 21
(Feb.1978).
211. The appearance of the public trust doctrine in the Magna Charta was summarized in Arnold v. Mundy:
[I] n Magna Charta, which is said to be nothing more than a restoration of the
ancient common law, we find this usurpation [granting several fisheries] broken down and prohibited in future. That charter, as passed in the time of
king John enacts, "that where the banks of rivers hadfirst been defended in his time,
(that is, when they had first been fenced in, and shut against the common
use, in his time) they should be from thenceforth laid open." And, by the charter of
Henry Il. which is but an amplification and confirmation of the former, it is
enacted, "that no banks shall be defended (that is, shut against the common use)
from henceforth, but such as were in defence in the time of king Henry our grandfather,
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common law of England. As Wilkinson noted, "[t]he common law
distinguished between the jus privatum, which the Crown could transfer
to individuals in fee ownership, and the jus publicum, which the Crown
held in trust for the public."2 2 Wilkinson also noted that conflicting
authority exists over whether the Crown could convey jus publicum
lands."'
In 1715, North Carolina adopted the common law of England. "
North Carolina General Statute section 4-1 codified this adoption:2 '
All such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use
within this State, or so much of the common law as is not destructive
by the same places and the same bounds as they were wont to be in his time." By this
charter, it has been understood, and the words fairly import, that all grants of
rivers, and rights of fishery in rivers or arms of the sea, made by the kings of
England before the time of Henry II. were established and confirmed, but
that the right of the crown to make such royal grants, and by that means to
appropriate to individuals what before was the common right of all, and the
means of livelihood for all, for all future time, was wholly taken away.
Arnold v. Mundy, 6 NJ.L. 1, 73 (1821). See alsoJames R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentageof the Equal Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REv. 1,
22, 23 n.76 (1997). As discussed by Rasband, the accuracy of the Arnold court's summary is open to question.
212. Wilkinson, supra note 206, at 430-31 (internal citation omitted). See also Richard Ausness, Water Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986
U. ILL. L. REv. 407, 409-411 (1986). Scott characterized this distinction as follows:
"[The public trust doctrine] stipulates that for the purpose of delimiting a government's relationship to ownership of the earth resources there are two classifications of
property: (1) that which is capable of transfer, in usual and ordinary course, to private
ownership; and (2) that which is not and is to be held by government in a public trust
for its constituents." Scott, supra note 206, at 15 (citing Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 367(1842) (additional citations omitted)).
213. "Compare Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842) ('the question
must be regarded as settled in England against the right of the king since Magna
Charta to make such a granL') with 4 R. Clark, [WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS (1970)] at
101 ('Statements found in the American cases which assume that the King could not
grant the beds of navigable waters, the jus privatum, in to private ownership are
wrong.')." Wilkinson, supra note 206, at 431, n.31.
214. "At least after 1715, the common law of England was applicable in North Carolina only to the extent it was deemed 'compatible with our way of living.'" Gwathmey,
464 S.E.2d at 679 (citing State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854, 854 (1961)).
215. "The 'common law' referred to in N.C.G.S. § 4-1 has been held to be the common law of England as of the date of the signing of the American Declaration of Independence." Id. Rasband described the public trust doctrine at the time of the American Revolution as follows:
[b]y the time of the American Revolution ...the understanding that the
crown had granted most of the foreshore had been replaced with a different
concept: what has been called the prima facie theory. Under that theory, the
crown was presumed to own and never to have parted with the foreshore or
fishery. An individual could acquire title to the foreshore or its associated resources by custom, prescription, or grant, but the foreshore was prima facie in
the crown and would remain the crown's absent express proof.
Rasband, supra note 211, at 11.
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of, or repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the freedom and independence of this State and the form of government therein established,
and which has not been otherwise provided for in whole or in part,
not abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, are hereby declared to
be in full force within this State." 6
In general, two themes run through the decisions in cases involving
the public trust doctrine. First, the doctrine serves as a restraint on

alienation,"7 precluding states from alienating property "common to all
mankind" held in trust by the state."1 8 In Illinois Central Railroad Com-

pany v. Illinois,"' for example, the state legislature attempted to convey
virtually the entire Chicago waterfront to the railroad."' Invalidating
the conveyance, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the validity of the public trust doctrine: "[t]he State can no more abdicate its trust over
property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use
and control of private parties ... than it can abdicate its police powers

216.
Gwathmey, 464 S.E.2d at 679.
217. "The traditional role of the public trust doctrine has been to restrain governmental activities that impair public rights...." Ausness, supra note 212, at 414. "Traditionally, the public trust 'functioned as a restraint on the states' abilities to alienate
public trust lands.'" Carmichael, supra note 171, at 201 (quoting District of Columbia
v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082-83 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Scott noted, however,
that case law is inconsistent regarding the extent of the prohibition on alienation:
[s]ome courts have concluded that the government cannot dispose of public
trust property and that any attempt to do so is voidable or void ab initio. To
these persons the public trust doctrine may be a simple immutable principle
or a means to democratize a check on a corrupt executive or legislature.
Others have concluded that trust property can pass into private hands, while
remaining quiescently impressed with the trust which can awaken any time it
is in the public interest. Still others have held that government may transfer
trust property so long as the grantee will place it into public service by executing a trust purpose through private initiative. Finally, some have held that
trust property may, in circumstances not fully delimited, pass unfettered into
the private domain.
Scott, supra note 208, at 22 (internal citations omitted). See also Scott supra note 208, at
24-36 (discussing the inconsistent interpretation of the public trust doctrine over
time).
218. "The sovereign power itself ... cannot, consistently with the principles of the law
of nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute
grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right." Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 78.
219. 111.Cent. R.R Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
220. In 1869, the legislature granted approximately 1,000 acres of the Chicago waterfront (including all of the Chicago harbor) to the railroad. In 1873, the legislature
revoked the grant and the state attorney general sought to have it declared invalid.
Rasband, supra note 211, at 63; Ausness, supra note 212, at 412; Wilkinson, supra note
206, at 452.
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in the administration of government and the preservation of the
peace.
Second, the public trust doctrine imposes a fiduciary duty of the
trustee to protect the assets of the trust for the beneficiaries of the
trust. With regard to such duties, the public trust doctrine is quite
similar to the laws applicable to any trustee managing the assets of any
trust.2 22 For example, in upholding use restrictions intended to protect

riverine resources, the Court of Appeals in Morse v. Oregon Division of
State Land?" noted: "[t]hese resources, after all, can only be spent
once. Therefore, the law has historically and consistently recognized
that rivers and estuaries once destroyed or diminished may never be
restored to the public and, accordingly,
has required the highest degree of
22 4
trustee."
public
the
from
protection
The most significant public trust doctrine case to date has been Na2 25
tional Audubon Society v. Superior Court,
the Mono Lake decision.

At

issue was the authority of the State of California to allow the City of Los
Angeles to divert flows from the watershed of the lake.22 6 The California Supreme Court restated the public trust doctrine as "an affirmation
of the duty of the state to protect the people's common heritage in
streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of
protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of that right is
consistent with the purposes of the trust. '2 7 The court held that the
state had an affirmative and continuing duty to evaluate the impact of
water allocations on trust resources and to protect those resources
whenever feasible.2 8 "In our opinion, the core of the public trust doctrine is the state's authority as sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over the navigable waters of the state and the
lands underlying those waters. This authority applies to the waters
tributary to Mono Lake and bars [Los Angeles] or any other party from
claiming a vested right to divert waters once it becomes clear that such
diversions harm the interestsprotected by the public trust."'2

221. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 453. The rule in North Carolina is somewhat different. See
infra text accompanying notes 244-252.
222. The principles applicable to the "authority and duties of the state as trustee of
trust resources ... applied to rights in flowing waters just as they did to other trust
property." Ausness, supra note 212, at 426.
223. Morse v. Or.Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520 (Or. Ct. App. 1978).
224. Id. at 524 (emphasis added).
225. Nat't Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 724.
228. In his interpretation of this decision, Ausness concluded "that the public trust
doctrine imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use of appropriated water." Ausness, supra note 212, at 426.

229.

Nat'lAudubon Socy, 658 P.2d at 712 (emphasis added).
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OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NORTH CAROLINA

As noted above, North Carolina adopted the common law of England over sixty years prior to the American Revolution."n By adopting
the common law, North Carolina also adopted the public trust doctrine."'
Following the Revolution, North Carolina "became the owner of
lands beneath navigable waters."" In Gwathmey, the North Carolina
Supreme Court addressed two public trust doctrine issues. First, what
was the appropriate definition of "navigable" waters?... Second, what
was the authority of the State to convey "lands beneath navigable waters"?"3
Definition of "navigable"waters
With regard to the appropriate definition of "navigable" waters, the
petitioners argued that the court should consider the waters navigable
The State of
if people, in fact, used those waters for navigation.'
were subject
if
they
navigable
North Carolina argued that waters were
to the ebb and flow of the tides."'
The answer was of significant importance because the State Board
of Education between 1926 and 1945 conveyed marshlands owned by
the state located between the high and low water marks in the Middle
Sound area of New Hanover County.22 7 In 1987 pursuant to North
Carolina General Statute section 146-20.1 (b), the Division of Fisheries,
Department of Natural Resources issued "resolution letters purporting
to validate the plaintiffs' titles to the marshlands [which] were accompanied in each case by a 2purported reservation of public trust rights in
those same marshlands. 8
Of particular importance (and stated in Gwathmey) is the fact that
the "lands beneath navigable waters" referred to lands owned by the
State of North Carolina.2 5' As noted by the court, "looming over any
discussion of the ownership of estuarine marshes is the 'public trust'
doctrine - a tool for judicial review of state action affecting State-owned
230. See Gwathmey, 464 S.E.2d at 679.
231. "North Carolina accepted the public trust doctrine in Shepard'sPoint Land Co. v.
Atlantic Hotel in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina quoted the decision in
Illinois Central with approval." Carmichael, supra note 171, at 177 (internal citations
omitted).
232. Gwathmey, 464 S.E.2d at 677.
233. Id. at 677-78.
234. Id. at 682.
235. See id. at 677.
236. The "ebb and flow" test was the navigability test that arose under the common
law of England. Id. at 678-79.
237. Id. at 676.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 677.
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submerged land underlying navigable waters, including estuarine marshland, and a concept embracing asserted inherent public rights in these
lands and waters."
In essence, the plaintiffs argued that the public trust doctrine applied only to state-owned lands underlying waters navigable in fact
while the State argued that the public trust doctrine applied to stateowned lands underlying waters subject to the ebb and flow of the
tides."' The trial court ruled for the plaintiffs, concluding that the test
for determining navigability (and therefore application of the public
trust doctrine) was whether the waters were navigable in fact.24 The
North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed this conclusion." '
State authority to convey public trust doctrine lands
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Illinois CentralRailroad v. Illinois. suggested that a state could not convey lands to which the public
trust applied. "' Not all of the states have followed this rule.4 6
The North Carolina Supreme Court addressed this issue in Gwathmey, concluding that it was within the authority of the General Assembly to convey public trust doctrine lands. 47 In reaching this conclusion,
the court made reference to a number of earlier decisions that appeared to reach a contrary result. For example, the court cited State v.
Twiford "[n] avigable waters are free. They cannot be sold or monopolized. They can belong to no one but the public and are reserved for
free and unrestricted use by the public for all time. Whatever monopoly may obtain on land, the waters are unbridled yet.""4
240. Id. at 677-78 (quoting Monica Kivel Kalo & Joseph J. Kalo, The Battle to Preserve
North Carolina's Estuarine Marshes: The 1985 Legislation, Private Claims to Estuarine
Marshes, Denial of Permits to Fill, and the Public Trust, 64 N.C. L. REv. 565, 572 (1986)
(emphasis added). See also Op. N. C. Att'y Gen., No. 346 (1998) (the public trust doctrine applies to "the state's navigable waters").
241.
Gwathmey, 464 S.E.2d at 677-78.
242. Id. at 677.
243. Id. at 688.
244. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
245. "The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole
people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them
entirely under the use and control of private parties ...
than it can abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace." Id. at
453.
246. With regard to the authority to states to convey such lands, Corbridge noted
that in many states the public trust doctrine "establish[ed] the principle that transferees from a state of bottomlands underlying navigable waters take qualified title, subject
to a varying range of overriding public rights to use the surface." Corbridge, supra
note 1, at 898. With regard to the restraint on alienation, Ausness concluded that the
public trust doctrine "protects the public's interest in certain critical resources by treating the public's interest as a property right which the state cannot wholly alienate."
Ausness, supra note 212, at 408 (emphasis added).
247. Gwathmey, 464 S.E.2d at 683.
248. North Carolinav. Twiford, 48 S.E. 586, 588 (N.C. 1904).
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After quoting this language, the court concluded that, "[t] o the extent that this statement in Twiford can be read expansively to indicate
that the General Assembly does not have the power to convey lands
underlying navigable waters in fee, it too was mere obiter dictum, unsupported by our laws or our Constitution, and is hereby expressly disapproved." 9
The court also cited North Carolinav. Credle.
[n]avigable waters ... are subject to the public trust doctrine, insofar
as this Court has held that where the waters covering land are naviga-

ble in law, those lands are held in trust by the State for the benefit of
the public. A land grant in fee embracing such submerged lands is
void.su

After quoting this language, the court reached the following conclusion:
[t]he first sentence is entirely consistent with our opinion in this case.
The second sentence is true in the sense that a land grant in fee pursuant to the general entry laws and conveying such submerged lands is
void. However, we hereby expressly reject any construction of the second sentence in the above quotation from Credle that would support the proposition
that the GeneralAssembly is powerless to convey lands lying beneath navigable
waters free of public trust rights when it does so by special legislativegrant. To
construe the second sentence so broadly would conflict with the longestablished rule of Ward v. Willis, 51 N.C. 183 (1858) (per curiam),
that fee simple conveyances - without reserving rights to the people
under the public trust doctrine - of lands beneath navigable waters
pursuant to special legislative grants are valid.25 '

In essence, the General Assembly may dispose of public trust doctrine lands if it does so expressly "by special legislative grant." Absent
such a grant, the General Assembly may not convey public trust doctrine lands.2
249.
250.
Land
251.
252.

Gwathmey, 464 S.E.2d. at 683.
North Carolina v. Credle, 369 S.E.2d 825, 828 (1988) (citing Shepard's Point
Co. v. Atlantic Hotel, 44 S.E. 39 (1903)).
Gwathmey, 464 S.E.2d at 683 (emphasis added).
"[T]his Court has recognized the public interests inherent in navigable waters

and qualified the State's ability to part with title to lands submerged by navigable wa-

ters with a presumption that legislative enactnents do not indicate a legislative intent to
authorize the conveyance of lands beneath navigable waters." Id at 678.
[I]n North Carolina, the public trust doctrine operates as a rule of construction creating a presumption that the General Assembly did not intend to convey lands in a manner that would impair public trust rights. 'Unless clear and
specific words state otherwise, terms are to be construed so as to cause no interference with the public's dominant trust rights, for the presumption is that

the sovereign did not intend to alienate such rights.' RJR Technical Co. v. Pratt,
453 S.E.2d 147, 149 (N.C. 1995). However, this presumption is overcome by a
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C.APPLICABILrY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO LAKE

LuRE

Initially, the public trust doctrine as discussed in Gwathmey applies
only to lands owned by the State of North Carolina that are navigable
in their natural condition:
[t]he controlling law of navigability as it relates to the public trust
doctrine in North Carolina is as follows: "If water is navigable for
pleasure boating it must be regarded as navigable water, though no
craft has ever been put upon it for the purpose of trade or agriculture. The purpose of navigation is not the subject of inquiry, but the
fact of the capacity of the water for use in navigation." In other
words, if a body of water in its naturalcondition can be navigated by watercraft, it is navigable in fact and, therefore, navigable in law, even if
it has not been used for such purpose. Lands [owned by the State of
North Carolina] lying beneath such waters that are navigable in law
are the subject of the public trust doctrine"

Neither of the conditions precedent to application of the public
trust doctrine apply to Lake Lure. At no Lime did the State of North
Carolina own the bed of the lake." ' Furthermore, the lake could not
have been navigable "in its natural condition" because it is an artificial

waterbody.

special grant from the General Assembly expressly conveying lands underlying
navigable waters in fee simple and without reservation of any public trust
rights.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the General Assembly isnot prohibited by our laws or Constitutionfrom conveying in fee simple lands underlying waters
that are navigable in law without reserving public trust rights. The General Assembly
has the power to convey such lands, but under the public trust doctrine it will be presumed not to have done so. That presumption isrebutted by a specialgrant of the General Assembly conveying the lands in questionfree of all public trust rights, but only if
the specialgrant does so in the clearest and most express terms.
Id. at 684 (emphasis added).
253. Id. at 682 (emphasis added). See also Op. N. C. Att'y Gen. No. 346, supra note
240 (citing Gwathney for the proposition that North Carolina's public trust doctrine
applies "if a body of water in its natural condition can be navigated by watercraft" (emphasis added)).
254. Those who oppose the LAC recommendations argue that the mere fact that
pleasure boats operate on Lake Lure means that the public trust doctrine applies. This
argument either reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the Gwathney decision or

is an attempt to bootstrap a right of access to Lake Lure where no right of access exists.
The operation of pleasure boats on the lake does not have the effect of transferring
title to the bed of Lake Lure to the State of North Carolina. See Gwathmey, 464 S.E.2d
at 682 (stating that lands beneath navigable waters are the subject of the public trust
doctrine).
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Nonetheless, the Town owns Lake Lure and holds it in trust for the
benefit of the citizens of the Town." As a result, the public trust doctrine may apply to the Town (regarding Lake Lure) as it was applicable
to the State of North Carolina (regarding the Middle Sound area of
New Hanover County).256

Assuming that the public trust doctrine does apply to Lake Lure,
then the Town would be prohibited from conveying any portion of the
lake absent some form of a "special grant" by the Town Council." 7 The
Town would also have a fiduciary obligation to protect the assets of the
trust, specifically the lake itself. "
The State of North Carolina and political subdivisions of the State
may exercise police power as needed to protect public resources held
in trust for the citizens of the respective jurisdictions. With regard to
the protection of North Carolina's wildlife, for example, the Court of
Appeals ruled in North Carolinav. Stewar 66 that "[a] s the State's wildlife
population is a natural resource of the State held by it in trust for its
citizens, the enactment of laws reasonably related to the protection of
such wildlife constitutes a valid exercise of the police power vested in
the General Assembly. " "°
The Washington Supreme Court addressed the need to exercise
the police power to protect the assets of the trust, in a case involving
the regulation of personal water craft. In Weden v. San Juan County,"'
the court concluded that a county ordinance prohibiting such craft
complied with Washington's public trust doctrine.26" Specifically, the
court ruled that "it would be an odd use of the public trust doctrine to
sanction an activity ''that actually harms and damages the waters and
wildlife of this state. 1"
If the public trust doctrine is applicable, the opposite side of the
coin is that a failure to protect Lake Lure could subject the Town to
liability based on a breach of trust theory. Andes noted that public trust
255. It may be advisable to amend the language of proposed Ordinance Number 0112-11 to state unequivocally that the Town holds Lake Lure in trust for the benefit of
the citizens of the Town. The proposed Ordinance is discussed in Part V infra.
256. It is interesting to note that "[tlitle to real property held by the State and subject to public trust rights may not be acquired by adverse possession." N.C. Gen. Stat.
§1-45-1 (2003). It may be appropriate to consider similar legislation for real property
held in trust by political subdivisions of the state.
257. See supra note 252.
258. As Andes noted, "it is settled that states' responsibilities for navigable waters
constitutes a fiduciary trust." Andes, supra note 149, at 87.
259. North Carolinav. Stewart, 253 S.E.2d 638 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
260. Id. at 640 (citing Baldwin, 436 U.S. 371; North Carolina v. Lassiter, 185 S.E. 2d
478 (N.C. 1971).
261. Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273 (Wash. 1998).
262. Id. at 284.
263. Id. See also Donna R. Christie, Marine Reserves, the Public Trust Doctrine and IntergenerationalEquity, 19J. LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 427, 432 (2004).
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responsibilities "are serious and subject to equally serious judicial scrutiny."

'

Ausness summarized this conclusion:

courts can enforce the public trust doctrine against the government
itself. Standing requirements are generally not very restrictive, and
courts seem willing to engage in a searching inquiry when called
upon to determine whether a particular legislative or administrative
action is consistent with public trust obligations. This inquiry may
lead to outright reversal of a legislative or administrative decision;
more often the court requires that the legislature or agency reevaluate its decision, either in a more broad-based forum or by a process
that properly considers trust interests. "'
D.

EXAMPLE: WISCONSIN V. VILLAGE OFLAKE DELTON

Lake Delton, an artificial waterbody, is located entirely within the
boundaries of the Village of Lake Delton and the Town of Delton, Wisconsin.2
During the summer months, the Tommy Bartlett Water
Show performs water ski exhibitions on one portion of Lake Delton.m
In order to facilitate these performances as well as to protect both the
performers and the general public, the Village and the Town enacted
an ordinance reserving the performance area of the lake for the exclusive use of the Water Show during performance periods. " In essence,
the ordinance zoned the lake, reserving one area being for performances, and requiring a license before performers could offer such performances to the public. The Tommy Bartlett Water Show was the only
license. 9
The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources challenged the
7
ordinance, alleging it violated Wisconsin's public trust doctrine.Y
The
Department of Natural Resources also asserted that the ordinance violated both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution."'
In Wisconsin v. Village of Lake DeltonY' the court rejected the state's
challenges. Dismissing the argument that the ordinance violated the
264. Andes, supra note 149, at 87 (citing Arizona Ctr. for Law v. Hassell, 837 P.2d
158, 168-69 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (invalidating statutes that relinquished state ownership of submerged lands for unquantified consideration); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance,
Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983); Joseph L. Sax, The

Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.
REv. 473, 475 (1970).
265. Ausness, supra note 212, at 435 (internal citations omitted).
266. Wisconsin v. Village of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 626.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 624.
271. Id. at 635.
272. Id. at 622.
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public trust doctrine, the court concluded: "no single public interest in
the use of navigable waters, though afforded the protection of the public trust doctrine, is absolute. Some public uses must yield if other public uses are to exist at all. The uses must be balanced and accommodated on a case by case basis."27
The Court of Appeals also concluded that "[tjhe rights of the public to use navigable waters are not absolute, but are subject to state and
local police power to insure that such rights are exercised in a safe and
orderly manner. " "
To determine whether the ordinance violated the Wisconsin public
trust doctrine, the court applied a two-part test: 75 First, did the ordinance serve a legitimate public purpose?27 Second, if so, did the ordinance employ reasonable means to accomplish that the purpose? 77
Answering both of these questions in the affirmative, the court rejected
the public trust doctrine challenge raised by the Department of Natural Resources.
The court also rejected the state's Equal Protection and Due Process challenges: "[flinally, we cannot accept the state's assertion that
the town and village were exclusively and improperly motivated to enact this ordinance by the desire to benefit a single, private, commercial
corporation, or that the ordinance offends the due process and equal
'
protection clauses of the United States Constitution."78
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Both the Town and the LLMC have more than sufficient authority
to regulate activities occurring on Lake Lure. Such regulations could
include permit requirements (with associated fees) for both recreational and commercial uses as well as limitations on the number of
vessels using the lake. These regulations could also restrict certain
types of activities (e.g., commercial or nonresidential) during certain
times of the year as needed to allow use of the lake by the citizens of
the Town. While the Town's authority may be limited to those areas of
Lake Lure located within the boundaries of the Town, the authority of
the LLMC extends to the entirety of Lake Lure and its shoreline area.
However, with this authority comes potential liability. Situations
could arise where the Town of Lake Lure, as the owner of Lake Lure,
could be liable for injuries suffered on the lake a claimant could prove
that injuries resulted from the Town's negligence.

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id. at 632.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 635.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Issue 2

THE LA W OF LAKE LURE

Exercise such authority is not restricted by the assertion of littoral
rights for the simple reason that such rights do not exist. At no time in
its history did ownership of lakeside property carry with it a right of
access to Lake Lure. Even if such rights did exist, or had been acquired by adverse possession, regulation of those rights is clearly within
the authority of both the Town and the LLMC.
Finally, the public trust doctrine as restated in the Gwathmey decision does not convert Lake Lure from the property of the Town into
the property of the State of North Carolina. The Gwathmey decision in
no way restricts the authority of either the Town or the LLMC.
The Gwathmey decision reinforces the obligation of a trustee to protect the assets of the trust. In Gwathmey, the trustee was the State of
North Carolina and the assets of the trust were lands submerged below
navigable waters belonging to the State. With regard to Lake Lure, the
trustee is the Town of Lake Lure and the primary asset of the trust is
the lake itself. The obligation of the Town to protect Lake Lure is no
different from the obligation of the State to protect state trust resources expressed in Gwathmey.
In New Jersey v. New York, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes referred to
the Delaware River when he wrote: "[a] river is more than an amenity,
it is a treasure. It offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among
those who have power over it." 7' As with the Delaware, Lake Lure is a
treasure. Also as with the Delaware, use of the treasure must be both
protected and preserved.

279.

NewJersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
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I. INTRODUCTION

Colorado is the leading prior appropriation state of the American
West. In contrast to the riparian states of the East and the hybrid prior
appropriation states of the West, Colorado remains loyal in its adherence to a common-law doctrine of water rights that emerged from the
mining and irrigation practices in place at the time of statehood.'
However, as the population and economy of the West becomes increasingly urbanized and less agricultural,' effective management of water
rights will test Colorado water law. In particular, the growth of gateway
communities in the Colorado Rocky Mountains-and their increasing

t J.D., December 2004, University of Missouri, Kansas City. My special thanks go
to ProfessorJohn W. Ragsdale, Jr., Professor of Law at the University of Missouri, Kansas City, for his inspiration, guidance, and expertise in the field.
1.
See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6; GEORGE VRANESH, VRANESn'S COLORADO
WATER LAW 7 (James N. Corbridge, Jr. & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1999).
2. The West experienced a 75 percent increase in population during the period
from 1960 to 1990, during which domestic use of water rose from withdrawals of 6.5
million acre-feet ("af") to 14 million af.
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economic and political clout--could pose challenges to the state's
pronounced rejection of the public trust doctrine.' The recent decision of the Colorado Supreme Court to affirm water court decisions
granting instream flows to the cities of Golden, Breckenridge, and Vail,
and the legislative acknowledgment of local government influence on
water development, foreshadow this proposition.'
The Importance of Gateway Communities in Colorado
The Western economy grew from intensive farming and natural resource development. But times have changed significantly, bringing a
new economic era featuring a new service sector dominated by professionals and accompanying support jobs that no longer rely on raw resource development.' Historically, access to repositories of raw materials provided the economic benefit to Western rural communities,
especially.! But as the new service sector grows, gateway communities
are finding economic benefits from marketing their natural landscape
and outdoor amenities in the growing recreation and tourism industry.' For example, when nearly one third of the economic base of
Kremmling, Colorado, was impacted by the permanent closing of the
Louisiana Pacific wafer board plant in 1991, the tiny community of
about 1,200 residents responded by drafting an economic development

3. SeeJon Sarche, Recreational Users Win Water _Rights in the West, THE PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, June 25, 2003, at A2 (stating that the popularity of outdoor sports like kayaking and fishing has helped the recreation industry gain political clout in the West).
The competition among members of the recreation industry is likely to heat up as
hydroelectric dams are expected to be relicensed in the next fifteen years. Id.
4.
See David F. Jankowski et al, The 1969 Act's Contributions to Local Governmental
Water Suppliers, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 20 (1999) (noting that public water supply is
particularly a function of local government, which has gained significant importance
with the dual emergence of the 1969 Water Right Determination Act and rapid urbanization of the state's population); See GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An
Historical Overview, 1 U. DEN. WATER L. REv. 1, 16 (1997) (stating that currently municipal government entities, including quasi-governmental entities like sanitation districts, are primary parties in the water acquisition arena).
5. See State Eng'r v. Golden, 69 P.3d 1027, 1028 (Colo. 2003), affg by an equally
divided court, en banc, Decree, In re Application for Water Rights of the City of Golden,
No. 98CW448 (Water Ct. Div. 1, June 13, 2001) [hereinafter Golden Decree], available
at http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/watercourts/wat-divl/ordergolden.htm.
6. See, e.g., Raymond Rasker, A New Look at Old Vistas: The Economic Role of Environmental Quality in Western PublicLands, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 369, 373 (1994).
7. Id at 375.
8. See id. at 378. From 1969 to 1991, most of the two million new jobs added in
the Rocky Mountain West were service-related. Id. at 377. While in 1969 more than 11
percent of direct employment was in the natural resource industries, by 1991, these
industries provided less than 6 percent of all employment in the region, whereas service industries comprised over 81 percent of all employment. Id.
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plan marketing its environmental quality, including the designation of
the nearby upper Colorado River as a scenic byway.'
Vail, Colorado is the prime example of a burgeoning gateway
community that developed around a modern recreation based economy. Unlike surrounding revival towns like Aspen that started as mining settlements, Vail was born a small ski resort." But like many of the
surrounding mountain communities in the later half of the twentieth
century, the resort-turned-town" marketed its unique location and
natural amenities and quickly became a resort phenomenon,"2 sporting
luxurious spas and resorts, fabulous ski facilities, and decadent housing" for its wealthy visitors. But for its location in the high peaks of the
Colorado Rockies, it is doubtful the town would have achieved such
wealth. Vail and other gateway communities to the Rockies are examples of communities finding economic wealth in the quality of the
natural environment and the non-consumptive use of natural resources, both considered essential in retaining existing businesses and
attracting new ones."
More recently, mountain municipalities have emphasized other
forms of outdoor adventure and recreation as part of the repertoire of
available activities that help sustain the local economy year-round. 5
The latest trend across Colorado has been to host the whitewater sports
of boating and kayaking,' 6 which depend, of course, on water supply
and the right to use it.
9. Id. at 384.
10. SeeJohn W. Ragsdale, Jr., National Forest Land Exchanges and the Growth of Vail
and Other Gateway Communities, 31 URB. LAw. 1, 1-2 (1999) (describing the emergence
of Vail as the quintessential modern gateway community).
11.
The town of Vail became incorporated in 1965, three years after the ski resort
opened. Id. at 2, n.1.
12. The resort town is so popular that even its manhole covers are a commodity.
Marcia Martinek, Candidate, Issues and Manhole Covers, HERALD DEMOCRAT, July 23,
2004, available at http://www.leadvilleherald.com/archives/072904.pdf.
13. Of every four residences in Vail, three are occupied only a few weeks each year
as second homes. Ed McMahon & Luther Propst, Park Gateways, NAT'L PARKS,
May/June 1998, at 39.
14. Rasker, supra note 6, at 378. The remote nature of rural gateway communities
an economic benefit, drawing a growing number of professionals seeking to escape the
urban life for a higher quality of life in the country with entire firms migrating to more
remote small-town communities, a phenomenon known as "green-fielding," made
possible largely because of the mobility afforded by telecommunications. Id, at 378-79.
15. Whitewater parks extend the normal boating season by maintaining necessary
stream flows in drier months. See Tom Boyd, Paddle Up; White-water Parks are Experiencing a Sort of Ripple Effect, ROCKY MOUNTAN NEWS, Aug. 30, 2003, at 1M. Whitewater
parks in Colorado have been built in Boulder, Breckenridge, Denver, Durango,
Golden, Gunnison, Lyons, Steamboat Springs, and Vail. Id.
16. SeeJason Blevins, Battle Looms Over Kayak Parks Critics: Recreation Sites are Wasteful
Use of Water, THE DENVER POST, June 2, 2003, at IA (noting Colorado leads the nation
in developing whitewater kayaking parks, with twelve parks completed and nine more
planned). According to civil engineer Gary Lacey, whose company has helped design,
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WATER RIGHTS FOR RECREATION

The natural resources of the Rockies largely caused the success'7 of
Colorado's gateway communities-first because of extraction of these
resources and now the recreational uses of these resources. As a result,
these places face conflicting goals of promoting the resort, recreation,
and service industries that give economic life to the communities while
preserving the quality of the natural environment that makes the experience of these places so appealing. 8 What this means for Colorado
water law is that private industry could actually fuel a "quasienvironmental" or "quasi-public interest" argument in the courts and
legislature. This clearly makes for strange bedfellows in terms of the
constituencies that hold stakes in the future of Colorado water law,
because rights in water are decided not by whose interests may override
others on the basis of policy, but by the historical doctrine of prior appropriation. Further, what the Colorado public, environmentalists,
and private industry believe should be "priorities" in policy terms does
not necessarily translate into "priority" in legal terms.
The ChangingDoctrine
Colorado expressly adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation in
its state constitution, " as interpreted in subsequent judicial decisions'
and in legislation."' The creation of a water right in Colorado is accomplished by fulfillment of three elements: 1) intent to use the water;

build, or redevelop whitewater parks throughout Colorado, the parks are in demand
because they can revitalize downtown areas and bring visitors to resort towns during
the off-season. See Boyd, supra note 15, at IM.
17. Success in this context relates to the economic success of resorLs and the like.
Communities like Vail and Aspen are not successful in terms of socioeconomic aspects
of the community, in that people who work in resort communities are often unable to
afford to live in the same or nearby towns. Property values have risen to astounding
levels in Vail and Aspen, such that the cost of living is much higher than what may be
affordable to the average person. Growth of these gateway communities has been
characterized as urban sprawl, displacing the rural character of mountain communities. Bob Sachs, NationalPerspective on Mountain Resorts and Ecology, 26 VT. L. REV. 515,
520 (2002).
18. Those mountain communities that depend on tourism for the local economy
rely on the character and aesthetics of natural surroundings that influence the quality
of visitors' experiences. See McMahon & Propst, supra note 13, at 39-40.
19. COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, §§ 5-6.
20.
Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo.443, 446-47 (1882) ("[I]n the absence of
express statutes to the contrary, the first appropriator of water from a natural stream
for a beneficial purpose has, with the qualifications contained in the constitution, a
prior right thereto, to the extent of appropriation.").
21.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-102 to-103 (2004).
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2) diversion of the water; and 3) application of the diverted water to a
beneficial use.
"Diversion" remains an evolving concept. Usually meaning a direct
physical taking of water from a natural source, a diversion does not
necessarily mean removal of the water, as in the case of instream
flows. ' The codified definition of "diversion" includes either removal
of water from a natural source or "controlling water in its natural
course... "2 Though this conceptualization of diversion might seem
discordant to the traditional concept of "appropriation," Colorado has
clarified the definition of appropriation to mean "application of a
specified portion of the waters... to a beneficial use....
For the purpose of environmental conservation, the Colorado legislature has also provided for the appropriation of minimum stream
flows by the Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB). 6 The Colorado Supreme Court in ColoradoRiver Water ConservationDistrict v. Colorado Water Conservation Board examined this provision challenged as a
failure to divert under the state constitution." The court upheld the
minimum flow statute, concluding that the constitutional language
preserving the right to divert water to beneficial use was not intended
to establish a requirement that appropriation be based on diversion."

22. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d
798, 800 (Colo. 1965).
23. VRANESH, supra note 1, at 32-33.
24. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(7) (providing, however, that only a local govemnment entity can control water in its natural course for recreational in-channel diversions).
25.
Id. § 37-92-103(3) (a).
26. Id. § 37-92-102(3).
Further recognizing the need to correlate the activities of mankind with some
reasonable preservation of the natural environment, the Colorado water conservation board is hereby vested with the exclusive authority, on behalf of the
people of the state of Colorado, to appropriate in a manner consistent with
[the state constitution], such waters of natural streams and lakes as the [Colorado water conservation] board determines may be required for minimum
stream flows or for natural surface water levels or volumes for natural lakes to
preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree.
Id.
27. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d
570, 572-74 (Colo. 1979).
28. Id. at 574. There remains ambiguity in the statutory abolishment of the diversion requirement of appropriation; it could mean that the diversion requirement applies only to the instream use by the CWCB specifically authorized by statute or that
the diversion requirement has effectively merged with the beneficial use element.
VRANESH,supra note 1, at 38.
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InstreamFlows and Recreation as Beneficial Use
Beneficial use of water is the most fundamental diversion requirement.' The rationale for the beneficial use element was to avoid
speculation and to encourage rapid use of water." But what constitutes
beneficial use has been the subject of much debate, especially as patterns of use have changed over the last century with the decline of agriculture. Before the adoption of the Water Right Determination Act
of 1969," ' courts determined the relative priority among uses of water
in times of shortage by reference to the state constitution. The constitution recognizes a domestic preference over those claims for any
other purpose, and those using water for agricultural purpose have a
preference over manufacturing purposes.' The Colorado Supreme
Court did not interpret this list as exhaustive holding in City and County
of Denver v. Sheriff that the municipal use of water for irrigation was a
constitutional beneficial use.3" The court reasoned that the determination of what qualifies as beneficial use is a question of fact that depends
on the circumstances of the case. 4 In general, the common law interpretation of beneficial use under the prior appropriation doctrine
compares wastefulness of a specific use of water to other possible uses
and to alternative means of achieving the purpose for that particular
use. 5
The Water Right and Determination Act expanded the range of
beneficial uses by explicitly stating that impoundment for recreation
(i.e. fishing and wildlife) is a beneficial use.' The Act also includes a
beneficial use for appropriation by the state for maintenance of minimum flows necessary for the reasonable preservation of me natural
environment. 7 Thus, maintaining instream flow became a viable form
of appropriation to establish a water right.
Before the 2001 amendments to the Act, " the court determined
which entities other than the CWCB could appropriate instream flows.
In City of Thornton v. City of Fort Collins, Fort Collins filed an application
for the appropriation of instream flows on a stretch of the Poudre
29. Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530, 533 (1883) ("The true test of appropriation of
water is the successful application thereof to the beneficial use designed; and the
method of diverting or carrying the same, or making such application, is immaterial.");
VRANESH, supra note 1, at 43.
30. Combs v. Agric. Ditch Co., 28 P. 15 966, 967-68 (Colo. 1892).
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2004).
31.
32. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
33.
City & County ofDenver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 842 (Colo. 1939).
34. Id.
35. VRANESH, supra note 1, at 45.
36. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2004).
37. Id.
38. The language of the current statute expressly authorizes state and local government entities to make such appropriations. Id.
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River running through the city.' Thornton argued that the Act only
authorized the CWCB to appropriate instream flows.' Fort Collins
responded by amending its application.' The city characterized two
dam structures as diversions put to beneficial use: the Nature Dam,
built to return the stream to its historic channel from a flood channel;
and the Power Dam, built upstream to support a fish ladder and boat
chute designed for recreational and piscatorial purposes.' Though the
water court approved the Nature Dam, it denied the Power Dam appropriation, claiming the structure did not amount to a diversion, but
a minimum stream flow appropriation."
The Colorado Supreme
Court on appeal affirmed the Nature Dam appropriation but also held
the Power Dam to be a valid diversion." Citing the statutory definition
of a diversion, the court held that the conventional sense of removing
water from its natural course was no longer the legal requirement for
diversion." The court also declared that a valid appropriation may
result from controlling the flow of water by means of a device or structure employed for beneficial use."
Another decision by the state supreme court in 1992 upheld a decree granting a right to the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy
District to refill the Taylor Park Reservoir in order to maintain fishery
conditions." The court held that the Reservoir was a structure that
effectuated beneficial use of captured water for purposes of recrea-

tion."
The series of statutory amendments to instream flow legislation
culminated in 2001, when the Colorado General Assembly established
procedures for local governments to make appropriations for recreational in-channel diversions." Specifically, the legislation amended the
definition of beneficial use to include diversion "by a county, municipality, city and county, water district, water and sanitation district, wa39. City of Thornton v. City ofFort Collins, 830 P.2d 915, 919 (Colo. 1992).
40. Id. at 920.
41.
Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 921.
44. Id. at 931-33.
45.
Id. at 930.
46. Id.
47. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservation Dist.,
838 P. 2d 840, 854 (Colo. 1992).
48.
!d.
49. Act of June 5, 2001, S. 01-216, § 1, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws 305, 305 (current version at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(5) (2004)) (requiring local government entity to
submit a copy of the water right application to the CWCB for review within thirty days
of filing for an RICD adjudication); Id. (current version at § 37-92-102(6)) (stating
factors to be considered and requiring findings to be made by the CWCB regarding
RICD requests). Legislation also added new code sections stating standards for decisions by the water court and referees regarding RICDs. Id.§ 3 (current version at §§ 3792-305(13)-(16)).
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ter conservation district, or water conservancy district for recreational
in-channel diversion purposes. " ' Prior to the amendment, the statute
had indicated only fishery or wildlife as recreational purposes qualifying as beneficial uses." The legislature also changed the definition of
diversion to state, "only a county, municipality, city and county, water
district, water and sanitation district, water conservation district, or
water conservancy district may control water in its natural course or
location for recreational in-channel diversions."" Previously, the statute had indicated only the CWCB could hold minimum flow rights." A
new statutory subsection was also added to define RICD as "the minimum stream flow as it is diverted, captured, controlled, and placed to
beneficial use between specific points defined by physical control structures pursuant to an application filed by a [local government entity]
for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water.""
Though these new provisions have yet to be directly tested in the
courts, the recent case involving City of Golden's application for instream flow rights for a kayaking course suggests these amendments
are viable changes the state's prior appropriation doctrine."5 Specifically, the Colorado Supreme Court let stand the decision of the water
court holding that the appropriation of instream flows for recreational
purposes satisfies the beneficial use requirement under the Colorado
Constitution.'
The Case of Golden
In June of 2001, the Water Court issued a decree granting instream
flow rights to the City of Golden, Colorado, against objections of the
CWCB 7 and the State Engineer." The water court granted a flow rate
50. Id. § 2 (current version at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4)).
51. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2000).
52. § 2, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws 305 (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92103(7) (2004)).
53. COLO.REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(b) (4) (2000).
54. § 2, 2001 Colo. Sess. Laws 305 (current version at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92103(10.3) (2004)).
55. See Golden Decree, supra note 5. Since the City of Golden filed its application
for the instream flow rights three years before the General Assembly enacted the 2001
amendments expanding the list of government entities eligible for minimum flows, the
case granting the rights to the city did not rule on these issues. More likely, the 2001
amendments are a legislative confirmation of what has happened already in the state
courts-allowing local government entities other than the CWCB to acquire minimum
flow rights, as long as a structure "diverts" the water for beneficial use. See, e.g., City of
Thornton, 830 P. 2d at 929-31; Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist.,
838 P.2d at
854.
56. Golden, 69 P.3d at 1028, affg by an equally divided court, en banc, Golden Decree,
supra note 5.
57. Like its challenges in City of Thornton, 830 P. 2d at 920 and Upper Gunnison River
Water Conservancy Dist, 838 P.2d at 853, the CWCB argued the appropriation was similar
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of 1,000 cfs to Golden for use in seven dams and deflector devices constructed on Clear Creek to form the Golden White-Water Course. ,'
The Course design allows for the control and concentration of flow
within the creek that sustains use of boating chutes throughout the
year.' The city sought and the water court granted absolute water
rights" for the existing dams and deflectors, plus conditional rights to
maintain optimum flow during May andJuly
In accordance with City of Thornton," the court determined that
Golden made an appropriate diversion of the water by means of controlling the natural flow using the dams and deflectors." The court
affirmed that recreation for boating is a beneficial use of the water,
and stated, "City of Golden derives substantial economic benefit from
the recreational use of the Course. This benefit has been an important
factor in the economic redevelopment of the Golden downtown
area. " ' The court also pointed out that the question of reasonableness
of the amount of water appropriated was not whether the amount is
reasonable in the abstract, but whether the quantity was "reasonable

to an instream flow right that only it was authorized to hold under the statute in effect
at that time. See Golden Decree, supranote 5. See also William H. Fronczak, Court Report,
5 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 650, 652 (2002).
58. CWCB, the State Engineer, and the Engineer for Water Division No. 1 were the
only remaining objectors after Arvada, Idaho Springs, and Coors Brewing Company
withdrew statements of opposition and Golden stipulated to rights held by the municipalities of Westminster and Georgetown and the Clear Creek Skiing Company and
Clear Creek County. Golden Decree, supra note 5, paras. B-C.
59. Id. paras. D, E(l)-(2), (9).
60. Id. para. D. Golden accomplished the physical diversion of the water in part by
strategic placement of 4,000 tons of boulders creating waves, holes, and eddies. Howard Pankratz, Recreational Water Use Buoyed: Colo. High Court Lets 3 Towns Use Rivers for
Kayak Courses,THE DENVER Posr, May 20, 2003, at IA.
61. Golden Decree, supra note 5, para. E (6) (decreeing flow rights put to a beneficial
use, specifically the absolute cfs to range from 42 cfs in February to 840 cfs in June).
62. Id. para. D. Golden also applied for conditional water rights for each of ten
additional dam structures and deflector devices it proposed adding to the White Water
Course. Id. The court distinguished daytime from nighttime use, selecting 6:00 p.m.
and 6:00 a.m. as the average demarcation between light and dark. Id.para E(6). The
court noted that the city was still only in the planning stage of installing lights to enable use of the Course at night, but that during the diligence period, Golden could
establish actual use to secure absolute rights for 24-hour use. Id.
63. City of Thornton, 830 P.2d at 930 (declaring the control of water in its natural
course to be a valid appropriation).
64. Golden Decree, supra note 5,para. E (7).
65. Id. para. E(8). The water court findings highlighted testimony that the 1,000
cfs sought by the city would support such world-class competitions as the United States
Olympic trials and the Eddie Bauer Classic. Id. The court was particularly responsive
to the observation that thousands of dollars would be generated both by competitors
using the course and spectators attending the events, concluding "Golden's ability to
continue to attract such competitions depends on the possible availability of high flows
in the 1,000 cfs range." Id.
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for the purposes for which Golden made the appropriation."' In considering the reasonableness of the amount of water claimed, the court
stated "[a]lthough not required to consider other potential uses of
water in quantifying a water right under the beneficial use statute, the
Court notes that the rights at issue are non-consumptive, and the water
claimed is always available for all downstream uses."67 Weighing the
economically important recreational purposes of the whitewater course
against the subordination of Golden's rights to senior users downstream' and the city's stipulations to upstream users,69 the water court
found the instream appropriations were reasonable within the statutory requirements for beneficial use.'6 The water court concluded
Golden's constitutional right to appropriate a new water right in accordance with Colorado law may not be denied or limited based upon
the public trust doctrine, or similar policy restraints purportedly

rooted in concern for the quantities that should be left for future water users. "[A] public interest theory is in conflict with the doctrine of prior
appropriationbecause a water court cannot, in the absence of statutory authority, deny a legitimate appropriationbased on public polity."7"

M.

LIMITS ON INSTREAM FLOW APPROPRIATIONS

The decision of the Colorado Supreme Court is less a monumental
ruling than a procedural checkpoint in the tale of three cities. Since
the court issued no opinion, the "ruling" is not really a holding on the
merits of the case.72 This means that the ruling does not set any precedent and applies only to Golden, Breckenridge, and Vail." This leaves
for another day the interpretation of new statutory provisions govern-

66. Id. para. E (9).
67. Id.
68. All of the water claimed by Golden for the whitewater course is subject to a
senior call downstream in a dry water year. Id. Eighty-four percent of the water
claimed is subject to a senior call downstream in an average year. Id.
69. As part of the city's stipulations, up to 41 cfs of the instream rights are subordinated to future exchanges upstream. Id. The court also noted that the city agreed to
provide 125 af of consumable dry year augmentation water in order to meet the projected full build out requirements of the county. Id.
70. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (2004) ("Beneficial use is the use of that
amount of water that is reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient pracrices to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully
made...").
71.
Golden Decree, supra note 5, Conclusions of Law (quoting Bd. of County
Comm'rs v. United States, 891 P.2d 952, 972 (Colo. 1995); Aspen Wilderness Workshop v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d 1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995)).
72.
Golden, 69 P.3d at 1028.
73.
See Pankratz, supra note 60, at 10A.
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ing the adjudication of instream flow applications by local government
entities.'4
From a policy standpoint, however, many observers interpreted the
supreme court decision as a historic change in state water law, effectively placing the recreational uses of water for kayaking and fishing in
equal standing with consumptive uses for farming, industry, and development.75 However, closer examination of the amended state laws
governing instream appropriations by local entities suggests that procedures empowering the CWCB to impose limits on flow amounts are
likely to encumber the ability of local governments to exploit RICDs.
A reading of the amended statutes reveals that, while enabling local
governments to seek RICDs, the Colorado General Assembly at the
same time boosted the influence of the CWCB by adding procedures
for the adjudication of instream flow rights. Specifically, any local government entity seeking adjudication of an RICD must submit a copy
of its application to the CWCB, who "shall make findings of fact and a
final recommendation as to whether the application should be
granted, granted with conditions, or denied." 8 The factors under
which the CWCB must make findings include:
(I) Whether the adjudication and administration of the [RICD]
would impair the ability of Colorado to fully develop and place to
consumptive beneficial use its compact entitlements;

(II) The appropriate reach of stream required for the intended use;
(III) Whether there is access for recreational in-channel use;
74. The effect of the 2001 amendments on the adjudication of water rights appropriated by a local government entity will be tested when the water court considers an
application by the city of Pueblo, whose officials participated as Amicus Curiae in the
Golden case. See Margie Wood, Colorado High Court Deadlocks on Golden Guaranteedflow
Case, THE PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN, May 20, 2003. Gunnison and Longmont also applied for
RICDs under the new laws. Blevins, supra note 16, at 8A.
75. Pankratz, supra note 60, at IA (reporting statements of Glenn Porzak, counsel
for Golden).
76. See COLO. Rxv. STAT. § 37-92-102(5) (2004) (defining local government entity
as any county, municipality, city and county, water district, water and sanitation district,
water conservation district, or water conservancy district).
77. Id. § 37-92-102(10.3) (defining an RICD to mean "minimum stream flow as it is
diverted, captured, controlled, and placed to beneficial use between specific points
defined by physical control structures pursuant to an application filed by a [local government entity] for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water."). This
new breed of diversion reserved for local governments is distinguished from the
"minimum stream flows" that remain vested exclusively in the CWCB under statute,
which still reads "the [CWCB] is hereby vested with the exclusive authority...to appropriate...such waters of natural streams and lakes as the board determines may be required for minimum stream flows.. to preserve the natural environment to a reasonable degree." Id. § 37-92-102(3)
78. Id. §37-92-102(6)(a).
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(IV) Whether exercise of the [RICD] would cause material injury to
instream flow water rights appropriated pursuant to subsections (3)
and (4) of this section;
(V) Whether adjudication and administration of the [RICD] would
promote maximum utilization of waters of the state as referenced in
paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section; and
(VI) Such other factors as may be determined appropriate for evaluain rules adopted by the board, after
tion of [RICDs] and set forth
7
public notice and comment. 1

Factor I specifically addresses an objection raised by the CWCB in the
Golden case.8" However, the water court concluded in Golden that the
instream flow rights sought by the city would not have the effect of exporting water outside of the state, because the flows sought lay upstream from various customary diversions in-state." At the trial, the
state even conceded the water rights granted to Golden would have no
adverse impact on the state's compact entitlement at issue."
Minimum Flow as a Limitation
Colorado state courts could interpret the new designation of the
RICD as the exclusive means by which local governments may acquire
instream flow rights. The statutory language implies this result by exclusively authorizing the CWCB to appropriate instream flows for con-

servation." Additionally, the statutes limit the allowable amount of
water flow in the definition of RICD to the minimum flow required for a
reasonablerecreational experience in or on the water." A plain reading
of this definition suggests that the CWCB could attempt to significantly
restrict the amount of flow to a level substantially lower than the more
desirable seasonal high water mark most towns would seek. In fact, in
its first exercise under the new laws, the CWCB recommended 250 cfs
of flow for the application by the Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District that requested a range of flows from 270 cfs in Sep-

79. Id. §§ 37-92-102(6) (b) (I)-(VI). In addition to the statutory definition of RICDs,
regulations provide that in determining RICD applications, the CWCB shall make
findings as to the appropriateness of requested RICDs for the intended use, considering in part the nature of the recreational activity and whether the requested RICD may
have a negative impact on the environment of the instream flow, including the potential negative effect of constructing the diversions. See 2 COLO. CODE REGS. 4083(7) (b) (vi), (d)(iii-iv) (2001).
80.
GoldenDecree, supra note 5, para. F (8).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2004).
84. Id. § 37-92-103(10.3).
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tember to 1,190 cfs in May for a boating course in Gunnison. " According to the District's manager, the amount recommended by the CWCB
is "barely floatable," and that the peak amount requested by the District falls well below the present flow of the river at 3,000 cfs.8"
Judging from the disparity between the CWCB recommendations
and the flow amounts requested by the Gunnison District, local entities
might find it difficult to anticipate what the CWCB might consider the
minimum flow necessary for a reasonable recreational experience.
The CWCB itself is fully aware of the looming debate over what the
appropriate amount of flow is for RICDs. In a CWCB meeting specifically on the issue of RICDs, and before the Colorado legislature even
codified the definition of RICD, the CWCB questioned whether the
amount of flow should be the maximum amount necessary to achieve
the most desirable boating flows, or the minimum amount needed for
just boat passage, or the amount necessary to accommodate world-class
water sports." While is no legislative mandate for the water court to
adopt CWCB's findings, the law does state that "the water court shall
apply the factors [considered by the CWCB] and that "[a]ll findings of
fact contained in the recommendation of the [CWCB] shall be presumptive as to such facts, subject to rebuttal by any party."' Clearly,
the burden lies with the Gunnison District to persuade the water court
that a reasonable recreational experience on its watercourse requires
higher levels than the minimum flow suggested by CWCB.
85. See Blevins, supra note 16, at8A. As of the date of this article, the water right to
be granted to the District is still undecided after a recent appeal to the state supreme
court. See Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy
Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 603-04 (Colo. 2005) (remanding the case to the water court with
instructions to remand to the CWCB for fact finding). The water court initially determined that the District was entitled to more than 250 cfs recommended by the CWCB,
but the CWCB appealed the decision to the Colorado Supreme Court. Id. at 589. The
supreme court determined that the CWCB failed to properly make findings of fact as
to the minimum flows necessary for the specific uses in the District's application. Id. at
592 ("the General Assembly intended for the CWCB to analyze the application purely
as submitted by the applicant, rather than to objectively determine what recreation
experience would be reasonable, and what minimum stream flow would meet that
recreational need."). The CWCB's failure to make its determinations based strictly on
the District's application precluded proper adjudication of RICD rights by the water
court. Id. at 603. The case is being watched closely by other water districts and cities
for an indication of what the practical scope of a recreational instream flow right might
be. See Christine Metz, HearingSet for City Water Request, THE STEAMBOAT PILOT, July 29,
2004, available at
http:/ /www.steamboatpiolt.com/section/frontpagejead/story/24897.
86. Id. (quoting Kathleen Curry, manager of the Upper Gunnison River Water
Conservancy District).
87. Memorandum from Dan McAuliffe, Dan Merriman & Ted Kowalski, to Colorado Water Conservation Board Members, regarding Agenda Item No. 6, Nov. 21-22,
2000 Board meeting Recreational Flow Discussion of Next Steps, available at
http://cwcb.state.co.us/agendas/Nov%2000/AgendaltemNo6.pdf.
88. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(13) (2004).
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It remains to be seen how local governments will characterize the
recreational purposes in order to "maximize the minimum" flow. That
is, anticipating that the CWCB will recommend lower than desirable
levels, a town could potentially over-appropriate in an attempt to claim
maximum flows for conditional rights, and during the diligence period
hope to establish the actual flow rate necessary to justify absolute
rights. Glenn Porzak, who represented Golden in its request for instream flow rights, has put his faith in the water court " and has dismissed the minimum flow limitation, stating "[p]eople don't come to
Colorado to enjoy our 'minimum' amount of beauty, to climb our
'minimal'-sized mountains or to have a 'minimal' recreation experience."" It could therefore become vital for local governments that the
state courts interpret the new RICD as an instream flow right measured
by different standards than the minimum flows appropriated for conservation purposes by the CWCB. A differentiation from the minimum
flows necessary for conservation clearly would benefit local governments seeking flows that will maximize recreational experiences.
Therefore, much debate in Colorado courts will likely be over the legislative intent of defining RICDs for local governments separately from
the minimum flows the CWCB may appropriate. One could infer from
the statutory distinction that indeed more than the minimum flow for
conservation may be necessary for a reasonable recreational experience. Perhaps this distinction is also an attempt to avoid lumping
other instream uses of water under the CWCB, which may give the impression that the CWCB in fact represents the public interest. The
distinction generally seems to hinge on the fact that unlike the CWCB,
whose purpose is really serving the public by taking conservation
measures, local governments are not serving the public interest per se,
but instead facilitate private enterprise in the form of attracting tourism and sporting events.

89.
Blevins, supra note 16, at 8A. In Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District,
the division of function and authority as between the CWCB and the water court was
clarified. 109 P.3d at 588-98. Construing various sections of the CWCB's enabling
statute, the court held that, while the CWCB conducts fact finding and makes recommendations to the water court, its authority does not encompass "the extensive oversight and adjudicatory authority it sought [in its arbitrary determinations regarding the
Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District application]." Id. at 595. Only
factual findings by the CWCB (i.e. that an RICD would impair upstream uses under
compact entitlement), are presumed correct by the water court; the recommendation
of the CWCB is only to be considered as part of the record by the water court, and
therefore is not presumptively correct. Id at 603. However, the applicant still bears
the evidentiary burden to rebut the presumption that the findings of the CWCB are
correct. Absent such a showing based on a preponderance of the evidence standard,
"the findings of the CWCB are binding on the water court." Id. at 596-98.
90.
Rosemary Winters, Colorado Supreme Court Turns Tide in Favor of Kayakers, 35
HIGH COUNTRY NEws 3 (2003).
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Reasonableness of the RecreationalExperience
In Golden, the water court stated, "[w]ater rights in Colorado are
quantified according to the amount of water that is reasonable to serve
the appropriator's intended beneficial use."'" The new definition of
the RICD states that the measure of the water right is the minimum
flow necessary for reasonable recreation.' Apparently, then, the reasonable amount of water for recreational use according to the CWCB is
the minimum flow necessary for that use. This implies that the measure of the water right ultimately may depend on the type of recreational activities for which the instream flows are sought. For example,
world-class kayaking obviously requires significantly more water flow
than fishing.
Cities seeking to maximize the amount of RICDs may thus be
forced to choose from various recreational uses that utilized the greatest flow in water. While recreation is not defined yet in Colorado law,
the term does suggest a variety of uses. Variability in seasonal flow, a
factor already weighed in determining the amount of flow constituting
the water right, could also weigh more heavily in the determination of
reasonableness of the recreational use itself. The latter possibility is
especially likely in times of dry water years, when domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing uses have preference. Debates over what
types of recreation are legitimately beneficial uses of water will surely
emerge as cities attempt to boost their economies by appropriating
RICDs. Conceivably, the Colorado legislature eventually will have to
consider creating statutory preferences. This measure, however, is
unlikely because the doctrine of prior appropriation expresses preference as priority in time.
Efficiency as a Limitation
Some criticize leaving water in its natural course for the sake of
maintaining flow as "wasteful" because water left in its course is not
applied to a beneficial use. Indeed, the Colorado judiciary rejected
the fundamental riparian principle of natural flow long ago, when it
declared that the riparian doctrine made no beneficial use of water

91.
Golden Decree, supra note 5, para. E (9).
92. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(10.3). The issue regarding the meaning of an
RICD made its debut in the case of Colorado Water ConservationBoard v. Upper Gunnison
River Water Conservancy District. 109 P.3d at 587-88. The court noted the ambiguity in
the definition of an RICD, in particular the phrases "minimum stream flow.., for a
reasonable recreation experience." Id. at 592. The court found it "improper to defer
to the CWCB's definition of a 'reasonable recreational experience,"' opting instead to
engage traditional statutory construction by examining the language and legislative
history behind the RICD statute. Id. n.8.
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and was not applicable to Colorado." Colorado applied the concept of
maximum utilization historically to promote efficient use of water in
the state. In Fellhauer v. People, the Colorado Supreme Court held
vested rights acquired by appropriation coexisted with the principle of
maximum utilization of water, stating "the right to water does not give
the right to waste it."9" However, because the law has determined
wastefulness of a use is relative to other use patterns, the legal operation of "waste" under the prior appropriation doctrine gives appropriators a disincentive to make diversions more efficient. In the past, water
claimed by an appropriator but left unused or that returned to its
natural channel was lost to junior appropriators." The concept of
waste itself, however, changed when the benefit of its use is leaving it in
its natural course. Objectors can no longer argue that leaving water in
its course is "wasteful" or an invalid use after Golden and the modem
development of Colorado's prior appropriation doctrine recognizing
RICDs as a legitimate beneficial use. Until the state legislature expressly defines "waste," then, the definition of the concept will continue in terms of beneficial use.' And, when opponents of instream
flow rights argue "waste," they will really be arguing over preferred uses
among competing appropriators. As Professor Getches observed, "[i] f
the city of Golden had authorized a subdivision to take the full amount
of water out of the stream, no one would have objected...."" Thus, the
true threat of the instream flow right is not that it is wasteful per se, but
that the consumptive uses needed to sustain population growth will be
subordinate to rights to nonconsumptive uses that, though junior today, will be senior rights in the future."
IV. PUBLIC INTEREST IMPLICATIONS
Instream Flows and PublicInterest Considerations
A major criticism of instream flow rights under Colorado's doctrine
is that leaving water in its natural course is riparian and directly conflicts with prior appropriation principles.' However, as the Colorado
Supreme Court noted in Colorado River Water Conservation District, the
93. See Coffin, 6 Colo. at 447. See also Empire Water & Power Co, v. Cascade Town
Co., 205 F. 123, 128-29 (8th Cir. 1913) (denying landowner from a right to leave water
in its natural course without diminution for piscatorial purposes).
94. Fellhauerv. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1969).
95. See, e.g., S.E. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d
1321, 1325 (Colo. 1974); Comstock v. Ramsay, 133 P. 1107, 1111 (Colo. 1913).
96. See VRANESH, suipra note 1, at 44-52.
97. Winters, supranote 90, at 3.
98. See, e.g., Ed Quillen, Editorial, Why the Water Buffaloes are Snorting, THE DENVER
PoST, June 3, 2003, at 7B.
99. See Rocky Mountain Power Co., 406 P.2d at 800-01; Empire Water and Power Co., 205
F. at 129.
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test for an appropriation of water is fundamentally whether water is put
to a beneficial use, and that a diversion may legitimately be accomplished by controlling water within its natural course."u Colorado implicates public interest considerations by instream flow rights that have
the effect (if not purpose) of preserving natural flows for environmental conservation.
The PublicInterest in the West
In most prior appropriation states, the entity vested with the power
to grant water rights-usually a court or administrative agency-is required to make public interest or public welfare considerations. '
Where defined by state legislatures, state courts often look to the terms
of public interest statutes to determine what factors those entities
should consider. For example, in Shohal v. Dunn, the Idaho Supreme
Court looked to the statutory language defining instream flows to determine what factors the state's Director of Water Resources was to
consider in rejecting or modifying a fishery's application for water
rights." The Idaho court noted that public interest duties derive from
the larger public trust doctrine. ' Thus, the court ultimately looked to
the state laws defining, inter alia, instream flows and conservation to
determine the elements of the local public interest."' The court concluded that it was in the public interest to conserve and protect minimum flows necessary to protect fish and wildlife, recreation, aesthetics,
and water quality.' 5
Shokal also cited the case of Young & Norton v. Hinderlider.5 In that
case, the New Mexico territorial engineer denied the application for

100. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d
570, 573 (Colo. 1979).
101.
Lori Potter, The 1969 Act and EnvironmentalProtection, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
70, 76 (1999). In Colorado, the entity granting water rights is the water court and the
supreme court. The CWCB is limited to an advisory role and only gives recommendations for instream flows.
102.
Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 449 (Idaho 1985) (looking also at similar laws
from Alaska and California to determine the definition of public interest).
103. Id. at 447, n.2 ("protect[ing] the public interest is related to the larger doctrine
of the public trust...'). In perhaps the strongest application of public interest considerations in a prior appropriation context, a California superior court held that even
after the waters from a lake had been acquired by appropriation, "tlhe state ha[d] an
affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of
water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible." Nat'l Audubon
Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d. 709, 727 (Cal. 1983).
104.
Shohal 707 P.2d at 448-49. But see Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Washoe County,
918 P.2d 697, 700-01 (Nev. 1996) (refusing to examine legislative intent in other contexts and limiting the definition of public trust to the state engineer's definition).
105. Shokal, 707 P.2d at 448-49.
106. Young & Norton v. Hinderlider, 110 P. 1045 (N.M. 1910).
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water rights to an irrigation project."7 Instead, he granted rights for a
storage reservoir on the ground that the reservoir served the best interest of the public."° He concluded that the reservoir enabled residents in the surrounding vicinity to purchase water at a lower price
than if the irrigation project had been approved. 9 The court effectively rejected the contention that public interest concerns were limited to broad matters of public health and safety."' The court interpreted the statutory local public interest to secure the greatest possible
benefit from water for the public."'
Environmental factors also implicate public interest according to
the Washington Supreme Court. In Stempel v. Department of Water Resources, an applicant sought a domestic use permit to withdraw water
from a lake, which raised concerns of numerous pollution and health
problems."' The court held that legislative authority requires the
agency granting the permit to consider such factors."' The court inferred this conclusion from Washington's environmental protection
laws enacted subsequent to water permit laws, which did not expressly
require these considerations."' Thus, the public welfare standard required consideration of the negative impact of appropriations on the
local environment.
In contrast to the Western states that implemented public trust
considerations in their water allocation schemes, Colorado purportedly
follows a "pure appropriation" scheme and refuses to acknowledge the
public interest as a matter of law. However, some expressions of the
public interest may be found in the state's laws and, to an extent, in
cases defining water rights.
PublicInterestPrinciplesin Colorado WaterLaw
The Colorado Constitution states "[t]he water of every natural
stream, not heretofore appropriated.. .is hereby declared to be the
property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the
people of the state, subject to appropriation....""' This provision makes
it clear that the public holds rights to the state waters until appropriated.' 0 Further, "recognizing the need to correlate the activities of
107. Id. at 1046.
108. Id. at 1046-47.
109. Id. at 1047.
110. Id. at 1050.
111. Id.
112. Stempel v. Dep't of Water Res., 508 P.2d 166, 168 (Wash. 1973).
113. Id. at 172.
114. Id.
115. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
116. SeeWyatt v. Latimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 29 P. 906, 910-11 (1892) (concluding that the terms "public" and "people" are synonymous and intended to be so by the
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mankind with some reasonable preservation of the natural environment," the CWCB is vested with the exclusive authority to maintain
minimum streams flows necessary to preserve natural environments. " '
This statute essentially codifies public interest principles reflected by
environmental purposes.
In holding that the State Engineer has standing as a party to file a
protest in the adjudication of water rights, the Colorado Supreme
Court in Wadsworth v. Kuiper stated:
There can be no question that, under the inferences in [Article XVI §
5 of the Colorado Constitution] ... the public has a vital interest in
preserving the water resources of this state and adhering to correct
rules for the allotment and administration of water.... [I]t is essential that the relief requested be granted in order that the people may
have their day in court in the assertion of the public interest"
The court reasoned that, by including the definition of "person" for
the purposes of appearing at water adjudication hearings in the 1969
WRDA Act, the Colorado legislature intended to give standing to the
State Engineer, who by protesting appropriations asserted the rights of
the public.'" The court justified its interpretation of legislative intent
by stating that "[t]he Colorado Constitution mandates the protection
of the public interest in water."'"' What appears to make this expression of public interest unique from other Western states is that an
equal part of the public interest is the individual right to appropriate.
The State Engineer also has no express mandate to consider the public
interest beyond the function of contesting appropriations on behalf of
other appropriators.
In Colorado, the entity granting water rights is the water court. A
party may appeal the decision to the Colorado Supreme Court. The
CWCB is limited to an advisory role and may only hold or give recommendations for instream flows. The Colorado judiciary has ruled in
terms of the public interest peripherally at best, diverging from the
legislative implementation of public interest considerations in the 1969
WRDA. In the decade following the enactment of the WRDA, the
courts seemed at least willing to incorporate public interest considerations in its decisions. As indicated above, in 1977 in Wadsworth, the
framers of the state constitution). See also Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Colo.
River Water Conservation Dist., 526 P.2d 302, 304 (Colo. 1974) (noting the waters of
the state and the right to appropriate are vested in the people).
117. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-102(3) (2004).
118. But see Hobbs, supra note 4, at 9 (characterizing the statute as an exception to
Colorado's prior appropriation and possibly confirming at least one Justice of Colorado's high court reluctance to consider the public interest in allocating water rights).
119. Wadsworthv. Kuiper, 562P.2dl114,1116 (Colo. 1977).
120. Id. at 1116.
121. 1d.at 1117.
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Colorado Supreme Court specifically stated a mandate by the Colorado
Constitution to protect the public interest in water, which justified the
General Assembly in giving the State Engineer standing to contest adjudications."n Then in 1979, the court again upheld controversial instream flow appropriations-challenged as unconstitutional-in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Colorado Water Conservation
Board.'
2'
At issue
In 1983, the court decided the case of Alamosa La-Jara.1
was the State Engineer's interpretation of the law governing priority in
the context of interstate compact agreements."'5 The court held that instate users of water might have their supply curtailed in order to satisfy
the essentially treated senior priority rights of out-of-state commitments.' 26 Important for public interest considerations, the court acknowledged the relevance of environmental factors and tempered the
principle of maximum utilization by stating that
the policy of maximum utilization does not require a single-minded
endeavor to squeeze every drop of water from the valley's aquifers.
[Statutory law] makes clear that the objective of "maximum use" administration is "optimum use"... Optimum use can only be achieved
with proper regard for all1 7significant factors, including environmental
and economic concerns.
Seemingly, in Alamosa-LaJara,the Colorado Supreme Court mimicked
the method of the Idaho court in Shokal" by divining public interest
considerations not from any existing statutory mandates, but instead
from subsequent related statutes (i.e. the WRDA granting the CWCB
authority to appropriate minimum flows for conservation) and academic sources." However, unlike the status of the law in Idaho at the
ruling of Shokal, no express statutory duty to consider the public interest in allocating water rights existed in Colorado at the time when the
court decided Alamosa-LaJara,nor does any such statute currently exist. Thus, it seems that the State Engineer might still administer water
rights without considering public interest factors,'" in which case the
122. Id.at1l16-17.
123. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 594 P.2d
570, 572, 578 (Colo. 1979).
124. Alamosa-LaJara Water Users Prot. Ass'n v. Gould, 674 P.2d 914 (Colo. 1983).
125. Id. at 916-17, 919.
126. Id. at 917, 925. See also VRANESH, supra note 1, at 539.
9
127. Alamosa-LaJara,674 P.2d at 35 (internal citations omitted).
128. Shoka4 707 P.2d at 448 (finding that although the statute creating the duty to
consider public interest, it does not define the term, the legislature did provide guidance in a related statute as well as sister states and the academic community).
129. Alamosa-LaJara,674 P.2d at 935 (internal citations omitted).
130.
A. DAN TARLoCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND
PUBLIC POLIcy 342 (5TH ED. 2002).
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grounds for a challenge would be failure to effect the optimum utilization of water under the maximum utilization doctrine.''
After the Alamosa-La Jara decision, the Colorado Supreme Court
looked at the case of RJA., Incorporatedv. Water Users Association of District 6.112 In RJA., the Colorado Supreme Court denied a water right to
an Estes Park summer resort business that wanted to remove peat moss
from a mountain valley to free waters for appropriation.' Though the
case hinged on whether the waters sought from the peat bog were
tributary and therefore subject to adjudication under the WRDA,
again, as in Alanosa La-Jara, the court noted in terms of public interest
concerns that
[t]he water rights sought here are based upon alterations of long existing physical characteristics of the land. Alteration of natural conditions and vegetation in order to save water carries with it the potential
for adverse effects on soil and bank stabilization, soil productivity,
wildlife habitat, fisheries production, water quality, watershed protection and the hydrologic cycle. Whether to recognize such rights, and
thus to encourage innovative ways of reducing historical consumptive
uses by modifying conditions found in nature, is a question fraught
with important public policy considerations. As such, the question is
especially suited for resolution through the legislative process."'
While RJJ.A. and Alamosa-La Jara are not monumental cases in
themselves, they subtly demonstrate the Colorado Supreme Court's
avoidance of fully implementing considerations of the public interest,
though it clearly acknowledges the intention of the state legislature to
protect those concerns. This is important because it explains, in part,
why Colorado courts can today uphold that the state's doctrine of water rights remains that of "pure" appropriation. Whereas in most other
Western prior appropriation states statutes require a court or administrative agency to consider the public interest in granting water rights,
in Colorado, the state legislature has not mandated these measures. As
such, neither the Colorado water courts nor the state supreme court is
required to adjudicate water rights in consideration of the public interest. Moreover, the current statutory configuration accommodates
this avoidance of the public interest in the courts. As noted above,
principles of the public interest appear by statute only in reference to
minimum instream flows that the CWCB may appropriate and recommend for RICDs sought by local government entities. Even these provisions are not mandates, though, and since the function of the CWCB

131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
R.J.A., Inc. v. Water Users Ass'n of Dist. 6, 690 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1984).
Id. at 824.
Id. at 828 (internal citations omitted).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 8

is advisory only, no court adjudicating water rights in Colorado must
consider public interest factors.
Hence, in United States v. Colorado River Water Conservation District,
the Colorado Supreme Court rejected an argument that the beneficial
use test encompassed a broad public policy to protect the environment."' There, the court held that the consideration of the application for a conditional use decree for Arapahoe County for the construction of the Union Park Reservoir did not include evaluation of
environmental factors.t" Environmental groups contended that the
Union Park Reservoir would have adverse effects on such factors as
"fisheries and wildlife habitat, recreation, water quality, the basin's
economy including the tax base, property values and land use, and the
general quality of life-factors they deem [ed] vitally important to the
public.""7 To justify its rejection of these arguments, the court reasoned that the WRDA and its subsequent amendments, in recognizing
the need to protect the environment, established an adequate mechanism for protecting the concerns of the environmental groups.' " The
court further explained that while environmental factors could be a
"reasonable and sound basis for altering exiting law," the change from
precedent would be a legislative function."' The court further excused
itself from making public interest considerations by stating:
The degree of protection afforded the environment and the mechanism to address state appropriation of water for the good of the public is the province of the General Assembly and the electorate. Conceptually, a public interest theory is in conflict with the doctrine of
prior appropriation because a water court cannot, in the absence of

statutory authority, deny a legitimate appropriation based on public
policy. 0

Finally, the enforcement of public interest principles by the Colorado Supreme Court emerged in Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Incorporated
v. Colorado Water Conservation Board.' In 1980, the water court decreed
to the CWCB 12 cfs on Snowmass Creek for preserving the natural en-

135. United States v. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., 891 P.2d 952, 971 (Colo.
1995).
136. Id.
137. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
138. Id. at 972.
139. Id.
140. Id. But see Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1, 86 (Colo. 1996) (affirming the water court's imposition of a revegetation condition upon the adjudication of a
water transfer, and held that it was within the authority of the water court to "balance
the beneficial use of water with the preservation of other natural resources...").
141. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d
1251, 1260 (Colo. 1995).
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vironment.'' The Colorado River Water Conservation District objected
to the application, claiming that the amount of flow exceeded the
amount necessary to maintain a reasonable natural flow."' Eleven
years after the appropriation, the CWCB decided not to enforce its
appropriation as too high as well as too low during certain times of the
year because of Pitkin County's growth and development in the Aspen
area." The Division of Wildlife initiated an investigation on behalf of
the Aspen/Pitkin County Planning Office, which had contacted the
Division seeking advice in dealing with instream flows in terms of
snowmaking.'
The Division Wildlife found that the CWCB had erred
in calculating the minimum flows for the 1980 decree.' The Division
of Wildlife, upon request of the CWCB, then refigured the winter seasonal flow requirement and concluded that indeed, the CWCB appropriated too much water.' 7 In light of these findings, the CWCB ultimately decided in 1992 to modify its water rights by not enforcing the
full 12 cfs in sections of Snowmass Creek where flows exceeded rates
recommended by the Division of Wildlife."* Conveniently, this reduction in flows enabled the Aspen Skiing Company to increase its snowmaking operation on Snowmass Creek.'
The Aspen Wilderness Workshop, a nonprofit environmental
group,'" filed suit against the CWCB, arguing that the decision not to
enforce its full instream flow appropriation was tantamount to "a perThe Colomanent relinquishment of a public instream flow right....'
rado Supreme Court agreed, and held that the CWCB "has a unique
statutory fiduciary duty to protect the public in the administration of
its water rights decreed to preserve the natural environment. "' Thus,
the court ruled that the CWCB, uniquely charged with holding water
rights in the public interest, was not free to appropriate its water for
any purpose or beneficial use at its discretion. ' Moreover, when the
General Assembly created the CWCB it did not alter the exclusive jurisdiction of the water court over the adjudication of water rights.' 4

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1253.
Id.
Id. at 1254.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1255-56, n.9.
See Court Puts Crimp in Resort Expansion; Snowmass Creek Water Rights Upheld, THE
DENVER POST, June 20, 1995, at 3B.
151.
Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc., 901 P.2d at 1255.
152.
Id. at 1260.
153.
Id. at 1259.
154.
Id. at 1258.
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The authority of the CWCB was therefore limited by statute and water
court adjudications accordingly.'
The court's holding prompted a dissent that specifically objected
to the majority's implication of the public interest in finding a fiduciary duty by the CWCB. Justice Mullarkey argued in dissent that the
CWCB satisfied any fiduciary duties it may have had by acting within its
purported statutory authority to alter its decreed instream flows, and
that no other responsibilities to the public existed.'57 Further, Justice
Mullarkey argued that water judges should not hear matters to determine minimum instream flows for the preservation of the natural environment.' 8 Thus, the issue would not be a "water matter" over which
the water court would have jurisdiction.'
At first glance, it may seem that Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Incorporated presented a platform for the public interest to enter the Colorado
judicial scene. However, loyalists to the idea of "pure" appropriation
could rest their fears that the public trust would come to impinge on
water rights, for the petitioners contesting the CWCB's actions were
careful to base their challenge on a statutorily defined fiduciary duty,
not on the common law public trust doctrine.
V.CONCLUSION
The intersection between public policy considerations and Colorado water law thus remains limited. The initial enactment of instream
flow laws in Colorado seemed to suggest that the state was following
the lead of many other Western states by adapting its prior appropriation doctrine to weigh the public interest in the allocation of water
rights.'6 ' To some, the acknowledgement of maintaining flows in natural watercourses signaled the coming of the public trust doctrine. The
Colorado judiciary, though, has managed to keep public interest factors out of its allocation scheme, albeit by strict statutory construction.
Even after the legislative recognition of RICDs expanded the list of
beneficial use to include instream flows for recreation, public interest
concerns remain the province of the CWCB. Although the CWCB is
155. Id. The court further stated that the CWCB had to seek modification of its
decree from the water court based on two policy considerations: 1) the original decree
as a lawful order had to be given full force and effect until its terms were modified by
the water court; and 2) unlike other appropriators, the C'WCB was to be held to a different standard because of its unique statutory responsibilities to public and limited
authority. Id. at 1259.
156. Id. at 1262-63 (MullarkeyJ., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1263.
158. Id. at 1266.
159. Id.
160. Potter, supra note 101, at 77.
161. See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 317, 335-36 (1985).
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held to a fiduciary duty to the public while other appropriators are not,
the CWCB is clearly limited to an advisory role and enjoys standing no
different from that of any other appropriator, public or private."' Additionally, should the CWCB make recommendations in the interest of
conservation and the environment, those recommendations must only
be consideredby the water court, not adopted nor followed per se. "
According to Justice Hobbs of the Colorado Supreme Court, "there
are no aspects of the public interest that cannot be protected within
Defending the judiciary's
[the prior appropriation] framework.""'
adherence to the prior appropriation doctrine, Justice Hobbs posited
that each element of the doctrine (diversion, beneficial use, and priority) is consistent with public policy concerns.16 The sections of the
state constitution adopting the prior appropriation doctrine establish a
stable policy for allocating an essential but scarce resource among users." There is nothing particularly sacred about the prior appropriation doctrine, but because Colorado chose this particular scheme, the
courts must honor it as the exclusive means of allocation until the
people of Colorado amend the constitution to adopt an alternative
method.' 7
Justice Hobbs also differentiated public interest considerations
(purportedly expressed by Colorado's prior appropriation system)
from the public trust doctrine (rejected under Colorado's system)."'
While allocation under the public trust doctrine is subject to a determination of navigability conferring a right in the public, the allocation
of water rights in Colorado focuses on the right of citizens to divert
water for beneficial use.' Under the reasoning of People v. Emmert,7°
since Colorado's streams were not navigable at the time of statehood,
and since landowners adjacent to natural streams owned the beds and
banks, the General Assembly should resolve the question of public access to the waters of Colorado, not the courts. 7' Criticized as resulting
in uncertainty of allocation, the public trust doctrine, according to

162. Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc., 901 P.2d at 1257-58.
163.
See generally id.at 1259-60 (establishing CWCB's statutory authority with regard
to water courts).
164. GregoryJ. Hobbs,Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quality
Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 841, 874 (1989).
165.
Id. at 878-79.
166. Id.at 879.
167.
Id.
168. Id. at 874-75, 881.
169. Id. at 879-81.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1979).
170.
SeeHobbs & Raley, supra note 164, at 881.
171.
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Justice Hobbs, provides no standards by which the Colorado judiciary
may determine allocation among competing demands for water.
Is the PublicInterest Really Expressed by PriorAppropriation?
Colorado's focus on competing appropriators elevates consumptive
interests over conservation interests-unless conservation serves an
economic purpose. Under a democratic model, when representative
state and local governments operate as appropriators, presumably they
should do so in the interest of the public. But under a prior appropriation scheme such as Colorado's, when local governments must
compete for water rights with other appropriators (abuse of police
power issues aside), privatization of public interest considerations occurs. The case of Golden, discussed above, provides an illustration.
Developing a recreational watercourse is a reasonable means of achieving legitimate ends of revitalizing the city's business district to sustain
economic growth in the community, improve aesthetics and quality of
life for the city's residents. The secondary effect of drawing tourists,
and specifically their money, 7 ' is the real purpose of acquiring the water right, though. Acting on behalf of the public in this context means
the city must show that leaving the water in its course-normally
viewed as a measure of environmental conservation-is beneficial.
However, the benefit cannot be for the public interest in terms of environmental conservation. Unlike the CWCB who exclusively may appropriate specifically for this purpose, local governments, by law, must
appropriate instream flows for recreational (i.e. economic) purposes. 7 '
This privatization of the public interest arguably may provide a
perverted means of achieving environmental conservation. Recall that
among gateway communities, redefining their community identity in
terms of developing a recreation and tourism industry based on a
qualitatively superior natural environment is the modern trend. Without intending, local governments could legitimately achieve dual purposes by appropriating RICDs, a prospect nonprofit conservation
groups are already keenly aware of. Environmental groups like Trout
Unlimited and Great Outdoors Colorado have provided major funding
for some of the new boating courses constructed throughout the Colo172. Id. But see Charles F. Wilkinson, supra note 161, at 336 ("The recognition of the
public trust doctrine in water law is the single strongest statement that historic uses
must accommodate modem needs.").
173. See, e.g., Sherry A. Caloia et al., The Water Rights Determinationand Administration
Act of 1969: A Western Slope Perspective on the First Thirty Years, 3 U. DENY. WATER L. REV.
39, 51 (1999). In 1997, the tourism industry in Colorado generated $7.1 billion in
revenue and provided 112,000jobs paying $1.5 billion in salaries. Id. at n.60. About
36 percent of Colorado's tourism dollars were spent in the mountain resort region in
1997. Id.
174. SeeCOLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(10.3) (2004).
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rado Rockies.'
Following the Golden decision, Trout Unlimited indicated the potential for environmental groups to derive substantial
benefits from RICDs sought for economic purposes by stating "[it's]
not a kayaking organization, but these types of (recreational) rights do
benefit fish, because they leave water flowing." 76 Thus, in a somewhat
distorted way, Colorado's prior appropriation doctrine might very well
accommodate the public interest to some measure, at least to the extent that keeping water in its natural course constitutes a beneficial use
under the law (and concurrently to the extent that cities have priority
over junior users).'
Local governments see the Golden decision as a green light to proceed with plans to appropriate instream flows for similar recreational
uses to revive local economies. For example, Fort Collins plans to
build a whitewater kayak park in the next few years, hoping to collect
significant revenue like that claimed by Golden."8 Golden apparently
collects in excess of 2 million dollars annually from the kayakers and
spectators drawn to its park, ' " and in total, the local economy took in
23 dollars million from 45,000 park users plus accompanying spectators in the first three years of park operation." Vail and Breckenridge
also seem to benefit substantially from their whitewater parks, enjoying
increased tourism during the off-season that brings millions in sales tax
revenue."6 ' Many municipalities with access to streams cannot resist the
lure of such revenues, especially when cost comparisons project that
development will yield such large monetary returns.'87
Yet, as Colorado's gateway communities continue to rely on the
recreation industry, tensions will result between sustaining the growth
these communities desire and maintaining the environmental quality
of the area that makes them appealing to visitors and businesses.
175. Trout Unlimited helped fund the Golden whitewater course, and Great Outdoors Colorado funded more than half of the cost for a new whitewater park in Lyons,
Colorado. Blevins, supra note 16, at 8A.
176. Winters, supra note 90, at 3.
177. The instream flow scheme is somewhat of a mixed blessing for mountain municipalities. Caloia et al., supra note 173, at 54 (noting rapid growth of towns due to
the expanding resort, recreation, and tourism industries creates high demand for water flow in local streams, but upstream appropriators holding rights to instream flows
obstruct growth by limiting available water supply for diversion to domestic uses).
178.
See Editorial, Recreation is a Player in State Water Rights, FORT COLLINS
COLORADOAN, July 7, 2003, at A4.
179. Id.
180. Pankratz, supra note 60, at 10A.
181.
Recreation is a Playerin State Water Rights, supra note 178, at A4.
182. Id. (noting that the cost of building a whitewater park in Fort Collins amounts
to about $280,000 as part of a $4.2 million project involving other improvements like
storm drains and cleaning the riverbank). See also Charley Able, In Wake of Ruling River
Runners' Spirits Buoyed, RocxY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 20, 2003, at 5A.
183. Unlike the prototypical recreation strategy of Vail in skiing and Golden in boating, Kremmling, for example, has specifically limited tourism development to mini-
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Like Golden, mountain communities hoping to grow from the recreation industry will be forced to choose (or at the very least balance) between exploiting and preserving the natural resources that are the very
foundation of the new tourism/recreation industry.
One thing is for sure in the legal realm-until the Colorado General Assembly mandates considerations of public interest factors in
water rights adjudications or amends the state constitution, environmental conservation will justify minimum stream flows only for the
CWCB. In the mean time, public interest groups will attempt to piggyback onto local government RICD appropriations. Municipal water
suppliers already have become important players in the legal arena of
water rights. The inherent stability as public corporations, the ability
to plan for growth and development of utilities, and the ability to finance water development projects through taxing authority make municipal suppliers politically powerful at the local level. 8' Moreover, the
statutory provisions enabling local government entities to appropriate
instream flows also makes them increasingly powerful at the state level.
Market forces will also continue to push Colorado's economy toward
tourism and recreation, and as gateway communities exploiting RICDs
begin to sprawl as a result, public interest concerns in terms of water
supply and water quality will become ever more pressing.
Ultimately, Colorado constituencies-from individuals to communities and local governments to private enterprise-will have to decide
whether it truly is in the best interest of all to compel public interest
considerations in water allocation. On one hand, Colorado needs to
sustain growth in increasingly urbanized areas in an era when traditional industries are replaced by newer ones that still depend on the
bounties of the state's natural resources. On the other hand, the state
also must temper that demand in order to preserve the very elements
that make economic survival possible. Regardless of any desire to adhere to a water allocation scheme entrenched in history, as the preservation of the natural environment becomes more vital to local economies, Colorado lawmakers will eventually have to reconcile goals that
have historically been at odds: maximum application and consump-

mize the industry's impact on the environment and the social and cultural assets of the
small town. See Rasker, supra note 6, at 384.
184. The prospect of amending the state constitution is not far from the minds of
Colorado citizens. As recently as 1996 there has been an attempt to amend the state
constitution by adding a public trust mandate to Section 5 of Article XVI. See MacCravey v. Hufford, 917 P.2d 1277, 1278 (Colo. 1996) (holding that initiative seeking to
amend state constitution did not violate single-subject requirement).
185. SeeJankowski et al., supra note 4, at 22.
186. Id.
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tion of water at present, and conservation of an economic asset for the
future.'

187.
See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER,
AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 17 (1992). While apparently there is a broad consensus
in the West that development of natural resources should be prudent and balanced,
"natural resource policy is dominated by the lords of yesterday, a battery of nineteenthcentury laws, policies, and ideas that arose under wholly different social and economic
conditions but that remain in effect due to inertia, powerful lobbying forces, and lack
of public awareness." Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Nepali government is anxious to increase the efficiency of agricultural production to meet the demands of its growing population.'
Currently only 17 percent of the cultivated area in the country is irrigated all year round and there is, therefore, a significant need to extend the existing network of irrigation systems to improve efficiency.2
His Majesty's Government (HMG) regards PIM as an essential requirement in meeting its target of year-round irrigation of 90 percent
of irrigable lands by 2027.' Historically, farmer-managed groups
(FMIS) in Nepal implemented PIM, but, in recent years, agency or
joint-managed systems have increasingly implemented PIM as well,
though the latter failed to match the productivity of the former.' One
of the reasons for the comparative lack of success of agency and jointmanaged systems is the absence of a strong regulatory foundation: the
legislation that put into place is often ignored or not enforced. The
lack of a strong regulatory foundation occurs for several reasons, for
example: the legislation lacks detail in crucial areas; the necessary financial resources are not available to those enforcing or obeying the
provisions; and the rules are contradictory or inconsistent. To address
these problems, this article assesses both law and policy related to irrigation management in Nepal, focusing on the particular issues raised
by agency and joint-managed irrigation systems. The article investigates broader water use management practices to highlight the fact
that irrigation management does not exist in a vacuum, but rather irrigation management affects other water uses just as other water uses
affect irrigation management. The article is based on a review of relevant legislation in Nepal and the advice of local experts, which the author followed-up on by conducting a fact-finding mission to Nepal in
November 2003. In conclusion, the article suggests solutions and remedial actions with respect to the difficulties identified. Where appropriate, the article analyzes remedies applied in other parts of the
world in an effort to resolve similar problems.

1. See
Irrigation
Policy,
2060
§§
1.1-1.2
(Nepal),
http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigation-policy.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005) [hereinafter
Irrigation Policy]. See also WATER ENERGY COMM'N SECRETARIAT, WATER RESOURCES
STRATEGY, para. 1.1 (Kathmandu 2002) [hereinafter WATER RESOURCES STRATEGY].
2.

WATER RESOURCES STRATEGY, supra note 1, at para. 2.4.2 (stating that out of a

total cultivated area of 2,642,000ha, it is possible to irrigate 1,766,000ha, of the possible
irrigable area 452,000ha are actually irrigated). See also Irrigation Policy § 1.3.1. See
WATER REsOURCES STRATEGY, supra note 1, at ch. 2 (providing further details of the
hydrographic and economic context in Nepal).
3.

WATER RESOURCES STRATEGY, supra note

1, at para. 6.5.

4. See, e.g., Ashutosh K, Shukla, Policies, Processes, and Performance of Management
1Turnover and Agency-Initiated Interventions, in IMPROVING IRRIGATION GOVERNANCE AND
MANAGEMENT IN NEPiAL 75, 76, 84-85 (Ganesh P. Shivakoti & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2002).
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Introduction to the Legislation
The Water Resources Act (WRA) is the regulatory regime that
largely governs water use management in Nepal and sets out the general principles to be applied to water resource management.' The Act
includes broad provisions related to the ownership of water and the
establishment of Water User Associations (WUAs). WUAs are organisations formed by groups of individuals who wish to use of water resources on a collective basis.6
In Nepal, certain water uses are licensable while others are exempt.
Two pieces of secondary legislation set out more detailed licence application rules, one dealing with irrigation management, one with the
8
exempt uses,' and the other with licensable activities. Further legislation addresses one specific licensable activity, electricity generation,
while the Environmental Protection Act'" and its subsidiary rules govern broader environmental control."
In addition to legislation, the Muluki Ain, which codified the law of
Nepal in 1854 and again in 1963, affects water use management. The
Muluki Ain contains a chapter dedicated to irrigation management,
portions of which are consistent with the current legislation'" while

5.

Water Resources Act, 2049 pmbl. (1992) (Nepal), reprinted in ELEC. DEV. CTR.,

NEPALESE LEGAL PROVISIONS ON HYDRO-POWER DEVELOPMENT

15 (1996) [hereinafter

Water Resources Act].

6.

Id.§5.

7. Irrigation Regulation, 2056 R. 1 (2004) (Nepal) [hereinafter Irrigation Regulation]. No official English translation of this latest version was available at the time of
publication. The author has, therefore, used an unofficial translation along with the
official translation of the previous version dated 2000. The author is grateful to Dr.
Umesh Nath Parajuli for his translation of the 2004 edition.
8. Nepal permits establishment of WUAs with respect to licensable activities, but
the Water Resources Regulations govern the issuance of licenses. See Water Resources
Regulation, 2050 §§ 8, 14, 20 (1993) (Nepal), reprinted in ELEC. DEv. CrR., NEPALESE
LEGAL PROVISIONS ON HYDRO-POWER DEVELOPMENT 145 (1996) [hereinafter Water Resources Regulation]; see also infta Part Il.B.1. (discussing the current state of the licensing process).
Electricity Act, 2049 pmbl., § 3 (1992) (Nepal), reprinted in ELEC. DEv. CTR.,
9.
NEPALESE LEGAL PROVISIONS ON HYDRO-POWER DEVELOPMENT 29

(1996)

[hereinafter

Electricity Act].
(Nepal),
(1997)
2053
Act,
Protection
10. Environment
9
http://www.mope.gov.np/environment/act 7.php (last visited May 1, 2005) [hereinafter Environment Protection Act].
(Nepal),
1997
Rules,
Protection
11. Environment
7
http://www.mope.gov.np/environment/rule9 .php (last visited May 1, 2005) [hereinafter Environment Protection Rules].
12. For example, the rule that a new irrigation canal can be constructed upstream
of another canal only if it does not harm the downstream one is consistent with current
legislation. See § K. Khadka, Water Use and Water Rights in Nepal: Legal Perspective, in
WATER RIGHTS, CONFLICT AND POLiCY 23 (Rajendra Pradhan et al. eds., 1997).
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other portions directly contradict current legislation.'" The current
status of the Muliki Ain is unclear: although subsequent legislation has
not expressly repealed it, the two are not always consistent. In the absence of available information regarding the Nepali courts' treatment
of the Muluki Ain,'4 this article concentrates on the current legislation
as much as possible.
I.

OWNERSHIP AND ALLOCATION (IN RELATION TO BOTH
WATER RESOURCES AND LAND)
A. OWNERSHIP

1. Water
The Water Resources Act vests ownership of Nepal's water resources in the Kingdom of Nepal: "[tihe ownership of the water resources available in the Kingdom of Nepal shall be vested in the Kingdom of Nepal."" For the purposes of the Water Resources Act, "water
resources" include all surface and groundwater and water in any other
form. 6
2. Land
Both private individuals and WUAs formed under the Water Resources Act have the capacity to own land and moveable property."
With respect to land registration, no central cadastral system exists as
registration takes place only at the local District Land Revenue Office.
As regards to ownership of canals, those the Department of Irrigation
(DOI) constructed remain vested with the DOI. The DOI may only
transfer management responsibilities to WUAs, although the extent of
transfer depends on the terms of the transfer agreement.
B.ALLOCATION

The Water Resources Act, Water Resources Regulations" (WRR),
and the Electricity Act" (EA) set out a system for allocating water use
13. The "first come, first serve" rule with respect to irrigation waters is not conducive to ensuring that tail farmers, for example, have access to irrigation water. Id. at 15.
14. Bishal and Santosh outline the Supreme Court's water-related decisions during
the period 1980-90, and note that the Supreme Court recognised customary water
rights, but they do not include an analysis of decisions made after the enactment of the
Water Resources Act in 1992. See § Bishal & K.C. Santosh, Analysis of Supreme Court
Cases and Decisions Related to Water Rights in Nepal, in WATER RIGHTS, CONFLICT AND
POLICY 47-62 (Rajendra Pradhan et al. eds., 1997).
15. Water Resources Act § 3.
16. Id.§ 2(a).
17. Id. § 6(3).
18. Id.
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rights through licensing and registration. Since practices deviate from
the letter of the law somewhat, this section describes the legislative
provisions relating to licensing assuming the government actually enforced the law. Later sections describe how the practical situation differs from the legal ideal.
The WRA's default position is to require a licence for all water
utilisation."° The following uses, however, are exempt from this requirement:
(a) For one's own drinking and other domestic [sic] use on an individual or collective basis,
(b)For the irrigation of one's own land on an individual or collective
basis,
(c) For the purpose of running water-mill or water grinder as cottage
industry [sic],
(d) For the use of boat [sic] on personal basis for local transportation,
(e)For the use, as prescribed, of the water resources confined to a
land [sic] by the owner of such land."

In the light of these exemptions, the principal water use that still
requires a licence is hydropower." Further provisions contained in the
Electricity Act, however, exempt national and corporate hydroelectric
power projects with a capacity of less than 1000 kilowatts." Notably,
19. Electricity Act §§ 4-9. See also Hydro-power Development Policy, 1992 § 4(a)(1)(2) (1992) (Nepal), reprinted in ELEC. DEv. CTR., NEPALESE LEGAL PROVISIONS ON HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT 1 (1996) [hereinafter Hydro-power Development Policy].
20. The Water Resources Act states "[n]o person shall be entitled to utilize the
water resources without obtaining a license under this Act." Water Resources Act §

4(1). The Water Resources Regulation underlines this, stating "[t ] he licensee, who has
obtained license for the works relating to utilization of water resources under this

Regulation, shall have the right to use the water resources for the works as mentioned
in the license to the extent of water resources of such place and area as specified in the
license." Water Resources Regulation R. 22.
21.
Water Resources Act § 4(2).
22. This Nepalese regulatory structure ignores commercial navigation, another
major potential use of a watercourse, because commercial navigation is nonexistent in
Nepal. Additionally, Nepal seems to require a license for uses such as fish farming.
But see infra Part II.B.1. (discussing the current state of the licensing process).
23. The Act reads:
[N]o license shall be required to be obtained by a national or a corporate
body for the generation, transmission or distribution of electricity up to 1000
kilowatt[s] and for conducting necessary survey thereof. Before generating,
transmitting or distributing hydroelectricity of the capacity ranging from 100
kilowatt[s] to 1000 kilowatt[s], information to that effect shall be given to the

prescribed officer in a manner as prescribed.
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the Water Resources Act licensing regime does not cover the emission
of pollutants into watercourses; the issuing of Pollution Control Certificates falls within the remit of the Ministry of Population and Environment (MOPE). 4
For the purposes of the current study, it appears that since "irrigation of one's own land on an individual or collective basis" is exempt
from the licensing regime,5 WUAs would not need a licence because
their actions qualify as irrigation on a collective basis."0
1. Licensing
The District Water Resources Committee (DWRC) is the body
charged with the task of issuing water utilisation licences. The WRR
established the DWRC as the "prescribed committee" for the purposes
of the Water Resources Act." However, despite being only indirectly
relevant to irrigation management as a result of the exemption noted
above the theoretical licensing process will be outlined in order that
possible improvements may be suggested. The licensing of other uses
of water resources in the wider basin or watershed context may have an
impact on the resources available to WUAs and on the way that these
organisations are managed.
The WRR sets out the licensing process in detail, beginning with
the composition of the DWRC. The DWRC is made up of nine members representative of various bodies and interests concerned with water utilisation."8 This body is not responsible for issuing hydropower
licences, but rather, the Ministry of Water Resources has the sole capacity for hydropower licences.' The WRR establishes the procedural
Electricity Act § 3. Nepal's hydropower policy reiterates this regulatory structure, stating that such licenses as are necessary for hydropower projects must be sought from
the Ministry of Water Resources, rather than the Water Resources Committee. See
Hydro-power Development Policy § 4(a)(l)-(2). The Electricity Act does not define a
licensing authority but presumably regulations, made under that Act, enumerate the
licensing authority. The author was unable to access these regulations. See also Water
Resources Act § 9(1) (noting the generation of hydro-electricity is governed by the
prevailing laws).
24. See infta Part III.A.1. (discussing pollution control and environmental protection).
25. Water Resources Act § 4(2) (b).
26. See id. § 5 (1) (stating collective benefits may be realized by establishing a WUA).
27. Water Resources Regulation R. 8 (1); Water Resources Act § 8(2).
28. Water Resources Regulation R. 8(2) (listing the membership of the DWRC,
which includes the Chief District Officer, the Local Development Officer, and Representatives of: the District Agriculture Development Office, District Forest Office, District Drinking Water Office, District Irrigation Office, District Development Commit-

tee, any electricity project run by His Majesty's Government in the district, and any
other office in the area concerned with water utilisation). The membership of the
DWRC may be above or below nine, depending on which offices are in the district.
29. See Hydro-power Development Policy § 4(a) (2).
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requirements for the meetings of the DWRC, and sets out requirements with respect to licence submission and assessment, renewal, and
No perpetual licences for hydropower exist since
fees chargeable."0
the EA limits the duration of hydropower licences to fifty years.' However, no other legislation mentions restricting the duration of any
other licences that might be issued if the exemptions under Section 4
of the Water Resources Act were ever amended." Section 21 of the
Water Resources Act allows the cancellation of licences when the licensee has not complied with the Act or its subsequent regulations. "
Again, the WRR vests the DWRC with this power.' Under the Water
Resources Act, the DWRC is obligated, in general, to follow a particular
order of priorities in allocating water utilisation licences:
(a) Drinking water and domestic uses;
(b) Irrigation;
(c) Agricultural [u]ses such as animal husbandry and fisheries;
(d)

Hydroelectricity;

(e) Cottage [industry, industrial enterprises and mining uses[;]
(f) Navigation;
(g) Recreational uses;

30. Water Resources Regulation R. 9-26.
31.
Electricity Act § 5(2).
32. Unless the licensing regime provides allows review and revision of allocations,
perpetual licences may be seen as being inimical to good water resources management
as they do not allow for water rights to be adjusted to take account of different circumstances. The water rights allocation mechanisms must be flexible enough to allow for
government review of the uses of a particular watercourse, while giving adequate protection and stability to the holders of those rights. For an international example, consider the position of South Africa, permitting a maximum duration of forty years for
1998,
Act 36
of
Water
of National
§
28(1)(e)
licenses.
water
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Legislature/nw-act/NWA.pdf (last visited May 1,
2005). South Africa's agencies review licenses at intervals not exceeding five years, and
the responsible authority may change the terms of the license for various circumstances. Id § 28(1)(f), 49(2). The responsible authority may alter the license if the
other licenses for the same water course have been amended in an equitable manner
Id. § 49(3). However, the responsible authority
through a general review process.
may not alter the duration of a license. Id. § 49(2).
33. Water Resources Act § 21(1). Regulations promulgated under the Act include
the WRR and the Irrigation Regulations.
34. Water Resources Regulation, R. 36.

Issue 2

(h)

WATER USER ASSOCIATIONS IN NEPAL

Other uses."

No indication is given however with respect to application of these
priorities: the implication is that the list indicates the relative ranking
of each use, and therefore the degree of protection that each enjoys
when the DWRC is assessing licence applications. It is not clear if existing low-priority uses would be vulnerable if an application for a higher
ranked use were to be considered by the DWRC in the context of an
already fully utilised watercourse. It should be pointed out, however,
that existing uses appear to be protected to the extent that "[a] person
or a corporate body making use water resources shall make its beneficial use
without causingdamage to other" uses." The interaction between the protection of existing uses and the water use priority list above is not
elaborated upon and the concept of beneficial uses is flimsy in the Water Resources Act." As regards the considerations to be considered by
the DOI in allocating water, there is no indication as to the level of
importance that will be attached to each of the factors.
2. Allocation in the context of WUAs
The practicalities of the situation with respect to the allocation of
water resources become more complicated when the terms of the Irrigation Regulations 2056 ("IR") are considered. A distinction must be
made between the licensing authority identified in the WRA/WRR (i.e.
the DWRC) and the authority responsible for distribution of the water
itself. In the Irrigation Regulations, the body responsible for distributing water to irrigation systems is either the local office of the DOI, in
Water Resources Act § 7(1) (a)-(h). The Act also states that:
If a dispute arises while utilizing water resources, the prescribed committee
shall, on the basis of priority order as set out in sub-section (1), the beneficial
use or misuse made of the water resources in accordance with sub-section (3)
of Section 4 [obligation to make beneficial use without damaging other users] and also by conducting other necessary enquiries, decide as to whether
or not or in what manner such use could be made.
Id. § 7(2). Regarding the link between priorities and licensing, the Act states:
On receipt of an application pursuant to sub-section (1), the prescribed officer or authority shall conduct or cause to conduct necessary enquiries and issue a license to the applicant by prescribing necessary terms according to the
format as prescribed within 30 days of the receipt of such application in the
case of [a] license for conducting [a] survey of water resources and within
120 days in the case of [a] license for the utilization of water resources in accordance with the priority order as set out in sub-section (1) of Section 7.
Id. § 8(2).
36. Water Resources Act, § 4(3).
37. It may be that the translation of section 4(3) is incomplete, and that the words
"beneficial uses" should appear at the end of the provision. Ifthis is the case, existing
beneficial uses would have greater importance than is currently apparent. As the clause
stands, however, all potential existing uses are nominally protected, although this appears to be subject to the water use priority list.
35.
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situations where the government remains in control of a system, or the
relevant WUA where management has been transferred.' In order to
establish the priorities for provision of water, the service provider (or
"Project Office" as it is referred to in the IR), in conjunction with the
District Agriculture Development Office and relevant WUAs, 5 must
take the following considerations into account:
(a) Geographical location of the concerned area
(b)Area of land
(c) The quantity of water available at the source
(d)

Type of crop to be cultivated no [sic] the land

(e) Nature of soil of the land
(f) The capacity of the structure and other technical matter'
The allocation of water to watercourses by Project Offices is based
only on the factors in IR rule 21, although, again, no assistance is provided which illuminates the way in which these criteria should be applied in practice. In addition, when considering how water should be
distributed, it is not possible for Project Offices to guarantee that they
are in possession of the all relevant information regarding a particular
watercourse. This is especially true with respect to the availability of
the resource, because additional licences may already have been allocated by other responsible authorities for that water, whether in the
same District or not. This raises the broader issue of how an effective
licensing regime can be possible in circumstance where licences may
be issued by a number of separate and independent bodies, each responsible to different ministries. None of these bodies operate on a
catchment basis and none of them control all the water uses within
their respective areas. Ideally, there would be only one licensing

38. The licence holder, where one has been issued, may also be considered to be a
service provider, but the regulations do not provide further detail regarding what
situations may be covered by this. It appears simply to be a reference back to the abortive licensing regime of the Water Resources Act, although licence holders under that
Act would still be WUAs. As shall be seen below, the Water Resources Act requires that
WUAs be licensed, but the Irrigation Regulations merely require that they be registered.
39. Irrigation Regulation R. 21(1). Prior to the introduction of the most recent
version of the Irrigation Regulations in February 2004, WUAs had no right to be consulted in this process.
40. Id. R. 21 (l)-(2). Prior to the February 2004 amendments to the Irrigation
Regulation, no right for consultation with the WUAs existed in this process.
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agency controlling all water use in a particular catchment," and this
must be the recommendation in Nepal for the longer term.
In addition, the entities responsible for licensing and registration
are constituted on the basis of political (i.e. District) boundaries rather
than hydrological ones. There are no provisions ensuring information
transfer between districts as regards inter-district watercourses, and the
result of this is that in the event of the licensing regime being put into
effect, conflicting licences could be issued for the same watercourse,
with consequent impacts on downstream water quality and quantity.
This is compounded by the fact that an individual watercourse may be
affected by licences issued by the relevant DWRCs and also by the pollution control licensing of the MOPE. Shrestha cites the problems
encountered in one example where a downstream WUA was significantly affected by the establishment of a fish farm upstream."
The advantage derived from bringing irrigation activities within the
licensing regime as a whole is that this would allow the DOI and the
DWRCs to exercise a degree of control over one of the major uses of
water in Nepal. Currently, the Project Office must take account of the
availability of water at the source. 3 Without information detailing the
level of water use on a watercourse, it will not be possible for the Project Office to do this with any degree of accuracy. A comprehensive
licensing regime would increase the authorities' understanding of the
way in which a canal is used and, in cases where no transfer agreement
is in place between the government and a WUA, should provide an
enforceable right that can be relied upon by licence-holders."
The licensing of WUAs in the context of subsistence farming raises
a number of problems, however, especially where the WUA is part of a
broader irrigation system. In such cases, the identity of both licensor
and licensee becomes an issue, as does the necessity for having a single
body in charge of all water uses. Where the WUA is part of a much
larger irrigation system, the Project Office for that system will normally
be part of the DOI, although it may also be a private operator. 5 The
As is the case, for example, in South Africa and in parts of Australia.
Ava Shrestha, Building Gender-Responsive Water User Associations in Nepal, in
BRINGING WATER TO THE POOR: SELECTED ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK CASE STUDIEs 14, 1718 (Mary Ann Asico & Lisa Lumbao eds., 2004).
43. See Water Resources Act § 21 (1).
44. See also M. Svendsen & G. Nott, Irrigation Management and Transfer in Turkey:
Process and Outcomes, in CASE STUDIES IN PARTICIPATORY IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT 55 (D.
Groenfeldt & M. Svendsen eds., 2000), available at www.inpim.org. Securing enforceable water rights was regarded as essential if the organisations set up in Turkey were to
be sustainable.
45. See Irrigation Regulation R. 43A-B (addressing the potential for transfer of
operation and maintenance responsibilities to private concerns:
43A. To be operated on lease:
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this regulation, Department may
lease out the responsibility of maintenance and operation as whole or in a
41.
42.
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party withdrawing water from the original watercourse, and consequently the entity that would be licensed in the South African context,
is the DOI. A general requirement for WUAs to be licensed would
cause problems for such organisations operating within these larger
projects, as the control of water use would be the responsibility of the
Project Office. The WUA would be taking water from the canal system
controlled by the Project Office, but would be licensed by the body
responsible for the watercourse as a whole. This separation of the responsibilities for licensing and management would have the effect of
either taking control away from the Project Office or rendering worthless the licence itself.'
Notwithstanding the provisions detailed above regarding the licensing of water use and allocation of resources, the government retains
the capacity to issue unchallengeable directives regarding water use."
With respect to the criteria to be taken into consideration by the
Project Office when distributing water, questions may be raised as to
whether or not the list is comprehensive enough to meet the objectives
of the Nepali government. For example, the Branch Committee of the
Bijayapur WUA is bound by its constitutive documents to distribute
water according to equity.'8 This is a concept that the Project Office is
currently not obliged to take into account. While equity is a difficult
standard to measure, it may be that by adding it as one of the criteria
to be used by the Project Office in distributing water, members will
partial manner on the basis of competition to a person Users' Association or
Non Governmental Organisation of the canal, secondary canal, sub secondary
canal and water course under the system operated by His Majesty's Government or conducted in under the joint Management system.
(2) The notice of at least 35 days shall be published in the national daily
newspaper for the lease pursuant to sub rule (1) and other procedure shall
be as mentioned on Directives.
43B. Management may be transferred:
(1) The regular management responsibility as carried out by His Majesty's
Government on large and medium irrigation system constructed by His Majesty's Government and presently managed under joint management system
shall be transferred to the local bodies on the basis of demand, technical capacity and availability of resources of the local bodies.
46. In South Africa, difficulties have been encountered with respect to the licensing
of WUAs formed from groups of subsistence farmers. Individual subsistence farmers do
not appear to need a licence, but this acts as a disincentive for farmers to form WUAs,
as this makes administrative and economic demands that farmers cannot afford or do
not wish to make. This in turn may result in lack of water for downstream WUAs due to
the cumulative effect of large numbers of unlicensed subsistence farmers upstream. See
Chancellor F. Upton, M. Shepherd & D. Shepherd, KaR Project R7810 Final Report:
Revitalisation and Transfer of Smallholder Irrigation schemes to Farmer Managers, and the
Establishment of Water UserAssociations (on file with author).
47. Water Resources Regulation R. 39; Irrigation Regulation R. 41.
48. Water Users' Institution 2058, Lekhnath Municipality, Bijayapur Irrigation
System, Constitution, para. 15(h) (n.d.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Bijayapur
Irrigation System Constitution].
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gain some degree of protection. It may also encourage other WUAs to
include equity as a governing principle in their own constitutive
documents."
3. Allocation in Times of Shortage
It is the responsibility of the Project Office,' as water distributor, to
decide how to allocate water in the event of a shortage," In making
these decisions, the Project Office must take into account the six usage
priorities listed in the Irrigation Regulations, and must "consult with
the concerned Irrigation Office... and the concerned local body."52
Presumably, the local body is as defined in the Local Self-Governance
The Project Office must also "coordinate" with the efAct (LSGA).
fected WUA before deciding how to allocate water. 4 The wording of
the provision implies the Project Office need not actually consult with
the WUA, but must inform the WUA in advance. The Irrigation Regu49. This, of course, will only be of use if members have the capacity and means of
enforcing this standard. See id. para. 3.1. It may also be noted in the context of the
Andhra Pradesh reforms, that while the Farmers' Management of Irrigation Systems
Act 1997 acknowledges that the state depends upon "efficient and equitable supply and
distribution of water," there is no explicit requirement for the WUA to create an equitable
system.
Equity underlies the entire water use management system in South Africa, with
duties being placed on the relevant Minister, equity being the driving factor behind
the licensing strategy and in the reviewing of licenses. In Kyrgyzstan, WUA members
have the right to receive a" fair and equitable" share of the water distributed in the
irrigated area. See Law on Unions of Water Users, art.9 (n.d.) (on file with author). See
also HODGSON, LEGISLATION ON WATER USERS' ORGANISATION 48 (FAO Legislative Study
79, Rome 2003).
50. The Project Office is the DOI in the case of agency and joint-managed projects,
and the WUA in the case of Users' Association managed projects. Irrigation Regulation R. 2(k).
51. Id. R.22.
52. Id. R. 22(2).
53. The LSGA defines a "Local Body" as "the Village Development Committee,
Municipality and District Development Committee." Local Self-Governance Act, 2055
(Nepal),
(1999)
2(a)
§
http://www.undp.org/governance/marrakechcdrom/concepts/HMG%20Nepal%20%20Local%2OSelf%20Governance%2OAct.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005) [hereinafter
Local Self-Governance Act].
54. The Irrigation Regulation states:
(1) On the circumstances that due to the demand for water exceeding the
availability of water at the source or the capacity of Structure, the Service
could not be supplied in accordance with demand, the Project Office upon
coordination of Users' Association may decide to reduce the service partially
subject to the order as specified in Rule 21.
(2) While making decision pursuant sub-rule (1), the Project Office shall be
required to consult with the concerned Irrigation Office and the concerned
local body.
Irrigation Regulation R. 22, (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file with author).
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lation is silent on the subject of dispute resolution; no appeal appears
to be available to challenge the decisions of the Project Office in such
circumstances. Joint-managed projects may allocate specific roles to
the managing partners in such circumstances, but one must consult
the relevant transfer document and WUA constitutive documents for
the details of such roles.5 In the case of the Sunsari Morang Irrigation
Project, no provision relating to the allocation of water in times of
shortage is evident: the Water Users Committee is responsible for setting rotational schedules, but need only involve water users and keep
them informed. 6
Where the WUA itself is the Project Office, it must take account of
the usage considerations, but will have to do so using only the water
that it receives from the DOI, which again is obliged to make use of the
same priorities. In the Bijayapur system, one of the objectives of the
WUA is to prepare rules regarding the use of water in times of shortage,57 but these are unavailable, if they exist at all. As noted above,
however, in the absence of such rules, the Branch Committee is by default obliged to distribute water according to equity."
4. Allocation of Water Resources to New Users
The introduction of new users to irrigation systems raises issues related to the adequacy of the resource (and assessment thereof), the
criteria applied to applications, consultation requirements and the
degree to which existing rights to water use are protected. A distinction is made in the legislation between applications to join an existing
project and applications for water utilisation licences: the former are
made to the relevant WUA or Project Office, and the latter to the
DWRC.

55.

For example, one such document states: "WUC is fully responsible to manage

rotational practice between users of canal command area to best utilize limited water
in agriculture by informing all users about rotational schedule of the canal operation
through involvement of water users groups in whole command area." The Agreement
of Hand Over to Water Users Committee For Operation and Management of SS9E

Sub-Secondary Canal in Sitagunj Secondary Canal of Sunsari Morang Irrigation Project, para.(b) (v) (n.d.) (on file with author). See also Bijayapur Irrigation System Constitution, para.4(f) (stating that the obligations of the institution include making "rules
and regulations to use the water in case insufficient water in the canal").

56. See Agreement of Hand Over to Water Users Committee For Operation and
Management of SS9E Sub-secondary Canal in Sitagunj Secondary canal of Sunsari
Morang Irrigation Project para. (b) (v) (n.d.) (on file with author) (stating "WUC is
fully responsible to manage rotational practice between users of canal command area
to best utilize limited water in agriculture by informing all users about rotational

schedule of the canal operation through involvement of water users groups in whole
command area").
57. Bijayapur Irrigation System Constitution, para.4(f).
58. See supra note 45.
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a. New Users Applying to an ExistingSystem
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in practice, the Nepali government applies the proper procedure for the introduction of new users
to a system to varying degrees. The IR sets out the procedure in Rule
18, providing:
1. A person desirous of enjoying the Service of Project developed
and operated by His Majesty's Government or a project transferred to
Users' Association after being developed by His Majesty's Government
shall be required to submit an application to the concerned Project
Office.
2. Upon receipt of the application pursuant to sub-rule (1) the Project Office shall deliver the Service after making an inquiry on the
technical and other necessary details as to whether the Service can be
provided or not. If the Service cannot be delivered, the applicant
shall be notified accordingly. 9
The wording above limits the application process to those WUAs that
possess operational control following government development.
Therefore, the application process in the IR does not apply to WUAs'
controlling systems that HMG did not originally develop.
The Project Office may attach licensing conditions consistent with
the provisions of the 1R to the use of the water resources.' The implication taken by the author during a visit to a farmer-managed irrigation system was that the circumstances would be different in every case
of a prospective new use, depending on the number of current users,
current water usage and local hierarchies, and other factors.
Rule 18 of the Irrigation Regulations states that new applicants will
receive service provided to them unless the required inquiries the Project Office undertakes reveal service "cannot be delivered.""1 Additionally, Rule 5(1) (d) of the same regulations, in setting out the duties of
the WUAs, includes the requirement "[tlo distribute water to new User
causing any harm to the previous Users who are receivfarmers without ""
ing the Service.
This requirement complies with Rule 18 insofar as
the WUAs responsibility is to protect existing users and to admit new
users if resources allow. The relevant WUA's constitution may also
significantly bear on the restrictions for new membership.

59.

Irrigation Regulation R. 18 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file

with author).
60.

Id. R. 20.

61.

Id. R. 18(2).

62.

ld. R. 5(1)(d).
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b. New Projects
For entirely new projects, Section 17 of the WRR appears to demand applicants submit an application in the form provided to the
DWRC." The WRR does not explicitly apply only to new projects, but
to those persons who desire "to obtain a licence for utilisation of water
resources."'
However, the language in those sections detailing the
application requirements' strongly suggests applications are for new
projects. While this is not directly relevant to WUAsj it has a direct
bearing on the way that new users are incorporated into water systems,
and therefore has the potential to have a significant impact on the
availability of water to WUAs.
All of the above-mentioned legislation regarding new users fails to
set out criteria against which the relevant authority may evaluate a new
application. Rules 18 and 19 of the WRR only require the licensing
authority to confirm the applicant submitted the relevant documentation," giving public notice of the application, and that the licensing
authority took into account the objections received related to public
concern over adverse effects.'
This evaluation process has two main effects. First, the evaluation
of applications by the DWRC could be more difficult since the licensing authority contains no objective method for determining whether
or not an application is reasonable. Second, the lack of objective standards obfuscated the process of evaluation and is characterised by a
general lack of transparency. Furthermore, since there is no requirement to publish details of any objections received, there is no way of
ascertaining if any conditions attached to a licence match the adverse
impacts alleged. As a result, it is not possible to objectively determine
if the licensing authority considered all of the objections it received.
In issuing a licence, the licensing authority is not required to assess
the quantity or quality of water available, although the applicant must
provide some information concerning environmental effects in the
initial application. 9 The licensing authority is required to take account
of the priorities listed in Section 7 of the Water Resources Act in making its decision, 7 but uncertainties regarding practical application of
63.

Water Resources Regulation R. 17(1) (1993) (Nepal).

64.

Id.

65.

See id. R. 17(1)(a)-(f).

66.
67.

Due to the fact that irrigation is not a licensable activity.
Id. R. 18.

68.

Id. R. 19.

69. The wording of the WRR is broader than simply providing environmental information. The provision also includes details of social and economic impacts, and
alleviatory measures taken to reduce adverse effects. Id. R. 17(e).
70. The WRR does not mention these priorities with respect to the licensing procedure. See infra note 35.
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these priorities render the process open to broad interpretation.
Moreover, the licensing authority need not consider other uses of an
inter-district watercourse in other districts. Instead of assessing water
availability during licensing, any usage rights endowed by the licence
are subject "to the extent of water resources of such place and area as
specified" in the particular licence.7' Therefore, the licence holders
and users must allocate available resources if the licensing authority
issues water usage licences beyond a watercourse's capacity or in time
of drought."
It should also be noted that applications for larger irrigation
schemes may require environmental impact assessments. Part III.A.I.,
below, covers the details of this process.
5. Registration of Water User Associations
To complete the discussion of the allocation of water resources, the
separate issue of WUAs' registration must be addressed. As indicated
above, the IR demands that WUAs register themselves. 3 Rule 3 of the
IR states: "[t]he following users of irrigation system constitute an users
association ... and submit an application to the concerned Irrigation
office in the format as prescribed in Schedule -1: Developed and operated by His Majesty's Government; Maintained and rehabilitated by His
Majesty's Government; Constructed and operated by the farmer
groups.""4
The WUA is therefore required to register with the local DOI office
before beginning to use water resources.7 ' There is no centralised database of registered WUAs and each district office retains only its own
records. More fundamentally, there is no basin-wide register of water
rights for particular watercourses. Since the districts are based on administrative rather than basin boundaries, this further creates difficulties and unwieldiness in the administration of disputes between
neighbouring districts. These difficulties decrease the effectiveness of
any integrated water resource management practice.
Prior to the introduction of the water resources legislation, water
use organisations registered with the Local Development Office (LDO)

71.
Water Resources Regulation R. 22.
72. See supra Part II.B.2. (providing further detail regarding the water allocation
procedures followed in times of shortage).
73. Irrigation Regulation R. 3 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file with
author).
74. Irrigation Regulation sched. 1.
75. See id. (enumerating the requirements of the form submitted to the DOI). Registration is also required in other countries, notably: Armenia (see Law on Water User
Associations and Unions of Water User Associations, art.8, on file with author); and
Kyrgyzstan (see Law on Unions of Water Users, art.5, on file with author). It has not
been possible to confirm what the renewal requirements in these nations are, if any.
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under the auspices of the Association Registration Act.76 Following the
passage of the Water Resources Act, at least initially, WUAs erroneously
registered with the LDO, largely due to a lack of knowledge on the part
of local officials, and, possibly, political manoeuvring at the local
level." Until recently, registration was permanent, although the former practice of registering with the Chief District Officer required annual renewal. With the advent of the changes to the Irrigation Regulations, however, WUAs must now renew their registration annually."
Such a renewal process will be a valuable tool for performance monitoring and general monitoring purposes, although the frequency of
renewal is arguable. This is especially true in an environment where
licensing of collective irrigation does not take place.
Registration results in a number of important consequences for
WUAs. First, a properly registered WUA will become "an autonomous
and corporate body having perpetual succession," and will "have the
right to acquire, enjoy, sell, dispose or arrange by any means of movable and immovable property.'" Secondly, WUAs are capable of suing
and being sued."0 WUAs, therefore, possess the authority to take legal
action against other users who misuse water resources.
In addition, it should not be possible for unregistered WUAs to
make use of water resources from government-run schemes. In practice, however, the DOI can point to no powers that allow it to take action against any such transgressing WUAs. It is also the case that WUAs
will not have access to government funds if they are not registered.
Information regarding unregistered WUAs is not available, and it is
therefore not possible to determine whether or not this is an issue of
concern at present. As regards the consequences for a WUA of nonrenewal of registration, the legislation says nothing. If a WUA is no
76. Association Registration Act, 2034 BS (1977) (Nepal).
77. There may be local tension between the resource demands of the DOI and the
LDO. Additionally, the LDO may wish to continue receiving any revenue related to
registration, or there may be conflicts regarding status and influence.
78. The Irrigation Regulations states:
(1) Every users association, registered as per this Regulation, shall submit an
application to the concerned Irrigation Office along with audit report as audited by recognised auditor from the Auditor General's Department and annual report for the renewal within the ninety days of fiscal year.
(2) If it is not possible to produce an application due to some reason within
the time frame pursuant to sub rule (1) an application with reasons shall be
submitted within additional ninety days for renewal including Rs. 100 [sic] as
late fee
(3) Upon receiving an application pursuant to sub rule (1) and (2) Concerned Irrigation Office shall renew within seven days. Written information
shall be given to the concerned user's association if there is any reason for not
to renew it.

Irrigation Regulation R. 8.
79. Water Resources Act § 6(1), (3) (1992) (Nepal).
80. Id. §6(4).
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longer registered, it would in theory lose its legal status, which would
cause many problems, not least for those seeking to recover debts from
them. It could no longer be sued as a separate legal entity and there is
nothing in the WUA legislation to indicate that the individual members of the WUA could be sued for those debts. Members of the WUA
would also be unable to take action against other persons and there
may be consequences with respect to its ability to use its bank account.8' It might be better if withdrawal of registration was used only as
a means of enforcing compliance where all other measures have failed.
A presumption could be introduced such that registered WUAs will
continue to operate, unless they repeatedly fail to produce relevant
documentation and / or comply with the requirements of the legislation.
IH. RESTRICTIONS ON USE
A.LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS

The system of unlicensed water utilisation the Water Resources Act
and subsequent regulations created both defacto and, in effect, dejure is
subject to a number of legislative restrictions to protect other users and
the environment. Nepal protects other users and the environment
through pollution control legislation, the enforcement of which falls
outside the remit of the Ministry of Water Resources and the DOI.
Similar to the situation of the Water Resources Act licensing system,
however, the intention behind the restrictions is nobler than the reality
due to the complete lack of a monitoring network in Nepal.
The Irrigation Policy seeks to address this to some extent; it recognises, for example, that irrigation projects should have minimal adverse environmental effects and that irrigation should leave such quantity of water as will not detrimentally effect biodiversity." The Nepali
government imposed no timescale on this objective, although they direct that the policy is due to be updated after five years."

81. In the Bijayapur context, the constitution states that if the institution "collapses", the assets of the WUA will revert to the government of Nepal. See Bijayapur
Irrigation System Constitution, para.31. However, legal incapacity is not synonymous
with "collapse", so it is not at all certain that this provision would be triggered by the
lack of registration. The position is the same in Kamala Uttarbahini. See Kamala Uttarbahini Canal Project: Constitution of the Water Users' Working Committee, Bandipur,
Siraha, 2059, para.28 (n.d.) (on file with author).
82. See
Irrigation
Policy
§§
2.11.1,
2.11.3
(Nepal),
http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigation-policy.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
83. Id. § 2.15.8.
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1. General Pollution Control and Environmental Protection
The government has the power to publish enforceable water quality standards for particular uses, but it has not yet set these standards."
Although Nepal has not yet formulated water quality standards, it has
established some emission limits. Primary responsibility for pollution
control lies with the MOPE, which implements the Environment ProThe EPR states,
tection Act, 2053 and its subsequent regulations."
"[n]o person shall emit or cause the emission of noise, heat, radioactive [sic] material and waste from any mechanical means, industrial
establishment or any other place in contravention of the standards
prescribed by the Ministry by notification published in the Gazette." 6
General and industry-specific tolerance limits have been set with
respect to certain substances, 7 but the level of enforcement seems to
be erratic' - from the list of fifty-five industries indicated in Sch.7 of the
Environment Protection Rules, it appears that ELVs have been set for
only nine.'
Those affected by pollution incidents are entitled to compensation
for loss suffered.' Additional anti-pollution provisions are contained
in the WRA:
1) His Majesty's Government may, by a notification published in the
Nepal Gazette, prescribe the pollution tolerance limit for water resources.
2) No one shall pollute water resource [s] by way of using or putting
any litter, industrial wastes, poison, chemical or toxicant to the effect
that the pollution tolerance limit of the water resource[s] as prescribed pursuant to sub-section (1) is exceeded.
84. Water Resources Act § 18.
I
(Nepal),
ch.
Rules
Protection
85. Environment
http://www.mope.gov.np/environment/rule97.php (last visited May 1, 2005).
86. Id. ch. 3.
87. The MOPE website provides further details of these limits. A list of industries
requiring Pollution Control Certificates, which are required by Environment Protection Rule 16 of the EPR, may be found in schedule 7 of the Environment Protection
Rules, available at http://www.mope.gov.np/environment/rule9 7 .php. Provisional
Certificates must be renewed every year and Permanent Certificates (those relating to
industries for which emission standards have been published) every three years. See
Environment Protection Rules R.16. It has not been possible to verify the degree to
which these requirements are followed in practice.

88. E-mail from Andrew Allan, author, to Basistha Raj Adhikari, Department of
Irrigation (on file with author).
89.

See MOPE, available at http://www.mope.gov.np/environment/industry.php

(listing the details of the industries for which effluent standards have been established).
90. See Environment Protection Rules ch. 3, 8. Nepali courts are currently dealing
with a number of compensation actions, but the author understands that the government has not yet prosecuted under the Act.
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3) The prescribed officer may, as required, examine or cause to examine to determine as to whether or not the water resource has been
polluted or the quality standard as prescribed pursuant to sub-section
(1) of Section 18 has been maintained.91
Further, with the broader aim of preventing harm to the environment
in general, the Government mandates "[w] hile utilizing water resources, it shall be done so in such a manner that no substantial adverse effect be made on [the] environment by way of soil erosion,
flood, landslide or [any] other [similar] cause. ""
Again, the Nepal government has not yet determined these pollution tolerance limits, making the likelihood of successful actions
against polluters remote. Since neither those discharging chemicals
nor government agencies measure emissions of potentially polluting
materials, any legal actions presumably face significant difficulties with
respect to proving causation. Environmental assessments must be undertaken with respect to certain types of project." A distinction is made
between projects requiring Initial Environmental Examinations (LEEs)
and the large-scale projects that require the more onerous Environmental Impact Assessments (ELAs).
Unfortunately, it has not been
possible to obtain data from the MOPE regarding the degree to which
this legislation is enforced and complied with following project implementation. In general, environmental assessments are necessary only
for larger projects.' Although it is beyond the scope of this report to
comment on the levels at which such assessments are required and the
industries that are affected, it may be useful to indicate the extent to
which a WUA may be involved in the environmental assessment processes. If we take as an example a proposal to develop a new drinking
water supply, the level of environmental assessment required will be
governed by Schedules 1 and 2 of the Environmental Protection
Rules.'
Proponents of new projects requiring environmental assess91. Water Resources Act § 19 (1992) (Nepal).
92. Id. § 20.
93. Environment Protection Act § 3, 5. Approval of a project may be given under
section 6.
94. For further details regarding the processes to be followed with respect to environmental assessments, see Environment Protection Rules, rules 3-14 and Schedules 1,
3 and 5 (with respect to Initial Environmental Examinations) and 2, 4 and 6 (with
respect to Environmental Impact Assessments).
95. The rehabilitation of irrigation systems do not require EIAs, but may require
IEEs depending on their size and location. The scale of assessment needed for new
schemes will also vary according to size and location, but ELAs may be necessary. Full
ELAs will also have to be completed for any project, irrespective of magnitude, if, for
example, the affected area contains a main source of public water or is semi-arid or
mountainous. Environment Protection Rules, sch.2.
96. Schedules I and 2 set out the criteria which will govern whether an IEE or an
E1A are required. For example, the criteria with respect to water resources projects are
as follows:
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ments must inform a number of specified local bodies about such proposals to seek their views on the environmental impact of the project.
Such consultations take place during the scoping of the project and
during the preparation period of the LEE or EIA."7 WUAs are not specified organisations in either case, although they may give their views.
The body responsible for authorising such projects, for example, the
Ministry of Population and Environment, must take account of the
representations made by those who responded to the consultations and
may give approval to the project if no substantialnegative or adverse
impact on the environment will result. 8 There is no duty placed on
the approving body to consult with any other authority or any individual groups or organisations. Schedules 5 and 6 of the EPR set out the
information that must be submitted to the approving body, which includes details of the impact on land use and the degradation of cultivable land. The rules, unfortunately, do not contain any indications as
to the importance attached to the information provided in these applications, and it is therefore not possible to assess the priority attached to
the damage caused to irrigated land by any resultant shortages of water.
The Environment Protection Act distinguishes between the regulation of emissions and that of water quality, making different ministries

Impact
Assessment
Examination
Environmental
Initial
Environmental
(Sch.2)
(Sch.1)
New irrigation systems:
New irrigation systems:
- Those irrigatingmore than 2000 hectares in
- Those irrigating25 to 2000 hectares in the
the Tarai.
Taraikilometre
-Those irrigating15 to 500 hectares in the hill -Those irrigatingmore than 500 hectares in the
hill valleys.
valleys."
-Those irrigating10 to 200 hectares in the hill -Those irrigationmore the 200 hectares in the
hill and mountain areas with a steep gradient.
and mountain areas with a steep gradient.
-Any water resources development activity
Rehabilitated irrigation systems:
which displaces more than 100 people with
- Those irrigatingmore than 500 hectares in the
permanent residence.
Tarai.
Additionally, any projects that are pro- Those irrigatingmore than 200 hectares is the
posed in certain areas, including the
hill valleys.
following:
-Those irrigatingmore than 100 hectares in the
-Historical,culturaland archaeologicalsites
hill and mountain areas with a steep gradient.
-Environmentally "weak and wet"areas
-Any water resources development activity
which displaces from 25 to 100 persons with -Nationalparks
-Semi-arid, mountainous and Himalayan
permanent residence
areas
-Flood prone areas
-Areas with main sources of public water supply.
97.
98.

See Environment Protection Rules R. 4, 7.
Environment Protection Rules R. 9.
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responsible for each. Best practice in the European Union and in
South Africa regulates emissions, whether point source or diffuse, according to the capacity of the receiving waters.' Nepal does not follow
this practice despite some efforts to implement this methodology in
the above legislation. The author's impression, taken from discussions
with employees of the DOI and FMIS officials, is that problems associated with pollution were of less concern to WUAs outside the Kathmandu Valley. Apparently, these WUAs are more concerned with the
lack of water, although as Nepal industrialises, water quality will become more important. In addition, there is currently no provision
compelling the DOI to consult on any matter with the MOPE. Communications between the author and representatives of the DOI suggest that lines of communication between employees of the two ministries may be ill-defined.
Along with the DOI and the MOPE, both Village Development
Committees (VDCs) and municipalities are assigned roles with regard
to pollution control, although, again, the extent of their involvement is
uncertain.'" Under the LSGA, VDCs have a general obligation to formulate plans for environmental protection, and, more specifically, to
prevent pollution in areas used for tourism.' However, municipalities
have a duty to control water pollution generated within their respective
areas. Part 3 of the LSGA designates these municipal areas, and, although they imply some degree of urban development, they may also
include hill areas, which have developed to a certain degree."2 The
allocation of responsibilities between the MOPE and these local bodies
is uncertain under the current legislation.
2. Protection of Other Users
The Water Resources Act contains a number of provisions that seek
to limit the damage caused by pollution or abuse of water resources.

99. See, e.g., Council Directive 2000/60/EC of 23 October 2000 Establishing A
Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water Policy, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 40,
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/i327/_32720001222enOO010072.pdf (last visited May 1,
2005); DEP'T WATER AFFAnts & FORESTRY, REPUBLIC OF SouTH AFRICA, NATIONAL WATER
56
(2004),
STRATEGY
RESOURCE
http://www.dwaf.pwv.gov.za/Documents/Policies/NWRS/Sep2004/pdf/General.pdf
(last visited May 1, 2005) (noting the dual system of "Resource-Directed Measures" and
"Source- Directed Controls").
(Nepal),
Act
§§
28,
96
(1999)
100. Local
Self-Governance
http://www.undp.org/governance/marrakechcdrom/concepts/HMG%20Nepal%20%20Local%2OSelf%2oGovernance%2OAct.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005).
101. Id. § 28(h), (j). The VDC also has enforcement powers with respect to those
who dump solid waste; municipalities have similar powers, but may levy fines 150 times
as large as VDCs. Compare id. § 70(c), (g), witih id. § 165(f).
102. Id. § 72.
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Section 4(3) of the Water Resources Act states that "[a] person or a
corporate body making use of water resources shall make its beneficial
use without causing damage to other[s] ."'°
Compensation may be available to those damaged by another's water use. 1 This compensation may provide a better foundation for antipollution than the Environment Protection Act's provisions. In addition, Section 14 of the Water Resources Act provides that services may
be terminated if a person "is in default of payment of the charge for
the utilisation of services or utilises the services [without proper authorisation] or misuses the services or acts in contravention of the
terms and conditions. '" °0
Water users found to be misusing water resources could have their
service terminated, although the Water Resources Act does not specify
the exact meaning of "misuse." In fact, the Act does not define either
"use" or "misuse," which is not helpful for licensing or avoiding disputes. Nevertheless, the Act provides that "use" must take place without "substantial adverse effect ... on [the] environment by way of soil
erosion, flood, landslide or [an] other [similar] cause," although it
fails to provide measures for enforcement."'
A similar provision appears in the EA, requiring that "[w] hile carrying out electricity generation, transmission or distribution ... no substantial adverse effect be made on [the] environment by way of soil
erosion, flood, landslide, air pollution [,] etc."" 7 The EA also requires
an applicant submit an environmental report to the prescribed officer
before the officer may grant a licence related to electricity generation.10 8 However, there is no corresponding obligation on the prescribed officer to consider such a report in making his or her decision,
and the EA does not set out requirements regarding the preparation
or contents of environmental reports.
04

IV. GOVERNANCE: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE
A. ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
For details on dispute resolution processes and requirements, see
Part IV.E., below.
103. Water Resources Act § 4(3) (1992) (Nepal). The Water Resources Act defines
"beneficial uses" as "rational uses of the water resources within the available means and
resources." Id. § 2(b).
104. The Water Resources Act notes "[tihe prescribed officer may impose a fine up
to an amount of five thousand rupees to any person who acts in contravention of this
Act or rules made under this [A] ct and realize compensation also for such damage
from such person if damage is caused to anybody due to such act." Id. § 22.
105. Id. § 14.
106. Id. § 20.
107. Electricity Act § 24 (1992) (Nepal).

108.

Id. § 4.
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1. Legislation
Under Nepal's water resources legislation, WUAs have limited
powers to financially penalise their members for non-payment of service fees or for unauthorised use of water resources within their respective irrigated areas. WUAs may charge penalty fees with respect to service fees that the users pay late,"° but this relies on the charge the Service Charge Fixation Committee sets. ' To date, Nepal does not appear to have established this committee on a general basis."' Regarding penalties, the wording of Section 14 of the Water Resources Act
appears to allow recipients of service charges to terminate supplies to
members who are "in default of payment of the charge for the utilisaton of services or utilises the services [without proper authorisation]
or misuses the services or acts in contravention of the terms and conditions..' These "recipients of service charges" may include WUAs, but
based on the wording and context of the clause, it appears more likely
that the provision allows the DOI to stop services to WUAs, rather than
enabling WUAs to take action against members." ' The context concerns the rights and obligations of licensees, and, as previously discussed, WIUAs do not fall into this category.
Despite this argument under the Water Resources Act, WUAs and
the DOI do possess power under the IR to suspend water services to
members:
a. If the User has failed to pay Service Charges due,'14

The Irrigation Regulation provides:
If the Service Charge to be paid by the User to the users association or person
or institution entitled to power is not paid within the specified time, the User
shall be required to pay [a] late charge in addition to [the] Service Charge
and the rate of the late charge to be paid by the User shall be as fixed by the
Service Charge Fixation Committee constituted pursuant to Rule 25.
Irrigation Regulation R. 30(1) (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file with
author). Note, however, that the reference to R.25 is incorrect; R.26 is, in fact, the
relevant provision. The recent changes made to the Irrigation Regulations introduced
a new member to the Service Charge Fixation Committee: a representative of the District Irrigation Users' Association. Id. R. 4. This body is referred to elsewhere in the
IR; for example, see R.4 (8) with respect to the dissolution of Executive Committees of
user associations, and R.7 with respect to Users Coordination Associations. The Service Charge Fixation Committee is not further defined though; thus, it is not clear
what its role is or from what source it should draw its members.
110. Id. R. 26.
111. Interview with Basistha Raj Adhikari, Department of Irrigation (on file with
author).
112. Water Resources Act § 14 (1992) (Nepal).
113. If the author's inference is incorrect, it may be that the quality of the translation is complicit.
114. The actual wording of the new Rule 23(a) is not entirely clear, and may be less
broad than the previous version. There is an implication that the provision refers only
109.
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b. If the user violates the conditions of the agreement with the WUA,
c. [W]here the canal structures have been damaged (until necessary
repair and maintenance is complete)." 5
In addition, the revised Rule 5(1) (h) of the IR specifically allows
WUAs to "exclude those users who fail to pay the service charge.""'

Experience indicates that instances of WUAs actually terminating supply are very limited at best."' Where the social cohesion of farmermanaged schemes is missing, WUAs lack the resources or willingness to
police cessation of service, so it is difficult to ensure the enforcement
of such action. The agreement between the WUAs and individual is
memorialized in that WUA's constitution and by laws. Of the three
examples available to the author, 6 8 only one details the obligations of
members (Bijayapur), and its obligations are limited to requiring that
members attend meetings and work in favour of the WUA."9 The by
laws for the same system, however, allow cancellation of membership if
service charges are not paid.'
The constitution of the Sunsari-Morang
system requires one of the committees prevent illegal use of water, but
provides no enforcement powers for it to do so.'
However, in theory, bodies other than WUAs may levy penalties
and compensatory awards are possible in instances where:
* the Water Resources Act or rules made under it have been contravened;
* water has been used beyond the terms of, or in the absence of, a
licence;
*

water has been stolen; or

to the fees the WUA pays to the Irrigation Office. If this narrower reading is indeed
correct, WUAs may still terminate or suspend service under the revised Rule 5(1) (h).
115. Irrigation Regulation R. 23.
116. Id. R. 5(1) (h).
117. Interview with Simon Howarth & Mott MacDonald.
118. Bijayapur Irrigation System Constitution & By Laws, supra note 46; Kamala
Uttarbahini Constitution & By Laws, and Sunsari-Morang Constitution & By Laws
(n.d.) (unofficial English trans. of the official documents, on file with author).
119. Bijayapur Irrigation System Constitution, para. 19(v).
120. Bijayapur Irrigation System By Laws, para. 3.3. Cancellation of membership
may also occur when ownership or tenancy is ended or if membership fees are unpaid.
It is not clear how often such a sanction is imposed, nor is it clear how it is enforced,
given the problems of blocking water supplies. The other consequence of nonmembership of a WUA is the loss of voting rights with respect to committee membership. Id. para. 9.5.
121. Water Users' Institution, Sitagunj Branch Canal, Constitution para. 10.1.2(iii)
[hereinafter Sitagunj Branch Canal Constitution].
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o wilful harm has been done to water-related infrastructure.

The local DOI office is responsible for enforcing the first three items
in the list above,'123 and, although it is unclear which body is responsible
for the punishment of wilful destruction of water-related infrastructure, it seems reasonable to assume this too would be within the remit
of the DOI. From the author's conversations with DOI officials, it
seems the DOI has not yet prosecuted a breach of the Water Resources
Act. As regards to the other circumstances listed above, active enforcement would be unrealistic because the use of water beyond the
terms of a licence is not relevant to WUAs and falls outside the licensing regime.
The relevant WUA could more appropriately deal with the stealing
of water and wilful destruction of infrastructure at least in situations
involving individuals. The WRR also allocates additional powers to
24
DWRCs with respect to terminating the service of licensed WUAs.
These bodies are authorised to cancel licences in a number of circumstances.12 However, the lack of WUA licences makes this power merely
theoretical, at least for now.' 6 With respect to enforcement of the
terms of the Water Resources Act, the DOI is also poorly placed: it has
no remit beyond irrigation management, and would consequently find
it difficult to enforce the broader provisions of the Water Resources
Act, especially in relation to licensing.
Late fees are chargeable in the event that service fees are not paid
on time. The Service Charge Fixation Committee is responsible for

122. Water Resources Act § 22(1)-(4) (1992) (Nepal).
123. Irrigation Regulation R. 40 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file
with author).
124. See Water Resources Regulation R. 36(1) (1993) (Nepal); Water Resources Act
§21.
125. DWRCs may cancel licenses:
(1) If the licensee performs any act contrary to this Act or rules made under
this Act, the prescribed officer may issue an order to the concerned licensee
by prescribing necessary improvements to be made on such activity within the
specified period.
(2) If the licensee makes no improvement within the prescribed period pursuant to sub-section (1), the prescribed officer may cancel the license of such
person.
(3) Prior to the cancellation of [a] license pursuant to sub-section (2), the
prescribed officer shall give the licensee a reasonable opportunity to explain
his innocence.
Water Resources Act § 21.
126. The power to revoke licenses and the power to penalise transgressions is split
between two different bodies. The DWRC has the power to revoke licenses, while the
DOI has the power to penalise transgressions.
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setting the late fee,'" although this does not appear to happen in practice. This is due, in part, to the very low levels of fee collection and
also because the rates chargeable do not make pursuit cost-effective.
In many cases such committees have simply not been created.'" The
WUAs now have explicit responsibility for collecting both service
charge fees and late fees." The proposed allocation of service fees collected has been set out in the most recent Irrigation Policy, although
this apportionment does not attempt to establish fee levels.1"

Irrigation Regulation R. 30(1). However, the functions and duties of the Service
127.
Charge Fixation Committee, as set out in Rule 28, do not explicitly include setting the
level of the late fee:
The function, duties and power of Service Charge Fixation Committee shall
be as follows:
(a) To determine the minimum service charge for each crop on the basis of
average agricultural production to be increased upon the availability of the
Irrigation service.
(b) To make available the particulars and advice as sought by His Majesty's
Government from time to time.
(c) To seek advice from His Majesty's Government while making change in
the rate of service charge.
The Irrigation Regulations unfortunately does not define "late", and this lacuna is also
evident in the by-laws of the individual systems seen by the author. The point at which
"late fees" become "penalty for non-payment of service fees" is therefore debatable.
128. E-mail from Andrew Allan, author, to Basistha Raj Adhikari, Department of
Irrigation (Dec. 20 & 26) (on file with author).
129. The most recent version of the Irrigation Regulations provides: "[t]he Functions Duties and Power of the Users' Association shall be as follows:
(g) To collect service charge from users and deposit it as prescribed by concerned Irrigation office.
(h) To exclude those users who fail to pay the service charge, to collect late
charge and to inform the same to the concerned Irrigation office. Irrigation
Regulation R. 5(1).
130. Annex 2 of the Irrigation Policy 2060 sets out the following apportionment:

Level of participation in the
operation of the system

1. Water course and there
under operated by the users
association and above than
water course managed by His
Majesty's Government.
2. Tertiary and there under
operated by the users association and above than tertiary
managed by His Majesty's
Government.

Sharing of Irrigation Service Charges Collected from
Users (in Percentage)
National Treas- To be retained
Central Mainteby the water
ury of His Majnance Fund,
users associaesty's GovernDepartment of
tion
ment
Irrigation

40

40

20

30

30

40
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At the broader level, the enforcement and implementation of the
water resources legislation is sporadic at best. The licensing system
ostensibly established by the Water Resources Act and WRR does not
exist in practice. Standards for water quality, and the monitoring network necessary for measuring such limits, have not been established
and service fees are often not charged. This leaves little for an agency
to enforce.
The allocation of enforcement responsibilities creates further confusion. For example, if WUAs are autonomous, it is essential that they
take responsibility for the use and abuse of water resources within their
Accordingly, the WIUAs should be acrespective irrigated areas.'
countable for policing water theft within their areas. Currently, however, the DOI is responsible for policing water theft.' A better system
makes the DOI responsible for punishing those who steal from the
larger canals that fall within its remit and the WUAs responsible for
punishing theft within their respective areas.
Although the suspension of elected democracy that occurred with
the dissolution of parliament and elected VDC membership is not directly responsible for the weak enforcement of legislation in this area,
it probably exacerbated the situation.

3. Secondary canal and there
under operated by the users
association and above than
secondary canal managed by
His Majesty's Government.
4. All canals below than main
canal managed by the users
association and other canals
managed by His Majesty's

20

20

60

10

10

80

Government-

5. All the structures including
main canal other than head
works managed by the user
association.
6. In case of complete transI
fer of the project.

90

0

5

95

131.
See, e.g, E. Ostrom, Governingthe Commons - The Evolution of Institutionsfor Collective Action (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990), 94: in "robust institutions monitoring and sanctioning are undertaken not by external authorities but by the participantsthemselves", quoted in
STEPHEN HODGSON, DEV. LAw SERv. FAO LEGAL OMCE & WATER RES., DEv. AND MGMT.
SERV., LAND & WATER DEv. Div., LEGISLATION ON WATER USERS' ORGANISATIONS: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 88-89 n. 141 (2003).
132.
Irrigation Regulation R. 40. While the new Irrigation Regulation seeks to transfer some responsibility for the enforcement of legislation from the DOI to the relevant
WUA, the policing function remains with the DOI. Id. R. 23. For example, the WUA
has a duty to inform the DOI about damage to infrastructure, but responsibility for
punishing the breaches remains with the DOI. Id. R. 25(a).
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2. Bylaws, Constitutions and Statutes
Although anecdotal evidence suggests that the constitutive documents of WUAs are generally adhered to, the extent of enforcement is
unclear.'
In addition to rules detailing the powers and functions of
the operating committees, the constitutive documents may contain
requirements for auditing annual accounts and the representation of
women in the decision-making process. For example, the Bijayapur
and Sunsari-Morang documents require annual auditing of accounts,
which are then forwarded to the DOI, and, in the case of SunsariMorang, to the Chief District Officer, who has the power to challenge
irregularities."
Of the three WUA documents available, only the Bijayapur specifically mentions the representation of women, requiring a
target goal of 30 percent female participation."
It does not appear that any single body, other than the DOI or
Chief District Officer to a very limited extent, is responsible for ensuring compliance with WUA documnentation."'
However, this responsibility naturally falls on the WUA members. This raises the separate
question of the rights, powers, and obligations of members in general.
This article will discuss this issue later as it applies to dispute resolution
and the capacity of the various, relevant organisations. It also obliquely
raises the issue of those provisions that members will wish to enforce: it
may be difficult for gender balance targets to be achieved at the WUA
level, for example, if it is left to the WUA members to enforce such
provisions. If such targets are not met, those seeking to remedy this
will not be able to do so within the administrative structures of the
WUAs because they lack the voting power. Such targets must therefore
be properly enshrined in legislation.' 7
B. COMPLIANCE MONITORING
Currently, compliance with general pollution control rules is not
monitored because of an absence of information monitoring networks
and the paucity of enforceable standards. In order for compliance to
be effectuated, clear, measurable, and in some cases time-limited,
standards must be established. Some aspects of the Water Resources
133.

E-mail correspondence from Andrew Allan, author, to Basistha Raj Adhikari,

Department of Irrigation (on file with author).
134. See, e.g., Sitagunj Branch Canal Constitution, para. 9.1.3(b). See also infta Part
IV.B.1. (reviewing the broader aspects of auditing).
135. "Since there is negligible women's participation in every aspect of life, there
shall be at least 30 percent women's participation in days to come." Bijayapur Irrigation System By Laws, para. 9.3.
136. See infra Part IV.B.I. (discussing the general legislative obligations regarding
compliance and auditing requirements).
137. See infra Part 3.3.1 (describing the degree to which gender balance requirements are protected under the law).
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Act regime have such standards in place, but the mere existence of
these standards does not guarantee compliance.
HMG is empowered to create an Evaluation Monitoring Committee under IR Rule 43 to monitor the management and performance of
WUAs:
(1) His Majesty's Government shall constitute [an] Evaluation and
Monitoring Committee as per necessity for the evaluation and monitoring of irrigation system[s] on the basis of service provided by irrigation system[s], quality of water, crop intensity, increase of production, institutional and financial status of the Users' Association and
physical changes in the working area.
(2) The representation of irrigation Users' Association shall be introduced... while constituting [an] Evaluation and Monitoring Committee pursuant to sub [-] rule (1).1"

The author could not confirm whether an Evaluation and Monitoring Committee, or its predecessor from the previous version of the Irrigation Regulations, has ever been formed, and if so, if it has ever met.
It is also unclear who, other than representatives of the WUAs themselves, would serve on the committee. Yet, in order to ensure the
committee retains an appropriate degree of independence, it is essential that the committee is not composed of primarily WUA members.
The extent of the committee's power is significantly broader than under the previous version of the Irrigation Regulations, although the
phrase "institutional and financial status of the Users' Associations" '
gives little information regarding the details of the committee. The
increased power of the committee is a positive step, and hopefully the
new committee will receive appropriate resources.
However, questions remain regarding the role and effectiveness of
such a committee, specifically with respect to its procedures and information sources. How often will the committee meet? Will each
district establish a committee or will HMG establish a single committee
with jurisdiction over the entire country? Should the committee rely
on information provided by the WUAs or information that it either
produces itself or receives from the DOI?
Another aspect of the monitoring committee that requires examination is the enforcement of standards. The committee's focus is on
the physical elements of irrigation: the infrastructure, the quality of
water supplied, crop intensity, physical changes to the area, and the
increase in production. The WUA itself is less directly monitored.
However, arguably, better management of the WUAs improves productivity. Although the financial and "institutional" status of WUAs is ex138.
139.

Irrigation Regulation R. 43.
Id.
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pressly referred to, that does not appear to incorporate monitoring
WUAs general performance.
The functions and duties of WUAs, against which its performance
must be measured, are broadly set out in Rule 5 of the IR:
a. To repair and maintain; operate and manage the Irrigation System
operated by [the WUAs]. Provided that if it requires to change or replace the equipment affecting the Structure prior approval of the
concerned Irrigation Office shall be required.
b. To avail water to the User farmers at appropriate time[s] in proper
quantity as required by the type of crop and the condition of the land.
c. To keep the record of the land in which service could not be
availed and to recommend that such users be exempt from the Service Charge.
d. To distribute water to new User farmers without causing any harm
to the previous Users who are receiving the Service.
e. To mobilize public participation for maintenance of the Irrigation
System [.]
f. To construct additional Structures to increase irrigable area considering the supply of water.
g. To collect service charge[s] from users and deposit [them] as prescribed by [the] concerned Irrigation [O]ffice.
h. To exclude those users who fail to pay the service charge, to collect late charge[s] and to inform the same to the concerned Irrigation [O]ffice.
i. To provide notice to the concerned Irrigation Office of any information pertaining to any demolition or destruction, alteration, obstruction or any knowledge about the possibility of the same activities[,] irrigation system[,] or structure.o
More specific standards, discussed in greater detail below, apply to account reporting and gender participation.'
The Evaluation and Monitoring Committee encounters problems
because the WUAs only need to keep records relating to income and
expenditure, and services provided over the past financial year.'42 Con140.
141.
142.

Id. R. 5(1).
See infra Parts V.B.I., IV.B.2..
The Irrigation Regulation explains the records WUAs must keep as follows:
1. The Users' Association shall maintain up-to-date record including the record of the Service Charge to be paid by the Users for the use of Service made
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sequently, WUA reports do not include details relating to the quality of
water,"" crop intensity, and increase in production, or the "institutional
status" of the WIUA. Furthermore, the records do not include details of
the output of the irrigated area. The new IR's monitoring requirements are broader than the previous version and are a significant step
forward because HMG will be able to assess whether or not a particular
area is becoming more productive. The monitoring results will form
the basis for determining whether or not the WUA strategy is successful.
The Irrigation Policy establishes a new committee dedicated to
monitoring: the Central Irrigation Monitoring and Evaluation Committee."' However, this committee may be intended to fulfil the Irrigation Policy promise. No date appears to have been set for the establishment of this committee, and details of its powers and infrastructural
capacity remain unavailable. Additionally, the jurisdiction of the new
Evaluation and Monitoring Committee is still uncertain.
Compliance, however, is not simply the enforcement of standards
by a regulatory body. Compliance must also include the WUAs' ability
to enforce the standards of service they are entitled to receive under
agreements with the DOI. Yet, the IR does not contain comprehensive
details about the obligations and duties of the DOI with respect to the
service provision. In the case of joint-managed projects, the DOI may
have specific duties to adhere to according to the transfer agreement.'45
The problem with having these obligations enumerated only in the
transfer agreements is that the extent of the obligations depends in
part on the negotiating power of the relevant WUA. Additionally, the
WUA may not have the means to enforce the DOI's obligations.
The DOI is obligated to provide service to prospective new users
upon submission of an application, unless service is not possible. 4 ' A
prospective new user may challenge the DOI's refusal to provide service, except when the refusal occurred because of shortages. '47 Notification procedures must be followed when service levels are terminated

available by it showing expenditure incurred for the maintenance as well as
balance of its fund.
2. The Users' Association shall, within three months of expiry of fiscal year,
submit its report to the concerned Irrigation Office along with the financial
statements of the Users' Association and all details of the Service made available to the Users in that fiscal year.
Irrigation Regulation R. 6.
143. This assumes the monitoring network necessary to determine the quality of the
water was in place.
144.
Irrigation Policy § 2.14.1 (Nepal), http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigation-policy.pdf
(last visited May 1, 2005).
145.
Irrigation Regulation R. 13.
146.

Id. R. 18.

147.

Id. R. 22-23.
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or reduced.'48 Unless explicitly set forth in the transfer agreement, the
DOI is not bound by any performance standards. Consequently, the
DOI is largely unaccountable to the WUAs. If the DOI fails to provide
water, because of a lack of water due to drought or leaking infrastructure, or it provides water of unsuitable quality, the WUAs are, prima
facie, powerless to hold the DOI accountable. This system prevents
WUAs from assessing whether a decision to reduce service has been
based on tenable grounds, even when drought motivates the reduction, because the DOI is not obligated to make its decision-making
processes public. Although the DOI must consult with the relevant
local Irrigation Office and other Local Body,' 9 this does not include
the WUA itself."n Furthermore, these consultations do not need to be
public, and, as a result, the reasons for making a particular decision
remain hidden.
1. Auditing
WUAs must provide the DOI with their financial records within
three months of the end of each financial year.' Additionally, Rule
8 (A) of the revised IR obligates WUAs to audit their finances ' as part
of the registration renewal process. The Auditor General's Department must audit these financial reports, and the WUAs must submit
them, along with the registration renewal application, to the DOI."3
User associations' constitutive documents may also require them to
produce, audit, and present such accounts to the local district officer,
or DOI. The local district officer or DOI may or may not be able to
challenge questionable accounts. This new auditing requirement '
enables greater scrutiny of the financial condition of WUAs. Although
the DOI must give reasons for refusing a registration renewal application, there is no provision allowing a WUA to challenge such a decision. The inability to challenge such decisions, coupled with the fact

148. Id. R. 24.
149. Id. R. 22(2).
150. This assumes the term "local body" does not include WUAs. See Local SelfGovernance Act § (2) (a) (1999) (Nepal) (excluding WUAs from the definition of local
bodies),
http://www.undp.org/governance/marrakechcdrom/concepts/HMG%20Nepal%20%20Local%2Self%20Governance%20Actpdf (last visited May 1, 2005).
151. "The Users' Association shall, within three months of expiry [sic] of fiscal year,
submit its report to the concerned Irrigation Office along with the financial statement
of the Users' Association and all details of the Service made available to the Users in
that fiscal year." Irrigation Regulation R. 6(2).
152. Id. R. 8(A)(1).
153. Id. R. 8(A) (1). The capacity of the Auditor General's Office to process all WUA
accounts within ninety days of the end of the fiscal year is not certain.
154. The DOI may refuse an application for the renewal of registration. Id. R
8(A) (3). See supra Part II.B.4. (explaining the consequences of non-registration).
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that the grounds on which the DOI may refuse to grant renewal are
not explicitly set out, further reduces the transparency and predictability of DOI decisions.
Although there is no generally accepted, standard form of accounts, only a limited number of auditors may audit the accounts of
the WUAs, even at the district level. 5 WUA members, and more specifically executive members, have no obligation to be account-literate,
which is not conducive to transparent accounting. 56' However, a requirement to submit accounts would not be universally applicable because many WUAs have no involvement with cash, due to the likelihood that they do not charge service use fees.
C.REPRESENTATION

The most recent version of HMG's Irrigation Policy recognises the
importance of participatory management in achieving the goal of increased agricultural productivity.'
Participatory management can only
be successful if representative participation is in place.
Water resources legislation, constitutions, and statutes govern representation in Nepali WUAs. The statutory rules are inconsistent,
155. Audit requirements in other countries are tied to established standards rather
than a particular group of people. For example, Pakistan requires that accounts and
audit reports conform to local accounting standards. See, e.g., THE PUNJAB IRRIGATION
AND DRAINAGE AuTHoprr Acr R. 20 (1999) (Pakistan) (requiring adherence to the
standards of the Pakistan Institute of Chartered Accountants).
156. With regard to the transparency of WUA financial information, two scholars
have recommended:
0 Training in agreed financial practices for the treasurer of the WUA and
the chief financial officer of the WSP should be provided (if required). Also,
training in bookkeeping practices could be given to all WUA directors and
WSP administrative staff.
• Financial transactions should only be made with a minimum of two authorized witnesses and a record of the transaction.
0 Financial records of the WSP should be available for inspection by farmers.
0 There should be a clear basis for how the level of water fees is determined
(such as needs-based budgeting).
* Amount of water fees to be collected should be based on a known and
measurable level of service, such as volume of water delivered, area served or
number of irrigations.
0 An independent financial auditor could periodically examine WSP accounts.
0 Social ties between the WUA treasurer and WSP financial officer should
be avoided.
* The WUA treasurer should be replaced periodically.
DouGLAs L. VERMILLION & JUAN A. SAGARDOY, TRANSFER OF IRRIGATION MANAGEMENT
SERvICES: GUIDELINES 31 (1999).
157.
Irrigation
Policy
§§
1.1-1.2
(Nepal),
http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigation-policy.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005).

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 8

however, with respect to the degree of representation required for the
formation of WUAs and relevant committees. The WRR provides:
"[p]ersons, who desire to use the water resources on [an] institutionalized basis, may form a consumers' association consisting of at least
seven persons as officials and members." 5 ' "At least seven persons, selected from among the concerned consumers desiring to register the
consumers' association, shall have to submit an application to the District Water Resources Committee in the format as [p]rescribed in
Schedule-I together with a copy of [the] statute of the consumers' association and a fee of one hundred rupees.""9
The Irrigation Regulations, conversely, requires the Executive
Committee of the WUA contain no more than eleven members." The
IR also sets out the requirements for the degree of local representation
necessary to form a WUA:
While constituting the Users' Association .

.

. there should be repre-

sentation of at least sixty[-]seven percent [of] Users of the irrigated
area of such canal, secondary canal, sub-secondary canal, tertiary canal, watercourse distributed water from which canal, secondary canal,
used.""
sub-secondary canal, tertiary, water course is to be
The WUA, therefore, needs the support of 67 percent of its potential
users before it can be formed. Additionally, a document of consent
from those users must be submitted with the application form.' Similarly, a consensus of two-thirds of the general members of a WUA can
precipitate the dissolution of its executive committee if the irrigation
Previously, the IR provided
system has not been properly operated.'
that all users of a particular system automatically became members of a
particular WUA upon registration.'" This is no longer the case, as
membership is now governed entirely by the constitutive documents of
158. Water Resources Regulation R. 3 (1993) (Nepal) (emphasis added).
159. Id. R. 4 (emphasis added). It should be noted that "consumers' associations,"
as used in the WRR, are narrower in scope than "users associations" in the Water Resources Act. The consumers' associations are concerned only with irrigation, whereas

.user associations" consist of "persons willing to make use of water resources for collective benefits on an institutional basis" and might be putting those resources to any
licensable use. Water Resources Act § 5 (1992) (Nepal).
160. Irrigation Regulation R. 3(1) (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file
with author) (emphasis added).
161. Id. R. 3(2). Note that under the previous version of the Irrigation Regulation,
R.3 also contained a clause stating that "[elach, user shall be deemed to have been
ipso facto general member of such Association." Id. R. 3(2).
162. Id. R. 3(2). Pursuant to Schedule 1 of the Irrigation Regulation, two copies of
the WUA constitution must also be submitted with the registration application. Id.
sched. 1.
163. Id. R. 4(2).
(Nepal),
R.
3(2)
(2000)
Regulation
164. Irrigation
http://www.doi.gov.np/doi/ID2/3/index.html (last visited May 1, 2005).
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the WUA.' It is possible that the new rule may consequently be used to
exclude tenant farmers, and those without security of tenure, from
membership of the WUA, although in practice this would be dependent upon the rules of the WUA itself as regards the admission of new
members. Regardless of whether or not this may be possible, the
change in the legislation does nothing to strengthen the position of
the more disadvantaged farmers and enhances the opportunities for
more powerful farmers to pursue their own agenda either inside or
outside the WUA system.
1. Gender Balance
The Irrigation Policy sets out the government's intention to involve
women in the irrigation management decision-making process. It
states, the "[u]ser association shall be composed of with [sic] at least
thirty [-] three percent of the women representation.
166 Neither the
Water Resources Act nor the WRR contain a provision for the representation of women. The revised Irrigation Regulations, however, does
contain such a provision. 6 ' As for the monitoring and enforcement of
this provision, it is unclear whether or not the DOI has such powers."
In the farmer-managed scheme, the author visited, two women did
indeed sit on the committee, "' but the author was unconvinced that
their role amounted to much more than a box-ticking formality.
Aside from the representation of women in WUAs and the provisions in the LSGA, the remaining legislation generally fails to address
the issue of gender balance in other decision-making bodies. For example, the LSGA obligates VDC members to create a list of arbitrators
available for dispute resolution procedures, three of whom will be chosen to sit on cases."' The list of potential arbitrators must include
women and "backward class [es] ,"..but the VDCs are not obligated to
165. Irrigation Regulation R. 3(2) (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file
with author).
166. Irrigation Policy § 2.4.3 (Nepal), http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigation policy.pdf
(last visited May 1, 2005).
167. Irrigation Regulation R. 3 (requiring thirty-three percent of the Executive
Committee to be women).
168. See supraPart IV.B. (discussing compliance issues in more detail).
169. The previous version of the Irrigation Regulation required two women to serve
on the executive committee.
Irrigation Regulation R. 3(1) (2000) (Nepal),
http://www.doi.gov.np/doi/ID2/3/index.html (last visited May 1, 2005).
170. Local
Self-Governance
Act
§§
34(2),
35
(1999)
(Nepal),
http://www.undp.org/governance/marrakechcdrom/concepts/HMG%20Nepal%20%20Local%20Self%20Governance%2OAct.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005). See infra Part
IV.E. (detailing additional information on the dispute resolution process).
171. "The Village Development Committee shall have to include the women and
back Ard [sic] class as well, to the extent possible, in the list of arbitrators referred to
in sub-section (1)." Id. § 35(2). See also id. § 103(3) (detailing similar requirements for
municipalities).
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ensure that arbitrators chosen for a particular case include these persons. Although the LSGA does not establish particular targets for the
representation of women or disadvantaged groups in the arbitration
process, the Municipal Council, under the same legislation, must consist of at least 40 percent women."' HMG has the power to monitor
local bodies... to assess whether they have "accorded necessary priority
However,
to the backward communities, women and children ....
because the standards are insufficiently rigorous, and HMG is not obligated to carry out such monitoring, the effectiveness of this provision is
doubtful, even aside from the current dormancy of local bodies.
Additionally, the local Irrigation Office has no standards to adhere
to, and the DWRCs need not contain any women at all. 7' Furthermore, the level of female participation may not be set at the correct
level, as there may be irrigation areas where women constitute more or
less than one-third of the population. It remains to be seen how successful the government will be in fulfilling the Irrigation Policy's objective of female participation. The level set by the policy is not unchallengeable either; presumably irrigation areas are not populated by
groups consisting of only one-third women, so it is questionable
whether that standard is, in fact, accurate in the first place.
2. Representation of Other Disadvantaged Groups
The revised IR requires the representation of so-called "backward"
parts of Nepali society. Rule 3 requires the Executive Committees of
WUAs to contain two members drawn from the "dalit, downtrodden
and backward ethnic community,"76 when possible. The last phrase is
an important qualification to the rule, because the legislation does not
provide factors for determining whether the dalit are available to serve
on the Executive Committee. Availability may depend upon the
demographics of the irrigated area, the willingness of the dalit community to participate, and perhaps most importantly, the willingness of
the rest of the community to accept their participation. While the
general rule is admirable in its intent, 77' the "availability" qualification
renders it virtually useless.

172. Id. § 76(2).
173. Id. § 2(a) (defining "Local Body" as the "Village Development Committee,
Municipality and District Development Committee.").
174. Id.§ 234(l).
175. SeeWater Resources Regulation R. 8 (1993) (Nepal).
176. Irrigation Regulation R. 3 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file with
author).
177.
The Irrigation Policy states: "there shall be representation of dalit, doAntrodden and backward ethnic communities" in user associations, but the question of avail2.4.3
(Nepal),
Irrigation
Policy
§
ability
is
not
addressed.
http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigadon-policy.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005).
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A related issue is who "users" are as defined in Rule 3 of the Irriga"User" is sufficiently broad to include not only
landowners, but also tenant farmers. "Users" may also encompass
sharecroppers, farmers with no security of tenure. However, in practice, such a broad definition is not adhered to at the WUA level. For
instance, in the Bijayapur system, an "ordinary member" of the WUA is
defined as a beneficiary of the system.' 9 However, paragraph 5 provides that one male and one female member of each landowning or
tenant household shall be accorded membership of the WUA, thereby
excluding farmers lacking legal status.'80 The implementation of the
broader legislative requirement is, therefore, limited by the constitutive documents of the WIUAs themselves.
The question of membership in this respect is fraught with difficulty. Some have argued that users with only short-term interests in
the irrigation systems'8 ' may possess an economic interest in postponing essential infrastructure repair work.'
Additionally, if sharecroppers are allowed to participate in the WUAs, and are given voting rights
in WUAs, what voting rights should attach to a particular parcel of
land? Should the sharecroppers have rights within the WUA in addition to, or in place of, the respective landowner or tenant? In other
words, can one area of land be the basis for more than one vote?' 3

tion Regulations. "'

D.

CONSULTATION

Nepal's water resources legislation contains a small number of instances where decision-making processes must involve consultation,
while the Irrigation Policy emphasises the importance of integrating
the DOI and the Department of Agriculture, both horizontally and
vertically.'84 The practical application of the consultation requirement,
178. See Irrigation Regulation R. 3. See also supra Part IV.C. (providing further information on representation).
179. Bijayapur Irrigation System By Laws, para. 2(h).
180. Id. para. 5. See HODGSON, supra note 131, at 32-35 (illustrating how other parts
of the world legislate on this issue, though the author does not comment on the effectiveness of these approaches).
181. For example, those users who do not know if they will be farming the same land
in the following year because they are subject to the demands of the landowner.
182. See HODGSON, supra note 131, at 33.
183. Voting rights are complicated somewhat by the issue of absentee landlords, who
may have voting rights but who take little interest in the day-to-day operation of the
organisation. It seems doubtful that absentee landlords would give up their rights in
WUAs if voting accrued to a specific piece of land, because this would mean the land
user in situ would most likely hold such a vote. Alternately, giving voting rights to
sharecroppers might encourage landowners to accept more sharecroppers on smaller
areas of land, because this would increase the landlord's voting power.
184. "The district, regional and central offices of the Department of Irrigation and
Department of Agricultural shall be functionally tied up and coordinated in the process of implementation, follow up and evaluation from the level of identification and
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however, is less clear. Consultation performs the multiple roles of improving public participation, alleviating the difficulties caused by imprecise allocation of responsibilities and awkward geographical
boundaries, and of facilitating the integration of all relevant factors
into the decision making process.
Currently, the DOI is not obligated to consult with the MOPE to
ensure that the two licensing bodies are not issuing mutually incompatible licences.'85 In fact, the DOI, as the nominal registration body, is
not obligated to consult with any other organisations or individuals.
The practice set out in the WRR for the DWRC also does not require
consultation. The role of the Ministry of Water Resources as licensor
of hydropower projects does not appear to necessitate consultation
with any other body either. Additionally, licensing and registration
authorities of any sort are not required to communicate with their
peers in other districts regarding inter-district watercourses. Lastly, the
delineation of boundaries on a political level instead of a hydrological
one exacerbates the potential problems, while increasing the need for
consultation.
When required, the degree to which others are involved in the decision-making process ranges from mere notification to "consultation,"
the latter implying some level of dialogue. Instances where the legislation requires this involvement are effectively limited to the following
three examples. First, in the event that service is reduced or terminated under Rules 22 or 23 of the Irrigation Regulations, the DOI
must notify the relevant WUA and local body.' 6 In addition, where
demand for water exceeds supply and the Project Office determines
that a reduction of service is required, it must "consult with the concerned Irrigation Office . . . and the concerned local body"' 87 and "coordinate" with the affected WUA"' If the Project Office is the WUA
itself, there is no obligation to consult with all members, except where
the constitutive documents and administrative processes of the WUA
demand otherwise.
Second, Rule 19 of the WRR requires the DWRC to publish public
notice of all water licence applications it receives. ' The DWRC may
impose conditions on the licence, if necessary, to reduce any adverse
effects of the water use. Third, the EPR contains provisions requiring
consultation with the relevant VDCs and Municipalities in order to
selection of the project to irrigate the irrigation and agricultural development programs.Irrigation
Policy
§
2.13.4
(Nepal),
http://www.doi.gov.np/irrigation-policy.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005).
185. See supra Part II.B. 1. (discussing the licensing scheme).
186. Irrigation Regulation R. 24 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file
with author).
187. Id. R. 22(2).
188. Id. R. 22(1).
189. Water Resources Regulation R. 19(1), (3) (1993) (Nepal).

Isstve 2

WA TER USER ASSOCIATIONS IN NEPAL

ascertain whether the pollution associated with an application for a
Pollution Control Certificate will adversely affect the environment."
The licensing body must confirm with the VDCs and Municipalities to
ensure there is no risk of a "substantial adverse impact" on the environment, or that there is at least a possibility that any such effects can
be alleviated. ' The views of the potentially affected WUAs are not included in this process.
E. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ACCESS TOJUSTICE

Generally, the dispute resolution procedures WUAs adopt are not
statutorily based. The legislation is relatively silent on dispute resolution and lacks detailed processes. No single body has the responsibility
for all dispute resolution, although a number of bodies may claim limited jurisdiction in certain circumstances. There are a number of levels at which conflicts may arise and where dispute resolution or access
to justice may be necessary:
1. disputes between individual users in a WUA;
2. disputes between conflicting users, whether licensed or unlicensed, of a watercourse in a single district;
3. disputes between users of a watercourse that straddles two or more
districts;
4. challenges to WUAs' decisions;

5. challenges to DOI or DWRC decisions; and
6. challenges to HMG decisions when it issues
under the IR or WRR.

overriding directives

Formally, WUAs play no role in any of the above disputes, as their
functions ' do not include this aspect of irrigation management. During the author's visit to the farmer-managed systems at Dodhikot and
Balkot, the impression received was that the WUAs themselves would
resolve disputes between individual members, although there is no
legislative basis for this and the processes followed in such cases would
be unique to each WUA.
The WRR, however, provides for the establishment of a Water Resources Utilisation Inquiry Committee to settle any disputes that arise

ch.
3
(1997)
(Nepal),
Protection
Rules
190. Environment
http://www.mope.gov.np/environment/chapter3.php (last visited May 1, 2005).
191.
Id.
192. See Water Resources Act § 8 (1992) (Nepal); Water Resources Regulation R. 8.
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during the utilisation of water resources.' 3 This committee, which appears to operate at the district level, consists of at least three members.'94 The purpose of the committee is apparently to address conflicts
arising between users, whether licensed or unlicensed, of a watercourse
in a single district and conflicts between users of a watercourse that
straddles two or more districts. In effect, though, the committee's focus is on, and may potentially be limited to, addressing issues normally
assessed at the licensing stage, such as environmental impacts and
whether a proposed use would be broadly beneficial or detrimental.'95
Currently, the DWRC would not assess these issues when licensing
a particular water use and possible conflicts would be identified only if
the public filed objections. ' The DWRC, taking into account the factors set out in Rule 28(3) of the WRR"' and the priorities set out in
Section 7 of the Water Resources Act,' 9 may determine that a particular water resource use is not beneficial and may either prohibit that use
or attach conditions to the use. Because the DWRC is responsible for
approving licensable water uses, the implication is that DWRC may
only prohibit or attach conditions to licensable uses. Accordingly, the
DWRC would lack the capacity to take any action against WUAs registered under the Irrigation Regulations. The Water Resources Act does

193. Water Resources Regulation R. 28.
194. These members are representatives from the following organisations: the Ministry of Water Resources, the relevant District Development Board, and the regional
office of the National Planning Commission. Additionally, if the dispute is between
two districts, representatives from all concerned district development boards will be
members of the commission. Id. R. 28(1)-(2).
195. See id. R. 28(3). These provisions relate primarily to disputes arising out of
proposed uses of water resources. Accordingly, the National Planning Commission has
a member on the Water Resources Utilisation Inquiry Committee. However, such a
representative does not sit on the DWRC itself and would, therefore, not otherwise
participate in the water utilisation licensing process.
196. See id. R. 18-19. See also supra Part V.D. (explaining the role of consultation in
various decision-making processes).
197. Water Resources Regulation R. 28(3) (b)(i)-(viii).
198. The Water Resources Act states:
(2) If a dispute arises while utilizing water resources, the prescribed committee [i.e., the DWRC] shall, on the basis of priority order as set out in subsection (1), the beneficial use or misuse made of the water resources in accordance with sub-section (3) of Section 4 ["A person or a corporate body
making use water resources shall make its beneficial use without causing
damage to other."] and also by conducting other necessary enquiries, decide
as to whether or not or in what manner such use could be made.
(3) The decision made by the prescribed committee pursuant to sub-section
(2) shall be valid to all concerned.
(4) The procedure of the committee, as prescribed pursuant to sub-section
(2), while deciding on matters mentioned on that sub-section, shall be as prescribed.
Water Resources Act § 7(2)-(4) (1992) (Nepal).
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not permit appeal of DWRC decisions, 99' and does not provide further
detail about how the inquiry body functions. The DOI enforces the
Water Resources Act provisions relating to the misuse of water.'
However, the DOI does not have a legislative role in administering
justice regarding WUAs, and DOI decisions, other than denial of prospective users, cannot be appealed."0 ' Prospective users can appeal to
the same body that made the original decision; however, the decision
of the local Irrigation Office is final, so an aggrieved prospective user
has no additional appeal procedures." ' Other decisions by the DOI,
such as the registration of WUAs, reduction or termination of service,
or the enforcement of DOI standards are not open to review or challenge, leaving users with no right of recourse.'
Finally, one other body has ostensible jurisdiction to hear cases at
the local level: the VDC, under the LSGA' Interestingly, the LSGA,
which is currently in abeyance because of the lack of elected local bodies, contains the most detailed provisions relating to the resolution and
avoidance of disputes by VDCs. However, it is regarded as largely unworkable by DOI because of the differences in hydrological and administrative boundaries, and because it is apparently felt that, politically, the WUAs rather than the VDCs should be empowered to collect
irrigation service fees.
The jurisdiction of the VDCs includes: "[ciases on border[s]/boundar[ies] of land, public land, Sandhi Sarpan (inconvenience in respect of boundary or way-outs), Aali Dhur. canals, dams,
ditches or allocation of water and encroachment on roads or way-outs.
• . [and]

compensation for damage of crops .... "20' The VDC must

form an arbitration board for the purpose of hearing such cases."'
See id. § 7(3) ("The decision ... shall be valid to all concerned.").
199.
200. See supra Part IV.A.1. (addressing enforcement and compliance issues with water resources legislation).
201. The Irrigation Regulation provides:
1. If a person not satisfied with the notification server pursuant to sub-R. (2) of
Rule 18 of the decision to the effect that the Service could not be made available, such person may submit a complaint against such decision to the concerned Irrigation Office within thirty-five days of such decision.
2. The concerned Irrigation Office shall conduct the necessary inquiries on
the compliant received pursuant to sub-R.(1) and issue an order. And such
order shall be final.
Irrigation Regulation R. 19 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file with author).
202. Id.
203. See id. R. 3-5, 22-23, 40-45 (establishing the rules that authorize the DOI to register WUAs, reduce or terminate service, and enforce DOI standards; the rules do not
include mechanisms for appeal or reconsideration).
204. See Local Self-Governance Act § 33.
205. Id.§ 33(a)-(b). Negotiation is encouraged prior to pursuing arbitration. Id.§
37(1).
206. Id. § 34(2).
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Three arbitrators are chosen from the board and agreed upon by the
parties."7 The LSGA, unlike other water resources legislation, provides
details about the decision-making process for hearing and administering cases."'
Significantly, the LSGA permits either party, if dissatisfied with the
decision of the arbitrators, to appeal to the relevant district court. '
Currently, however, this process is in abeyance because of the lack of
VDC membership. Additionally, the performance of the court system
in general has not been assessed as part of this project. Thus, it is not
clear if a right of appeal from other tribunals would be rendered impractical because of the interminable hearings process of the district
courts. Enforcement of arbitration decisions is the responsibility of the
VDCs in the first instance, and ultimately, that of the Land Revenue
Office. '
In summation, the decisions of the DOI and HMG are largely unchallengeable. At one level, the HMG's decision-making is not open to
public review because of the temporary suspension of democracy in
Nepal. At the water resources management level, the IR and the WRR
empower the HMG to issue directives that must be implemented without question."' However, it has not been possible to assess the potential power of the court to use the judicial review as a check on government decisions.
V.CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As will be evident from the above outline of the legislative framework with respect to water resource management in Nepal, a number
of major issues must be addressed before improvements may be
made."' Unfortunately, however, the political and economic situation

207. Id. § 34(2). Alternative arbitrators may be appointed from outside the board in
the event that the parties cannot agree. Id. § 34(3).
208. Id. §§ 33-42 (providing comprehensive instructions for forming and running
VDCs). See also supra Parts IV.C.1. - IV.C.2. (describing the requirements imposed on
VDCs to include women and "backward classes" in the arbitration board).
209.
Local Self-Governance Act § 40.
210. Id. § 41.
211.
Irrigation Regulation R. 41 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file
with author); Water Resources Regulation R. 39 (1993) (Nepal).
In the event that a major effort is made to overhaul the current legislative
212.
framework in order to achieve a coherent and comprehensive water code, a number of
elements should be considered crucial. Tarlock's view is that a successful water code
should possess the following attributes:
1) development of a permit system to give the state control of the allocation
and reallocation of water used by public and private entities.
2) The creation of public rights for the allocation or reallocation of water for
the maintenance of aquatic ecosystems services and the restoration of degraded riverine environments.
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in the country inevitably means that the ideal regulatory environment
for irrigation management will not be put in place in the short term.
In conclusion, then, recommendations will be made below that seek to
derive the maximum improvement from the minimum legislative tinkering. The aim is to imbue the WUA system with the credibility and
legitimacy that farmers require before they will participate fully and
actively. Without this legitimacy, both in terms of purpose and of governance, farmers will continue to be unwilling to pay for the WUA and
the improvement of the irrigation systems. By establishing good governance of the WUAs, it is hoped that it will be possible to break the
"vicious cycle of low O&M expenditure leading to poor performance and increasing reluctance on the part of farmers to pay when they see no benefit.""'5
Following the structure of this paper, a slightly artificial distinction has
been made between allocation matters and governance - the latter will
be more concerned with procedural administrative issues.
A.ALLOCATION

Before making recommendations regarding concrete reforms to
the relevant legislation in the short-term, the following summarizes the
gaps and flaws in the current framework and suggests remedial measures.

3) Procedures such as regulated markets to reallocate water from marginal
agriculture to more efficient uses, both urban and environmental.
4) Special protections, either water reserves or financial transfers, to protect
rural, generally poor, areas that may face the loss of water and livelihood opportunities.
5) The creation of rights to protect at-risk minority groups such as indigenous peoples and other people who have developed sustainable customary
use practices.
6) The limitation of groundwater mining.
7) Special procedures to declare river and ground water basins closed to new
uses.
8) The ground rules for temporary, emergency sharing.
9) A recognition that water plans need to factor in possible adaptations to
global climate change which threatens to alter rainfall patterns and create
more extreme cycles of flood and drought, especially in arid countries.
10) The procedure for the enforcement and quantification of rights.
11) The development of more inclusive decision making processes.
12) The coordination of water quantity and quality regulation.
A. DAN TARLocK, NATIONAL WATER LAw: THE FOUNDATION OF SUSTAINABLE WATER USE
120, 123 (2004). While not all of the above are directly applicable to Nepal, the conclusions and recommendations made below broadly reflect the priorities identified by
Tarlock, but attempt to do so within the context of the available regulatory and institutional environment
213.

WATER CHARGING IN IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE:

LESSONS FROM THE LITERATURE,

REPORT OD145, at 44 (B. Bosworth et al. eds.,
2002), available at
http://www.hrwallingford.co.uk (including a number of other useful reports located
in the Water Publications section of the HR Wallingford website).
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1. Conclusions
No catchment-wide system of water use management is in place.
The WRR has not been implemented, and activities that would otherwise be licensable under the Water Resources Act are consequently
uncontrolled. Integrated Water Resources Management implemented
through a comprehensive licensing system would protect WUAs to the
extent that water allocation would be more controlled than it is currently in its quantitative and qualitative aspects. A number of bodies
are ostensibly responsible for controlling particular types of water use,
but there is no single body with the power to oversee all uses, and the
mechanisms for facilitating the transfer of relevant information between the existing bodies is inadequate.
1. The DWRC is not obligated to take into account the following
fundamental considerations in allocating water use: (a) environmental and ecosystem requirements; (b) the quantity and quality of
available resources; and (c) any other uses of a particular watercourse. 14 Although priorities for utilisation are set out in Section 7 of
the Water Resources Act,215 the DWRC is not explicitly obligated to
take these considerations into account when approving applications
for licences under Rules 18 through 20 of the WRR!"1
2. Although the WRR requires licence renewal within the time frame
specified in each licence, there is no statutory maximum duration for
7
water use licences other than hydropower licences." DWRCs do not
of licences.
alter
the
terms
have the power to review, or if necessary,
The allocation scheme, therefore, is not flexible enough to adapt to
changing circumstances. In periods of shortage, upstream users are
protected by licences issued subject "to the extent of water resources
of such place and area as specified in the licence.""'
3. Water use rights are allocated on the basis of political boundaries,
not hydrological ones. Accordingly, watercourse uses in other districts may impact downstream uses, including irrigation. However,
unless the public brings these uses to the attention of the DWRs,
they may not be aware of downstream uses and might not consider
their importance when issuing licences. This problem could be ameliorated by making usage registries available to all district bodies on a

214. See Water Resources Regulation R. 17-18, 20 (requiring water use applications
to include details such as analysis of environmental effects of the proposed project, but
allowing the DWRC to issue a license without explicit evaluation of these impacts).
215. Water Resources Act § 7(1) (a)-(h) (1992) (Nepal).
216. See Water Resources Regulation R. 18-20 (detailing the requirements of water
use applications; fails to mention the list of priorities).
217. Id. R. 26(1).
218. Id. R. 22.
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particular watercourse, and creating a requirement in the WRR that
licensing bodies take into account all uses on the watercourse.
4. There is no watercourse-based process for the allocation of water
resources during times of shortage. The IR allows the relevant Project
Office, the local DOI, WUA, licensee, or otherwise, to allocate water
to their users.2 1 9 The DWRC plays no role in this process.
5. Pollution control monitoring is deficient, with the result that
WUAs may suffer from problems caused, for example, by industrialisation and municipal waste.
6. The incentive for farmers to participate in WUAs, and to engage
with the authorities to formally establish such entities, is limited due
to the administrative burdens imposed and by the want of necessity to
do so.

2. Recommendations
If integrated water resource management is pursued, the ideal
situation would be for a single body to allocate and approve all uses of

water resources. ° Currently, irrigation user groups only need to register with the relevant district's DOI office. The Water Resources Act
details what uses of water resources are permissible without a licence.'
There is no immediate hope that this provision can be changed because primary legislation may only be changed with the approval of
Parliament, though secondary legislation may be modified by the
Cabinet. As Parliament is currently suspended, only secondary legislation can realistically be altered. Consequently, the following changes
to existing legislation would help remedy the above problems, without
undertaking the ideal large-scale reform:...
1. WUAs should continue to register with the local DOI office pursu-

ant to the Irrigation Regulations. However, unlike the current system,
the district WUA registries should be made available to the public.
219. See Irrigation Regulation R. 5(1)(b)-(d), 10, 18-24, 37 (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on file with author) (granting the WUA, DOI, and other licensees
the authority to allocate water).
220. The Water Resources Strategy sets out plans to incorporate decision-making
regarding new irrigation schemes within broader river basin management. WATER
RESOURCES STRATEGY, supra note 1, para. 6.5.3.1.
221. WaterResourcesAct§ 4(2)(a)-(e) (1992) (Nepal).
222. Such large-scale reform involves implementation of an integrated water resource use allocation programme, including pollution control under the primary control of a single independent body, eradication of corruption, and the development of a
democratic government. On February 1, 2005, King Gyanendra declared a state of
emergency in Nepal, dismissed his government and assumed direct control himself. It
remains to be seen how and when democratic government will return to Nepal, but
these recommendations must assume that it will.
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The local VDC offices could be used for public viewing of the registries at a local level. These registries should also be available to the licensing and registration bodies in all other districts on the same watercourse. Although a single licensing body is desirable, this compromise, coupled with the recommendations in point two below,
should enable the licensing and registering bodies to account for all
of the available information, rather than focusing narrowly on a particular aspect of water use.
2. Notification procedures need to be established for inter-district
watercourses, such that when either the DWRC or the district DOI offices receive an application for a licence or registration, DOI offices,
the MOPE, and the relevant DWRCs can be informed and have the
opportunity to comment. This should also be the case with respect to
environmental assessments of projects that may affect other uses of affected watercourses.
3. Registration requirements should be enhanced. Currently, prospective WUAs do not need to submit information about the number
of users, crops grown, or the extent of the irrigated area. If the
WUAs' right of use is to be protected, it is imperative that other licensing bodies have as much information as reasonably provided.
Thus, the register should contain this information, and if possible a
map of the irrigated area. The map should indicate the actualarea irrigated, rather than its theoretical extent.
4. Currently, the IR does not obligate the DOI to take any factors
into consideration when deciding whether or not to register a WUA."'
The IR could be altered to obligate the DOI to consider the priorities
listed in Section 7(1) of the Water Resources Act. However, the DOI
must also be required to contemplate the following factors in addition
to those set out in the WRA:
"

Environment and ecosystem requirements;' 2'

" Other uses made of the watercourse that are, or should be, licensed under the WRR, or controlled under the EPR;
0 Uses made of the relevant watercourse in other districts, where the
watercourse is a transboundary one;22

223. See id. R. 3(3) (requiring the DOI to determine only discrepancies or duplications in applications).
224. Although the VDCs and Municipalities have pollution prevention duties under
the Local Self-Governance Act, it is presently unclear how their responsibilities interface with those of the MOPE. If such duties are actually carried out by the local bodies,
the decision-making processes of the DOI, DWRC, and MOPE must also take into consideration the pollution prevention plans of the VDCs and the Municipalities where
appropriate.
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* The availability of the resource, in terms of both quantity and
quality;
* The pollution tolerance levels and water quality standards established under Sections 18 through 19 of the WRA;'26
" The National Water Resource Strategy.
* Equity - this might provide some basis for ensuring that WUAs are
not established in such a way that certain water users in the irrigated
area are patently discriminated against.
5. The criteria to be used by the Project Offices in distributing water
to its respective users should be also be broadened to include equity.
Coupled with the requirements as regards improved transparency in
the annual reports detailed below, this might provide a foundation
for greater focus on the provision of water to tail farmers especially,
and to more disadvantaged farmers in general.
6. The licensing process set out in the WRR, subject to the other recommendations herein, should be implemented. However, the regulation is currently inadequate as to the considerations that may affect
the DWRC's decision. Therefore, instead of making a judgement
based on whether the requisite documents have been provided,2 7 the
DWRC should adhere to the list of priorities listed in Section 7 of the
Water Resources Act, as well as the following factors:
" Environment and ecosystem requirements;
" Other uses made of the watercourse that are registered under the
IR (i.e. irrigation) or controlled under the EPR;
* Uses made of the relevant watercourse in other districts, where the
watercourse is transboundary;
o The availability of the resource, in terms of both the quantity and
quality;
a The pollution tolerance levels and water quality standards to be set
under the Sections 18 through 19 of the WRA;
225. The DOI must also take into account the rights, duties, and obligations of Nepal under relevant international agreements where the relevant watercourse is international in nature.
226. See Section 27 of South Africa's National Water Act for an example of a licensing authority being required to take such factors into consideration. § 27 (l)(g), (j) of
1998,
Water
Act
36
of
National
http://www.dwaf.gov.za/Documents/Legislature/nw-act/NWA.pdf (last visited May 1,
2005).
227. SeeWater Resources Regulation R. 13(1), 18(1) (1993) (Nepal).
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The National Water Resource Strategy.

These factors will help ensure the licensing and registration regimes,
as consistent as possible with each other.
7. In order to ensure the decision-making processes are as integrated
as possible, the following improvements to the constitutions of the
registering and licensing bodies should be made:
* A member of the MOPE, or2 its licensing arm, should be added to
the constitution of the DWRC; 1
e The DOI's registration decisions with respect to WUAs should be
made in consultation with the DWRC and the MOPE;
* The MOPE should be required to obtain and consider the opinions of the relevant DWRC(s) and DOI office(s), in addition to the
organisations listed in Schedule 7 of the EPR when issuing pollution
control certificates.
8. The water use licences issued by the DWRC should be added to
the public registry. This will require amending the WRR.
9. The DOI and DWRC, as registering and licensing authorities respectively, must take a pivotal role in the allocation of water resources
in times of shortage. The DWRC, as the primary licensing body,
would probably be best suited to take on this role, subject to the improvements suggested above. Relevant changes, therefore, need to be
made to the WRR, with appropriate cross-references in the Irrigation
Regulations, to ensure water uses registered under those regulations
are also subject to the decisions of the DWRC in times of shortage. As
a corollary, maximum durations must be set with respect to water
utilisation licences so that perpetual rights are no longer possible.
The DWRC should also have the power to review licences in the light
of water resource changes, although the rights of licence holders
must be protected in order to imbue the licences with the necessary
credibility.2"
10. Finally, the licensing of water pollution will only be feasible if a
pollution-monitoring network is put in place. To this end, HMG must
do three things:

228. Currently, a member of the DOI is already required to sit on the DWRC. Id. R.
8. Adding a member of the MOPE should facilitate better communication about using
watercourses for irrigation purposes.
229. In South Africa, licenses are reviewed no more than every five years, although
the duration of the license itself cannot be altered. See §§ 28(1) (f), 49(1) of National
Water Act 36 of 1998.
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• Establish comprehensive ELVs for the polluting industries listed in
the EPR;
* Set pollution tolerance levels and water quality standards for watercourses under the powers set out in the WRA;" 0
- Establish a pollution-monitoring network capable of supporting
the above limits and standards.

B. GOVERNANCE
1. Conclusions
The administration of water resources management in Nepal is neither based on clear and comprehensive regulation nor enforced rigorously. The lack of enforcement is partly a result of the insufficiency of
regulation, and is compounded by the dearth of available resources
and the unwillingness of WUAs to accept the responsibilities for operation and maintenance the legislation imposes upon them. Such reluctance is understandable to some extent because the legislation sets out
the responsibilities of the WUAs, but neither offers correlative duties to
be adhered to by any of the licensing or registering authorities, nor
provides the WUA with commensurate rights and powers to carry out
these responsibilities. Additionally, there is not enough transparency
or accountability at any level. Improving transparency and accountability is a prerequisite to WUA members regarding the system as
credible and fair. Furthermore, establishing credibility is the first step
toward improving cost recovery rates and agricultural efficiency. The
recommendations below seek to consolidate the current system to obtain the maximum benefit, without imposing a disproportionate administrative burden.
2. Recommendations

a. Reporting
1. Currently, the annual reports WUAs provide the DOI include income, expenditure, and details of services provided throughout the
fiscal year. These reports should also include the following:
a Irrigation outputs; productivity reports are needed to measure the
efficiency of an irrigated area.
- A list of the parts of the irrigated area for which service could not
be provided, along with their location. At present, WUAs are obli230.

Water Resources Act §§ 18-19 (1992) (Nepal).
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gated to keep records of "the land in which service could not be
availed and to recommend to exempt the Service Charge to be paid
by such Users.""' By noting the location of land that does not receive
water, one could track instances where tail farmers are being deprived
of water as a result of excess water use by upstream farmers. The performance of the WUA could be measured in part by its ability to provide water equitably to all members. This will have a corresponding
impact on the credibility of the WUA, especially with tail farmers.
Additionally, cost recovery may be enhanced, along with agricultural
efficiency. This will also encourage WUAs to be more efficient with
water use.
*

The General Assembly of the WUA should approve these annual

reports 2

2. The DOI should produce an annual report detailing the progress
of the WUAs on a number of indicators. These indicators might include:
* Information relating to the levels of cost recovery and changes in
production efficiency by WUAs, based on the information WUAs provide as part of the registration renewal process;
*

Reductions in the level of member's lands that cannot be served;

" Information regarding the application of distribution priorities as
set out in Rule 21 of the IR;
9 Details about WUA compliance with gender balance requirements;
a Levels of DOI compliance with the performance standards established for particular projects;
* Details of WUA registrations and renewals, including conditions
attached to renewals;
a Periods where service to WIUAs has been reduced, with reasons for
reductions; and
*

Information regarding appeals and challenges of DOI decisions.

231. Irrigation Regulation R. 5(l)(c) (2004) (Nepal) (unofficial English trans., on
file with author).
232. This may already be reflected in the constitutive documents of WUAs, as is the
case in Bijayapur, but having an explicit requirement will enhance the transparency of
the WUAs. See Bijayapur Irrigation System Constitution, supranote 55, para. 9.
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The new Evaluation and Monitoring Committee could have the responsibility for enforcing these measures. DOI performance in providing services must also be assessed, and the annual report should
form the basis of this assessment.
3. While the new renewal requirement with respect to registration is
to be welcomed, it is deficient in the following ways:
The information to be included in the required annual report should
be set out and directly linked with the data required by the Evaluation
and Monitoring Committee. In addition to this monitoring information, details should also be provided to indicate the level of compliance with representation requirements relating to gender and oppressed groups.
The basis on which the DOI may refuse applications for renewal is not
clear. A list of grounds should be set out, and this may include:
" Outstanding service fees;
* Inadequate accounts. For example, as a result of being:
o unaudited,
o unapproved by auditors,
o fraudulent, or
o where gross financial mismanagement on the part of the WUA is
indicated
0

Late submission of accounts and annual report.

These measures should not contribute greatly to the administrative
burden imposed on WUAs. However, the question of the timing of
renewal remains potentially problematic: there is no evidence to suggest that the Auditor General's Office has the capacity to audit all
WUA accounts properly within ninety days of the end of the financial
year, and this mayjeopardise the prospects of a WUA meeting the renewal deadline set out in IR rule 8A. This will depend on whether
the term "fiscal year" used in the IR relates to the financial year of the
individual WUA or to the general accounting financial year.
It should also be recognised that the DOI may wish to apply sanctions
other than the simple refusal to renew. For example, it might approve an application, but attach conditions, with the threat of deregistration being applied in the event of non-compliance. If the renewal is linked to the flow of water or government funds, it is far
more likely that WUAs will continue to maintain their registration.
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b. Miscellaneous
4. The gender balance requirements for WUA membership, which
currently vary across the legislation, should be harmonised. As discussed earlier, under the LSGA, Municipalities must have at least 40
percent female membership, while the Irrigation Policy requires that
one-third of the membership to be female. The harmonised level
should, at a minimum, reflect one of those standards, though the
ideal target should be 50 percent. The harmonised level should be
applied to WUAs under the Irrigation Regulations, and to the DWRC
under the WRR. The apparent lack of gender equality goals at the
government level should also be addressed.
5. Rather than setting out a standard form for WUAs' constitutions
and by laws, a requirement should be inserted into the IR mandating
that the constitutive documents of WUAs be consistent with prevailing
legislation."'
6. The DOI must be obligated to set out the reasons for its decisions. 23 ' This will enhance the accountability and transparency of the
DOI. The DOI should also be obligated to publish the public responses to consultation efforts and, if applicable, the reasons why it
did not adopt the public comments.
c. Dispute Resolution and Enforcement
7. A WUA should be responsible for addressing disputes between its
members. The functions and duties of the WUA set out in the IR
must be amended accordingly. The arbitration board procedure used
by VDCs, 3 5 including the ability to appeal to the relevant district
courts, should be the model for WUAs. For disputes between WUA
members in different districts, one arbitrator from each WUA should
be appointed, along with a mutually acceptable representative from
the DOI. For disputes between WUAs themselves, a similar approach
to the VDC arbitration might be adopted. VDC arbitration procedures require the District Irrigation Office to draw up a list of possible
arbitrators, and the parties choose three arbitrators from the list who
are mutually acceptable. Disputes involving WUAs in separate districts might be heard by a representative from the lists of both dis-

233. This will also achieve greater participation from sharecroppers, because the
WUA will be required to include all users, not just landowners and tenants. However,
this is not an ideal solution because it may adversely affect absentee landlords. Nevertheless, it will alleviate some of the current problems.
234. See also supra Part IV.E. (exemplifying the decisions where this requirement
should apply).
(Nepal),
34
(1999)
Act
§
Self-Governance
Local
235. See
http://www.undp.org/governance/marrakechcdrom/concepts/HMG%20Nepal%20%20Local%2OSelf%2OGovernance%20Act.pdf (last visited May 1, 2005). See also supra
Part V.E. (discussing the arbitration board system).
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tricts, with a third member potentially coming from a list drawn up at
a national level.
8. The decisions of the district offices of the DOI and the DWRC
should be open to challenge. For example, aggrieved parties should
have recourse to a committee made up of members of the Ministry of
Water Resources and MOPE, or alternatively, the district courts if the
dispute is confined to a single district or higher courts if it involves
more than one district.
9. Responsibility for policing water theft within irrigated areas should
be transferred from the DOI to the relevant WUA. This will require
amending Rule 40 of the Irrigation Regulations. The WUA constitutive documents should reflect these changes. Similarly, since the responsibility for repairing damage to canal infrastructure within the irrigated area belongs to corresponding WUA, that WUA should have
the power to recover the costs of any repairs in the event of wilful
damage by its members. The constitutive documents must clearly set
out duties of members and explicitly state that transgressors will be assessed costs, or even penalties.

BOOK NOTES
JUSTICE GREG HOBBS, IN PRAISE OF FAIR COLORADO: THE PRACTICE
OF POETRY, HISTORY AND JUDGING, Bradford Publishing Company,
Denver, CO (2004); 427 pp; $23.95; ISBN: 1-932779-02-7, softcover.
Review by Ruth M. Wright
In Praiseof FairColoradois the fitting title of a remarkable collection
of writings by Colorado Supreme CourtJustice Gregory Hobbs.
With the painting of Odessa Lake in Rocky Mountain National
Park on the cover, we immediately relate "fair" in the title to the natural beauty of Colorado. But "fair" also means just, as in a just society
that treats its citizens equally and with respect. Justice Hobbs's writings
praise both of these aspects.
"We might think of justice as a bushel of Orchard Mesa peaches,
ripe and delicious. Each has been nurtured to maturity. The rights of
individuals and the rights of the community are like that." Justice
Hobbs elaborates on this concept in his poem "Our Own Peaches."
"Every legal case begets of rights
and responsibilities.
If I promise and perform
a duty which we both agree upon,
I have the right that you will too.
When one of us fails without excuse,
or leave of the other, a breach occurs
and, rather than speaking of it openly, we demur
to speak at all and so dismiss the other's right.
In this deny our own responsibility.
The art of sealing breaches starts
with peeling back excuses,
so juice of mutual promises
will renew our taste
for tasting rights
of others,
as our own Peaches.
Some states elect judges-a system where candidates have to campaign and solicit contributions from others, including from lawyers
who will appear before them in court. Colorado, Hobbs points out,
603
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used this system until 1966, when it changed to an appointive system
with citizens' right to vote to retain judges. He lauds this system of an
independent judiciary, removing judges from the political process.
The people of Colorado have determined that judges should have independence to examine each case before them fairly and impartially.
... It's hard, humbling, and invigorating work. Each case is a direct
window on Colorado.... To find out what happened and why and to
apply the principles of constitutional, statutory, and common law the
best we can requires concentration, practical judgment, and a strong
sense of the rights and values of the community and of individuals.
The only way to pursue life, liberty, and happiness is to work at each
of them in every way we may, every day.
This is certainly an idealistic goal for all of us to follow in our work and
lives.
In "Scouting for All" he deals with the debate regarding accepting
gay members into scouting. In a speech to Boy Scout leaders, he
brings up the subject. "Discrimination bears a terrible price .... The
more we work to be inclusive of the various communities comprising
our community, the more we can fulfill our great calling of service to
God, country, each other, ourselves." Interestingly, after the talk, he
was not reappointed to a certain board after many years of service to all
aspects of scouting.
Justice Hobbs also has high goals for the legal profession. In a letter to his daughter on entering law school, he tells her that being a fine
person in the community with problem solving ability is what good
lawyering is about. Then she can help others to be treated fairly. He
tells the entering class of the University of Denver Law School to get
ready for the river trip of their lives (he often puts his remarks in context of the great outdoors). "You're on the way of service, community,
and peace. You get to love yourself because you can hold yourself to
the mirror each morning and evening and say, 'I have this day been a
worthy instrument."'
After graduating from law school himself, Hobbs clerked for Judge
William Doyle. He saw what a fine person he was and the role judges
play in our society, and decided he wanted to be a judge. Of course,
there were several eddies in the river along the way: working for the
Environmental Protection Agency enforcing air quality laws, a position
with the Colorado Department of Natural Resources where he learned
much about water law, and then private practice. This is when I first
met Justice Hobbs, when I was on the Colorado Water Quality Control
Commission. Water quality was a new aspect of water law and water
lawyers were concerned that the Commission would impact the appropriation doctrine. Later he lobbied for his clients when I was a state
legislator. In both of these forums, while Justice Hobbs and I agreed
and disagreed, the relationship was always civil, professional and intel-
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lectual. Finally, when I joined the Board of the Northern Colorado
Water Conservancy District, he was our highly effective lawyer and advisor.
Now a Justice on the Colorado Supreme court, Hobbs has much to
say about judging and advice to those writing appellate briefs. Judging
is very different from the other two branches of governmentexecutive and legislative. A judicial decision, especially an appellate
decision, has to stand on its own; it is launched and cannot thereafter
be further explained by the judge. For those who are trying to persuade the decision maker, he has several practical suggestions. "The
art of advocacy resides in telling a good story that strikes true and holds
firm .... Would you be convinced if you heard or read your argument?" Also, he implores legal writers to use the active rather than the
passive voice. "Clarity and simplicity are hard won. They're born of
humility and hard work. Enjoy telling your story of the case! Then
leave the rest of the work to your interested listeners." Justice Hobbs
highly recommends a book tiled, Thinking Like a Writer, which reveals
three basic secrets. One, the law is so complex it needs your clear and
concise explanation; two, if your reader cannot understand what you
are saying, you probably don't understand it either; and three, decision
makers will blame you for poor writing that wastes their time. Then,
he tells us, the authors walk you through the principles and techniques
of becoming a good legal writer.
Hobbs, himself, has done just that. He gives us three decisions he
has written, two for the majority of the court and a dissent. They are
good reads. In People v. Schafer, 946 P.2d 938 (Colo. 1997), the decision
hinges on whether a tent is a home for Fourth Amendment purposes.
His undergraduate degree in history comes into play as he describes
"tenting' from the days of Lewis and Clark, Major Stephen Long, the
Hayden Survey, on through the labor union tents at Ludlow and scouting. His decision: a tent is a home. In Board of Education v. Wilder, 960
P.2d 695 (Colo.1998), the majority of the Court upheld Jefferson
County School Board's determination firing the Columbine High
School teacher for showing the film "1900" by Bernardo Bertolucci. In
a spirited dissent he states, "When we strip teachers of their professional judgment, we forfeit the education vitality we prize. When we
quell controversy for the sake of congeniality, we deprive democracy of
its mentors." The third case is the recent People v. Kobe Bryant, 94 P.3d
624 (Colo. 2004), in which Justice Hobbs delivered the opinion for the
majority of the court. The court held that protection of the victim under the Rape Shield Act justified the trial court's order prohibiting
publication of the in camera transcript pending the rape shield hearing.
The entire decision is quoted in the text.
As expected, the book also includes several legal treatises that appeared in law review journals. The most extensive is "To See the
Mountains: Restoring Colorado's Clear and Healthy Air," the definitive
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article on air pollution and air quality which could be written only by
someone who personally participated in the battle for clean air in
Colorado. Justice Hobbs also included "A Primer on Colorado Water
Law," another treatise on groundwater law, "Where We Are, Where
We've Been" and "Prior Appropriation and Instreamn Flow: The Struggle to Integrate Instream Flow Rights into Western Water Law," presented at a conference. To get your law and history in docudrama
form, see "Inside the Drama of the Colorado River Compact Negotiations: Negotiating the Apportionment" and "The Trial of the President," that is, Andrew Johnson's impeachment trial before the United
States Senate, both scripted by Hobbs. For lighter fare, "A Former Water Lawyer's View of Torts" is hilarious. He must have surprised his
audience with his opening statement: "I thought I was addressing the
Colorado Trail Users Association. I'm somewhat confused about the
notion of a Trial Lawyer's Association. I thought, after graduation
from law school, you either passed the bar and got admitted or you
joined the F.B.I. I didn't know you had to keep on trying." Playing on
the word tort, he says, "An intentional tort involves a whole lot of batter. The negligent tort just kind of happens when the cook isn't looking." A second witty piece is "May Day Anniversary: On Being an Imminent Jurist" (he had been called an eminent jurist), which is filled
with clever malapropisms.
Some of us look up to the west and see the Rocky Mountains. Justice Hobbs sees the Great Divide "where oceans gurgle from snow
seeps, in multiple directions, drawn by gravity to destinies far and near
.... It stands astride the backbone of the continent." He gives us a
charming poem by Thomas Hornsby Ferril, entitled "Waterbug."
I climb to a lily-pad lake
at the top of a mountain pass,
some of the water flows to the east,
some of it goes west.
Look how that struggling waterbug
is pushing sundown back
on golden ripples
of the lake.
Which ocean will he blunder to?
He does not know, nor I,
but I can feel the wonder
of the blue bandanna sky.
And then Justice Hobbs adds his own version in "The Divide."
"The mystery of a divide

Issue 2

BOOK NOTES

is this, you can stand on opposites
and not lose your balance.
Draw a straight line from the sky
through the middle of your forehead,
half of you belongs to the other ocean.
Half your mind and half your heart,
you share downstream equally
and never drift apart.
Now to the beauty of Fair Colorado, "Our spirit belongs to the
mountains, mesas, deserts, canyons, and rivers. No other place seems
like home, and to be away is disorienting .... What a magnificent
place we share. The Continental Divide is our spine. Glorious mountain parks, North Park, Middle Park, South Park, and the San Luis Valley, hold our interior high and wide." He has hiked, climbed, boated,
and fished, sharing his experiences with family and friends. Probably
his favorite attire and environment is the picture on the back cover.
Before appointing him to the Court, Governor Roy Romer supposedly said that he would do so only ifJustice Hobbs promised not to put
poetry in his court decisions. Justice Hobbs agreed, but his inspired
prose comes close, which is one of the delights of this book. "Working
with water makes you want to sing. In the rhythm of the rivers, the
West finds its most treasured experience." And again, "Each day we
work in community - whether the last day of the year, in spring or fall,
or the quickening moments of a long summer evening, beyond the
niches of our doubts - peace and beauty surround us. Into our hands
we receive the paddle of grace. Across the mirrored water, we take
heart. Islands and continents, take us home again." "Poetry" he says,
"is a very personal form of public speech" and he has been writing it
since long before he was a lawyer or a judge. Emily Dickinson (whose
father was also a lawyer) is a favorite of his, and it is no coincidence
that his own daughter is named Emily. My personal favorite of'Justice
Hobbs's poems is "Canoe."
"Help me summon up the strength
to do the good I can each day,
at least a little space with you
between despair and opportunity.
To dip my shiny stirring blade
in waters deep and welling full
and let my muscle ache desist
to sit a-center my canoe.
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Quiet would you spread to me
hums and hums of sinewing,
nimble tissues at their work
ofjoining joy to drudgery.
Thank you for this resting me,
for the whys persisting me,
I take this heel to my hand,
paddle, Lord, this promised land."
Justice Greg Hobbs reveals a great deal about himself in these writings - his love of the land, his passions about justice and community,
and love of family. "The most beautiful occurrence ever happening in
my life is the day I met Bobbie on the face of Baldy Mountain ...and
every day since." What a great tribute to your life's partner. This is a
rewarding book, which readers will cherish and enjoy.

THE INSTREAM FLow COUNCIL, INSTREAM FLOWS FOR RIVERINE

RESoURcE STEWARDSHIP (Revised Ed. 2004) Instream Flow Council, Cheyenne, WY (2004); 267 pp; ISBN: 0-9716743-1-0, hardcover.
Review by Larry MacDonnell
In 1988 the Natural Resources Law Center convened a conference
to discuss the burgeoning number of state programs in the West intended to provide some legal protection for unappropriated water
needed for environmental purposes. The very idea that water left instream had value and should be legally protected represented a dramatic break with traditional notions of western water law and policy.
Yet it was clearly an idea whose time had come.
We have come a long way in the past 16 years. Interestingly, the
laws have not changed much since that time. But the science of rivers
blossomed, greatly increasing our understanding of how rivers function. In the 1980s the law focused primarily on how to keep in place
some minimum amount of water necessary to sustain a fishery. Today
we view instream flows in the context of the larger question of river
health. Fortunately, a comprehensive guide now exists for those wanting a better understanding of river function and the central role of
stream flows (hydrology) in support of river function. Produced by the
Instream Flow Council, the book is called Instream Rows for Riverine Resource Stewardship. The Instream Flow Council recently published book
in a richly illustrated revised edition.
The Instream Flow Council ("IFC") is an association of the United
States and Canadian state and provincial fishery and wildlife agencies.
IFC emerged out of a project intended to evaluate processes in use in
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the two countries to identify and protect instream flows. Participants
recognized the need to share knowledge and experience; they agreed
on the need to develop guidance for their programs and their assessment practices. InstreamFlows is an important outcome of this process.
The Council views its role as promoting the protection of rivers as
well as providing guidance for achieving that protection: "The IFC
promotes the goal of maintaining the ecological integrity of unregulated rivers and restoring regulated rivers to the ecological conditions
that more nearly approximate their natural form and function"
Throughout the book, the authors present council policy statements
on a wide range of topics. The authors collect the policy statements in
an appendix.
The authors organize the book around eight "components" for
evaluating and prescribing instream flows. The following five components are technical: hydrology, geomorphology, biology, water quality,
and connectivity. The following three components are social: legal,
institutional, and public involvement. The authors fully recognize the
complexity of their subject and the need for integration of many different considerations. It is this integration, one of great teachings of
the science of ecology that provides perhaps the book's most important contribution.
We live in a world of specialization. Increasingly, professionals
come to know more and more about their particular expertise. Managers and decision makers, however, have to deal with the general.
They are responsible for outcomes and how these outcomes affect
people. They need access to the learning of experts but in a form that
is comprehensible and usable. In my view, Instream Flows serves this
very purpose.
Rivers are the terrestrial form of the hydrologic cycle. They are the
manifestations of water's passage through land. The science of hydrology focuses on the water resource itself, its patterns of availability,
and its flow regimes. Geomorphology considers the interactions between water and the earth, how sediments are carried, and what channel forms result. Biology adds in the dimension of plant and animal
life. Water quality focuses on physical, chemical, and biological capacity of the water. Connectivity brings attention to the dynamic system of
instream and out-of-stream exchanges of organisms, energy, and matter.
Instream Flows provides an informative and comprehensible overview of these essential components of a healthy river. Its purpose is to
explain why it is necessary to take all of these components into account
when considering the manner in which human actions can intervene
in normal river function in order to capture some of its benefits. In
particular, its focus is on human uses of stream flows and the effects
such uses have on river function.
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In the more arid regions of the United States and Canada, it is
common for communities to store water in on-stream reservoirs and
divert it out-of stream for human uses, particularly for irrigated agriculture. In other places, groups straightened and even concrete-lined
river channels in an attempt to prevent overbank flooding. Groups
constructed levees to contain floods and enable human use of lands
formerly in the floodplain. Communities also constructed many dams
to take advantage of the energy that falling water produces. People
widened and deepened rivers and installed lock structures in order to
use rivers for navigation. All of these uses have provided human benefits.
Engineering development of rivers as a tool of economic development no longer plays as important a role in the United States economy
as it once did. Yet such river uses continue, and those who still directly
benefit understandably oppose any change. Nevertheless, there is
growing interest in restoring rivers where possible to return at least
some of the lost functions and values. That interest may be recreational-to improve sport fishing, for example, or to enable swimming
or whitewater boating. It may be aesthetic-to support a greenway
through an urban area. It may be ecological-to support aquaticdependent wildlife and vegetation. In situations where a species is in
danger of extinction because of river alteration there may even be a
legal imperative to restore the river. Whatever the motivation, the demand for healthy rivers increases.
Instream Flows offers a framework for developing comprehensive
ecologically based instream flow management. The authors are primarily state and provincial wildlife managers. They recognize that
people and policy will shape any such program as much as science and
management will shape it. They find legal support for their approach
in the public trust doctrine, the common law duty of the state to act as
public steward of common property resources such as water and wildlife, and in other sources of law. Wisely, they encourage active public
involvement in formulation of instream flow programs.
Ultimately, the authors focus the book on the specific subject that
initiated their efforts: instream flow assessment tools. A variety of assessment methodologies for determining desirable stream flow conditions now exist. Instream Flows provides a survey of these methodologies that includes such considerations as their scale, the riverine components considered, their intended application, and their strengths
and weaknesses. The authors emphasize the importance of choosing
an assessment methodology that is suited to the situation at hand. No
single methodology will always be appropriate.
Primarily intended to serve as a sourcebook for those working to
develop and use instream flow assessments, Instream Flows meets an
even larger need: it is a guide for those interested in promoting inproved river health and function. It brings together in one book the
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science, the process, and the law. Instream tRows is an important contribution to ongoing efforts to ensure that America's water resources
are serving today's needs.

SHERRY L. SMITH, ED., THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN PLAINS, Uni-

versity of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Ok. (2003); 275 pp; $29.95;
ISBN 0-8061-3553-0, hardcover.
This book contains collection of eight essays about the past, the
present, and the future of the Southern Plains. The authors each
wrote sections to collaborate with the others, never overlapping but
always complementing each other's work. The topics include: the history of the people in the Plains, the development and evolution of family farms, the history of droughts and their implications on the Plains,
an overview of the Ogallala Aquifer and a comparison of how water
districts deal with the limited water supply, the role of the petroleum
industry in the Plains, the political history and future of the people in
the Plains, the history of Hispanic people in the area, and conservation
plans and parks. Larry McMurtry, author of Lonesome Dove and resident
of the Southern Plains, called the collection "informative, provocative,
and stimulating."
Each essay incorporates the same themes that make up the character and essence of the geographic area that primarily includes western
Texas, Oklahoma, and eastern New Mexico. The book starts with an
essay about the human history of the Southern Plains, including everything from early American Indians, to their eradication and the eradication of the buffalo, to present-day tourism. The book concludes with
an essay summarizing the results of human action and several suggestions for the restoration of the wild, animal-filled, expansive grasslands
that used to make up the area. In between, the essays cover specific
aspects of the Southern Plains. Each essay paints a vivid picture of
both prosperous and desperate times with the bleak resignation of the
fact that people migrating away from the area. This movement results
from a combination of natural and manmade factors including
weather, climate change, drought, depletion of resources and natural
ecology, fewerjobs, and the demise of the family farm.
The first essay, Trails and Footprints,by Elliott West, compares the
oldest known human history of the Plains with the present day. The
author describes the importance of the area for early Americans because of the trade of flint, bison, people, crops, and horses and the
impact of European settlers on these practices. American Indian tribes
who hunted in the area, and those who farmed elsewhere, engaged in
a huge bison and crop trade. The author goes into detail about the
arrival of Coronado and the Spanish, giving a description of the native
people and their practices from the Spanish point of view. In addition
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to these descriptions, the Spanish forever put their mark on the area by
introducing horses, which changed the way tribes interacted with each
other and with newcomers.
The essay also describes the decimation of the once seemingly endless bison herds in concert with the displacement and near-eradication
of the American Indian tribes. Even with small numbers of these
Plains icons, trade in the area continued with the invention of the railroad and automobiles. However, as people constructed roads into and
out of the area, the incentives to stay in the Southern Plains have gone
the way of the buffalo. The author describes towns that once boomed
with the discovery of oil only to become remnants of their former
selves, with more ghosts and stories than actual residents. These places
use their history to draw people into the Plains, advertising themselves
with small town festivals and chili contests in an effort to draw tourists
looking for something different.
The second essay, When CorporationsRule the Llano Estacado,by John
Miller Morris, gives an in-depth history of the family farm in the
Southern Plains, also known as the Llano Estacado, or Staked Plains.
The history of farming in the Llano Estacado includes major ranching
enterprises, the expansion of the railroad, the sale of land for little, if
any profit, and the constant struggle with Mother Nature. Using his
own family's farm as an example, the author describes how some farms
survived while most did not, making room for corporations to move in
and redefine the concept of farming. Drought and inconsistent crop
production pushed family farmers to a corporate style of business, with
more emphasis on larger, more intensive land use, and less on the environmental impacts and conservation practices.
The author explains the struggle between the small family farm
and the ever-increasing corporate presence as the "little men" against
the "big men," but also describes the optimistic view that the corporations never actually ruled the area despite their perceived domination.
The area experienced different movements in response to the social
and environmental climate including conservation, colonization, and
creative movements that colored the Southern Plains for the rest of the
world to see. Conservation plans became important in times of
drought when water was scarce and crop yields were low. Painters,
photographers, writers, and musicians romanticized the area, giving it
a certain appeal that waned in the aftermath of constant dry seasons
and economic failure. The author describes the farmers of today and
the obstacles they face, with a call for a renewed conservation movement to ensure the survival of the family farm tradition.
The third essay, Droughts of the Past, Implications for the Future?, by
Connie Woodhouse, gives a history of drought in North America and
particularly the Southern Plains. The author focuses mainly on
droughts of the twentieth century, when they occurred, how severe,
and how long they lasted. She explains different methods of tracking
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droughts including tree rings, layers of sand dunes, historical documents, and archaeological artifacts. The sand dunes represent climatic
events as far as twelve thousand years ago, and the author compares
the long-term history of droughts with those from the last millennium,
the last four hundred years, and the last century. The last century's
droughts are consistent with past droughts, but they have generally
been less severe than those that occurred in the last century. The author concludes that drought is a way of life on the Plains and that it will
continue as a prominent feature of the climate in the area.
The fourth essay, A Tale of Two Water Management Districts, by John
Opie, begins with an overview of the Ogallala Aquifer and the human
impact on the that Aquifer. The author explains the history of the
Southern Plains farmers' dependence on the water once considered
limitless. People quickly realized that the aquifer had a limited supply
and that the end was a lot closer than comfortable. The aquifer also
faces threats in the form of water pollution from industrial hog confinement operations that have become more prevalent in the area.
The waste management practices include disposal in lagoons and
neighboring fields, resulting in irreversible pollution of the aquifer.
The author describes two groundwater conservation districts, one
in Texas and one in Kansas, that both depend on the Ogallala Aquifer
for their water supply. The Texas conservation district, originated in
1949, encountered fierce resistance from farmers who did not want to
give up their personal rights to groundwater. The conservation plan
made participation voluntary and, as a result, changes in pumping
practices have been slow coming. A 1997 report set a long term planning goal of fifty years, focusing on the conservation of groundwater
for harder times to come. In contrast, the Kansas conservation district
focuses more on conserving for the present. The author compares
Texas's long-term plans with Kansas's immediate implementation of
water banking and describes Kansas's plan as putting the protection of
the aquifer above economic, social, and political goals. The author
then explains how the government kept Southern Plains agriculture
alive and addresses the question of whether humans should have settled the Plains at all.
The fifth essay, Exploitationists and Depletionists, by Diana Davids
Olien, addresses the importance of the oil and gas industry in the
Southern Plains, especially in the Permian Basin. The author describes
the history of the industry, and how major oil company mergers have
affected the area. Mergers resulted in corporate restructuring and
many of the major companies moved out of the Permian Basin in favor
of offshore and international drilling opportunities. This left room for
independent oil companies to move in and exploit the abandoned
wells. Takeover of well operations by independent companies created
a problem because the independents lacked the money to replace the
jobs the majors eliminated during their exodus. Nor did the inde-
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pendents have the money for new research or technology, which will
cause their own exits. The author compares the oil industry to the
overall situation of the Southern Plains-fewer jobs and less money
contribute to the movement out of the Plains.
The sixth essay, Identity and Conservative Politics on the Southern
Plains, by Jeff Roche, explores the political history of people living in
the Plains. The author describes the importance of individualism, the
pride of being a pioneer on the frontier, and how these ideals formed
the basis of their political affiliation. The Great Depression and the
subsequent Dust Bowl in the 1930s reinforced a sense of community in
the minds of the people as they fought the New Deal and anything else
from the federal government. Conservatives in the Southern Plains
focused on fighting Communism and reducing the centralization of
government.
As minorities in predominantly white towns started the fight for
equality, southern politics focused more on race. The ideals of the
Republican Party, with which the southern Conservatives aligned
themselves, shifted towards white supremacy. The author notes in the
later half of the twentieth century, the racial demographics of the
Southern Plains changed as Hispanics predominantly populated more
and more towns. The author predicts a political shift towards the Democratic Party as the changing majority and the remaining southern
Conservatives find their ideals less in line with those of today's Republican Party.
The seventh essay, Hispanics on the Texas South Plains, by Yolanda
Romero, gives a history of the in-migration of Mexicans, especially into
Texas. Mexican Americans did not arrive in large numbers until after
the 1920s. They came in as sheep farmers, railroad workers, and seasonal farmhands, working in sub-par conditions for little money. However, Hispanic settlers found support in the Catholic Church and
started their own civil rights movements, demanding equal pay and
better conditions. The author emphasizes the importance of tradition
and culture for Mexican Americans and their adaptation to life in a
primarily Anglo American setting. The author gives population predictions for towns and cities in the Southern Plains and discusses challenges Hispanics continue to face, including providing and taking advantage of education opportunities.
The eighth and final essay, Loving the Plains, Hating the Plains, Restoring the Plains, by Dan Flores, provides a summary of the changes
humans have made to the Southern Plains. The author starts with a
series of quotes from people, spoken during the beginning of the
colonization of the area. He compares those views with recent descriptions that characterize the area as "un-country" and explains how and
why such a transformation occurred. The author describes the ongoing struggle for National Park status in the Plains, using Palo Duro
Canyon as an example. He calls for a revived conservation and envi-
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ronmental movement to restore this vast area to its previous state and
leaves the reader believing and hoping that it can succeed.
Kathleen Booth

CARLJ. BAUER, SIREN SONG: CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR
INTERNATIONAL REFORM, RFF Press, Washington, DC 20036

(2004); 172 pp; List Price $33.95; ISBN 1-891853-79-1, hardcover.
Siren Song describes the political and legislative history of water law
in Chile, focusing specifically on the 1981 Water Code, the leading
example of a free-market approach to water rights. The book examines the strengths and weaknesses of the Code, and analyzes both its
effectiveness as a model for reform in other countries and the challenges faced within Chile as the government debates reforming the
Code.
Chapter 1, The InternationalContext: the Water Crisis and Debates about
Water Policy focuses on integrated water resources management
("IWRM") and the role economics plays within the interdisciplinary
approach to water issues espoused by IWRM. The chapter lays out a
framework for understanding competing economic theories that underlie water policy debates. Bauer categorizes schools of economic
analysis as either "narrow," focused on formal, quantitative approaches
to neo-classical economics or "broad," focused on qualitative, interdisciplinary analyses such as political economics. Neo-classical economists
focus on the concept of economic efficiency, the idea that a resource
will go to the user who places the highest value on it. Political economists, by contrast, focus on the role political and legal institutions play
in shaping the values the market reflects, arguing that markets are the
effects of those institutions, not autonomous mechanisms. Bauer analyzes the theoretical frameworks of a number of water economists
whose views range from a narrow, neoclassical view of water as an economic resource to a broad, interdisciplinary perspective of water as an
"ecosocial" asset, or an asset that satisfies social and environmental, as
well as purely financial functions
Chapter 2, The Free-Market Model. Chile's 1981 Water Code describes
the basic legal framework for the Chilean Water Code ("Code"), gives a
brief history of the development of water law in Chile, and describes
the changing political regimes that influenced the development of the
law. The Code not only privatized water rights, giving them explicit
status as private property, but also treated water as a fully marketable
commodity. Chile grants an unconditional private water right allowing
private owners to freely change type of water use without government
approval. Owners are under no obligation to use their water, a characteristic that led to unrestricted speculation in water rights. While the
code establishes non-consumptive rights, it contains no provisions for
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resolving conflicts within a river basin or for coordinating multiple
uses. The Code resolves disputes through private bargaining among
property owners, or in the ordinary civil courts.
Chapter 3, Reforming the Reformi? Policy Debate under Chilean Democracy discusses the policy debates within Chile about reforming the
Code. Non-use of water is a major issue at the center of the debates.
After an initial attempt to move to a "use it or lose it" scheme that redefined property rights in water, the government focused on improving economic incentives for water use and allocation. On one side of
the debate, the government proposed charging fees for nonuse of water. On the other side, opponents favor levying taxes on water rights
ownership regardless of actual use. However, the government has not
yet adopted either alternative. Either alternative would require a massive effort to set up and maintain a new administrative system to oversee collection.
Chapter 4, the Results of Chilean Water Markets: Empirical Research
Since 1990 focuses on how water markets in Chile worked in practice
rather than in theory. Bauer argues that researchers focused almost
entirely on the buying and selling of water and ignored other issues
critical to integrated water resources management. After summarizing
several studies of Chilean water markets, the chapter turns to the issues
lacking research, which include social equity and river basin management. The author uses case studies from two river basins to illustrate
problems arising from conflicts between consumptive and nonconsumptive uses and the inadequacy of the Water Code in dealing
with how to interpret and enforce the relationship between the two
types of rights.
The final chapter, Conclusions and Lessons about the ChileanExperience
focuses on two categories of issues. First, the chapter identifies and
discusses issues that were of little concern when the government
adopted the Code in 1981, but that are critically important today. Second, the chapter discusses the lessons that integrated water resources
management can learn from a free-market water rights system. Bauer
concludes that while a free-market economic system addresses issues of
water scarcity, legal and political institutions are required to deal with
water conflicts, and for that reason, the Chilean experience confirms
the need for an interdisciplinary approach in forming water management policy.
Kate Iverson

WILLIAM BLOMQUIST ET AL., COMMON WATERS, DIVERGING STREAMS:
LINKING INSTITUTIONS AND WATER MANAGEMENT IN ARIZONA,
CALIFORNIA, AND COLORADO, Resources for the Future, Washing-

ton, D.C. (2004); 205 pp; $30.95; ISBN 1-891853-86-4, softcover.
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Common Waters Diverging Streams provides an empirical survey of
three of the most complex water management schemes devised, all
located in the Western United States. Because water is a scarce resource in the arid west, water management is critical to the continued
growth and sustainability of major metropolitan areas, agriculture, and
industry while maintaining the environmental needs of the local ecosystems. The authors highlight the importance of conjunctive management of groundwater and surface water systems in three prominent
western states-California, Arizona, and Colorado. The authors focus
on these three states because each state developed a different management scheme, all producing different results. Each state battles a
similar problem, how to divide a scarce resource efficiently and equitably among competing uses.
Conjunctive management consists of the coordinated use and storage of surface and groundwater systems. Water managers can encourage water users to draw on surface water sources, such as rivers and
reservoirs, during times of plentiful water, thereby allowing groundwater sources to recharge. In times of drought, water users may then utilize groundwater supplies and allow in-stream flows to remain constant
to support environmental needs. As the price of real estate rises along
with heightened environmental concerns, the construction of large
above ground storage reservoirs becomes less appealing, and the utilization of underground aquifers for long and short-term storage of surplus water becomes more attractive.
As the authors explain, the idea of conjunctive management has
existed for at least 75 years. However, physical and institutional barriers often frustrate the progress towards effective conjunctive management. Additionally, the perceived purpose of water management may
significantly affect the institutional choices used for conjunctive management.
After introducing the concept of conjunctive management, the
book dives into a detailed survey of each state's development of water
rights and attempts at conjunctive management. First, the authors explain how California developed a decentralized approach to water
management, which led to a hodgepodge of conjunctive management
projects varying from basin to basin. Next, the book chronicles Arizona's recent, statewide reorganization of its water management, which
led to a dramatic increase in underground storage of surplus water.
Finally, the authors detail Colorado's staunch adherence to the prior
appropriation system of water rights, leading to a limited use of conjunctive management specifically tailored to maintain in-stream flows
for senior water rights holders and environmental needs. The authors
point out the successes and shortcomings produced by the differing
water management institutions in each state.
In the final section of the book, the authors examine the future of
water needs and possible management solutions. The reality is that the
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American West is one of the fastest growing regions of the country and
the growth trend does not appear to be slowing down. The authors
present conjunctive management as a feasible tool for water managers
in the face of increased need for water from expanding urban communities, sensitive environmental concerns, and downstream flow obligations. The book does not merely point out the flaws in the existing
infrastructures and propose idealistic models and goals. Instead, the
authors attempt to balance the reality of competing water users and
suggest realistic improvements each state could strive for in order to
fully realize the benefits of conjunctive management.
David B. Oakley

THOMAS V. CECH, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RESOURCES: HISTORY,

DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT, AND POLICY, John Wiley & Sons,

Inc., (2005); 468 pp; List Price $93.95; ISBN 0-471-48475-X, hardcover.
Principles of Water Resources outlines the complex field of water resources. Mr. Cech's textbook interprets water terminology, data, viewpoints, and complex topics in terms understandable to the layperson.
Principlesof Water Resources provides illustrative charts and graphs, along
with a glossary and clear subheadings. Each chapter highlights policy
issues, giving the reader an idea of the big picture involved in water
resource issues. Additionally, Cech provides the reader with the key
concepts and questions for discussion.
The textbook begins with the historical context of simple and
complex water resources issues. Early civilizations obtained water and
constructed irrigation projects with a wide variety of methods, all easily
outlined. From the ganats, the underground water delivery system
created by ancient well diggers in Africa, to the Roman cisterns and
aqueducts, the book describes early water delivery systems in detail.
Cech also depicts the irrigation systems of Egypt, China, the Middle
East, India, Spain, Portugal, and North America. The textbook describes each country's initial stages of development, along with the intricacies of transportation and hydropower needs.
The next few chapters outline the natural physical processes of water, including climate and weather patterns, surface and groundwater
processes, and the interaction between surface and groundwater hydrology. While Doppler radar, snow tubes, snow cores and snow pillows measure precipitation, evaporation is measured with Class A
evaporation pans and by using a pan coefficient. Dendrochronology,
which is studying tree rings, along with studying ice rings and ocean
coral, all monitor climate change. Cech educates the reader about
weather patterns, especially drought and floods, and how they can affect a water supply. Then, Cech explains the paramount physiographic
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terms in surface and groundwater hydrology, along with the ecologic
features that govern their storage and use.
Cech continues by explaining the primary components of water
quality, especially those affecting human and ecosystem health. The
book describes in detail the water treatment process, along with types
of pollution, and how they affect the human population. Cech outlines the typical pollutants, including heavy metals, inorganic and organic chemicals and nutrients. He then goes through the transportation of pollutants in the water stream, particularly fate and transport,
which describe plumes in both surface and groundwater, as well, as
how the United States manages pollution, problems and the models
used for testing and control.
The next four chapters objectively delineate municipal and irrigation water development. In contrast to the earlier chapters that dealt
with the beginnings of irrigation, this chapter starts with the birth of
community development and "improved" society. Cech believes that
public water supply systems embody the ideals of economic growth and
reliable communities. However, he is quick to point out that along
with development comes environmental devastation that society must
deal with. We are provided with case studies of three cities, Los Angeles, Lincoln, Nebraska, and New York City that illustrate how arid or
extremely large communities can outgrow their boundaries and water
supplies but that water engineers will still find ingenious ways to irrigate crops and provide domestic water. Cech then reports on irrigation techniques including gravity, wild flood, furrow, and drip.
Cech transitions into discussing dams, their impacts, navigational
uses and a cost-benefit analysis. He oudines all the vital statistics of
United States dams, their principal components, and types. A case
study on Hoover Dam provides insight into the costs, necessary construction materials, and storage capacities of a $165 million dam. Another case study on Kingsley Dam and Lake McConaughy in Nebraska
furnishes information on earthen dams, as opposed to the concrete
Hoover Dam.
Next, Cech breaks water allocation law down into historical time
periods, 1200-1799, 1800-1847, 1848-1899, and 1900-present. The
reader acquires a great sense for early water conflicts and how the earliest human civilizations developed water law, such as the Babylonian
civilization of King Hammurabi. Cech then describes the origins of
riparian and prior appropriation laws, along with the laws of the Native
He characterizes
American pueblos, and English common law.
groundwater doctrines, interstate compacts, and other, more modem
legal systems, along with federal reserved water rights.
The textbook next describes federal, local, regional, state, and
multi-state water agencies, along with their duties and development.
Cech discusses the United States Army Corp of Engineers and its navigation duties and flood control progression through pictures, key
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terms, and the many statutes enacted under their auspices over the
years. He also lays out the role of the National Park Service, Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Environmental Protection
Agency. Finally, the book chronicles local and municipal departments,
which are somewhat more complicated, along with their irrigation districts, sewer districts, mutual irrigation and ditch companies, and surface or groundwater management districts.
Cech then forays into the uses of water. Drinking water, wastewater
treatment, natural habitat for aquatic wildlife, and the economics of
water all affect how we manage and mismanage our water supplies.
The details of desalinization, the Safe Water Drinking Act, septic tanks
and leaching fields all affect human life, along with fish and wildlife.
While laws and landmark events such as the National Environmental
Policy Act, the Endangered Species Act, and Earth Day have improved
the quality of our water supplies, the destruction of wetlands and other
habitats jeopardize the sandhill crane migration corridor, snail darter
fish in Tennessee and salmon in the Columbia River. The economics
of water, including privatization, water affordability, marketing, banking, and pollution fees and credits, is based on the allocation of the
resources among different uses. Clean drinking water for humans and
clean rivers for wildlife have different economic values and affect the
way in which people distribute and sell water.
Lastly, Cech describes the most recent water resource issues-water
use conflicts and emerging water issues. Water and conflict have been
linked quite frequently in the last few years, in the Middle East, California, and China. Population growth and poor water quality continue
to apply pressure on usable water supplies. Traditional water conflicts
have grown more complicated over time in areas like the Tigris and
Euphrates, the Texas Panhandle and the Ogallala Aquifer, and the
Jordan River. This lack of usable water contributes to emerging issues
such as lack of wastewater treatment in third world countries, groundwater recharge, and the privatization of water delivery. Cech provides
information about a wealth of organizations that promote water conservation, education, ethical information, and cooperation among
humans to protect a resource without which people cannot live.
ChristinaValerio

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Kansas v. Colorado, 125 S. Ct. 526 (2004) (holding the Special Master's recommendation that the United States Supreme Court not appoint a River Master was appropriate; overruling Kansas' objections to
the Special Master's recommendations; accepting the Special Master's
recommendation; and remitting the case to the Special Master for
preparation of a decree).
This case involved a long running dispute between the states of
Kansas and Colorado. In 1949, the two states entered into the Arkansas River Compact ("Compact"), whereby the states agreed to divide
and apportion the waters of the Arkansas River equitably. In 1985,
Kansas alleged Colorado violated Article IV-D of the Compact by depleting river water that otherwise would have been available for Kansas'
use. The Special Master appointed under the United States Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction agreed with Kansas and recommended the
Court conclude Colorado violated Article IV-D of the Compact. The
Court followed this recommendation and remanded the case for
remedies. That case is commonly known as Kansas I. In a subsequent
case, Kansas III, the Special Master, in his Second and Third Reports,
proposed methods for calculating remedies and recommended the
Court award prejudgment interest on the damages Kansas incurred
from 1969 to 1994 due to Colorado's overuse of water. The Court
adopted the recommendations with the exception that prejudgment
interest would begin in 1985 rather than 1969. The instant case involved the Special Master's Fourth Report, which resolved the remaining issues from Kansas I. Kansas objected to several of the Fourth Report's recommendations.
Kansas first objected to the Special Master's recommendation that
the Court not appoint a River Master to decide technical disputes related to the decree. The Special Master advised the Court to retain
jurisdiction and permit the Special Master to resolve remaining issues
subject to the Court's oversight. Accordingly, the Court denied Kansas' request for a River Master, noting the Court appointed a River
Master in only two other cases, and only because it significantly aided
in resolving further disputes. The Court reasoned further disputes in
this case might require "discretionary, policy-oriented decision-making
directly related to underlying legal issues." Thus, the Court concluded

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 8

this case differed from those where it had appointed River Masters.
The Court also commented that because neither party objected to using arbitration, which the Compact provided for, the need for a River
Master, was minimal. Accordingly, the Court denied Kansas' objection.
Kansas next objected to the Special Master's prejudgment interest
calculation. The Special Master found Colorado's unlawful water depletion began harming Kansas in 1950. Kansas argued interest should
date back to 1950. Colorado argued the Compact did not anticipate
interest on unliquidated claims. To resolve this problem, the Special
Master divided the prejudgment period into three periods: the Early
Period, 1950 to 1968; the Middle Period, 1969 to 1985; and the Late
period, 1985 to 1994. The Special Master then awarded prejudgment
interest for the Middle Period, resulting in a total damages award of
$38 million. The Court accepted the Special Master's equitable approach, but changed the prejudgment interest period from the Middle
Period to the Late Period. In addressing Kansas' complaint, the Court
stated its purpose in awarding prejudgment interest was equity, not the
compensation of lost investment opportunities. The Court also noted
that by not commenting on the Special Master's exemptions of the
Early Period, the Court had implicitly accepted the Special Master's
scheme. The Court concluded Kansas' contention that prejudgment
interest should date back to 1950 ran counter to both the Court's equitable scheme and the Court's damages award, which was slightly more
favorable to Colorado than was the Special Master's award.
Kansas also objected to the Special Master's recommendation that
the computer model the parties agreed to use to ensure Colorado's
future compliance be based on a 10-year measurement period. Kansas
argued the Compact prohibited the accumulation of debits or credits
on water usage, and a 10-year measurement would result in an averaging of Colorado's water usage that would be equivalent to allowing it to
accumulate debits or credits. However, the Court observed that while
the Compact proscribed offsetting debits with credits, it failed to define the duration for which to measure a credit. The Court also noted
any period of measurement would involve an averaging of use over the
measurement period no mater how short the period. Moreover, the
Court pointed out the compliance computer model was highly inaccurate at modeling measurement periods of less than 10 years. Finally,
the Court concluded that because Colorado law required the use of
water replacement plans to minimize depletions, Kansas was unlikely to
suffer serious harm due to the 10-year measuring period. On these
bases, the Court overruled Kansas' objection to the 10-year measurement period.
The Court similarly overruled Kansas' objection to the Special Master's recommendation that Colorado's Water Court determine the final amount of water replacement plan credits that applied toward
Colorado's compact obligations. Kansas claimed the Supreme Court
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must oversee all questions essential to resolving interstate disputes.
The Court concluded Kansas' argument ignored the full language of
the Special Master's recommendation, which made the Colorado Water Court's determination subject to Kansas' right to relief under the
Court's original jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court overruled this
objection.
On Kansas' objection, the Special Master found Colorado was in
compliance for the years 1997-1999 using a measurement period of
longer than one year. The Court overruled Kansas' objection to the
Special Master's finding because the Court already ruled against Kansas regarding the 10-year measurement period discussed above.
The Court also ruled against Kansas on fifteen items, which the
Special Master refused to make recommendations on, and which Kansas grouped in three categories: (1) disputed computer model calibration issues, (2) disputed 1997-1999 accounting issues, and (3) disputed
future compliance issues. The Court concluded the issues addressed
by category two were moot under the Court's ruling on the 1997-1999
compliance issue discussed above. As for categories one and three, the
Court stated that with the passage of time, the states would learn more
about the computer model's strengths and weaknesses and, because
the Court retained jurisdiction over the case, it could direct the Special
Master to address these remaining issues later.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, the Court accepted
the Special Master's recommendations, overruled Kansas' objections,
and recommitted the case to the Special Master for preparation of a
decree.
Jeff Gillio

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
FIRST CIRCUIT

Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the
Army, 395 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding the Army Corps of Engineers properly exercised jurisdiction and followed proper procedures
to issue a permit for an offshore data tower on the Outer Continental
Shelf).
On August 19, 2002, the United States Army Corps of Engineers
("Corps") issued a navigability permit to Cape Wind Associates ("Cape
Wind") for the purpose of erecting an offshore data tower in an area of
Nantucket Sound located on the federally controlled Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS"). The tower's purpose was to gather data to determine the feasibility of locating a wind energy plant in Nantucket
Sound. After a public notice and comment period, the Corps issued
Cape Wind the permit. The Corps accompanied the permit with an
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Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact
("FONSI"). Cape Wind's permit was subject to additional conditions,
including the removal of the tower within five years, required sharing
of the collected data, and permitting government agencies and research institutes to place additional data gathering equipment on the
tower.
The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound ("Alliance") filed an action against the Corps in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, alleging (1) the Corps lacked authority to issue a
permit for the data tower; (2) the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") by
granting Cape Wind a permit, despite Cape Wind's lack of a property
right on the OCS; and (3) the Corps failed to comply with requirements for evaluating the data tower's environmental impacts. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Corps, and the
Alliance appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit. The court reviewed the lower court's decision on the data
tower permit de novo. However, the permit application for the wind
farm was separate from the data tower application; therefore, the court
did not consider it.
First, the court determined the Corps had proper jurisdiction to issue the permit. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA")
and the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 authorized the permit. Congress passed OCSLA in 1953 to assert federal jurisdiction over the OCS
and to establish a regulatory framework for the extraction of minerals.
Congress amended the statute in 1978 to extend jurisdiction to "devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, which may be
erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources therefrom...." Alliance argued Congress intended
this language to limit the Corps' permit granting authority to structures related to the extraction of mineral resources. Although the
court decided the statutory language was ambiguous, the court reasoned there was clear legislative intent in the 1978 OSCLA Amendments Conference Report ("Report"). In the Report, Congress explained it did not intend to limit the authority of the Corps to structures used for exploration, development, removal or transport of minerals. Consequently, the court held the Corps had proper jurisdiction
to issue the permit.
Second, the court considered whether the Corps properly considered Cape Wind's lack of property interest on the OCS land for which
the Corps issued the permit. The Corps' regulations provided (1) the
granting of a permit did not convey a property right, (2) the applicant's signature on the permit application affirmed that the applicant
possessed or would possess the requisite property interest to undertake
the activity proposed in the application, and (3) that dispute over
property ownership would not be a factor in the Corps' public interest
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decision. The Corps interpreted these regulations as requiring it only
to remind applicants that they must obtain proper property rights, not
for the Corps to evaluate property disputes. The court concluded the
Corps reasonably interpreted its regulations; therefore, the Corps was
not required to evaluate Cape Wind's property interests before granting a permit.
Next, the court determined the Corps properly considered the
various impacts of the data tower on federal property as negligible.
Thus, the court rejected the Alliance's argument that erecting the data
tower contradicted public interest.
The court then addressed whether the Corps' reliance on Cape
Wind's affirmation that it would obtain the necessary property rights
was capricious, in violation of the APA. The court declined to determine whether a permit alone sufficiently authorized building on the
OCS; however, it concluded the construction of a single, temporary
data tower could not be an infringement on any federal property ownership interest in the OCS. Therefore, the court held no additional
Congressional authorization was required to proceed with the data
tower's construction.
Finally, the court addressed whether the Corps provided sufficient
notice and comment opportunities to review the proposed project.
The Alliance argued the construction of the data tower of was without
precedent, therefore requiring the Corps to make a draft FONSI available for public comment. The court rejected this argument, stating
that although this was the first data tower permit granted in these particular shoals, it was not the first physically similar structure permitted
in Massachusetts waters. Thus, the court held the Corps complied with
its requirements to engage the public in preparing the required environmental documents.
After rejecting each of the Alliance's claims, the court affirmed the
district court's summaryjudgment in favor of the Corps.
JulieM. Schmidt
Knott v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 386 F.3d 368 (1st Cir. 2004)
(denying petition for review when Federal Energy Regulatory Commission exercised proper authority over navigable watercourse, provided a
hearing, and issued orders that were not arbitrary or capricious).
Riverdale Power & Electric Company and its owner, James Knott,
(collectively "Knott") filed a petition with the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit to review three orders issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") concerning Knott's hydroelectric project ("Project") that included a river dam and a water
impoundment area. Knott operated the Project under a voluntary
conditional license granted by FERC pursuant to the Federal Power
Act ("FPA").
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After receiving letters alleging extreme fluctuations in the Blackstone River below the Project and concerns from state agencies and
conservation groups that these fluctuations arose from Knott's failure
to allow a continuous stream flow, FERC issued compliance orders asserting mandatory licensing authority over the Project. Specifically,
FERC ordered Knott to install gauges to measure stream flow at the
Project, and directed Knott to submit Project design revisions on microfiche cards. Knott petitioned the court for review, claiming (1)
FERC improperly asserted jurisdiction over the Project, (2) complying
with FERC orders would affect an unconstitutional taking of property,
(3) FERC denied Knott a hearing, and (4) the orders were unreasonable.
The court first assessed whether FERC possessed authority to assert
jurisdiction. The FPA required FERC to apply mandatory licensing
over projects located on navigable waters of the United States or located on a body of water regulated under Commerce Clause authority
by Congress where project construction occurred after 1935 and the
project affected interstate commerce. The court determined FERC
properly concluded the Blackstone River was suitable for interstate use
and, thus, was a navigable waterway subject to FERCjurisdiction.
The court next determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear Knott's
Fifth Amendment takings claim. Specifically, the Tucker Act and the
"Little Tucker Act" vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Federal
Claims, thereby barring the court from hearing the case.
On the issue of whether FERC denied Knott a hearing, the court
concluded FERC provided Knott with a hearing in a manner common
in utility and carrier regulation. In formulating its decision, FERC accepted extensive evidentiary submissions from both sides in the form
of affidavits from experts, in addition to extensive written arguments.
The court determined FERC's method was sufficient and noted a
"true" hearing before an administrative law judge was unnecessary because genuine issues of material fact could be adequately resolved on
the written record.
The court addressed Knott's claim that FERC acted unreasonably
in demanding Knott file project drawings on microfilm. The court
held FERC's order requiring Knott to submit records on microfilm to
conform to FERC's existing record-keeping system was not overly burdensome. Moreover, the court determined FERC's request was not
arbitrary or capricious in light of microfilm's durability and inexpensive cost.
The court rejected Knott's claim that FERC acted unreasonably in
requiring him to install stream flow gauges in addition to other gauges
that previously existed. The court concluded FERC's compliance order was reasonable because the other gauges were too distant to measure the Project's impacts.
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The court held there were no errors in FERC's orders and accordingly denied Knott's petition for review.
Michael Graetz

SECOND CIRCUIT
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. United States Envd. Prot. Agency, 399
F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding some provisions of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency regulation regarding concentrated
animal feeding operation violated the Clean Water Act).
Waterkeeper Alliance, Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. and American Littoral Society (collectively "Environmentalists") and American Farm Bureau Federation, National Chicken
Council, and National Pork Producers Council (collectively "Farmers")
challenged a regulation promulgated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") regarding water pollutants released
from concentrated animal feeding operations ("CAFOs") in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The EPA regulation ("CAFO Rule")
follows from the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), which proscribes the release of pollutants from any "point source" into navigable waters,
unless otherwise authorized by permit. The Environmentalists and
Farmers asserted the CAFO Rule violated, or failed to advance the
CWA's goals concerning the permitting scheme, the types of discharges regulated, and the effluent limitation guidelines the CAFO
Rule established.
The Environmentalists objected to the EPA's permitting scheme
because the CAFO Rule allowed the EPA to issue permits without
comprehensive review and without enough specified terms in the permits as to meet the CWA's requirements. They also objected to the
duty to apply for a permit imposed on CAFOs outside the jurisdiction
of the EPA. The CAFO Rule required large CAFOs to develop nutrient
management plans. However, the Environmentalists argued this requirement alone failed to ensure the CAFOs followed through with the
implementation of those plans. The court agreed with the Environmentalists' allegation concerning the lax standards of review for permit
issuance, allowing CAFOs to possibly misrepresent their compliance.
The court also determined the CAFO Rule violated the CWA by failing
to require CAFOs to include the terms of the nutrient management
plans in their permits. The CWA specified that effluent limitations, or
any restrictions enforced by the State regarding quantities, rates, and
concentration of discharge, must be included in the permit. The court
reasoned that the nutrient management plans constituted effluent
limitations and must be included in the permit in order to comply with
the CWA. Finally, the Farmers argued the permitting scheme outlined
in the CAFO Rule allowed the EPA power over CAFOs, or the ability to
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usurp rights, the CWA did not grant. Since the CAFO Rule demanded
that all CAFOs either apply for a permit or prove the CAFOs had no
potential to discharge, the Farmers asserted the EPA broadly regulated
all potential polluters, rather than the actual polluters. The court
agreed this policy, while possibly aligned with the goals of the CWA,
superseded the powers that Congress gave the EPA through the CWA.
Secondly, the Environmentalists and Farmers challenged the CAFO
Rule with regards its stormwater discharge exemption and its regulation of "uncollected" discharges. Under the CAFO Rule, all discharges
of manure, litter, or process wastewater were subject to permit requirements and regulation; however, as long as the CAFOs were acting
in accordance with their specific nutrient management plans, precipitation related discharge or agricultural stormwater were exempt. The
Environmentalists contended the EPA should regulate stormwater like
any other point source for discharge. The court looked to precedent
case law and the express language of the CWA, which exempted agricultural stormwater, and held the CAFO Rule's exemption properly
comported with Congress' intent to limit liability for discharge caused
by nature. The court also dismissed the Farmers' assertion that the
EPA could consider only discharges collected at the area of land application point sources or regulated as such. The court reasoned it was
irrelevant whether the discharge was collected or uncollected at a certain point, because any discharge from a CAFO becomes subject to
regulation.
Thirdly, the Environmentalists attacked the effluent limitations
guidelines the CAFO Rule established. They objected to the guidelines' use of the best available technology ("BAT") standards, the
guidelines' failure to regulate or reduce pathogens in the discharge,
the guidelines' provisions for complying with the production area discharge ban through the creation of a facility or through alternative
performance standards, and the guidelines' lack of water quality based
effluent limitations. Regarding the BAT standards adopted in the
guidelines, the Environmentalists opined that the EPA improperly
chose the standards. The court relied on the record and the evidence
that the EPA did extensive research in determining effective standards,
including choosing the best BAT options for beef and swine regulation. However, the court did not determine the EPA had been as diligent in instituting standards to control pathogen levels. Under the
CWA, the EPA must employ guidelines that advocate the use of the
best conventional technology ("BCT") for controlling pathogens. The
court held the EPA must adopt effluent guidelines specifically for controlling pathogens, rather than relying on the effect of the other guidelines to reduce pathogens. Similarly, the court concluded the EPA did
not justify its adoption of alternative means for CAFOs to comply with
the total prohibition on production area discharge, because the EPA
failed to provide support for this decision in the record and precluded
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public participation in its decision-making process. Finally, the court
held no justification for the lack of water quality based effluent guidelines concerning any discharge, except stormwater existed.
In conclusion, the court vacated the following portions of the
CAFO Rules permitting scheme: (1) the issuance of permits without a
review of the nutrient management plans, (2) the allowance of permits
that failed to specifically identify terms of the nutrient management
plans, and (3) the requirement that all CAFOs to apply for permits or
prove no potential for discharge. The court also held the EPA must
select a BCT standard for pathogen control and clarify, through a publicly accessible process, why its CAFO Rule included an alternative
measure for meeting the production area prohibition and why its
guidelines lacked water quality based limitations.
Lynn Noesner

THIRD CIRCUIT
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir.
2005) (holding the district court correctly determined the existence of
an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and the
environment, and that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
required permanent injunctive relief by Honeywell).
From 1895 until 1954, Mutual Chemical Company ("Mutual")
dumped hexavalent chromium waste, creating a carcinogenic landmass consisting of 1,500,000 tons of waste at a wetlands site along the
Hackensack River in Jersey City, New Jersey. In 1982 the State of New
Jersey ("State") sought a permanent remedy after observing a green
stream and plumes on the site. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP") ordered Honeywell, Mutual's ultimate successor, to clean up the site. Honeywell implemented an interim measure by pouring concrete over seventeen acres and placing a
plastic cap over the remaining seventeen acres of the thirty-four acre
site. After litigation in 1993, Allied Signal, a predecessor to Honeywell,
promised 60 million dollars towards a permanent solution, but NJDEP
reserved the right to compel cleanup at a higher cost. In 1995 Interfaith Community Organization with five individuals (collectively
"ICO") sued Honeywell under the Resource Conservation and Restoration Act ("RCRA"), alleging the site presented an imminent and substantial danger to public health or the environment. The United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey ruled for ICO and
ordered Honeywell to clean up the site. Honeywell appealed to the
United State Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
On appeal, Honeywell challenged ICO's standing, the district
court's determination that an imminent and substantial endangerment
existed, and the district court's remedial injunction requiring excava-
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tion of the site. On the first issue, the court determined the ICO's five
individual members had standing because they established the requisite injury-in-fact by showing the inability to use the river for recreational purposes and the direct health risk concerns due to the river
pollution. The court further ruled the injury fairly traceable to and
redressable by Honeywell. In addition, the court ruled ICO established
associational standing because ICO's members otherwise had standing, the interests of danger to public health and environment were
germane to ICO's purpose, and the claim and injunctive relief did not
require the individual participation of ICO's individual members.
On the second issue, the court determined clear error existed
where the district court held Honeywell to a higher standard than required by RCRA. Specifically the district court added four additional
requirements to the statute. Although the district court clearly erred
in adding the four additional requirements to RCRA, the court determined no merit to Honeywell's argument and no reason to disturb the
district court's endangerment ruling. The court reasoned the district
court's ruling had merit because on the basis of the evidence present
and continuing pathways for exposure endangered both human health
and the environment.
Finally, the court determined none of the district court's findings
on injunctive relief were clearly erroneous within the meaning of
RCRA and upheld the decision of the district court. The court thus
affirmed the decision of the district court on all counts.
Alexandra Farkouh

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Chesapeake Ranch Water Co. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 401 F.3d 274 (4th
Cir. 2005) (holding: (1) the Le-Ax Lest applicable to determine whether
an association provided or made water service available for purposes of
section 1926(b) of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act;
(2) tapping into an aquifer, even in a way that impairs a water associations ability to provide service, is not an infringement under section
1926(b); and (3) occasionally providing service outside a franchise
area, by itself, does not expand the franchise area).
The Chesapeake Ranch Water Company ("Chesapeake"), a nonprofit water association, provided water services in Calvert County,
Maryland. On three prior occasions the Board of Commissioners of
Calvert County, Maryland ("County") granted Chesapeake's applications for expansion of its service franchise area to accommodate new
developments. The controversy in this case arose when the County rejected Chesapeake's formal offer to provide water service to two new
developments adjacent to, but not within, Chesapeake's existing franchise area. Instead, the County resolved to extend County-owned water
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facilities to provide service to the new developments. Chesapeake sued
the County seeking protection under section 1926(b) of the Consolidated Farm and Rural Development Act of 1961 ("CFRDA"). The
United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary judgment in favor of the County, and Chesapeake appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Chesapeake argued summaryjudgment was inappropriate for three
reasons. First, the County service to the new developments limited or
curtailed Chesapeake's service by invading a location where Chesapeake provided service. Second, the County's plan to tap the aquifer
from which Chesapeake presently drew its water supply limited or curtailed Chesapeake's ability to serve its existing franchise area. Lastly,
Chesapeake maintained issues of material fact existed as to the precise
scope of Chesapeake's franchise area.
In upholding the district court's decision, the court first examined
the legislative history of section 1926(b) of the CFRDA, finding it prohibited the curtailment or limitation of service provided or made available by a qualifying non-profit water association by inclusion of any
municipal corporation or other public body. The statute only protected the association in the area in which the association provided or
made water service available. Moreover, the court adopted the threepart, Le-Ax test articulated by the Sixth Circuit that requires an association to demonstrate (1) it is capable of servicing the disputed area, (2)
has a legal right under state law to do so, and (3) the disputed area is
within the geographic boundaries of the associations existing franchise
area.
The court then examined each of Chesapeake's claims, ruling on
the first claim that Chesapeake was not entitled to protection under
section 1926(b) of the CFRDA because the new developments were not
within the geographic boundaries of Chesapeake's existing franchise
area. With regard to the second claim, the court found that even if the
County tapped into an aquifer in a manner that impaired Chesapeake's ability to provide service, such an action would not constitute
an infringement under the statute. Finally, as to the scope of Chesapeake's franchise area, the court found that although Chesapeake previously provided service to customers outside of its franchise area, such
action by itself, did not expand the scope of the franchise area. Only
the County had authority to expand the scope of the franchise area.
Thus, because the County had not expanded the geographic boundaries of Chesapeake's franchise area to include the new developments,
and because tapping an aquifer in a way that impaired Chesapeake's
ability to provide service was not an infringing action under section
1926(b), the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the County.
CharlesP. Kersch, Jr.

WATER LA WREVIEW

Volume 8

SIXTH CIRCUIT
Am. Canoe Ass'n v. City of Louisa Water & Sewer Comin'n, 389 F.3d
536 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding environmental groups had standing to
sue on behalf of themselves and their individual members under the
Clean Water Act, based on the Clean Water Act's citizen-suit provision).
The American Canoe Association and the Sierra Club, on behalf of
themselves and their individual members (collectively "ACA"), alleged
the City of Louisa Sewer and Water Commission ("Commission") failed
to comply with the terms of its National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit and, thus, violated the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Kentucky dismissed ACA's suit for lack of standing. ACA appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing ACA
had standing to sue the Commission under the citizen-suit provision of
the CWA.
The goal of the CWA is to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of United States waters. To reach this
goal, the Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection issues
NPDES permits that restrict the type and amount of pollutants released
into the environment. As such, NPDES permit holders must monitor
and report pollution discharges. NPDES permit holders who fail to
monitor or report pollution discharges subject themselves to federal,
state, and citizen suits. To establish standing in a citizen-suit pursuant
to the CWA, the complainant must show an injury in fact, that the injury suffered is fairly traceable to the unlawful conduct, and that redress is possible through the requested relief.
Under the citizen-suit framework, ACA alleged the Commission's
failure to adequately report and monitor city pollution discharges
caused ACA recreational and informational injuries that constituted
injuries in fact. The court determined ACA suffered an injury in fact
because, as ACA argued, the Commission acted unlawfully by not providing requested pollution reports. Had ACA alleged the Commission
was simply not complying with the terms of the Commission's NPDES
permit, only an unrecoverable abstract injury, as opposed to an injury
in fact, would result. The court held ACA suffered injuries in fact, that
the injuries were fairly traceable to the Commission's failure to comply
with the Commission's NPDES permit, and that the redress sought was
an appropriate remedy
After finding ACA suffered an injury in fact, the court addressed
the Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Advisory Committee
Act to determine whether ACA had standing. Under these statutes,
litigants achieve standing when an agency denies a request for information. Accordingly, the Commission's refusal to honor ACA's re-
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quest for the pollution reports granted ACA standing. The court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Thomas Jantunen
Citizens Coal Council v. United States Env'tl. Prot. Agency, 385 F.3d
969 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding the Environmental Protection Agency's
Final Rule adding new subcategories to the Coal Mining Point Source
category under the Clean Water Act exceeded the Agency's statutory
mandate).
The Kentucky Resources Council and the Citizens Coal Council
(together "Councils") petitioned the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth District to review an Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") rule ("Final Rule") propagated under the Clean Water Act
("CWA") that applied to the effluent emissions from coal mining operations.
The CWA assigned EPA the duty to identify pollution control
measures and practices for various pollution point sources. EPA created categories of pollution point sources so that EPA could establish
effluent limitation guidelines for various industries. Within the Coal
Mining Point Source Category, EPA created four subcategories. EPA
did not create a subcategory for remining operations on previously
mined, but then abandoned, land. As technology for remining improved, which made remining a feasible option, the costs associated
with complying with EPA effluent regulations under the existing categories prevented miners from engaging in remining activities.
In response to the need for legislation to allow remining, Congress
passed the Rahall Amendment to the CWA. This amendment created
a modified permit for remining operations and required only that pollution emissions not exceed levels present before commencement of
the remining operation.
EPA created two new subcategories for remining operations under
the Coal Mining Point Source category: the Coal Remining Subcategory and the Western Alkaline Coal Mining Subcategory. The Councils claimed both new subcategories were inconsistent with the CWA
and the Rahall Amendment and were therefore invalid.
The court first considered whether EPA had the authority to create
subcategories inconsistent with the Rahall Amendment. The Rahall
Amendment authorized remining permits only when effluent emissions from the remining activity would be less than pre-remining emissions. The Final Rule allowed a permitting authority to grant a Coal
Remining permit in situations where that authority could not collect
baseline measurements but concluded that remining would reduce
effluent emissions. A permitting authority could issue these permits at
its discretion, bypassing the Rahall Amendment's requirement of base-
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line measurements. The court concluded that the Rahall Amendment
created an opt-in modified permit and did not limit EPA's authority to
create new subcategories consistent with the CWA.
The court held the Final Rule was inconsistent with the CWA. The
CWA directed EPA to determine the technology available and applicable for each category of operation to reduce emissions before EPA decided what level of emissions would be reasonably attainable. Under
the Final Rule, a permitting authority first determined the permissible
level of emissions, and then determined what technology the mining
operation should use to attain those levels. The CWA also set forth a
list of factors for EPA to consider in determining the best technology
to control effluent. The court stated that EPA was unable to show that
EPA considered all of the factors mandated by the CWA. The court
held that, by adopting the Final Rule, EPA did not fulfill the CWA requirement that EPA should consider technology available in determining an attainable level of pollution emission.
A dissenting opinion by Judge Suhrheinrich stated that the court
incorrectly found that EPA must consider the technology available and
the effluent limits in any specific order. The dissent also stated that
the original complaint failed to plead the issue of whether EPA considered all relevant factors as required by the CWA, and therefore should
not have been a factor in the decision. Finally, the dissent argued that
the CWA did not require that EPA assign numerical limitations on effluent. The CWA only required that EPA identify the amount of pollutants. The dissent suggested an interpretation of the word "amount"
not requiring specification of numerical limits.
The court thus held that both of the new subcategories created by
the Final Rule were inconsistent with the CWA, making the Final Rule
invalid. The court remanded the case to the EPA with instructions to
withdraw or amend the Final Rule.
Mark Terzaghi Howe

NINTH CIRCUIT

Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d
989 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that NEPA compliance requires a federal
agency to thoroughly evaluate potential cumulative environmental affects of proposed projects with individually minor potential of causing
environmental harm, and make that information available to the public before proceeding with the project).
The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") executed two of four
planned timber sales in the South Fork Little Butte Creek ("SFLBC")
watershed in the Cascade Mountains in Southwest Oregon. The BLM
produced a different environmental assessment ("EA") for each of the
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four planned timber sales. The National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") required federal agencies to perform an environmental impact statement ("EIS") before commencing any project with the potential of adversely affecting the human environment. If the federal
agency was unsure of potential environmental harm, the agency could
conduct an environmental assessment ("EA") to determine the presence of any potential risks that required a more in depth EIS. If the
potential for adverse environmental impact existed, the required EIS,
performed by the federal agency, must contain a thorough analysis of
the potential environmental harms and reasonable alternatives in
enough depth to fully inform the public of the potential environmental degradation. The BLM conducted EAs for all four proposed
timber sales separately and found that, individually, each timber sale
posed no significant potential threat to the environmental quality of
the SFLBC. Based on the findings of the EAs, the BLM issued two timber sales.
Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands ("KS Wild"), an environmental organization, challenged the sufficiency of the EAs for the two issued timber
sales on the grounds that the BLM did not properly consider the cumulative effect of the four timber sales on the SFLBC as required by
the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ') regulations implementing NEPA. Further, KS Wild asserted that the CEQ regulations
required the consolidation of the four EAs into one document for
proper evaluation. The United States District Court for the District of
Oregon granted the BLM's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all of KS Wild's claims. However, the district court granted an
injunction on logging activities connected to the timber sales pending
the outcome of the appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that the challenged EAs lacked the proper analysis of potential cumulative effects for the separate timber sales on the SFLBC and reversed
the district court.
CEQ regulations require evaluation of potential cumulative effects
of individually minor projects for NEPA compliance. The court found
the challenged EAs contained only general conclusions by BLM experts regarding the lack of potential adverse effects from the combination of the two issued timber sales along with the other two proposed
sales. Neither of the two challenged EAs contained any empirical data
supporting the evaluations of the agency's experts. The court ruled
that unsupported opinions of agency experts insufficiendy supported
lack of potential cumulative harm from the timber sales and to inform
the general public of any potential effects to the SFLBC posed by the
timber sales. Additionally, the court found that the EAs lacked the
proper evaluation of the potential harm by the combination of the
four timber sales on the habitat of the endangered spotted owl.
The BLM claimed that they could tier the EAs for the challenged
timber sales to an EIS prepared for the Medford District's Regional
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Management Plan ("RMP-EIS") and the Little Butte Creek Watershed
Analysis ("LBCWA") to cure any deficiencies in the cumulative analysis
of the timber sales in the EAs. The court found that RMP-EIS contained cumulative effects analysis for logging activities wholly outside of
the SFLBC watershed; therefore, the RMP-EIS could not cure the deficiencies in the timber sale EAs within the SFLBC watershed. In regards
to the LBCWA, the court ruled that an agency could not tier an EA to a
non-NEPA document such as the LBCWA to cure any deficiencies in
the EA.
KS Wild also claimed that the CEQ regulations required the BLM
to consolidate the timber sale EAs into one document for proper
analysis because of their cumulative nature. The court found that the
CEQ regulations did require federal projects with potentially cumulative harmful effects to be evaluated in a single document. However,
the court determined that, without the proper cumulative analysis in
the challenged timber sale EAs, the court could not rule on the appropriateness of the separate EAs for each individual timber sale. Further,
the court ruled that the CEQ regulations recommended that a federal
agency combine the analysis of similar federal projects into a single
document but did not require such action.
One judge dissented in part with respect to the court's ruling on
the proposed combination of the four separate timber sale EAs into a
single document. According to the dissent, NEPA required the evaluation of projects that developed from a single proposal or produced
cumulatively significant environmental impacts within a single document. The dissent found that the two executed timber sales along with
the two additionally proposed sales constituted a single proposal for
the development of the SFLBC watershed because the BLM initially
treated all proposed timber sales as a single development project and
continued to manage the four final timber sale proposals within a single watershed development plan. The dissent disagreed with the majority as to the threshold for requiring a single analysis of separate projects and found that NEPA required evaluation of separate projects
within a single document when ever the cumulative nature of the projects raised a substantial question of significant environmental impact.
For the dissent, the close proximity of the timber sales within the same
watershed raised a substantial question of adverse environmental impact. Therefore, the dissent would remand the case to the BLM for the
evaluation of the four separate timber sales within a single EA because
the sales all evolved from a single proposal and raised a substantial
question of cumulatively adverse impact on the SFLBC watershed.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of the BLM and required further analysis
of the potential adverse effects of the four proposed timber sales on
the SFLBC in order to fully inform the public before commencement
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of any further logging activities in the areas covered by the timber
sales.
Sean R Biddle
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 384 F.3d 1163 (9th
Cir. 2004) (holding a United States Army Corps of Engineers report
was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the law in concluding that
no further steps could be taken to reduce water temperature exceedances and that the operation of dams did not cause water temperature exceedances).
The National Wildlife Federation and other environmental groups
(collectively "NWF") filed suit against the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") in the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon. NWF claimed the Corps' 1995 and 1998 records of consultation and statements of decision ("ROD") about the operation of four
dams on the Snake River in Washington were arbitrary, capricious, and
contrary to the law. The Corps argued it adopted the recommendations of a 1995 biological opinion ("BiOp") issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") as required by the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA"). Initially, the district court ruled against the Corps, finding that although the 1995 and 1998 RODs complied with the ESA, the
RODs did not address the issue of the Corps' obligation to comply with
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The CWA requires federal agencies to
comply with state water quality standards, such as a Washington statute
that set temperature standards for the lower Snake River. The district
court thus remanded the CWA issue to the Corps for further consideration.
In response to the district court's ruling, the Corps issued another
ROD in 2001 acknowledging that the presence of the dams may have
contributed to temperature changes of the Snake River and that the
Corps would adopt the recommendations contained in a 2000 NMFS
BiOp to improve the Corps operations compliance with state water
quality standards. The Corps implemented several minor actions to
help alleviate adverse water temperatures, but also noted that no evidence indicated any operational modifications of the dams would have
a significant impact on water temperature. Therefore, the Corps concluded that operation of the dams did not cause a significant impact
on water temperatures.
NWF filed an amended complaint alleging that the 2001 ROD was
arbitrary, capricious, contrary to the law, and in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act because the 2001 ROD failed to adequately
address exceedances of state water temperature standards. The district
court granted the Corps' motion for summary judgment finding that:
(1) the Corps' 2001 ROD implemented each of the recommendations
set out in NMFS's 2000 BiOp; (2) the 2001 ROD properly evaluated
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the Corps' obligation to comply with Washington water standards as
required by the CWA; and (3) no evidence indicated that the Corps'
compliance with ESA was inconsistent with its obligations under the
CWA.
NWF appealed the district court's ruling to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. NWF first argued the Corps' incorrectly concluded that the Corps could make no operational changes to
significantly decrease water temperatures in the Snake River. NWF
referred to a 1995 Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") prepared
by groups, including the Corps and the Bureau of Reclamation. In
considering alternatives to operating dams, the EIS determined that a
"natural river operation" method of dam operation caused the fewest
temperature exceedances. The court rejected this argument finding
that (1) the EIS did not actually recommend adopting the "natural
river operation" method, (2) the viability of adopting the method was
unclear in regards to the potential enormous costs of adopting the
method, (3) adoption of the method might create conflicts with Corps'
compliance with other laws, and (4) adoption of the method might
interfere with Congress' purpose in creating the dams. Furthermore,
the court noted that where an agency relied upon scientific and technical expertise for decision-making, the Supreme Court held that a
reviewing court must be highly deferential to the judgment of the
agency.
NWF also argued the 2001 ROD's conclusion that the Corps's operation of the dams did not cause water temperature exceedances was
arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the law. A 1999 EIS used three
different temperature modeling techniques to predict how the differing methods of dam operations affected water temperature. NWF alleged that one of the models conclusively showed that the Corps' operations of the dams resulted in temperature exceedances. The Corps
argued that the model showed only that the existence of the dams, but
not the operation, caused temperature exceedances. The court agreed
with the Corps, noting that the Corps based its temperature model
conclusions on a comparison of water temperatures with the dams in
place and with the dams removed, not on a comparison of operational
methods. NWF then argued that even if the existence of the dams
caused temperature exceedances, the Corps still violated the CWA because the CWA contained no legal distinction between exceedances
caused by existence of the dams and exceedances caused by operation
of the dams. The court refused to interpret the CWA's compliance
provision to require the destruction of dams.
Although the district court's ruling was partly erroneous, the court
determined the Corps' 2001 ROD was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the law, and upheld summaryjudgment against NWF. In dissent, Judge McKeown stated that the majority erred by framing the
issue as a choice between compliance with CWA and tearing down the
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dams altogether. Judge McKeown argued that instead of hiding behind the threat of dam removal, the Corps should have addressed the
"real issue" of compliance with water quality standards head-on.
The court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary
judgment in favor of the Corps.
Andrew L. Ellis
Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 401 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding a treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe does
not implicitly reserve water rights to the tribe beyond the amount necessary for the reservation's primary purpose).
In 2004 the Skokomish Indian Tribe of Washington ("Tribe")
sought damages from the United States, the City of Tacoma ("City"),
and Tacoma Public Utilities ("TPU") for alleged harm caused by the
Cushman Hydroelectric Project ("Project"). The City constructed the
Project in 1930, which consisted of two dams and two reservoirs. The
Tribe sued the City and TPU because the Project released water that
flooded over thirty acres of federal land upstream from the Tribe's
land holding. The Tribe claimed the Project diverted the flow of the
Skokomish River and caused flooding of the reservation, the failure of
septic systems, contamination of water wells, and damage to orchards
and fisheries. In total, the Tribe claimed nearly $5 billion in losses.
The District Court for the Western District of Washington granted
summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed the Tribe's claim.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Tribe claimed the Project infringed on the Tribe's water
rights by diverting water and impeding the Tribe's ability to fish in the
Skokomish River. Specifically, the Tribe argued its treaty with the
United States implicitly reserved water rights sufficient to allow the
tribe to fish in the Skokomish River. However, the treaty provided the
Tribe should have "the right of taking fish.. .in common with all citizens of the United States." This language differed from the treaty in
United States v. Adair that expressly provided tribes with "exclusive onreservation fishing" rights. Additionally, the court reasoned that past
case law suggested treaties reserved "only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, [but] no more." Thus,
because the district court found fishing was not a primary purpose of
the reservation, diverting water for the Project did not violate the
Tribe's water rights. Therefore, the court upheld the district court's
grant of summary judgment.
In addition, the court dismissed the Tribe's claims under the Federal Power Act ("FPA"). The Tribe alleged the United States violated
the FPA by issuing a license to the City to build and operate the Project
without considering or providing protection for fish and wildlife. The
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court dismissed this claim because the FPA clearly exempted the
United States from liability.
In dissent, Judge Berzon disagreed with the majority's grant of
summary judgment on the issue of water rights. Judge Berzon argued
there a sufficient factual dispute over whether fishing was a primary
purpose of the reservation existed. Thus, judge Berzon believed the
Tribe's claims should survive summary judgment. First, Judge Berzon
argued the court could interpret the treaty as implicitly giving the
Tribe the right to fish on the reservation. Based on United States Supreme Court precedent in Winters v. United States, the parties to the
treaty were concerned with protecting the Tribe's fishing rights on the
reservation because the treaty preserved the right to fish offreservation. In addition, prior precedent in Fishing Vessel suggested the
court should construe the treaty in the manner in which it "would
naturally be understood by the Indians." Therefore, the court should
have given weight to the Tribe's understanding of the treaty. Thus,
Judge Berzon believed on-reservation fishing could be a primary purpose of the reservation and the court could construe the treaty as retaining water rights sufficient to provide for fishing.
The court thus affirmed the district court's holding that the Project
did not violate the Tribe's water rights.
Kathryn L. Garner
United States v. Orr Ditch Co., 391 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding
under the Orr Ditch Decree, Nevada procedures were applicable to the
adjudication of water rights).
The Orr Ditch Decree represented the final adjudication of water
rights in the Truckee Division of the federal Newlands Reclamation
Project, and allowed entitled parties to change the place, means, manner, or purpose of water use so long as they did so in a manner provided by law. This case arose after the United States District Court for
the District of Nevada ruled Nevada law, rather than the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, governed a motion for a stay of the State Engineer's
ruling under the Orr Ditch Decree.
The Orr Water Ditch Company appealed the State Engineer's ruling, granting the Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians ("Tribe") and the
United States' application to make temporary changes to two water
rights. Nevada Revised Statute section 533.450(5) allowed for an
automatic stay of the State Engineer's ruling on a change application
upon a timely request and posting of bond. The Tribe and the United
States argued the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should control because the stay was a procedural matter. However, the district court
concluded Nevada law governed the motion for a stay.
In upholding the district court's decision, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded the Orr Ditch Decree's
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order that parties make changes in water use in a manner provided by
law required the application of both substantive state water law and
procedural state water law. More importantly, the court determined
Nevada Revised Statute section 533.450(5) was an inseparable part of
Nevada water law because without an automatic stay, as provided by
Nevada Revised Statute section 533.450(5), it would be impossible to
remedy an error by the State Engineer since the water at issue would
already be used. Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted it previously held
Nevada procedures for adjudicating water disputes applied to Orr
Ditch proceedings. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's ruling
that Nevada law, rather than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governed the motion for a stay of the State Engineer's ruling under the
Orr Ditch Decree.
Charles P. Kersch, Jr.

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pages Morales, 368 F.3d 1320 (11th
Cir. 2004) (holding the District Court for the Southern District of Florida abused it discretion when it granted an abstention based on a misapplication of the ColoradoRiver doctrine, because even the six factors
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered in analyzing the
permissibility of an abstention failed to overcome the strong bias
against abstention).
This case arose between Ambrosia Coal and Construction Company ("Ambrosia") and Pages Morales ("Pages") over a settlement
agreement ("Settlement") concerning a leasehold interest in real estate in Isla Verde, Puerto Rico. After the entering into the Settlement,
Pages entered into an agreement with Green Isle, Ltd. that unilaterally
compromised the Settlement. Ambrosia filed a suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ("Federal
Case"). Simultaneously, Pages and other defendants filed a lawsuit in
the Court of First Instance of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
("Puerto Rico Case").
Pages filed a motion to dismiss the Federal Case. Although it denied the motion, the district court considered whether it should abstain, pending final judgment in the Puerto Rico Case, based on the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Colorado River Water Conservation Districtv. United States. After the district court granted an abstention, Ambrosia appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, alleging the abstention was an abuse of discretion.
The court began its analysis by discussing Colorado River, a case
where the United States filed a suit in federal court against approximately 1000 water users, seeking declaration of the government's water
rights. Before any proceedings occurred in that case, one of the water
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users filed a suit in state court seeking an order to join the United
States in a proceeding to adjudicate both federal and state water rights.
Under the McCarran Amendment, the water users could bring the
United States into the adjudication without the United States' consent.
Once the United States was included in the state proceeding, the water
users, who were defendants in the United States' federal court action,
filed a motion to dismiss the federal proceeding on the ground that
the "McCarran Amendment terminated jurisdiction of federal courts
to adjudicate federal water rights." The federal court in ColoradoRiver
granted abstention without reaching the jurisdictional question, and
the Supreme Court affirmed the abstention.
In its opinion in Colorado River, the Supreme Court held federal
courts could only abstain from a case that another court is also adjudicating to avoid duplicative litigation in exceptional circumstances. The
most important factor in granting the abstentionwas the fact that the
McCarran Amendment showed a clear federal policy of avoiding the
"piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system." The Supreme Court concluded that, because of the local nature of the water,
Colorado law would provide a more comprehensive adjudication.
The court considered whether the Colorado River doctrine should
apply to the Federal Case. The court held the Colorado River doctrine
applied when the proceeding involved substantially the same parties
and issues. Because the Puerto Rico Case and the Federal Case involved substantially the same parties and issues, the court concluded
the doctrine properly applied to the case. The court then considered
whether the abstention was an abuse of discretion.
The court laid out a set of factors the Eleventh Circuit used inanalyzing the permissibility of an abstention: (1) whether one of the courts
had assumed jurisdiction over property, (2) the inconvenience of the
federal forum, (3) the potential for piecemeal litigation, (4) the order
in which the forum obtained jurisdiction, (5) whether state or federal
law would be applied, and (6) the adequacy of the state court to protect the parties' rights. The court stated it would consider the factors
"flexibly and pragmatically, not as a 'mechanical checklist,'" and a
heavy bias against abstention existed. The court determined all of the
factors taken together and individually could not overcome the bias
against abstention; thus, the abstention was an abuse of discretion.
The court therefore reversed the district court's abstention and remanded the case.
Mark Terzaghi Howe
Fla. Pub. Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby v. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 386 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding: (1) environmental
groups had standing to sue; (2) EPA's review of Florida's impaired waters list did not rendered moot by EPA's review of Florida's impaired
waters list; and (3) remand to district court required to determine
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whether rule had actual effect of changing existing surface water quality standards).
The Florida Public Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby, three
environmental groups, and a Florida resident (collectively "Environmental Groups") brought an action in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to appeal the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida's order granting summary
judgment in favor of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection ("FDEP"). In district court, the Environmental Groups sought to
enforce the requirement that EPA review any new or revised water
quality standards for compliance with the citizen suit provision under
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). They contended that Florida's Impaired Waters Rule ("Rule") modified the state's surface water quality
standards; therefore, EPA had a duty to review the Rule. FDEP intervened as a defendant. The district court entered summary judgment
in favor of EPA and FDEP.
The Clean Water Act divides the nation's water responsibilities between the federal and state governments. State governments, like Florida's, must establish water quality standards for all of their water bodies. The Clean Water Act requires EPA to undertake a review of any
new or revised water quality standards adopted by the states.
The Florida State Legislature instructed FDEP to adopt a methodology to identify its impaired waters. On April 26, 2001, FDEP adopted
the Impaired Waters Rule under which Florida would compile an "Impaired Waters List" ("List") identifying bodies of water not safe enough
to use as designated. FDEP determined these impaired water bodies by
interpreting existing water quality criteria and evaluating attainment of
established designated uses. The Rule demonstrated no intent to establish new water quality criteria or standards. Once created, the List
required EPA approval, and if EPA disapproved of the states proposed
List, EPA would issue its own list.
On August 28, 2002, FDEP used the Rule to re-examine about
twenty percent of Florida's water bodies. On October 1, 2002, the state
submitted its updated List for EPA review. In this review, EPA did not
make a threshold determination whether the Rule complied with the
Clean Water Act, but rather subjected each of the state's methodologies to a "reasonableness" review. On finding a particular methodology reasonable, EPA approved without further review all water bodies
on the List based on that methodology. EPA did not re-examine the
data for water bodies that FDEP de-listed due to the change in methodology. Where EPA disagreed with a methodology, EPA simply conducted its own independent review of water bodies, repeating, rather
than reviewing, Florida's required work. EPA disagreed with many of
Florida's de-listings and added many back to the List. However, after
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complete review, FDEP had removed from the List over 100 water bodies previously considered impaired.
The Environmental Groups contended on appeal to EPA that the
Rule effectively changed Florida's water quality standards, and therefore, the Rule was subject to nondiscretionary review by EPA. First,
they argued that the state's original water quality standards required
criteria not to be exceeded at any time. The Rule allowed multiple
exceedances to occur without causing a water body to be classified as
impaired, which resulted in looser water quality standards. Second,
they argued that the Rule required use of specific nutrient concentrations as the primary means for assessing nutrient impairment in water
bodies and that Florida's pre-existing, approved water quality standards
did not include these means.
On appeal, the court first addressed the issue of whether the Environmental Groups had standing to sue. The court stated that standing
required the Environmental Groups to establish that 1) they suffered a
concrete, particularized, actual or imminent injury in fact; 2) the injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged actions; and 3) judicial action is
likely to redress the injury. Additionally, the party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of proving standing. At the summary
judgment stage, as here, the plaintiff must set forth, by affidavit or
other evidence, specific facts, which for purposes of the summary
judgment motion, will be taken to be true. Here, the Environmental
Groups provided detailed affidavits averring how the EPA's failure to
review the rule particularly injured them. The court held the Environmental Groups satisfied the prongs of the standing inquiry and that
their injury was fairly traceable to EPA's failure to review the Rule,
since the Rule could cause EPA to leave polluted water bodies off the
List, preventing those water bodies from being cleaned.
The court next addressed whether EPA's review of the List rendered the case moot. EPA argued that this case was moot because its
subsequent review of Florida's update to the List nullified any harm
that might have resulted from its failure to review the Rule itself. Section 303(c) of the CWA requires a rigorous examination of many factors including 1) whether the state's criteria protect the designated
water uses; 2) whether the state followed its own legal procedures for
revising or adopting standards; 3) whether the state standards are
based on appropriate technical and scientific date and analyses; and 4)
whether the revision is consistent with the state's anti-degradation policy. Here, EPA merely examined the Rule for reasonableness, rather
than subjecting it to the searching review required by section 303(c).
The court found EPA's review less comprehensive than required for
new or revised water quality standards. In addition, the court found
that the injuries alleged by the Environmental Groups went beyond
those caused by Florida's listing decisions and could recur each time
the List is updated, thus making the controversy not moot. The court
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also cautioned that Florida's reliance on the EPA to review its List
could eliminate one layer of protection envisioned by the CWA in that
Florida's reliance on EPA's review would give the power to enforce
pollution controls solely to the federal agency.
Lastly, the court addressed the Environmental Groups' argument
on the merits that the district court erroneously granted summary
judgment based on its conclusion that the Rule did not create new or
revised water quality standards. In Miccosukee, the district court similarly failed to conduct a thorough review of the Rule's effect on Florida's water quality standards concerning the Everglades Forever Act,
and the court found that EPA had a mandatory duty to review any new
or revised state standards. The court found that FDEP and EPA applied the Rule when they created and approved the updated changes
to the List. Thus, if water bodies under pre-existing testing methodologies would have been included on the List and were left off due to
the Rule, then the Rule would have created new or revised water quality standards, even if the language of the regulation said otherwise.
Therefore, the court held that the district court erred by relying on
Florida's failure to follow the mandated procedures to amend its water
quality standards and by failing to conduct a thorough review of the
effect of the Rule on Florida's water quality standards.
In conclusion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that the Environmental Groups had standing to sue, their
claim was not mooted by the EPA's review of the Impaired Waters List,
and the district court erred in determining as a matter of law that the
Impaired Waters Rule did not establish new or revised water quality
standards. The court vacated the final order of summary judgment
and remanded for further proceedings to determine what effect, if any,
the Impaired Waters Rule had on Florida's existing water quality standards.
JuliaHerron

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Edison Elec. Inst. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 391 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (holding the EPA's whole effluent test methods were not invalid
because the EPA did not ignore relevant record evidence, it adequately
accounted for its departure from its usual criteria and procedures for
ensuring scientific validity of test methods, and its actions were not
arbitrary and capricious).
Edison Electric Institute and other organizations representing corporate and municipal dischargers (collectively "Dischargers") brought
petitions for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia claiming Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA")
whole effluent toxicity ("WET") test methods were invalid. WET tests
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measure the descriptive criterion for effluent under the Clean Water
Act. Dischargers claimed (1) the EPA did not adhere to its usual criteria and procedures for ensuring scientific validity of WET test methods,
(2) WET test methods produced an unacceptably high number of false
positives, (3) the EPA failed to establish detection limits for WET test
methods, and (4) the EPA failed to demonstrate the applicability and
availability of WET testing.
First, Dischargers claimed the EPA did not adhere to usual criteria
and procedures for ensuring the scientific validity of the test methods,
which included accuracy, precision, practical applicability, establishment of detection limits, and the minimization of external interference. EPA conceded the WET tests did not incorporate all factors, but
the court held the EPA adequately accounted for any departure from
such factors. EPA admitted accuracy, which consisted of precision and
bias, in the technical sense was inapplicable to WET testing. However,
EPA broke down the accuracy analysis into precision and bias. EPA
conceded the inapplicability of bias but stated WET test methods satisfied precision and the court held EPA's action was not arbitrary or capricious. Since, WET testing was biological, relying on live organisms,
EPA could not attain a "true value."
Second, Dischargers argued WET test methods produced a high
number of false positives. Dischargers defined "false positive" far more
expansively than the EPA. Dischargers were concerned that WET tests
had the potential to produce arbitrary permit violations. However, the
court felt the EPA demonstrated the WET test methods produced a
variation that was not excessive. Further, EPA provided a safeguard by
limiting false positive rates to at most five percent, while allowing false
negative rates up to twenty percent.
Third, Dischargers objected to EPA's failure to establish detection
limits for WET test methods. However, EPA only applied detection
limits to tests that rely on instrumental measurements and because
WET testing is biological and experimental, EPA did not apply detection limit concepts. Further, the ratified test methods had a built-in
mechanism, which served the same basic purpose as detection limits in
an instrumental test.
Finally, Dischargers claimed EPA failed to demonstrate the availability and applicability of WET testing. Dischargers claimed the EPA
violated its own guidelines requiring a blind study because laboratories
chosen for the trial of WET testing knew in advance that they would
participate. However, the court stated Dischargers misinterpreted
blind testing because the EPA only required blind samples, which the
laboratories received. In addition, Dischargers alleged the EPA ignored results of the peer review process. However, the court found
EPA published an extensive response to peer comments and acknowledged the peer-review process in its revisions to the Final Rule in the
Federal Register.
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Therefore, the court rejected Dischargers' petition for review since
Dischargers did not demonstrate EPA ignored relevant evidence, contradicted its own policies without explanation, or acted arbitrarily or
capriciously.
Kevin Lazar
S.E. Fed. Power Customers, Inc. v. Harvey, 400 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(holding a federal court lacked jurisdiction because a district court's
conditional approval of a settlement agreement was not a final disposition that rendered the case moot).
The States of Alabama and Florida sought review of an order by the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia that approved
a settlement agreement between the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), various Georgia municipal and county water authorities ("Water Supply Providers"), and Southeastern Federal Power
Customers, Inc. ("Southeastern"), and then the court dismissed the
action as moot. The settlement agreement provided that the Corps
was to enter into renewable ten-year contracts with the Water Supply
Providers and Southeastern for the lease of water storage space.
Southeastern filed this suit in December 2000 to enjoin the Corps
from allowing increased water withdrawals by the Water Supply Providers. The Corps, Southeastern, and the Water Supply Providers reached
the settlement agreement in January 2003. Subsequently, Florida and
Alabama intervened in the action, alleging the settlement violated a
1990 stay order issued by the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama, which prohibited contracts or agreements relating to a suit Alabama filed against the Corps for allowing
increased water withdrawal by the Water Supply Providers. On October 15, 2003, the Alabama district court issued a preliminary injunction, but the District of Columbia district court denied a motion to
dismiss, transfer, or abate on November 7, 2003. Thus, two separate
actions remained. On February 10, 2004, the District of Columbia district court rejected Florida and Alabama's challenge and ordered instatement of the settlement agreement conditioned upon revocation of
the Alabama district court's preliminary injunction. Two days later,
the District of Columbia district court issued an order dismissing the
action as moot, based upon the District of Columbia district court's
approval of the settlement agreement.
On appeal, the United States Appeals Court for the District of Columbia Circuit considered its jurisdiction to hear this case. The appeals court stated it could review district court actions resulting only in
final orders. That court determined federal courts lacked jurisdiction
to consider the merits of moot claims, because judicial power extended
only to "cases or controversies." When a court already resolved the
issues presented or the parties no longer had a legally recognizable
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interest in the outcome, the case was moot. The court concluded the
instant action was not moot because the District of Columbia district
court only conditionally approved the settlement, and that condition
was an event not certain to occur. The settlement agreement was only
tentative, so the underlying action was not moot. The court would not
consider the approval of the settlement agreement as a final disposition until the Alabama district court lifted its preliminary injunction.
The court determined it lacked jurisdiction in this case because the
District of Columbia district court's approval of the settlement did not
constitute a final position. The court remanded the case because Article III of the United States Constitution prohibited federal courts from
issuing advisory opinions.
Kevin Kennedy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Am. Rivers, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, Civ. No. 043188, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25410 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2004) (holding a
claim seeking an injunction to lower water flow levels becomes moot
when water flow levels are voluntarily lowered back to original amounts
sought).
In July 2004, American Rivers, Inc., sought a preliminary injunction
from the District Court for the District of Minnesota ordering the
United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to reduce releases
from a dam on the Missouri River. Both sides moved for summary
judgment.
The dispute related to a United States Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS") biological opinion ("BiOp") that FWS issued in 2003. FWS
issued the BiOp after consulting with the Corps about increasing water
flow from a dam on the Missouri River. After consultation, FWS determined an increase in water flow would jeopardize three endangered
species. Pursuant to the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), FWS set
forth reasonable and prudent alternatives in the 2003 BiOp. One alternative allowed modification of water flow only after the Corps constructed 1200 acres of shallow water habitat. Once the Corps constructed the artificial habitat, FWS allowed the Corps to increase flows
above the current threshold. In 2004, FWS determined the Corps successfully constructed the 1200 acres of shallow water habitat and authorized increased water flow.
American Rivers filed suit against both the Corps and FWS. First,
American Rivers claimed the Corps violated the ESA by increasing water flow. Second, American Rivers claimed FWS acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in determining that the Corps successfully constructed the
habitat.
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The court dismissed the suit against the Corps because American
Rivers failed to provide proper notification under the ESA. American
Rivers' notice of intent letter and complaint alleged different claims
and failed to provide adequate notice. Thus, the court found it had no
jurisdiction over the claim.
The court also dismissed American Rivers' claim that FWS failed to
properly implement the 2003 BiOp. Although the Corps initially increased flow levels, the Corps subsequently reduced water flow to previous levels because of heavy rains. Thus, the court concluded the case
was moot because American Rivers had no injury at the time of litigation.
The also court found it lacked jurisdiction to decide the ESA claim
against the Corps, due to American Rivers' faulty notice letter. Additionally, the court held the claim against FWS regarding implementation of the alternative was moot. Thus, the court granted summary
judgment for FWS and the Corps and dismissed American Rivers'
complaint without prejudice.
Kathryn Garner
Cassaboon v. Town of Somers, 359 F. Supp. 2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(holding a town's issuance of a permit allowing individuals to connect
their home to a local water district did not authorize excavation of a
right of way and, therefore, did not violate procedural or substantive
due process, affect a taking or condemnation, or violate first amendment rights).
John and Barbara Ann Cassaboon ("the Cassaboons") filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
against the Town of Somers ("Town") and Stephen and Marie Danko
("the Dankos") alleging violations of multiple federal rights. Specifically, the Cassaboons contended the Town denied them procedural
and substantive due process, took a right of way they owned, and violated their First Amendment rights by retaliating against them for prior
claims against the Town. The Cassaboons claimed the Dankos were
also liable because the Dankos collaborated with the Town to deprive
the Cassaboons of federal rights. Finally, the Cassaboons' complaint
asserted a trespass claim and a de facto condemnation claim under
New York state law. The court granted the Town's summary judgment
motion, dismissed all claims against the Town, and partially granted
the Dankos summary judgment motion dismissing all claims except for
the trespass claim.
This case developed after the Dankos moved into a new home and
discovered the well supplying their home with water was dry. The
Dankos lived outside of the water district that supplied the Town, and
to solve their water problem, they petitioned for an out-of-district permit. On January 17, 2002, the Town board met and voted in favor of a
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resolution approving the out-of-district permit ("Resolution"). To
connect their home to the water supply, the Dankos excavated a right
of way adjacent to their land that appeared on the Dankos' survey as
part of an unimproved street. The Cassaboons owned parcels of land
on both sides of the right of way and claimed they owned the right of
way under New York law because the Town abandoned it. No party
disputed this claim. The Cassaboons claimed their property, if united
with the right of way, would be very valuable. As a result, the Cassaboons filed suit.
The court concluded the Town did not violate the Cassaboons' federal rights because the Resolution only gave the Dankos the right to
connect to the Town water supply, not to excavate the right of way.
The Resolution, therefore, did not authorize the Dankos' excavation.
Because the Town did not deprive the Cassaboons of a liberty or property interest, the court dismissed the takings claim and First Amendment claim. The court stated the Town's failure to give the Cassaboons notice of the meeting did not violate the Cassaboons' procedural due process rights because the meeting did not deprive the Cassaboons of property.
Since the Town did not deprive the Cassaboons of a property interest, the court also dismissed the claims for violations of federal
rights against the Dankos. The Dankos did not act together with the
Town to deprive the Cassaboons of their rights; furthermore, the
Dankos were private actors. The court similarly dismissed the condemnation claim against the Dankos because the Town did not take
the Cassaboons' property. However, the court allowed tho t respass
claim against the Dankos to go forward in the New York Supreme
Court.
Thus, the court dismissed all of the Cassaboons' claims against the
Town and all of the Cassaboons' claims against the Dankos, except for
the state law trespass claim.
JaredEllis
Dayv. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. SA-03-CA-0492-FB, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8908 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2004) (granting Edwards Aquifer Authority's motion to dismiss because the Edwards Aquifer contained a
limited amount of water, the water and its regulation was of vital importance to the citizens of Texas, and the state maintained a comprehensive regulatory system to manage the Aquifer).
On December 30, 1996, Burrell Day and Joel McDaniel (collectively "Day") filed an application with the Edwards Aquifer Authority
("Authority") requesting to withdraw 700 acre-feet of water from the
Edwards Aquifer. The Authority approved Day's application in 1998.
However, in 1999 Day realized that the existing well needed substantial
repairs, and accordingly applied to the Authority to transfer the initial
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permit for 700 acre-feet of water from the existing well to a new well
that Day planned to drill. The Authority approved Day's request to
drill a new well on December 10, 1999. However, on November 8,
2000, the Authority's general manager recommended that the Authority grant Day zero feet of water because Day failed to prove that the
water satisfied a "purpose authorized by law." Day objected to this recommendation, and the Authority referred Day's objection to the State
Office of Administrative Hearings where an administrative law judge
("ALJ") recommended the Authority grant Day a permit for fourteen
acre-feet of water. Day appealed this decision to the Authority's board
of directors ("Board"). On March 11, 2003, the Board adopted the
ALJ's recommendation and issued Day a permit for fourteen acre-feet
of water. Day filed suit in United States District Court for the Western
District of Texas. The Authority filed a motion to dismiss the case
from federal court because Day's case involved questions of state law
and issues of vital state concern.
The Authority based its motion to dismiss on Sierra Club v. City of
San Antonio, in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
Burford abstention doctrine in cases involving the Authority. The
court noted the Burford abstention doctrine turned on whether the
plaintiff's claim involved an issue of state law that a state court needed
to rule on before the federal case could proceed. The court found the
state of Texas retained great interest in the regulation of the Edwards
Aquifer, and because the Aquifer contained a finite amount of water,
the state should maintain the regulatory scheme. Furthermore, the
state maintained a comprehensive administrative and appellate procedure for considering questions regarding the Edwards Aquifer and
held greater interest and familiarity with the Aquifer than did the federal government. Therefore, the court granted the Authority's motion
to dismiss the case based on the Burford abstention doctrine.
In sum, the court granted the Authority's motion to dismiss because the Edwards Aquifer, a completely intrastate source of water,
contained a limited amount of water, because the water and its regulation were of vital importance to Texas, and because Texas already
maintained a comprehensive regulatory system to manage the aquifer.
BrettJohnson
Friends of the Earth v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 346 F. Supp.
2d 182 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding the Clean Water Act was ambiguous as
to whether the United States Environmental Protection Agency must
calculate total maximum daily loads on a daily basis and upholding the
United States Environmental Protection Agency's adoption of nondaily TMDLs as reasonable statutory construction and reasonably determined to achieve daily water quality standards).
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Friends of the Earth ("Friends"), an environmental group, sued the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in United
States District Court for the District of Columbia claiming the EPA's
approval of total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") for the District of
Columbia violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Both parties moved
for summary judgment. Section 303(d) of the CWA requires states to
promulgate water quality standards and supplement those standards
with TMDLs if effluent controls are not achieving the water quality
standards ("WQSs"). TMDLs are maximum pollutant concentrations
in a water body, for a given time, calculated at a level necessary to implement the WQSs, with seasonal variation and a margin of safety. The
District of Columbia created a yearly TMDL for biological oxygen demand ("BOD"), and the EPA approved this standard. The EPA created and approved a seasonal TMDL for total suspended solids.
Friends claimed the EPA acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner
for two reasons: the CWA required daily TMDLs, and both the BOD
and total suspended solids TMDL were insufficient to achieve the

WQSs.
The court first examined whether the EPA acted arbitrarily in setting a seasonal and annual TMDL, reviewing the agency decision under the standards set forth in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, Inc. First, the court asked whether Congress had directly addressed the issue. If the intent of Congress was clear, then the agency
and the court must give effect to that intent. Second, if the statute was
silent or ambiguous then the court must determine if the agency based
its answer upon a permissible construction of the statute.
To determine if the statute was ambiguous, the court applied traditional tools of statutory interpretation, including language, intent,
structure, and purpose. The court did not read the term "daily" in
TMDL in isolation, but rather in statutory context. The court looked
to the intent of Congress in creating the CWA and TMDLs, and compared portions of section 402 requiring the EPA to base municipal
storm sewer permits upon best management practices with the TMDL
requirement in section 303 (d). If section 303 (d) required daily TMDL
standards, it would alter the flexible choices and maximum extent
practicable controls of section 402. The court determined the conflict
between these two sections revealed an ambiguity in congressional intent on TMDLs. The court also decided that section 402 was not an
exception to 303 (d) TMDL requirements, as argued by Friends.
The structure and purpose of the CWA also suggested to the court
that Congress did not intend a rigid application of the word daily. The
EPA used TMDLs as tools, not formal controls, to achieve WQSs in
non-attainment waterbodies. The court noted Congress divided mandatory technology controls from WQSs and TMDLs within the CWA.
TMDLs exist to supplement insufficient technology based controls, and
it would be at odds with the statute to require the EPA to use daily
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TMDLs even if non-daily TMDLs more effectively achieved WQSs. In
addition, the court determined Congress did not intend for the EPA to
impose daily TMDLs when they generated no benefit, by looking to
various other sections of the CWA. The statute permits the EPA to issue permit modifications if there is a reasonable relationship between
the costs and the benefits. The EPA may modify effluent limitations
based on TMDLs where the water quality exceeds the WQSs.
The court also concluded non-daily TMDLs were consistent with
the congressional policy to delegate power to the EPA to set these
standards where appropriate. Deviation from daily standards occurred
only when there was a polluted waterbody that non-daily standards
would more effectively regulate. There was no agency usurpation in
this case, since the EPA was not substituting its judgment for that of
Congress. The regulated area required knowledge of the industry and
the definition of daily-required agency expertise. The court held the
word "daily" was ambiguous after considering the language, intent,
structure, and purpose of the CWA. Congress did not clearly intend to
require the EPA to calculate only daily TMDLs.
Since Congress was ambiguous in creating TMDLs, the court next
determined whether the EPA's use of a seasonal and annual TMDL was
reasonable in light of the record and purpose of the statute. For the
BOD TMDL, the court decided the EPA's use of a yearly term was reasonable because the agency explained its decision, and no evidence
existed of a superior term. The court also determined the seasonal
total suspended solids TMDL was reasonable since the EPA explained
its decision, and the court reasoned seasonal reductions effectively
regulated total suspended solids.
The second issue for the court was whether the EPA calculated the
TMDLs at a level reasonably stringent enough to achieve the District of
Columbia's daily WQSs. The court noted it must uphold a TMDL if it
falls within a zone of reasonableness.
The court concluded the EPA reasonably calculated the yearly
BOD standard to achieve the District of Columbia's daily WQSs because of the scientific uncertainty involved and the EPA's use of reliable computer modeling. The court would not require the EPA to
explain how the TMDLs would achieve the daily WQSs, only why the
EPA believed they would achieve the WQSs. Although the court believed one of the EPA's possible regulation scenarios was a better
choice, the court still upheld the EPA's decision because it was reasonable. The court also upheld the EPA's approach for determining the
margin of safety because determining the proper approach for margin
of safety was a policy choice left specifically to the agency's judgment.
The court also upheld the seasonal TMDL for total suspended solids against a challenge of failure to achieve daily WQSs. The EPA
chose to calculate the total suspended solids TMDL to achieve wildlife
protection and not recreational and aesthetic uses. The court permit-
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ted the EPA to use wildlife protection as a surrogate standard for
achieving recreational and aesthetic uses of the river because Congress
did not state a specific process for TMDL calculation. The EPA reasonably assumed their level of reduction would meet all standards. In
addition, the WQSs for the District of Columbia were subjective, requiring only that the waters be free from "objectionable odor, color,
taste, or turbidity." The court would not accept objective facts to contradict the EPA's assertion because there was no frame of reference to
compare the evidence. The EPA also indicated their willingness to
revise the standard set for total suspended solids if there was a future
showing the seasonal average violated the subjective criteria.
The court finally addressed the EPA's assignment of wasteload allocation, or the allocation of the receiving water's capacity to existing or
future sources of pollution. The EPA assigned waste loads by a single
permit to a treatment plant and a single permit to the District of Columbia's municipal separate storm sewer system. The court found this
allocation was a reasonable interpretation because allocation into categories of sources did not deviate from the CWA or regulations.
For the reasons articulated above, the court granted summary
judgment for the EPA.
HeatherHeinlein
Grand Lake Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Veneman, 340 F. Supp. 2d
1162 (D. Colo. 2004) (holding the United States Forest Service could
require special use permits that affected the use of private land adjacent to the boundaries of a national forest, but the Forest Service did
not have the authority to impound private property to compel holders
of special use permits to comply with the terms contained therein).
Grand Lake Estates Homeowners Association ("GLEHA") filed suit
in United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the
Secretary of Agriculture asserting claims for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief against the United States Forest Service ("Forest Service"), relating to GLEHA's use of facilities on Shadow Mountain Reservoir. GLEHA owned a marina and docks built in the early 1960s on a
small body of water located within the Grand Lake Estates subdivision,
where a small man-made channel provided boat access from the marina to Shadow Mountain Reservoir. In 1978 Congress created the
Arapahoe National Recreation Area ("ANRA"), which encompassed
Shadow Mountain Reservoir, and delegated management of the ANRA
to the Forest Service.
In 1985 the Forest Service notified GLEHA that it required a special use permit for GLEHA's marina. Thereafter, GLEHA applied for,
and the Forest Service approved, special use permits for GLEHA's marina and boat docks. Pursuant to the special use permits, the Forest
Service assessed GLEHA an annual fee, which GLEHA refused to pay
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between 1996 and 2000. In 2000 the Forest Service provided GLEHA
with notice that it might enforce the permit requirements, including
denying water access to Shadow Mountain Reservoir, impounding
GLEHA's boat docks, and impounding its members' personal boats.
The Forest Service then erected a fence across the channel, closing
access from the marina to Shadow Mountain Reservoir. In 2001
GLEHA brought this action to enjoin the Forest Service from impounding GLEHA's private property and to obtain a judicial determination of the Forest Service's power to require special use permits.
The court first addressed whether the Forest Service had the power
to require or issue special use permits that affected the use of private
land adjacent to the boundaries of a national forest. Interpreting the
Property Clause of the United States Constitution, the court stated the
United States had the power regulate conduct on non-federal land
when reasonably necessary to protect adjacent federal property or
navigable waters. According to the court, GLEHA's activities, if unregulated, may adversely affect federal land, due to the short distance
between the border of the ANRA and GLEHA's water and the possibility of direct affects from the marina on the water quality of Shadow
Mountain Reservoir. Thus, the Forest Service was justified in requiring
the special use permits for GLEHA's boat docks and marina.
Next, the court addressed whether the Forest Service had the authority to impound GLEHA's private property, including its marina,
boat docks and its members' boats. The Forest Service asserted it did
have such authority and cited a regulation providing for the impoundment of vehicles, or other inanimate personal property on National Forest System lands, which owners do not remove from the forestland within a prescribed time. However, the court refused to extend
the regulation to adjoining private land, and therefore held the Forest
Service did not have the authority to physically impound and sell, as it
threatened to do, the personal property located outside the boundaries of the ANRA. The court ruled the Forest Service's action of erecting a fence blocking access from the marina to Shadow Mountain Reservoir was a reasonable method for the Forest Service to enforce its
special use permits, because such action was within the ancillary authority of the Forest Service to protect the ANRA.
In conclusion, the court denied GLEHA's request for declaratory
judgment insofar as it requested the court declare the Forest Service
did not have the authority to require the special use permits. However,
the court granted GLEHA's request for declaratory judgment with respect to the Forest Service's authority to impound GLEHA's private
property. Lastly, the court dismissed GLEHA's request for an injunction against the Forest Service to preclude it from impounding
GLEHA's private property as moot.
DonaldE. Frick
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Natural Res. Def. Council v. Patterson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 906 (E.D. Cal.
2004) (holding a California statute requiring a dam owner to release a
sufficient amount of water necessary to keep any fish that lived below
the dam in good condition applied to federal agencies).
The Natural Resources Defense Council and others (collectively
"NRDC") filed a motion for summary adjudication of their claim
against Roger Patterson, the Department of Interior's Bureau of Reclamation ("BRC"), the Chowchilla Water District ("CWD") and several
irrigation districts (collectively "Friant litigants") under the Reclamation Act of 1902 ("Act"). The NRDC alleged the BRC failed to release
the amount of water through Friant Dam necessary to keep the historic
fisheries in good condition. The irrigation districts and the CWD
brought cross-motions for summary adjudication and dismissal in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California.
Before the construction of Friant Dam, the San Joaquin River supported substantial populations of Chinook salmon and other species of
fish. The San Joaquin River had one of the largest Chinook runs on
the Pacific Coast. Chinook habitation existed both above and below
the Friant Darn. The construction of Friant Dam blocked upstream
access to a portion of salmon and steelhead spawning habitat. The
dam's construction, however, was not the cause of a decrease in fish
population. For several years after Friant Dam was in place, the BRC
released a sufficient amount of water to sustain spawning habitat below
the dam. Rather, the BRC's increasing water diversions destroyed fish
habitation, which led to the decline in fish population.
The California Fish and Game Code ("Code") required the dam
owners to "allow sufficient water at all times to pass through a fishway,
or in the absence of a fishway, [to] allow sufficient water to pass over,
around, or through the dam, [and] to keep in good condition any fish
that may be planted or exist below the dam." Furthermore, the Act
provided that courts were not to construe the Act in any way that interfered with the laws of any state, including laws regulating the control
and use of water used for irrigation. The court held the Act required
BRC to comply with California's water laws.
The Friant litigants first argued NRDC lacked standing. The court
stated it had already denied the Friant litigants' previous motion to
dismiss on the same grounds, and concluded NRDC had constitutional
and statutory standing. The Friant litigants next argued the court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") did not authorize judicial review of NRDC's claim.
Relying on the United States Supreme Court, the court noted a litigant
could bring an APA claim where that litigant asserts an agency failed to
take a discrete action that the agency was required to take. The court
held, because the Act required the secretary of an agency to comply
with state laws, the court did have subject matter jurisdiction under the
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APA and the BRC needed to release sufficient water to reestablish and
maintain the historic fisheries.
The Friant litigants also argued a prior decision by the State Water
Resource Control Board ("Board") barred NRDC's claim. The court
reasoned that it had, in a prior ruling, already determined the Board's
decision did not bar NRDC's claim, and the Friant litigants could not
litigate the issue again without a change in law or circumstances. Finally, the Friant litigants argued the Central Valley Project Improvement Act ("CVPIA") preempted NRDC's claim. The CVPLA provided
that Friant Dam water was not to be released from the Dam to comply
with other provisions of the CVPIA regarding the development of a
plan to reestablish fish below the Dam. The court concluded it had
already denied the Friant litigants' previous motions to dismiss on the
same grounds, and the CVPIA was not in actual conflict with the Code.
After discrediting all of the Friant litigants' arguments, the court
held no genuine issue of material fact as to whether BRC had released
sufficient water to maintain historic fisheries below Friant Dam existed.
Therefore, the court granted NRDC's motion for summary adjudication.
Andrew L. Ellis
Romeo v. Sherry, 308 F. Supp. 2d 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding waterfront property owner's claims for trespass, nuisance, interference with
riparian rights, and adverse possession failed because property owner
did not prove ownership of foreshore and the owner did not have reasonable access to the waterway).
In August 1994 Joseph Romeo ("Romeo") purchased waterfront
property, zoned for heavy industrial use, in hopes of developing the
property into a multi-use facility for weddings and other community
events. Fourteen steel and wooden barges rested on the foreshore of
Romeo's property, and in his property's sightline were numerous businesses including a shipyard, a petrochemical tank farm, a sewer outlet,
and a railroad. At Romeo's request, Mark Sherry and John Garner
("Garners") removed numerous barges they conceded belonged to
them, leaving two steel and three wooden barges. The Garners offered
to remove the two steel barges at no cost to Romeo, but Romeo declined, believing the Garners' offer was not genuine. Romeo sued the
Garners for trespass, nuisance, interference with riparian rights, and
adverse possession, based on the remaining five barges, in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
Romeo and the Garners agreed that the State of New York owned
all lands beneath the median high water mark, including the land between the high and low water marks (" foreshore"). At the bench trial
and in post-trial submissions, Romeo contended that his deed indi-
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cated he owned the foreshore and that the barges infringed upon his
riparian rights,
The court first found Romeo's numerous post-trial submissions inadmissible. The court also found that Romeo did not own the foreshore because Romeo provided no external proof to support his claim.
Specifically, the court concluded that the original grant of the property, made in 1687, violated the public trust doctrine and that the 1779
Act of Attainder superseded the grant. Because the court found that
Romeo did not own the foreshore, his trespass claim failed. The court
determined that riparian rights reflected an owners' reasonable, but
not absolute, right to free ingress and egress to abutting navigable waters. The court found the barges blocked access to only 25 percent of
Romeo's property, and therefore did not obstruct Romeo from access
to the waterway. Romeo's claim of interference with his riparian rights
was therefore unsupported. Because the court found the barges did
not disturb Romeo's riparian rights, the court dismissed his cause of
action in nuisance. The court also found Romeo failed to mitigate his
damages when he refused the Garners' offer to move the two steel
barges and failed to secure removal permits. The court lastly found
that Romeo's claim of adverse possession of the foreshore failed because the New York could only convey the State's sovereign title by
grant. The court thus grantedjudgment in favor of the Garners.
LauraL. Chartrand
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nolen Group, Inc., No. 02-8601,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4200 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2005) (holding: (1) a
government-organized railway company was not entitled to government immunity for alleged negligence in maintaining a bridge; (2) the
"real estate" exception did apply where the poor maintenance of the
bridge was the direct cause of damages; (3) evidence existed as to
whether the railway company violated its duty to maintain the bridge;
and (4) enough evidence existed for a private nuisance claim, but the
evidence failed to indicate a public nuisance claim).
The St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company ("St. Paul") and
Zurich American Insurance Company ("Zurich"), as subrogees, sued
the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA")
under negligence and nuisance theories, alleging SEPTA improperly
maintained a collapsed bridge. St. Paul and Zurich also asserted claims
against The Nolen Group, Inc., Michael Anthony Homes, Inc. and
Garrison Greene Associates, L.P. as the owners and developers of the
site, who allegedly negligently developed the site, which led to excessive stormwater run-off and the collapse of the SEPTA bridge, triggering this lawsuit.
On June 16, 2001, during Tropical Storm Allison, a creek flooded
several buildings. The buildings housed several companies that St.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

Paul and Zurich covered. According to the insurers, the collapse of a
bridge maintained by SEPTA aggravated the conditions. A railway
company built the bridge in 1912; when a Pennsylvania statute created
SEPTA in 1968, SEPTA acquired the responsibility to maintain the
bridge.
First, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania addressed SEPTA's claim of sovereign immunity. An
agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has sovereign immunity
unless the court waives it. To waive immunity, the court looked at the
"common enemy" rule that holds a landowner liable to another landowner if the landowner diverted water from a natural channel or unreasonably or unnecessarily changed the water in quality or quantity.
The court denied summaryjudgment to SEPTA, holding SEPTA failed
to do "scour protection" to the collapsed bridge, that sufficient evidence that scouring of the bridge caused the collapse of the bridge
existed, and SEPTA was aware of the bridge's scour vulnerability and
failed to provide any measures.
Next, the court looked at the "real estate" exception. A party may
sue a Pennsylvania agency if an agency's actions lead to a dangerous
condition causing damages. The plaintiff must show the artificial condition or defect of the land itself caused the injury. SEPTA asserted
the real estate exception did not apply since the rainfall caused the
collapse, and the bridge was safe for its intended purpose. St. Paul and
Zurich argued SEPTA's poor maintenance of the bridge was the original source of the flooding. The court determined the ultimate source
of the flooding was the scoured condition and collapse of the bridge,
allegedly from SEPTA's negligence, so the real estate exception applied to SEPTA.
The court also addressed the negligence claims against SEPTA. St.
Paul and Zurich believed SEPTA breached its duty under the "common enemy" rule by negligently maintaining the bridge, which resulted in diverted rainwater. The insurance companies also asserted a
statutory duty for the maintenance of the bridge. The court reasoned
it could draw a reasonable inference from the record that SEPTA violated its duty to maintain its bridge, and concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed to the negligence claim; thus, the court
denied summary judgment on this issue.
Finally, the court addressed St. Paul and Zurich's public and private nuisance claims. Under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must prove:
1) the defendant's conduct was the legal cause of the injury; and 2)
that the conduct was negligent, reckless, or abnormally dangerous. A
public nuisance claim consists of the same requirements, plus the
plaintiff must prove the harm he or she suffered was different from
other members of the community. The court concluded no evidence
showing the plaintiffs suffered a harm that was different from other
plaintiffs and, therefore, the court granted summary judgment for
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SEPTA on the public nuisance claims only. Additionally, the court
denied summary judgment in all other respects for this action.
Becky Bye
Wyoming Outdoor Council v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 351
F. Supp. 2d 1232 (D. Wyo. 2005) (holding the Corps violated the National Environmental Policy Act by relying on mitigation measures not
supported by substantial evidence to issue a finding of no significant
impact, and violated the Clean Water Act by failing to consider the
cumulative effect of a permit on non-wetland aquatic environments).
Wyoming Outdoor Council, Powder River Basin Resource Council,
and Biodiversity Conservation Alliance ("Environmental Groups")
challenged the United States Army Corps of Engineers' ("Corps") decision to issue General Permit 98-08 ("GP 98-08") in the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming. In their petition for review,
the Environmental Groups claimed the Corps violated the National
Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") by failing to consider impacts to
various resources and by relying on unsupported mitigation measures
to issue a finding of no significant impact ("FONSI). The Environmental Groups also claimed the Corps violated the Clean Water Act
("CWA') by finding GP 98-08 would have minimal adverse effects on
the environment.
GP 98-08 authorized discharges of dredge and fill materials related
to oil and gas development in Wyoming. GP 98-08 permitted dredge
and fill activities on any land in Wyoming so long as the activities met
permit specifications. The Corps made six specifications and conditions regarding GP 98-08. First, no activity covered by the permit could
fill more than 0.30 acres of wetland. Second, the Corps required permitees to comply with the Wyoming Department of Environmental
Quality's water quality certification pursuant to the CWA. Third, the
Corps required permitees to give the Corps notice before undertaking
activity on non-federal lands with non-federal minerals in certain geographical locations. Fourth, the Corps required permitees to perform
wetland mitigation. Fifth, the Corps required permitees to restore temporarily filled wetlands. Lastly, the Corps required permitees to replace permanent fills of more than 0.25 acres at a one-to-one ration.
With regard to the NEPA claim, the Environmental Groups argued
the Corps deficiently prepared an environmental assessment ("EA")
because GP 98-08 demonstrated a significant impact that necessitated
preparation of an environmental impact statement ("EIS"). Specifically, the Environmental Groups claimed the Corps' consideration of
several environmental impacts, including impacts on water quality and
wetlands, was insufficient to support a finding of no significant impact
("FONSI"). The court explained that NEPA requires agencies to prepare an EIS for any agency action "significantly affecting the quality of
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the human environment." When an agency was uncertain whether a
proposed action required an EIS, an agency could prepare a less detailed EA. If the EA led the agency to conclude the proposed action
would not significantly affect the environment, the agency could issue
a FONSI and forego preparing an EIS. The court reviewed whether
the Corps acted arbitrarily and capriciously when the Corps issued the
FONSI, and declined to prepare an EIS.
The Environmental Groups argued that the Corps failed to evaluate or disclose impacts to water quality and relied excessively on state
water quality certification. The Corps responded that it did not fail to
disclose the potential impacts to water quality, but rather it briefly and
adequately described the potential impacts. The Corps also maintained that the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality and
the Wyoming State Engineer's Office controlled the water. The court
determined that the Combined Decision Document for GP 98-08 addressed impacts to water quality because the Corps recognized that
"natural gas production from [coal bed methane gas ("CBM")] wells
can result in significant changes in both quantity and timing of flows
due to the discharge of produced water directly into streams," that "oil
and gas production can generate numerous hazardous chemicals that
could effect water quality," and that "discharges of produced water
from CBM wells may effect salinity in surface waters." The court also
noted that the state agencies more directly controlled the discharge of
water associated with CBM production. Since GP 98-08 required permitees to comply with state agencies' conditions on CBM production
and the state agencies had sufficient conditions in place, the court determined these conditions effectively dealt with concerns that impacts
on water quality would be significant. The court thus found the Corps'
consideration of impacts to water quality and reliance on the state water quality certification was not arbitrary and capricious.
The Environmental Groups also argued that although the Corps
determined that GP 98-08 could lead to the destruction of 574 acres of
Wyoming wetlands, the Corps failed to analyze the significance of this
destruction. The Environmental Groups claimed the mitigation measures mandated by the Corps did not satisfy the Corps' responsibility to
evaluate and disclose how losing 574 acres of wetland would impact the
environment. The Corps responded that its evaluation of GP 98-08's
cumulative impacts to wetlands combined with its mandatory mitigation measures, which required permitees restore temporarily filled wetlands and restore or create similar wetland at a minimum one-to-one
ratio where projects permanently filled wetlands, would bring net wetland loss to seven acres per year. As such, the Corps maintained that
its evaluation combined with its mitigation measures supported its
FONSI. The court stated that agencies may rely on mitigation measures to make a FONSI. The court determined that the Corps' finding
that seven acres per year did not constitute a significant impact was
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not, in and of itself, arbitrary and capricious, and that the Corps did
not need to discuss the impact of a 574-acre loss when, after mitigation,
the Corps projected a 35-acre loss over a five year period. The court,
however, further explained that the Corps unjustifiably relied on mitigation measures, and therefore the Corps issuance of a FONSI was inappropriate.
The court next examined whether the mitigation measures of GP
98-08 justified the Corps' issuance of a FONSI. The court described
the minimum standards for mitigation measures to form the basis of a
FONSI, specifically articulating that the mitigation measures must be
more than a possibility and must be supported by substantial evidence.
The court determined that the GP 98-08 mitigation measures satisfied
the first standard because they were a mandatory condition of permit
use. The mitigation measures did not satisfy the second standard because the Corps did not detail them or justify them with evidence to
support their efficacy. The court noted that the Corps did not provide
evidence demonstrating that a one-to-one replacement ratio was possible and did not set forth a specific plan for monitoring the mitigation
measures' efficacy. Because the Corps did not support the mitigation
measures with any evidence, the court determined the Corps' acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by relying on mitigation to conclude GP 9808 would cause no significant impact to wetlands.
With regard to the CWA claim, the Environmental Groups argued
first that the Corps violated the CWA by finding that GP 98-08 would
have minimal adverse effects on the environment. The Environmental
Groups also argued that the Corps' acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
concluding that activities authorized under GP 98-08 were similar in
nature and similar in impact. The CWA authorized the Corps to issue
both individual and general permits in order to regulate discharge of
dredged and fill material into navigable waters. The court explained
that EPA guidelines required the Corps to perform an analysis of probable effects of proposed discharge on the aquatic ecosystem when the
Corps issued a general permit. As such, the Corps could issue a general permit only when the activities authorized were similar both in
nature and in impact and the activities resulted in only minimal individual and cumulative adverse effects on the water quality and the
aquatic environment.
The Environmental Groups argued the Corps lacked substantial
evidence to support its finding that the impacts of GP 98-08 were cumulatively minimal. The Environmental Groups claimed the Corps
failed to consider cumulative effects to non-wetland aquatic resources
and downstream effects to water flows, ranchlands, and threatened and
endangered species. The Corps responded that it considered the potential effects of GP 98-08 on wetlands, water quality, and aquatic resources and, based on the mandatory mitigation measures and the
state certification conditions; found that GP 98-08 would have only
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minimal effects on those resources. The court explained that EPA
guidelines required the Corps to consider more than just cumulative
effects on wetlands. The court concluded the Corps' "minimal effects"
finding failed because the Corps relied on mitigation measures unsupported by substantial evidence and failed to evaluate the cumulative
effect on non-wetland aquatic environments, in particular, downstream
waters that might feel secondary effects. Therefore, the court determined the Corps' minimal adverse effect finding was arbitrary and capricious.
The Environmental Groups argued the Corps' similar impacts finding was arbitrary and capricious because GP 98-08 expressly authorized
activities that caused different impacts. For example, the Environmental Groups cited the Corps' authorization of permanent as well as
temporary impacts specifically that the Corps did not distinguish between impacts on different regions of Wyoming with different local
ecosystems. In response, the Corps argued that permit conditions,
which placed limitations on the acreage permitees could affect, made
the impacts of GP 98-08 activities similar. The court explained "activities otherwise similar in nature may differ in environmental impact due
to their location," but "permit conditions ... can render otherwise dissimilar impacts, similar." The court determined GP 98-08's conditions
made the various activities' environmental impacts similar because no
matter what type of activity the permit authorized, the conditions limited wetland fill to 0.30 acre or less. Therefore, the court determined
the Corps' reliance on permit conditions make its similar impact finding was not arbitrary and capricious.
The court thus remanded the case to the Corps, ordering the
Corps to justify reliance on mitigation and to consider the cumulative
effect of GP 98-08 on non-wetland aquatic environments.
Elizabeth Frost

STATE COURTS
ARKANSAS
Swaim v. Stephens Prod. Co., No. 03-1395 2004 Ark. LEXIS 588 (Oct.
14, 2004) (holding landowners, as riparian owners, own additional
land formed by accretion, which is subject to royalty interests).
Buel and Sharon Swaim and David Kinney, Sr. ("landowners"),
successors-in-interest to Carrie Davidson and J.T. Harris, separately
owned two real property tracts adjacent to the Arkansas River ("River")
in Franklin County. The landowners brought an action in the Arkansas Supreme Court to appeal the Franklin County Circuit Court's order
granting summary judgment for Stephens Production Company
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minimal effects on those resources. The court explained that EPA
guidelines required the Corps to consider more than just cumulative
effects on wetlands. The court concluded the Corps' "minimal effects"
finding failed because the Corps relied on mitigation measures unsupported by substantial evidence and failed to evaluate the cumulative
effect on non-wetland aquatic environments, in particular, downstream
waters that might feel secondary effects. Therefore, the court determined the Corps' minimal adverse effect finding was arbitrary and capricious.
The Environmental Groups argued the Corps' similar impacts finding was arbitrary and capricious because GP 98-08 expressly authorized
activities that caused different impacts. For example, the Environmental Groups cited the Corps' authorization of permanent as well as
temporary impacts specifically that the Corps did not distinguish between impacts on different regions of Wyoming with different local
ecosystems. In response, the Corps argued that permit conditions,
which placed limitations on the acreage permitees could affect, made
the impacts of GP 98-08 activities similar. The court explained "activities otherwise similar in nature may differ in environmental impact due
to their location," but "permit conditions ... can render otherwise dissimilar impacts, similar." The court determined GP 98-08's conditions
made the various activities' environmental impacts similar because no
matter what type of activity the permit authorized, the conditions limited wetland fill to 0.30 acre or less. Therefore, the court determined
the Corps' reliance on permit conditions make its similar impact finding was not arbitrary and capricious.
The court thus remanded the case to the Corps, ordering the
Corps to justify reliance on mitigation and to consider the cumulative
effect of GP 98-08 on non-wetland aquatic environments.
Elizabeth Frost

STATE COURTS
ARKANSAS
Swaim v. Stephens Prod. Co., No. 03-1395 2004 Ark. LEXIS 588 (Oct.
14, 2004) (holding landowners, as riparian owners, own additional
land formed by accretion, which is subject to royalty interests).
Buel and Sharon Swaim and David Kinney, Sr. ("landowners"),
successors-in-interest to Carrie Davidson and J.T. Harris, separately
owned two real property tracts adjacent to the Arkansas River ("River")
in Franklin County. The landowners brought an action in the Arkansas Supreme Court to appeal the Franklin County Circuit Court's order
granting summary judgment for Stephens Production Company
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("Stephens"). The case came before the supreme court as an issue of
first impression.
In the late 1950s and 1960s, the landowners entered into oil, gas
and mineral leases with Stephens, a division of Stephens Group. The
State of Arkansas also entered into an oil and gas lease with Gulf Oil
Corporation, later succeeded by Stephens, for a tract of land underlying the River, which abutted the eastern side of both landowners'
tracts. All three leases reserved to the lessors a one-eighth royalty in
the oil and gas produced; however, the landowners' leases included
additional express provisions extending both leases to accreted land.
In 1967 Stephens commenced natural gas development and production in all three areas. In 1990 the landowners amended their leases
with Stephens to reserve a three-sixteenth royalty, but the State lease
for the River remained the same. Over the course of many years, the
River shifted eastward causing accretion on the landowners' land. In
2000 the landowners obtained quitclaim deeds from the State covering
this accreted land. In 2001 they sued Stephens in trial court for payment under the lease terms for their share of gas produced from the
accreted land.
On appeal, the supreme court addressed the issue of land formed
by accretion. Arkansas law states that when a gradual and imperceptible alteration in the land forms accretion land, the ownership of the
land vests in the riparian owner from whose shore or bank the water
receded. As a rule, the water itself forms a natural boundary and a
contiguous landowner's rights change as the natural boundary lines
change. Arkansas law also gives the State Land Commissioner the
power and authority to execute deeds to lands of riparian owners upon
application and the filing of proof of record ownership of adjacent
land.
Stephens admitted that the landowners obtained deeds from the
State but argued that oil and gas leases are more than conveyances of
determinable interests in the oil and gas below the lands that they
cover. Stephens also contended that its lease with the State continued
to run with the accreted land. The supreme court ruled that unlike a
conveyance where a grantor transfers title to a grantee, ownership of
the land vests automatically in the riparian owner when land accretes.
Therefore, Stephens did not continue to hold mineral lease rights in
land vested to the riparian owner because the accreted land did not
transfer by conveyance. The court held that the State's lease did not
apply to the accretion lands since the State's lease did not expressly
provide that it run with the accreted land.
In conclusion, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the landowners, as riparian owners, owned the additional land formed by accretion, which ownership encompassed both suiface and mineral
rights. Because the lease agreements between Stephens and the landowners contained express terms on accretion, the accreted land was
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subject to the landowners' respective royalty interests. The court reversed the trial court's order of summary judgment and remanded for
entry of summary judgment in favor of the landowners.
Julia Herron
CALIFORNIA
Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of San Diego County v. State Water Res. Control
Bd., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding the State Water
Board or a regional water board may impose municipal storm sewer
control measures more stringent than federal Clean Water Act standards).
The Clean Water Act ("CWA") prohibits pollutant emissions from
"point sources" unless the party discharging the pollutants obtains a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit.
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") or a state with a federally approved water quality program may issue an NPDES permit. In
1987 Congress amended the CWA to add provisions concerning
NPDES permits for storm sewer discharges. The California Regional
Water Control Board, San Diego Region ("Regional Water Board"),
issued a comprehensive municipal storm sewer permit governing nineteen local public entities. The Regional Water Board included in the
permit prohibitions concerning municipal storm sewer discharges.
The permit prohibited municipalities from discharging pollutants not
reduced to the "maximum extent practicable" and from discharging
pollutants which cause the receiving water body to exceed the applicable water quality standard.
The Building Industry Association of San Diego County ("Building
Industry"), an organization representing the interests of constructionrelated businesses, filed an administrative challenge with the California
Water Resources Control Board ("State Water Board"). The Building
Industry argued that the permit violated federal law because it allowed
the State Water Board and the Regional Water Board to impose municipal storm sewer control measures more stringent than the federal
standard. The federal standard only required that municipalities reduce discharged pollutants to the maximum extent practicable. The
Building Industry argued that under federal law, the "maximum extent
practicable" standard is the exclusive measure that may be applied to
municipal storm sewer discharges, and a regulatory agency may not
require a municipality to comply with a state water quality standard if
the required controls are more stringent than the "maximum extent
practicable" standard.
The State Water Board rejected the Building Industry's appeal.
Next, the Building Industry brought an action in the Superior Court of
San Diego County against the Water Boards, challenging the Regional
Water Board's issuance of the permit and the State Water Board's de-
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nial of the Building Industry's administrative challenge. The trial
court held that the Building Industry failed to meet its burden establishing that the State Water Board abused its discretion in approving
the permit, or that the permit requirements were "impracticable under
federal law or unreasonable under state law." The Building Industry
appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District.
In reviewing the trial court's legal determinations, the court conducted a de novo review. The court acknowledged that the statutory
language of section 1342(p) (3) (B) (iii) of the CWA was susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation. The court looked to the
legislative history, public policy, and administrative construction of the
section to determine its meaning. The court held that the language in
section 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) allowed the EPA, or an approved state
agency permitted to issue NPDES permits, to impose appropriate water
pollution controls in addition to those that come within the definition
of "maximum extent practicable." The court found that Congress did
not intend to bar the EPA or state agency from imposing a more stringent water quality standard if the agency, based on its expertise and
technical factual information, and after the required administrative
hearing procedure, found this standard to be a necessary and workable
enforcement mechanism to achieving the goals of the CWA. Therefore, the court found the NPDES permit did not violate federal law and
the water boards had the authority to include a permit provision requiring compliance with the more stringent state water quality standards. Accordingly, the court affirmed the superior court's decision.
James E. Downing
Cent. Delta Water Agency v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 124 Cal.
App. 4th 245 (2004) (holding permits for appropriation of water that
did not specify actual uses, amounts, or places of use were speculative
and insufficient to satisfy requirements of the California Constitution,
the California Water Code, and the California Environmental Quality
Act).
Central Delta Water Agency, CCRC Farms, LLC, Plan Tract Farms,
the County of San Joaquin, San Joaquin County Flood Control and
Water Conservation District, and several Reclamation Districts (collectively "districts") challenged permits issued by the State Water Resources Control Board ("Board") for a wetlands project to divert water
into reservoirs that would be constructed on two islands for later rediversion and sale to potential purchasers. In issuing the permits, the
Board did not require the proponents of the project, Delta Wetlands
Properties ("DW"), to specify amounts, nature of, impacts of, or beneficial use of water sold. As such, the permits defined beneficial use
generally to include "domestic, irrigation, municipal, industrial, and
fish and wildlife" uses, but did not include environmental conse-

Issue 2

COURTREPORTS

quences. The Superior Court of Sacramento County, California, held
the permits were valid and the districts appealed to the Court of Appeal of California, Third Appellate District.
The court first addressed on review whether the Board violated the
California Constitution and the California Water Code by failing to
evaluate the uses to which the appropriated water would be put before
issuing the permits. The Constitution and Water Code both required
the Board to formulate the reasonable amount of water available for
beneficial use and to state that amount in definite terms. The court
found DW's permit applications failed to set forth the specific amount
of water, the place the water would be used, the use of the impounded
water, and that the intended use would be beneficial. As such, the
Board was unable to determine the actual or intended uses of the proposed water appropriation. The court thus found the Board's general
statement of potential beneficial use was speculative and insufficient to
satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and Water Code.
The court next addressed whether DW could divert water from
DW's appropriated reservoirs to a would-be purchaser. As a condition
to issuing DW's permit, the Board required DW to demonstrate that
DW could reliably "wheel" water for the project. DW had not contracted to provide water to a specific customer, nor had DW contracted
with a conveyance facility to provide delivery to a customer. As such,
the court concluded the Board could not determine that DW could
reliably wheel water until DW demonstrated that DW had contracted to
provide water to a specific customer and obtained approval for the
necessary conveyance facilities.
Finally, the court assessed whether the Board violated the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA") by failing to evaluate the environmental impacts of the delivery of water to actual purchasers.
CEQA required a public agency to prepare an Environmental Impact
Report ("EIR") to determine whether a proposed project would have a
significant impact on the environment. The agency must assimilate
EIR findings into conditions placed on the permits to mitigate environmental consequences of the intended beneficial use of the impounded water prior to issuance of a permit. The Board's final FIR
stated the site-specific analysis was speculative because the area of delivery and end uses of the project water were unknown.
The court ordered the trial court to set aside the permits and directed the Board to require DW to amend its permit applications to
specify an actual use and the amounts of the proposed water appropriation consistent with the requirements of the California Constitution and California Water Code. Additionally, the court ordered the
Board to evaluate the specified uses to determine whether the uses
were beneficial and whether the amounts were wheelable. Lastly, the
court reversed the CEQA determination and required the Board to
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conduct an environmental analysis once DW specified the end users in
the amended permits.
The court thus reversed the trial court's validation of DW's permit.
Michael Graetz
City of Brentwood v. Cent. Valley Regional Water Quality Control Bd.,
123 Cal. App. 4th 714 (2004) (holding a party discharging pollutants
bore the burden of proving the exceptions in the California Water
Code relieved the party of liability for mandatory minimum penalties).
The City of Brentwood ("City") appealed the Alameda County Superior Court's decision to uphold the Central Valley Regional Water
Control Board's ("Board") imposition of $243,000 in mandatory
minimum penalties for violations of the City's wastewater discharge
permit. The City operated a wastewater treatment plant that discharged treated wastewater into Marsh Creek. In June 2000, the Board
issued the City a wastewater discharge permit mandating the concentration of dissolved oxygen in the plant's discharge not fall below 5.5
milligrams per liter. The permit required the City to monitor the dissolved oxygen level of its discharge daily and make monthly reports to
the Board.
The monitoring requirements went into effect inJuly 2001, and the
oxygen levels consistently fell below the proscribed minimums through
September. The City installed blower equipment to boost the oxygen
levels of the discharge. Following the installation, dissolved oxygen
levels returned to acceptable levels. However, oxygen levels fell periodically below the proscribed minimum due to equipment failures.
In June 2001 the Board issued a complaint charging the City with
eighty-one violations of the effluent limitation. Each violation carried
a $3000 penalty pursuant to the California Water Code ("Code"). The
Code stated that mandatory minimum penalties be assessed for each
violation where a party exceeded waste discharge limitations four or
more times in any period of six consecutive months. The Code enumerated exceptions for natural disasters or other occurrences of "exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character." The City asserted the
natural phenomenon exception applied because of a change in the
composition of the groundwater and the City could not otherwise explain the dissolved oxygen fluctuations. The City did not provide any
evidence to back this assertion, and further claimed the Board had the
burden of disproving the exception applied. The Board took the position that no exceptional circumstances beyond the City's control existed and the burden was therefore on the City to prove otherwise.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of California considered whether
the exceptions to liability in the Code were elements of the offense or
affirmative defenses. If the exceptions were elements of the offense,
the burden of proof would be on the Board. If the exceptions were
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affirmative defenses, the burden of proof would be on the City. The
court determined that while the plain language of the statute was silent
as to the burden of proof, the purpose and structure of the Clean Water Act's statutory scheme strongly supported construing the exceptions as affirmative defenses. Concluding otherwise would require "water quality control boards to affirmatively disprove each of the exceptions in [their respective subdivisions and] would undermine the legislative goal of simple and swift enforcement with a minimum of factfinding and investigation."
The court concluded the legislative intent behind the Code was to
provide swift and efficient enforcement, which would create incentive
for dischargers to comply with permit requirements. Furthermore,
mandatory penalties eliminated the need for time-consuming discretion and fact finding, while providing for consistent enforcement. The
court also reasoned the "descriptive nature test," as derived from
criminal law, supported this conclusion. Specifically, the court determined the Code's exceptions were limited to proscribed conduct and
did not define the offense. Thus, the discharger properly bore the
burden of proof.
The court affirmed the superior court's decision to uphold the
Board's imposition of mandatory minimum penalties.
Kevin Kennedy
Johnson v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 2004 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 9141 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2004) (holding that the State Water
Resources Control Board's discretionary decision as to whether to review a regional board's decision imposing administrative penalties is
not subject to judicial review).
William P. Johnson owned Vail Lake USA, LLC ("Vail Lake"),
which owned a 9,000-acre Riverside County ("County") ranch ("Property"). He applied for an Agricultural/Clearing Exemption ("Exemption") for the initial clearing and farming of grapes, olives, barley, and
oats. The County denied the application and required Vail Lake to
obtain a grading permit. Further, the California Regional Water Quality Control Board ("Regional Board") concluded that Vail Lake's best
management practices were inadequate. The Regional Board required
Vail Lake to file a notice of intent and a storm water pollution prevention plan, to implement additional erosion prevention and sediment
controls, and to obtain a grading permit.
In February 2001, Vail Lake filed a notice of intent to grade eleven
acres of the property for a residential project. In June 2001, the Regional Board filed a complaint against Johnson seeking $406,700 for
failure to file a timely notice of intent and failure to submit a technical
report. Johnson requested the Regional Board rescind the penalty
because a notice of intent had never before been required in Califor-
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nia for an access road on an agricultural ranch of this size. Johnson
also argued access roads within agricultural zones should not be subject to permitting requirements. The Regional Board denied the request and imposed a fine.
Johnson sought review by the State Water Resources Control Board
("State Board"). The State Board dismissed the petition, citing the
informal rule against reviewing administrative civil penalties imposed
by regional boards. Johnson then filed this action for a writ of mandate and damages against both the State and Regional Boards in the
Superior Court of San Diego County. Johnson alleged not only that
the State Board abused its discretion in dismissing their request, but
also that the State Board's informal rule constituted an abdication of
its administrative oversight duties and violated due process and equal
protection by imposing unequal penalties across the state. The State
Board demurred to the claims against it. The trial court sustained the
demurrer and dismissed the State Board from the proceedings. Johnson appealed to the California Court of Appeals, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. The court addressed whether the State Board's
refusal to consider a petition challenging a regional board's action or
inaction is subject tojudicial review.
The Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act ("Act") established
a statewide program of water quality control maintained through regional administration. This Act divided the state into nine regions,
each governed by a board. Each board must formulate and adopt water quality control plans within its region and establish water quality
objectives to ensure the protection of state waters. Pursuant to the Act,
a regional board may issue orders to enforce its plans and may impose
administrative penalties. An aggrieved party may seek administrative
review by petition to the State Board. The State Board has discretion
to review such orders and may refuse review if the petition fails to raise
substantial issues appropriate for review. The court relied on an earlier case holding that the State Board's exercise of discretion to determine which issues were substantial and appropriate for review was itself
not subject to judicial review.
Here, the court held that a discretionary decision by the State
Board as to whether to review a regional board's decision imposing
administrative penalties is not subject to judicial review. Moreover, the
state protected Johnson's due process and equal protection rights by
virtue of the statutory scheme that provides for direct judicial review of
a regional board decision where the State Board declines review. The
court affirmed the dismissal order.
JenniferSuh
Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho
Cordova, 127 Cal.App.4th 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that an
environmental impact report must adequately describe the anticipated
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sources of water and their impact on the environment, but need not
identify and analyze every potential source of water for the project if
the anticipated water sources fail).
In June 2002 Sacramento County ("County") certified the Final
Environmental Impact Report ("EIR") for a development project
("Project"). The County approved the Project in July 2002, which included the development of several thousand acres of rural open space
in eastern Sacramento County containing wetlands, creeks, and vernal
pools for residential and commercial use. The water plan for the Project included both groundwater and surface water sources. The main
source of water for the project was groundwater pumped to a location
south of the Project known as the North Vineyard Well Field
("NVWF"). However, the NVWF water was not sufficient to provide for
the needs of the completed project, and the Water Forum Plan
("WFP") limited the extraction of groundwater in areas of the Project
and NVWF. To supply needs, the Sacramento County Water Agency
("SCWA") created "Zone 40," which supplied groundwater and surface
water. The development of "Zone 40" was ongoing and, therefore,
NVWF only provided a short-term supply of water for the Project. In
August 2002 the Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc.
and others ("VACRG") filed an action in the Superior Court of Sacramento County under the California Environmental Quality Act
("CEQA") to overturn the County's approval of the Project. The trial
court denied the petition, and VACRG appealed to the California
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District.
The court reviewed the CEQA legal issues de novo to determine
whether the trial court erred in denying VACRG's petition. VACRG
alleged that the environmental review process did not adequately discuss the environmental impacts of the Project, which they alleged included lowering the water levels of two rivers and obliterating portions
of the wetlands within the Project area. The court rejected the argument, stating that both the final EIR and the trial court's findings addressed the impacts. In addition, the Sacramento County Board of
Supervisors ("Board") made findings that the Project would not result
in a substantial impact on the rivers and, therefore, discussion of that
issue was not necessary in the final EIR because the Board acted as the
fact-finder in this matter.
The court stated that the critical issue was whether the final EIR
adequately described the new water supply plan and its environmental
impacts. The court held that the EIR met this requirement since the
EIR described not only the sources of water the Project relied on, but
also the present environmental conditions of the Project area, current
water levels, and expected impacts of drawing water from the NVWF.
The final EIR analyzed different water demand scenarios and the anticipated impacts on groundwater levels in each scenario. The court
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held that the final EIR completely discussed groundwater-related issues, and sufficient evidence supported the Final EIR. . Therefore,
the court held that the EIR comported with the CEQA requirements.
Further, the court held that VACRG's argument that the EIR inadequately described the impacts on the wetlands lacked merit. The
final EIR explicitly stated the Project's unavoidable adverse effect on
the wetlands. The EIR even quantified the amount of the wetlands
losses projected. The function of the final EIR was to provide information, and the court held the EIR served that purpose.
VACRG next argued that the court should overturn approval of the
Project because the EIR did not describe a complete and certain water
supply throughout the completion of the Project. The court stressed
that two critical issues under a CEQA include: (1) identifying a source
of water for a project, and (2) addressing the environmental effects of
obtaining water from that source. The court held that the Project
identified the potential water supply sources and analyzed the environmental effects of those sources. Further, the court held that an EIR
was adequate without identifying every possible source of water for the
Project if the expected sources did not materialize. However, the EIR
could not list only speculative sources of water.
The court held that, even though the EIR did not confirm the WFP
water sources, the EIR was adequate, and although the identified
sources were incomplete, they were not speculative. The court rejected VACRG's argument that the final EIR was speculative, because
the availability of water from NVWF occurred on a first come first serve
basis. Also, the court reasoned that the County was not required to
take a "worse-case scenario" approach, but that the EIR met the CEQA
requirements by discussing reasonable scenarios. Therefore, the court
held that the County validly approved the Project, and affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
Kate Brewer
COLORADO
Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., No. 04SA44, 2005 Colo. LEXIS 201 ( Mar. 14, 2005) (holding (1) the Colorado Water Conservation Board functions as a narrowly constrained fact finding advisory body when it reviews recreational in-channel diversions applications, (2) Colorado water courts
give presumptive effect to the findings of the Colorado Water Conservation Board, which are binding on the water courts, but a party may
produce evidence to rebut that presumption and the water courts must
evaluate the contested factors using a preponderance of the evidence
standard, and (3) water courts must determine whether an application
for a recreational in-channel diversion is for a reasonable recreation
experience on each particular stream and determine the minimum
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amount of stream flow necessary to accomplish that intended recreation experience).
The Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy District ("District")
filed for a conditional water right for a recreational in-channel diversion ("RICD"). The Colorado Water Conservancy Board ("Board")
reviewed the application and, without evaluating the application
strictly, recommended a minimum stream flow necessary to provide a
reasonable recreation experience to the District Court, Water Division
4. The Board recommended a flow amount less than requested by the
District and the District proceeded to water court for adjudication.
After hearing testimony and reviewing the Board's findings and
recommendation, the water court issued a decree awarding a RICD in
higher flow amounts than the District requested. In doing so, the water court acknowledged that the District's application was the first application addressed under Senate Bill 01 216 ("SB 216"). Therefore,
the water court began its analysis by examining the language of the
statute, which ultimately led the water court to treat the Board's findings of fact as a rebuttable presumption. The water court then examined whether the District overcame the rebuttable presumption of the
amount recommended by the Board. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, the water court concluded the District met the burden of proof to overcome the Board's rebuttable presumption. With
the water court concluding that Gunnison should receive more water
than recommended, the water court then looked at whether the Board
made findings regarding stream flow amounts. The water court held
the Board did not find whether the amounts applied for comported
with the statutory factors of SB 216. SB 216 required the Board to look
at the following five statutory factors: compact impairment, stream
reach appropriateness, access availability, instream flow rights injury,
and maximum utilization ("Five Factors"). The water court also noted
the Board did not find the maximum quantity of flow that complied
with the Five Factors. Thus, the water court concluded the Board
made no presumptively valid findings concerning stream flows above
the recommended amount. The water court itself then attempted to
determine the minimum stream flow for a reasonable recreational experience as stated in SB 216. The water court, reluctant to usurp the
District's determination of the size and scope of a RICD, subject to the
traditional criteria of speculation and waste, concluded that the District's requested stream flows did not reach the level of speculation or
waste. Lastly, the water court analyzed the District's requested stream
flows under the Five Factors. Since the water court concluded the
Board did not make any presumptively valid findings regarding these
factors, the water court concluded the District's requested stream flows
were appropriate under the Five Factors. Thus, the water court
granted the District conditional water rights in a decree awarding the
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claimed amounts in full. The Board appealed the water court's decision to the Colorado Supreme Court.
The court began its analysis by examining SB 216. The court noted
that SB 216 changed the statutory definitions of diversion and beneficial use to expressly encompass RICDs. The bill defined RICD to mean
the minimum stream flow as such flow is diverted, captured, controlled, and placed to beneficial use between specific points defined by
physical control structures pursuant to an application filed by a county,
municipality, city and county, water district, water and sanitation district, water conservation district, or water conservancy district for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water.
The bill also outlined the review and adjudication process for an
RICD application. To start the RICD process, SB 216 required an applicant to submit a copy of the application to the Board for review
prior to the water courts adjudication. Since this was the first step in
the RICD process, the court first addressed the extent of the Board's
review of an RICD application.
After looking at the plain language of SB 216 as well as the legislative history of the bill, the court held the Colorado General Assembly
intended the Board to act as a narrowly constrained fact finding advisory board upon reviewing RICD applications. Thus, the Board, as
required by SB 216, could only consider the Five Factors and make
written factual findings as to these Five Factors. Reviewing an RICD
application under the Five Factors required the Board to undertake a
careful, probing analysis. The court, however, noted SB 216 limited
the Board to reviewing an application on its face. Nothing in SB 216
allowed the board to look beyond the stream flow claimed for the recreational experience intended by the applicant when reviewing an
RICD. The court went on to further state that an applicant did not
have an entitlement to a grant recommendation from the Board
merely upon a showing of water availability. The Board could recommend denial where an application did not comport with the Five Factors. Once the Board completed its review, the application returned to
the water court for adjudication along with the factual findings and
final recommendation. Since the water court looked at an RICD application after the Board, the court next examined the water court's
role.
The court began this part of its analysis by noting that SB 216 imposed several analytical burdens on the water court when reviewing an
RICD application. First, the bill made the Board's finding of facts presumptive, but subject to rebuttal by any party. Second, the water court
itself needed to apply the Five Factors to the RICD application. Based
on these burdens upon the water court, the court went on to define
each burden.
Starting first with the presumptive effect of the Board's findings
and recommendation, the court again examined SB 216. The court
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determined the recommendation given by the Board did not have presumptive effect before the water court. The court noted a recommendation functionally was not rebuttable. Thus, the court held the water
court needed only give the Board's findings presumptive effect. Looking at Colorado Rules of Evidence, the court determined "presumptive" meant the water court needed to presume the Board's findings
were correct if no party presented any evidence to the water court on
the Five Factors. The court continued by noting that any party who
presented evidence on the Five Factors could rebut the presumptive
effect of the Board's findings. The water court then needed to evaluate the contested factors anew, and, using the preponderance of the
evidence standard, make findings of fact with respect to the contested
factors.
The court then addressed the water court's review of an RICD.
The court determined the water court erred in adjudicating an RICD
using the beneficial use doctrine alone. SB 216 intended beneficial
use to encompass RICD uses of water, but only those uses limited to
the minimum stream flow for a reasonable recreational experience in
and on the water. As a result, the court noted that an RICD application required proof of these elements before the water court decreed a
conditional water right. The court went on to note that an RICD application did not satisfy the beneficial use requirement unless the application was limited to the minimum stream flow for a reasonable recreation experience in and on the water. The more difficult issue, however, was determining exactly what SB 216 meant by its RICD definition and, in particular, the phrases "minimum stream flow" and "for a
reasonable recreation experience in and on the water."
The court, looking at the common usage of the term, held that the
phrase "minimum stream flow," as used in the RICD definition, meant
the least necessary stream flow to accomplish a given reasonable recreation experience in and on the water. The phrase, "reasonable recreation experience in and on the water" in the RICD definition gave
the court more of a problem, since the term did not have a common
usage nor did SB 216 define the term. The court, in trying to define
the term, first noted the reasonableness of a given recreation experience such as whitewater kayaking, varied by the appropriator's perspective. A casual kayaker, for example, could be satisfied with low to
moderate flows, while an expert would probably demand higher
stream flows. In addition, some non-kayakers could consider enough
stream flow to merely float the kayak reasonable. Thus, the term had
no plain meaning that the court could apply as written. The court
therefore turned to the legislative history and intent of the bill to define the term. After a thorough review of the history and intent, the
court determined the RICD definition essentially provided flexibility,
requiring a recreation experience in and on the water be reasonable,
considering the water availability of a particular stream reach. The
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court opined that at a minimum, merely floating a kayak could be a
reasonable recreation experience on some reaches, while at a maximum, a world-class expert course requiring nearly the entire flow of a
given stream could also be reasonable. Thus, the reasonableness of an
applicant's sought recreation experience depended on the available,
unappropriated stream flow. As such, what constituted reasonableness
depended entirely upon the river basin.
Once the water court determined whether an RICD application was
for an objectively reasonable recreation experience in and on the
stream in question, then the water court needed to determine the
minimum amount of stream flow necessary to accomplish that intended recreation experience. Thus, the statute might require the
water court to weigh conflicting expert testimony given by course designers or other interested parties, and to make a finding as to the least
necessary stream flow to achieve an applicant's objectively reasonable
recreation experience. The court also made clear that the water court
could not take at face value the appropriator's suggestion, as set forth
in the application, of a reasonable recreation experience for the
stream involved, nor should the water court accept, without scrutiny,
the applicant's analysis of necessary stream flow to achieve that objective. In making its determinations, the water court must carefully
evaluate the Five Factors, giving presumptive effect to unrebutted
Board findings, and considering the Board's recommendation and any
other evidence submitted in the course of the trial.
Thus, the court held both the Board and the water court erred,
and remanded the case to the water court with instructions to remand
to the Board to determine whether the application comported with the
Five Factors.
David Michael Shohet
East Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., No.
03SA372, 2005 Colo. LEXIS 230 (Colo. Mar. 21, 2005) (holding the
terms of a contract govern restrictive, contractually created water rights
and may not exceed the uses detailed in the contract).
East Ridge of Fort Collins, LLC ("East Ridge") filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment against the Larimer & Weld Irrigation Company
("Irrigation Company"). East Ridge sought to change the point of diversion and place and the type of its water right pursuant to two contractual agreements. Conversely, the Irrigation Company claimed East
Ridge owned a water right perpetually restricted to irrigation use. The
Division 1 Water Court concluded the contractual nature of East
Ridge's water right perpetually restricted the use to irrigation purposes
only. East Ridge appealed the water court's decision to the Colorado
Supreme Court. In its appeal, East Ridge requested the court determine whether the contractual language prohibited conveying, chang-
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ing, or moving East Ridge's water right. East Ridge also raised the issue of whether it forfeited its water right by using the right for a nonspecified purpose.
In 1873 several individuals incorporated the Irrigating Ditch Company No.10 ("No. 10") for the sole purpose of irrigation. In 1879 Benjamin Eaton purchased all the rights, titles, and interests in the No. 10.
Each right, title, and interest expressly provided for the irrigation of
eighty acres of land. Eaton eventually conveyed all of the rights to the
Irrigation Company. East Ridge obtained a water right in the Irrigation Company through two contracts dated April 1878.
The supreme court began its analysis by defining mutual ditch
companies as quasi-public entities whose stock represents a definite
and specific water right. The court noted that, under Colorado law,
shareholders in a mutual ditch company may seek a change in their
water rights.
Since East Ridge owns a contractual delivery water right, the court
interpreted the terms of the contracts. The court noted the contracts
provided for a sufficient quantity of water necessary to irrigate eighty
acres of land. Accordingly, the issue was whether the irrigation of
eighty acres qualified as a descriptive or restrictive provision. The
court stated the contracts appeared facially ambiguous and it considered extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity.
First, the court inferred the decrees adjudicated to the Irrigation
Company included East Ridge's water rights, and, thus, the explicit
terms of the contracts governed the water rights. Second, the court
noted other jurisdictions concluded that specific reference to irrigation of land was restrictive, rather than descriptive. In addition, the
minutes from the March 25, 1878, No. 10 shareholders' meeting suggested the restrictive nature of the irrigation provision. Third, the
court construed the contracts to allow both East Ridge and the Irrigation Company to receive the benefits of the bargain based on their
reasonable expectations because the facts indicated the shareholders
believed the provision restricted the use and the location of the water
rights.
In his dissenting opinion, justice Hobbs noted the early priority
date of the No. 10 Ditch water rights and pointed out the practical effect of the majority's holding that only those with the first and best
priority rights needed to restrict their use to irrigation, while all other
shareholders in the Irrigating Company could change their uses and
location. Injustice Hobbs' opinion, the majority's reasoning deprived
the earliest priority owners of fully realizing the modern, economic
value of their water rights, a result that was "shocking, unconscionable,
and contrary to Colorado law." Justice Hobbs felt the majority also
failed to consider the most important extrinsic evidence: the historical
context surrounding irrigation priorities. In conclusion, justice Hobbs
stated all water users on the same ditch must possess the opportunity to
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change water rights to other uses and locations. By only allowing some
shareholders on the ditch to change their water rights, the majority
failed to honor the original intent of the parties.
East Ridge's contracts contained terms that narrowed and limited
the scope of the agreement. Therefore, the court held the contracts,
rather than Colorado water law statutes, governed East Ridge's water
rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the water court's decision and
prohibited changing the use or location of East Ridge's water rights.
Susan M. Curtis
In rePark County Sportsmen's Ranch, L.L.P., No. 01SA412, 105 P.3d
595 (Colo. Jan. 18, 2005) (holding an applicant that requests approval
of a plan for augmentation must prove that it can establish the timing
and location of depletions, and the availability of replacement water to
prevent injury from those depletions; and that in the absence of a
showing that out-of-priority depletions will occur when senior water
rights do not have a call on the river, or that depletions will be less
than its withdrawals because of anticipated return flows, an applicant
must replace 100 percent of its withdrawals from tributary groundwater
in an over appropriated basin).
In 1996, Park County Sportsmen's Ranch ("PCSR") filed an application with the District Court for Water Division 1 for conditional underground and surface water rights in the South Park region of Colorado on the South Platte River. PCSR also sought adjudication of a
plan for augmentation. Numerous parties objected to PCSR's application, and at the end of PCSR's case-in-chief, the water court dismissed
PCSR's application.
PCSR's proposed project envisioned pumping up to 140,000 acrefeet of groundwater from the underlying South Park Formation, a
saturated aquifer tributary to the South Platte River, using a series of
proposed wells on its property and delivering the water pumped from
the wells downstream to the City of Aurora. According to PCSR, the
pumping of the wells would create a cone of depression in the aquifer,
the underground storage vessel for which PCSR sought adjudication.
PCSR planned to store surface water, collected during periods of high
runoff through a system of diversions, in the underground storage vessel to recharge ponds located above the aquifer. PCSR also claimed
the right to store precipitation and irrigation return flows salvaged
from surface vegetation in the underground reservoir. PCSR's pumping would diminish the amount of groundwater flow to the South
Platte River from the aquifer, and the resulting cone of depression
would ultimately draw on and deplete the flow of the river.
PCSR initially proposed to replace our-of-priority depletions to the
South Platte River by utilizing the water pumped from its wells, and
previously decreed water rights in the area including three springs,
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which PCSR claimed as free from the priority system as developed water, as direct replacement to the river. In its application, PCSR also
claimed conditional water rights for six reservoirs, a direct flow collection system, the underground storage reservoir created by the project,
and a conditional water right for a fourth spring which it claimed was
free from the priority system as replacement sources.
Prior to trial, PCSR withdrew its claims to administer any of the
springs free of the priority system, and withdrew its claim to change the
use of previously decreed water rights for use in the plan for augmentation. Thus, prior to trial the only sources of replacement water for
PCSR's proposed plan for augmentation were its claim for conditional
surface rights with 1996 priorities and its claim for underground storage.
Opposers to PCSR's application challenged, among other things,
the adequacy of PCSR's plan for augmentation to replace out-ofpriority depletions associated with the project. In support of its application, PCSR hired a consulting firm to develop surface water and
groundwater models to demonstrate the legal availability of water, and
to simulate the operation of the project. Initially, PCSR also proposed
to use the models for the calculation of out-of-priority depletions in
actual operation of the project, in conjunction with a limited ground
water monitoring program. Before trial, PCSR abandoned the models
in favor of a more extensive ground water monitoring plan to quantify
and replace depletions associated with the project as they occurred.
At trial, the water court excluded expert testimony in support of
the proposed ground water monitoring plan due to PCSR's failure to
timely disclose the testimony. After PCSR's case-in-chief, in which
PSCR presented extensive expert testimony in support of its models,
the water court dismissed PCSR's application concluding that the
models did not produce sufficiendy reliable results to permit reasonably accurate determination of the timing, amount, and location of
stream depletions or rate of aquifer recharge. The water court also
found that PCSR's surface water model did not produce sufficiently
reliable results to determine stream flow or legal availability of replacement water for the project.
Following its ruling, the water court denied PCSR's motion for reconsideration, and granted the Opposers' request for costs, attorney's
fees, and joinder of Aurora. On appeal to the Colorado Supreme
Court, PCSR argued that the water court erred by dismissing PCSR's
application, and that the water court abused its discretion by awarding
costs and fees.
The court began by examining the water court's dismissal of
PCSR's plan for augmentation. First, PCSR argued that the water court
erred in requiring PCSR to replace 100 percent of its groundwater
withdrawals. To the extent, an applicant can prove that its depletions
are non-injurious or that its injurious depletions are less than its with-
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drawals, the applicant need not replace 100 percent of its withdrawals.
Where surface water is over appropriated, Colorado law presumes that
groundwater depletions through well pumping injure senior appropriators absent a showing to the contrary. The court suggested two
ways PCSR could have shown that it did not have to replace 100 percent of its withdrawals. First, PCSR could have demonstrated its depletions to the river would have occurred when downstream senior water
rights did not have a call on the river. During trial, however, PCSR
failed to prove the timing of depletions from its wells. Second, PCSR
could have shown that its depletions would be less than its withdrawals
due to return flows. The court pointed out that PCSR presented no
evidence of anticipated return flows, and instead claimed the right to
consume all of the water it pumped.
PCSR also argued that reductions in evapotranspiration resulting
from the project would offset some of its withdrawals. As part of its
proposed plan for augmentation, PCSR claimed that its wells would
cause reductions in the groundwater table that would eradicate certain
phreatophytes. These phreatophytes historically consumed tributary
groundwater. In support of its claim, PCSR argued that the underground storage created by the pumping was analogous to gravel pits
and on-stream reservoirs.
The court noted that generally an applicant cannot claim salvaged
water as credit in an augmentation plan, and that courts should narrowly construe exceptions to the general laws. Two exceptions allowed
applicants to credit the amount of water historically consumed by preexisting natural vegetative cover for unlined gravel pits and on-stream
reservoirs. The court rejected PCSR's argument, reasoning that legislature narrowly drafted the statutes, and refusing to imply that the legislature provided for credit such as PCSR claimed.
The court upheld the water court's exclusion of certain expert testimony and evidence regarding water availability and PCSR's ability to
calculate out-of-priority depletions. The court also considered the water court's dismissal of PCSR's augmentation plan pursuant to Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41 (b) (1). PCSR argued that it was
only required to meet a prima facie case to survive dismissal of its application. The court noted that where a court is the trier of fact and a
party brings a Rule 41(b) (1) motion to dismiss, the court should not
evaluate whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case, but instead should evaluate whether the evidence presented justified judgment in favor of defendant. In cases involving applications for approval of augmentation plans, the water court will only approve such
plans if such plan will not injuriously affect the owner of or persons
entitled to use the water under a vested water right or a decreed conditional water right. In reviewing a proposed augmentation plan, a water
court must consider the amount and timing of the applicant's depletions, the amount and timing of available replacement water, and the
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existence of injury to senior appropriators. Thus the court ruled that,
before an applicant can establish an absence of injury to satisfy its
prima facie case, the applicant must first establish the timing and location of depletions, as well as the availability of replacement water to
prevent injury from those depletions.
PCSR also argued that the water court should retain jurisdiction to
remedy uncertainty regarding injury from an augmentation plan,
rather than dismiss the case. The court rejected this argument holding
that water courts should retain jurisdiction to address injurious effects
that result from the operation of a decreed augmentation plan, and
Opposers may only invoke jurisdiction after a water court finds no injury. The trial court must determine quantity of depletions and the
legal availability of replacement water at trial as part of the court's injury analysis, not during retained jurisdiction. The court upheld the
water court's factual determinations that PCSR's groundwater and surface water models failed to produce sufficiently reliable results to permit a reasonably accurate determination of the timing, amount, and
location of stream depletions or the legal availability of replacement
water. The court therefore held that the water court correctly concluded that it could not determine the issue of injury, and properly
dismissed PCSR's augmentation plan.
The court next turned to PCSR's claims for absolute and conditional surface water rights, its claim for conditional water rights for
twenty-six wells, and the water court's dismissal of the claims. The
court noted that a conditional right to pump water that would injure
senior appropriators might only be decreed in conjunction with an
augmentation plan. Under Colorado law, to obtain a conditional decree, an applicant must present evidence of intent to appropriate and
an overt act in furtherance of that intent. Further, the applicant must
show that (1) the water can and will be diverted; (2) the applicant will
beneficially use the water; and (3) the applicant will complete the project within a reasonable time. Because PCSR's claims for conditional
water rights were interdependent with its claim for underground storage, and because PCSR failed to present testimony of Aurora's direct
use of the water without prior underground storage, the court held
that the water court properly dismissed PCSR's claim for absolute and
conditional surface water rights, and conditional underground water
rights.
In conclusion, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the water
court properly dismissed PCSR's application because PCSR lacked an
adequate augmentation plan. The court also ruled that the water court
abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees, with the exception of
attorney's fees incurred in defending PCSR's frivolous claims for precipitation and irrigation runoff. Because the water court made no specific findings with respect to the fees incurred in defending the frivo-
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lous claims for precipitation and runoff, the court remanded the case
to the water court for a determination of these fees.
DonaldE. Frick
Trail's End Ranch, LLC v. Colo. Div. of Water Res., 91 P.3d 1058
(Colo. 2004) (holding the practice of diverting water from points not
decreed to a water right amounts to a change in the right that cannot
enjoy the priority of the existing decree without first following the requirement of adjudication).
Trail's End Ranch, LLC, ("Trail's End") brought suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Colorado Division of
Water Resources ("Division"). The District Court, Water Division 2,
granted the Division's motion for summary judgment and Trail's End
appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
Trail's End held three decreed water rights for irrigation at separate ditches on Spruce Creek. Trail's End diverted water associated
with these rights not only at the decreed headgates, but also at points
downstream. When the Division Engineer issued an order to cease this
practice, Trail's End complied. However, Trail's End subsequently
proposed to the Division Engineer a plan to operate these rights by
diverting the associated water at the decreed headgates, measuring it,
and then returning it into Spruce Creek. The water then flowed downstream to points where Trail's End would recapture and use it for irrigation. Although this proposed practice occurred entirely on the
property of Trail's End and there were no other water users between
the headgates and the downstream points of diversion, the Division
Engineer found the practice objectionable and rejected the proposal.
When the State Engineer agreed that the practice was unacceptable,
Trail's End filed an action in the water court to declare its entitlement
to the proposed operations and to enjoin enforcement of the Division
Engineer's order.
The water court held that Trail's End's practice resulted in a
change of its decreed points of diversion and that the plan to convey
and recapture the same water did not exempt Trail's End from applying for a change of water right as prescribed by statute. The water
court granted the Division's motion for summary judgment and denied
the similar motion filed by Trail's End. Following this decision, Trail's
End appealed directly to the Colorado Supreme Court.
In addressing the appeal, the supreme court first recognized that
the legislatively created process of adjudication makes water rights enforceable. An absolute decree from such adjudication confirms a water
right holder's vested property interest in the use of a specified amount
of water, when the right holder obtains it through decreed points of
diversion and applies it to a particular beneficial use. Incident to this
right is the right to change the point of diversion to the extent it nei-
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ther enlarges the right or nor injures other water users. However, such
a change in the point of diversion constitutes a change in the water
right itself, which requires application and adjudication similar to an
initial determination of a water right. Considering the meaning of
terms used in the applicable statutory provisions, the court concluded
that diverting water from a natural stream at a point other than that
decreed to the water right was an out-of-priority diversion. This justifies an order from the Division to cease further diversions as to protect
other existing adjudicated water rights.
The court then applied this statutory scheme to the proposed practice of Trail's End. The court found that the plan to recapture diverted water returned into Spruce Creek below the headgates, constituted a change in point of diversion, regardless of the other measures
taken. As such, Trail's End could not benefit from the priorities of the
existing water rights without first adjudicating the change of those
rights. Although Colorado law permits water right holders to use natural streams to convey water when measured in accordance with the
dictates of the State Engineer, this allowance does not relieve the water
right holder from resulting legal obligations. The required adjudicative process played a critical role in the administration of water right
changes as it protected potentially-affected decreed water rights and
prevented the enlargement of appropriations by quantifying and establishing an appropriation's historic beneficial consumptive use before
approving any proposed change. In light of this, the court found no
legitimate purpose for the proposed rerouting practice of Trail's End
existed, other than to circumvent the statutory requirement to adjudicate a change of water right, which undermines this important protection for other decreed rights.
Having found that the proposed practice resulted in a new or
changed diversion, the court concluded that Trail's End could not
benefit from the priorities of its existing water rights without adjudicating the resulting changes in those rights in the manner prescribed by
statute. Therefore, the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the
water court granting the Division's motion for summaryjudgment.
Mark D. Shea
GEORGIA
Hughey v. Gwinnett County, 278 Ga. 740 (2004) (holding a nonlicensee party challenging the validity of a discharge permit has the
burden of proof of showing impropriety).
The Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department
of Natural Resources ("EPD") issued Gwinnett County a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit ("permit") to discharge
treated wastewater into Lake Lanier on November 9, 2000. Terence D.
Hughey and others appealed the issuance of the permit, and Gwinnett
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County intervened. At the first hearing, the administrative law judge
("ALJ") ruled in favor of the EPD and Gwinnett County. The Georgia
Superior Court subsequently reversed the ALJ's decision. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted a writ of certiorari after the Court of
Appeals of Georgia reversed the superior court's decision.
On appeal, Hughey contended (1) the court of appeals did not
have proper jurisdiction, (2) the court of appeals erred by placing the
burden of proof on Hughey, (3) the permit did not meet substantive
requirements under antidegredation rules, and (4) the EPD failed to
comply with required public notice and comment rules.
First, the court determined the court of appeals had proper jurisdiction and the order on remand was final and appealable. Next, the
court concluded the court of appeals was correct in placing the burden
of proof on Hughey. The court reasoned the burden of proof shifted
to Hughey under the Georgia Administrative Rules of Procedure, and
noted a party challenging the issuance of a license who was not the
licensee bore the burden of proof.
On the third issue, the court held the court of appeals correctly
found evidence to support the ALJ's ruling on degradation of water
quality and reasoned the evidence was justifiable due to social and
economic development. Furthermore, the court held the court of appeals erred in reversing the superior court's determination the permit
did not require the highest and best level of treatment practicable under existing technology. On the final issue, the court concluded the
court of appeals erred in reversing the superior court's finding of a
notice and comment rules violation because the ALJ did not have the
authority to summarily dispose of the issue and required more specificity for the public to have meaningful participation.
The court thus affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of
appeal's decision.
Alexandra Farkouh
IDAHO
Clear Lakes Trout Co. v. Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 106 P.3d 443
(Idaho 2005) (holding that the Interim Stipulated Agreement between
ground and surface water users provided safe harbor protection only to
junior ground water users).
Clear Lakes Trout Company ("Lakes") and Clear Springs Food,
Inc. ("Springs") operated fish hatcheries on adjacent parcels below the
rim of the Snake River Canyon near Buhl, Idaho. Following litigation,
Lakes obtained senior surface water rights and Springs obtained junior
surface water rights. In 2001, due to severe drought conditions, the
Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR") informed groundwater users that they intended to curtail water use above the canyon rim.
This notice motivated groundwater users and surface water users to
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negotiate an Interim Stipulated Agreement ("Agreement"), providing
additional water to enhance the flows. Both Lakes and Springs signed
the Agreement.
In 2002 Springs submitted a call intended to curtail Lakes' water
rights. Lakes filed suit in Fifth Judicial District Court of Idaho against
IDWR to enjoin the curtailment. After a motion for a preliminary injunction failed to stop the curtailment, Lakes removed approximately
17 percent of the trout in its hatchery. Later that year, Lakes responded by filing a complaint against Springs for breach of the
Agreement. After numerous motions from each party, the trial court
held that the Agreement did not prohibit Springs from seeking curtailment of Lakes' water rights. Lakes appealed to the Idaho Supreme
Court.
The hatcheries disputed the Agreement's safe harbor provision,
limiting the rights of parties to pursue actions against other parties for
curtailment of water. Lakes believed the Agreement's language protectingjunior water rights protected Lakes as surface water right holders. However, Springs argued the provision protected only junior
groundwaterright holders, not junior surface water rights holders.
After examining the plain language of the Agreement and finding
no ambiguity, the court affirmed, granting Clear Springs' motion for
summary judgment. The Agreement provided protection against senior surface water rights holders seeking curtailment of the rights ofjunior groundwater users. Nothing in the applicable sections of the
Agreement discussed a commitment made to junior surface water right
holders. Further, Lakes failed to take advantage of a provision that
may have provided added safe harbor protection in exchange for an
agreement to pay a proportionate share of the water replacement
costs. In conclusion, the court affirmed the trial court's decision.
Jennifer Suh
INDIANA
In re Change to the Established Water Level of Lake of the Woods in
Marshall County, 822 N.E.2d 1032 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming the
trial court's dismissal of petition by property owners to raise water level
of lake on grounds that (1) the trial court committed no error on remand in appointing the viewers from the original action to determine
whether lake level change was necessary, (2) case law established procedures, which when followed on remand, satisfied due process, and
(3) the property owners failed to establish any of the viewers' factual
findings were arbitrary and capricious).
A group of property owners surrounding the Lake of the Woods
("Property Owners") filed a petition in the Marshall Circuit Court seeking an order to raise the water level of the lake. The Property Owners
alleged that changes in the local sewer system, increases in the prop-
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erty values and recreational uses of the lake, and a decrease in local
agricultural activity necessitated raising the water level. A committee of
viewers determined that raising the level of the lake was not "practical
and of public need" as required by law. The trial court dismissed the
petition based solely on the viewers' determination. The Property
Owners appealed, alleging that the trial court denied their petition
without due process of law. Specifically, the Property Owners argued
the trial court did not allow the Property Owners an opportunity to
present evidence or testimony to the viewers. A Court of Appeals of
Indiana, Third District panel agreed and remanded to the trial court.
The Property Owners presented evidence at a hearing before the viewers, after which the viewers adopted the same determinations previously made. The trial court denied the petition, and the Property
Owners appealed.
In affirming the trial court, a panel of the court held that the trial
court did not err in appointing the same viewers on remand. In the
prior appeal, the court noted the viewers functioned in an administrative manner. Therefore, the court determined in the instant appeal
that the Property Owners needed to show actual bias by the viewers.
The court reasoned that the mere fact the viewers already made a determination in this matter did not demonstrate actual bias, and acknowledged the presumption that administrative bodies act properly
absent a showing otherwise. Additionally, the court held that because
the trial court conducted itself according to the court's previous instructions on remand, the Property Owners could not again allege a
violation of due process as the law of the case doctrine precluded such
an argument.
Finally, the court addressed the Property Owners' contention that
the factual findings of the viewers were arbitrary, capricious, illegal or
unsupported by the evidence. The Property Owners alleged (1) the
viewers improperly considered the adverse effects that raising the level
of the lake had on illegally installed drainage tiles, (2) the viewers'
finding that raising the lake level would detrimentally effect roads in
the area was speculative, and (3) the viewers' finding that no information was available to determine whether the current lake level adversely
affected recreational uses was unsupported because the viewers had
not visited the lake during a period of heightened water level. The
court addressed each contention, holding respectively: (1) that the
Property Owners bore the burden to show the illegality of the drainage
tiles and they had not done so; (2) that one of the viewers was the
county surveyor, who was, by statute, responsible for determining the
effect of water features on roads, so such a finding was not merely
speculative; and (3) that the viewers did not have to visit the lake during a period of heightened water level in order to draw reasonable
conclusions. For all of the foregoing reasons, the court affirmed the
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trial court's dismissal of the Property Owners petition to heighten the
level of the lake.
Matthew Sarles
LOUISIANA
Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085 (La. 2004) (holding indemnification
clauses and statutory time limitations barred oyster fishermen from
recovering damages for the loss in value to coastal water bottom leases,
granted by the State of Louisiana, caused by the introduction of freshwater into coastal areas for the restoration of wetlands).
The State of Louisiana and the Louisiana Department of Natural
Resources ("DNR") appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana to
determine whether the reclamation activities designed to restore recent deterioration of the State's coastal wetlands resulted in a compensable taking of property interests in water-bottom leases the State
granted to private fishermen for the cultivation of oysters. Oyster fishermen, including Avenal (collectively "Avenal"), brought the classaction suit against the State of Louisiana and the DNR for compensation for damage to the value of their water-bottom leases by the introduction of freshwater for wetlands restoration. The 25th Judicial District Court, Parish of Plaquemines found in favor of the fishermen and
granted compensation for the damage to the property interests held in
the leases. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme
Court of Louisiana reversed the findings of the lower courts and dismissed the class-action suit.
The expansion of the levee system on the Mississippi River after the
flood of 1927 gradually caused the deterioration and loss of hundreds
of square miles of coastal wetlands in Louisiana. Before the expansion
of the levees, naturally occurring floods of the Mississippi River deposited millions of tons of sediments onto the wetland areas. The sediments carried nutrients needed to sustain the vegetation that held the
soils in place and replenished soil carried away by erosion. Loss of the
wetlands also destroyed both fish and wildlife habitat. With the restriction of freshwater infusions into the coastal areas, saline levels also began to increase closer to the coastline. The increased saline levels destroyed historically productive oyster habitat and created saline levels
ideal for oyster growth closer to the shoreline in areas previously unable to sustain oysters. To prevent further erosion and restore some of
the lost wetlands, Louisiana, in cooperation with the United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), constructed three freshwater diversion projects designed to restore historic saline levels and sediment
loads needed to support coastal marshlands. Louisiana and the Corps
constructed the Caernarvon Freshwater Diversion Structure ("Caemarvon") to decrease saline levels to historic levels in the Breton Sound
Basin. Louisiana and the Corps had planned the construction of
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Caernarvon since the late 1950s, and Caernarvon began operating in
November 1991. The class of plaintiffs all held oyster leases in the
Breton Basin affected by Caernarvon.
In 1989, the DNR anticipated adverse affects to oyster production
in the Breton Sound Basin and objected to the issuance or renewal of
any leases near any of the planned areas of coastal wetlands restoration. As a compromise to concerned fishing interests, the Louisiana
Department of Wildlife and Fish ("DWF"), the agency in charge of issuing the oyster leases, inserted an indemnification and hold harmless
clause for damage to oyster productivity caused by wetlands reclamation activities into all oyster leases issued after 1989. The majority of
the oyster leases at issue contained the hold harmless clause.
The trial court failed to rule on the validity of the hold harmless
clause; however, the court did grant Avenal's motion in limine preventing any mention of the clause to the jury which ruled in favor of Avenal. In affirming the verdict of the trial court, the appellate court
ruled the DWF exceeded its authority by inserting the hold harmless
clause into the oyster leases. The DWF had the authority under La.
Rev. Stat. § 56:428(A) to refuse to renew oyster leases after the expiration of their fifteen year term if the DWF determined the leases would
not be productive in the future. The DWF also had statutory authority
under Louisiana Revised Statute section 56:425(C) to insert clauses
into the leases to promote the growth of the oyster industry throughout Louisiana. The supreme court concluded the hold harmless clause
furthered the interests of the oyster industry by allowing fishermen to
harvest oysters from the areas affected by Caerarvon before those areas became unproductive. Further, the supreme court reasoned the
overall effect of the wetlands reclamation program substantially benefited the oyster industry by greatly increasing oyster productivity in
those areas that had historically supported large oyster populations by
returning saline concentrations to naturally occurring levels. The supreme court held the hold harmless clause was valid and dismissed all
claims in the class-action suit for leases containing the clause.
A small number of leases remained in the suit that did not contain
the hold harmless clause. However, the supreme court concluded the
damage Caernarvon caused to the remaining leases did not result in a
taking of any of Avenal's property interests. First, the court stated Avenal could not claim a taking of the land associated with the leases because Louisiana could not take its own property. The court did note
Avenal held a valuable property interest in the leases. The court analyzed Avenal's taking claims as both a total taking of the value of the
leases and a partial taking of the property interests in the leases. At the
time of the decision, many of the oyster fishermen still harvested economically viable quantities of oysters from the leases in question. Further, some of leases were not productive even before Caernarvon went
online, and the lease holders still held the ability to exclude others
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from interfering with the leases and sue third parties for damage to the
leases. Therefore, the court concluded Avenal still held a valuable
property interest in the oyster leases.
Next, the supreme court determined Avenal must hold a legitimate
investment back interest in the value of the oyster leases to claim a partial taking of the property interests in the leases. Louisiana had
planned the Caernarvon diversion projects since the late 1950s, and
the saline levels in the leased areas in question had not increased to
levels that could support oysters until the 1970s. The court determined Avenal was on notice of the planned construction of Caernarvon before the issuance of any of the leases covered by the suit. Therefore, the court dismissed Avenal's ability to recover for a partial taking
of the value of the leases because the prior notice of the construction
of Caernarvon frustrated any legitimate investment back expectations
in the future productivity of the leases. The supreme court concluded
the operation of Caernarvon resulted in no compensable taking for
either a total or a partial reduction in value of the leases. The court's
opinion also noted the federal District Court dismissed Avenal's suit
against the Corps for failure to prove a taking for many of the same
reasons listed above.
Furthermore, Louisiana engaged in a valid exercise of its police
power by working to restore the wetlands that provided jobs to many
state residents and also provided a buffer against hurricane damage.
Because Avenal never held a legitimate property interest adverse to the
general health, safety, and welfare of the public, Louisiana's exercise of
its police power further barred a takings claim.
Finally, the court analyzed a possible claim by Avenal for compensation for property damaged by state actions for the public purpose.
The Louisiana Constitution art. I, § 4 provided for recovery for damage
to private property in addition to compensation for a governmental
taking. Louisiana Revised Statute section 9:5624 required the complaining party to file the suit within two years from the time the alleged
damage occurred. The supreme court determined Avenal failed to file
the suit in time to collect compensation for damage to the leases because Avenal claimed at trial that damage occurred to the leases as
soon as Caernarvon began operating in November 1991 and the lawsuit was not filed until April 1994. The supreme court found the remaining claims without the indemnification clause time barred from
recovery.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and dismissed claims for compensation for all the oyster leases asserted in the
suit. The court found the valid hold harmless clause barred recovery
for damage to any leases that contained the clause, and the remaining
leases were time barred from recovery.
Sean R Biddle
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Lake Bistineau Pres. Soc'y, Inc. v. Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n., 895
So. 2d 821 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (holding the Wildlife and Fisheries
Commission of the State of Louisiana did not abuse its discretion in
implementing an environmental plan to lower the water level of Lake
Bistineau since it adequately took into account the environmental, social, economic, and recreational impacts of their decision).
Lake Bistineau Preservation Society ("LBPS"), composed of homeowners, business owners, and persons who use the lake for recreational
purposes, contested an environmental plan recommended by the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries of the State of Louisiana ("DWF").
The plan would lower the water level in Lake Bistineau seven feet below its normal pool stage from July 15 of each year until January 31 of
the following year, for three consecutive years. The DWF initiated the
plan to improve suitable spawning habitat, control the submerged
aquatic vegetation, and reduce the accumulation of organic material
on the lakebed. These factors caused a decline in the spawning of
sport fish, made parts of the lake impassable to boat traffic, and adversely affected recreational water activities.
LBPS filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in the 26th
Judicial District Court for the Parish of Bossier, Louisiana. LBPS argued the DWF exceeded its powers and authority under the Louisiana
Constitution when it approved the plan to lower the lake's water level.
Specifically, LBPS claimed the DWF's plan was an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion because the DWF failed to balance the benefits of the plan against the economic and recreational costs. LBPS also
contended the DWF failed to create a record adequately setting out
the basic facts and establishing a rational connection between its findings and the decision made. The governing bodies of the parishes
where Lake Bistineau is located filed a petition of intervention, asserting the DWF's proposed plan was reasonable and in the best interest of
the lake and nearby property owners. The court denied the request
for the preliminary injunction. LPBS appealed to the Louisiana Court
of Appeal, Second Circuit.
The court noted Louisiana's Public Trust Doctrine ("Doctrine"),
embodied in Article Nine, Section One of the Louisiana Constitution,
required the DWF to protect the Louisiana environment. The Doctrine did not establish environmental protection as an exclusive goal,
but required a balancing process in which DWF had to give full and
careful consideration to environmental costs and benefits, along with
economic, social, and other factors. The court held the DWF adequately considered the economic and recreational impacts, and reasoned the long-term adverse effects of no-action would ultimately have
a greater negative impact on the environment. The DWF's plan had
the greatest chance of success and was the most cost-efficient. Further,
the court noted the preliminary injunction on appeal addressed an
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action that already occurred: the reduction of the lake's water level.
However, the court's ruling did not prevent a trial on the merits that
could take place prior to a scheduled lowering the following year. The
court denied the application for a preliminary injunction and affirmed
the trial court's ruling.
James E. Downing
MAINE
S.D. Warren Co. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 868 A.2d 210 (Me. 2005) (holding both the Clean Water Act and state certification rights subjected a
paper mill to water quality conditions even though the mill had not
polluted any water).
S.D. Warren Company ("Warren") owned and operated hydroelectric dams requiring a permit pursuant to the Federal Power Act
("FPA"). The FPA required permit applicants to comply with the
Clean Water Act ("CWA") as a condition to the issuance of a permit.
The water that passed through Warren's dams entered turbines and
then returned to the river operating in run-of-river mode. The projects, originally licensed between 1979 and 1981, were set to expire in
1990, but modifications allowed the license to continue until 2001.
Warren filed applications for certification in 1999, and then refiled his
applications in 2000, 2001, and 2002.
In April 2003 the Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP") approved water quality certification for the continued operation of Warren's projects subject to a number of conditions. In May
2003 Warren appealed DEP's decision to the Maine Board of Environmental Protection ("BEP"). The BEP found the water to be a discharge of a pollutant pursuant to the CWA and, thus, subject to certain
conditions for water quality. Warren appealed BEP's judgment to the
Cumberland County Superior Court, which affirmed BEP's decision
and conditioned the approval of Warren's application for water quality
certification under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and state statutes.
Warren appealed the superior court's decision to the Maine Supreme
Court.
Warren first challenged BEP's certification authority because Warren's operation of its dam did not result in a discharge. The court,
with deference to the BEP's decision, held the operation of Warren's
dams caused a discharge pursuant to the CWA. Specifically, the court
stated water removed from a navigable body of water and then redeposited into that same body of water constituted a discharge pursuant
to the CWA. The court also determined certification rights under the
CWA vested in a state if an activity resulted in a discharge. Furthermore, once certification rights vested, any conditions the state imposed
became conditions on the federal license as well.
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Finally, the court held, because the CWA permitted states to enforce their own higher standards through their certification process,
the BEP could impose any conditions necessary to ensure compliance
with Maine's higher standards. The court deferred to the BEP and
only reviewed the BEP's decision to ascertain whether the BEP's conclusions were reasonable. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial
court's decision, upholding the BEP's approval of Warren's water quality certification subject to conditions.
Story Washburn
MICHIGAN
Czeryba v. Marzolo, Nos. 246955 & 247754, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS
2985 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2004) (holding an express easement did
not encompass riparian rights when the agreement language did not
provide for such rights, but a prescriptive easement did include riparian rights).
Dennis J. Czeryba brought suit against a neighbor to enforce both
an express easement and a prescriptive easement across the property
of Enzo Marzolo. The Benzie Circuit Court held Czeryba had both an
express easement and a prescriptive easement over Marzolo's property
and permanently enjoined Marzolo from blocking or otherwise interfering with the use and enjoyment of those easements. The trial court
determined the scope of the express easement included the right to
maintain and use a dock and boatlifts, to drive motor vehicles, to moor
boats, and to engage in traditional beach and water activities so long as
such uses were not unduly burdensome to the servient estate. Czeryba
appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Marzolo owned property adjacent to Crystal Lake with all of the riparian rights associated with ownership. Czeryba owned property to
the south of Marzolo's land that did not abut the lake, but contained
an express easement and right of way granting use in common with
that of the express easement's grantor. Marzolo purchased the riparian property in 1993 and put up "no trespassing" signs and a fence that
blocked access to the lake. Prior to 1993, Czeryba used the riparian
property to drive to the lake. He installed docks, moored boats, and
generally acted as if he had riparian rights.
The court determined that because the express easement did not
contain clear and unambiguous language expressly granting riparian
or littoral rights, the express easement did not encompass rights typically reserved to riparian owners. However, an invalid express easement could establish an easement by prescription if the easement
holders acted as if their easement contained and express grant of riparian rights. Marzolo challenged the prescriptive easement on the
ground that the use was not hostile. The court decided Marzolo's use
of the docks and boats was sufficiently open to satisfy hostility. Marzolo
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did not challenge the trial court's holding regarding the rest of the
elements of a prescriptive easement. Since Czeryba exercised his rights
under the express easement as if his easement contained an express
grant of riparian rights, including the right to maintain docks and
boatlifts and the right to moor boats, he acquired a prescriptive easement to those riparian rights. Thus, the court reversed the trial court's
holding that the express easement granted riparian rights, but affirmed the holding that a prescriptive easement granted riparian
rights.
Stary Washburn
Glen Lake-Crystal River Watershed Riparians v. Glen Lake Ass'n, 264
Mich. App. 523 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2004) (affirming order changing lake level algorithm on grounds that no clear error existed in trial
court's decision finding one party's expert witnesses more convincing
than other party's expert witnesses, and that the trial court considered
all required statutory considerations).
A group of property owners in the Glen Lake-Crystal River watershed ("Property Owners") filed suit against the Glen Lake Association
("GLA") in the Leelanau Circuit Court seeking an order modifying the
water level algorithm for Glen Lake, which the GLA was responsible for
managing. The GLA was constructing a new dam to better control the
level of Glen Lake. The Property Owners, who lived downstream from
Glen Lake, demanded the GLA adjust the lake level to increase downstream flow. All parties stipulated that some level adjustment was necessary. The trial court, after considering expert testimony, adopted the
Property Owners' proposed algorithm for controlling the future level
of the lake over the GLA's proposed algorithm, and directed formation
of a technical committee to implement the algorithm. The GLA appealed.
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals of Michigan
quoted extensively from the trial court's findings and conclusions.
First, the court noted how all parties stipulated that some change in
the level of the lake was necessary. By making such stipulations, the
GLA waived any claim that the trial court erred in entering its order
for a new lake level. Next, the court found that the trial court made no
clear error in finding the Property Owners' expert testimony more
convincing than the GLA's expert testimony. Lastly the court held the
trial court considered all of the statutorily mandated factors including
past lake levels, location of other water features, government reports,
hydrology of the watershed, downstream impact, and wildlife habitat
protection and enhancement. The court thus affirmed the trial court's
order changing the lake level algorithm.
Matthew Sarles
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Meshkin v. Kominsky, No. 249916, 2004 Mich.App. LEXIS 2770 (Mich.
Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2004) (holding in order to properly allocate an accreted shoreline for riparian rights purposes, a trial court must draw a
line from the point where the originally platted boundary line meets
the original shoreline, as represented by the meander lines on the
original plat, to a point on the currently existing shoreline).
John Meshkin and Vicki Ten Haken (together referred to as
"Meshkin") brought suit to quiet tide to lakefront property they have
owned since 1975. The Meshkin property abutted the property of Paul
Kominsky, Sr., and Esther Coffindaffer (together referred to as
"Kominsky"). Meshkin alleged that his lot included land submerged
under water that extended beyond the shoreline. The conflict arose
due to a seawall that Kominsky constructed and allegedly extended
onto Meshkin's property. Meshkin sued Kominsky in the Allegan Circuit Court to quiet title to the land on which Kominsky's seawall extended. Kominsky counter-claimed, alleging that he had acquired tide
to the land based on adverse possession. The trial court found that
Meshkin failed to present a prima facie case that he had title to the
land in dispute and that both parties had riparian rights to the submerged land based on riparian boundary lines. These riparian boundary lines were part of a survey taken, which showed that the lake to
which the property abutted was irregular. Meshkin appealed this decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Meshkin claimed that Kominsky was not a riparian owner because a
court must make such a determination based on whether the parcel of
land was separated from the shoreline by another parcel at the time of
the original government plat, regardless of whether the water had subsequently risen to fully submerge the separating piece of land. Both
sides presented expert testimony. Meshkin's experts contended that
Komisnky's land did not touch the water, and Kominsky's experts
stated that Kominsky's property extended to the water's edge. The
trial court sided with Kominsky, and the court affirmed, finding no
clear error by the trial court.
The court also found that the survey the trial court used to determine the riparian boundary lines did not follow the appropriate case
law and was therefore incorrect. Case law mandated that a survey draw
riparian boundary lines from the meander line as established at the
time of the original government plat. In order to properly allocate an
accreted shoreline, such as the one at issue in this case, a survey must
draw a line from the point where the originally platted boundary line
met the original shoreline. The court further stated that three accepted methods of dividing ownership in a lake bed existed. If the lake
was circular, then the shoreline represented the base with the center
line being the vertex of a triangle. If the lake was four-sided or oblong,
the lines were drawn perpendicular to the median center. If neither of
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these methods could be used, authorities divided the lake bed in proportion to the shoreline owned. The shoreline described the point
where the property met the original lakeshore prior to any filling in or
rescission of the water.
Thus, the court upheld the ruling that Meshkin and Kominsky
were riparian owners, but reversed and remanded the method that the
trial court used in deciphering the riparian boundary lines.
Michael 0 'Loughlin
MINNESOTA
Dead Lake Ass'n, Inc. v. Otter Tail County, No. A04-717, 2005 Minn.
App. LEXIS 123 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2005) (holding a county's inquiry into the potential adverse environmental impacts of a conditional
use permit was insufficient, thus requiring preparation of an environmental impact statement to address the potential effects of increased
recreation and groundwater nitrate levels).
Dead Lake Association ("Association") brought a claim under the
Minnesota Environmental Policy Act against Otter Tail County
("County") for failure to prepare an environmental impact statement
("EIS") prior to approving a housing development proposal and conditional use permit on Dead Lake. Dead Lake, classified by the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") as a naturalenvironmental lake ("NEL"), had limited assimilation capabilities for
development and recreational impacts. Therefore, the County completed an environmental assessment worksheet ("EAW") that considered whether the potential impacts of development warranted further
inquiry in the form of an EIS. Due to the increased sensitivity of shallow NELs, both the DNR and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") recommended EIS preparation. However, the County
Planning Commission ("Commission") determined, after consideration of public input, an EIS was not necessary because reasonable mitigation techniques included in the proposal eliminated any potentially
adverse environmental impacts. After the County reviewed the Commission's decision, it ultimately declared an EIS was unnecessary and
approved the development proposal, granting the requested conditional use permit. The Association subsequently sought judicial review
in the Otter Tail County District Court.
The district court granted the County's motion for summary judgment, finding substantial evidence in the record supported the negative EIS declaration. Specifically, the district court held the County's
decision not to prepare an EIS was not arbitrary and capricious because the County considered all inherent and potential problems associated with the proposed development. The Association appealed to
the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
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While not determinative of the need for EIS preparation, the court
considered recommendations by the USFWS regarding the detrimental effects of increased boating traffic on NELs. The court determined
the County's EAW did not contain an adequate evaluation or description of these potential impacts and, furthermore, the proposed boating
restriction mitigation techniques would not alleviate the proven negative impacts. The court noted, while the County did not entirely fail to
consider the impacts of boat traffic, the County could not appropriately tailor the proposed restrictions to mitigate impacts when the potential impacts remained unknown without an EIS. Therefore, the
court ruled the County's decision not to prepare an EIS was improper.
The court reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the
case to the County for a more complete study of the environmental
consequences of the proposed development on Dead Lake.
Amy Mockenhaupt
MISSISSIPPI
Titan Tire of Natchez, Inc. v. Miss. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 891 So.
2d 195 (Miss. 2004) (affirming the fine the Mississippi Commission on
Environmental Quality imposed on a company for violating the company's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit).
In September 1998 Titan Tire of Natchez ("Titan") purchased a
tire facility from Fidelity Tire Manufacturing Company ("Fidelity").
Fidelity had a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit to discharge storm water runoff and treated process
water into state waters. In 1996 Fidelity requested a modification of
the permit to install additional groundwater monitoring wells. The
Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality ("MDEQ") granted
the requested modification, but Fidelity did not install the groundwater wells before Titan purchased the plant in 1998. Titan began operating under the existing NPDES permit. In June 2000 Titan renewed
the NPDES permit. In December 2001 MDEQ issued a written complaint to Titan asserting that in 1999 and 2000 Titan violated its
NPDES permit sixteen times. MDEQ granted Titan a two-day hearing
before the Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality ("Commission"). The Commission found that Titan violated its permit and
fined Titan $5000. Titan appealed to the Hinds County Chancery
Court, which affirmed the Commission's order. Titan subsequently
appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court.
MDEQ maintained that when Titan purchased the facility from Fidelity, Titan became responsible for all of the environmental conditions associated with the facility, including the conditions specified in
the 1996 NPDES permit. Additionally, when Titan renewed the
NPDES permit in 2000, Titan did not request a modification of the
1996 permit. Thus, the permit condition established in 1996 remained
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applicable. Conversely, Titan maintained that the conditions of the
1996 NPDES permit were not applicable because Fidelity never installed the groundwater wells. Titan also asserted that MDEQ's
method for calculating the concentration of regulated substances was
incorrect.
The court reviewed the Commission's decision to fine Titan. Specifically, the court addressed whether the Commission's order (1) was
supported by substantial evidence, (2) was arbitrary or capricious, (3)
was beyond the power of the administrative agency to make, or (4)
violated one of Titan's statutory or constitutional rights.
The court determined that substantial evidence supported the
Commission's order and that the Commission did not act arbitrarily
and capriciously in issuing the order. During the two-day hearing, the
Commission heard evidence from both parties, including discharge
monitoring reports submitted by Titan indicating that Titan exceeded
discharge limits specified in its NPDES permit. Thus, the Commission
had substantial evidence for concluding that Titan violated the conditions of its NPDES permit. Similarly, given the length of the hearing
and the information submitted, the Commission did not act arbitrarily
or capriciously. The Commission could have imposed a $400,000 fine
on Titan for the NPDES permit violations, but instead only fined Titan
$5000.
Mississippi statutes authorized the Commission to impose a penalty
of up to $25,000 for each violation of a statute or regulation. Thus, the
court found the Commission to be well within the Commission's power
upon imposing a mere $5000 fine. Additionally, the court deferred to
the Commission's interpretation of the Commission's own regulation
and methods for calculating the concentration limits imposed by the
NPDES permit.
Lastly, the court found the Commission did not violate Titan's
statutory or constitutional rights. The court rejected Titan's allegation
that the MDEQ engaged in selective enforcement. To maintain a
claim of selective enforcement, the court reasoned that Titan, in addition to showing other similarly situated facilities violated the law at issue, also needed to show that the Commission based its decision to
selectively prosecute Titan on impressible grounds, such as race or religion. The court determined Titan failed to demonstrate the Commission singled Titan out or that MDEQ based its prosecutorial decisions on impermissible grounds. Therefore, Titan could not demonstrate that MDEQ engaged in selective enforcement. Accordingly, the
court affirmed MDEQ's order fining Titan $5000.
Cheryl R Miller
MONTANA
Bitterroot River Protective Ass'n v. Siebel, 108 P.3d 518 (Mont. 2005)
(holding significant amendments to a pending water appropriation
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application yielded a completely new application for purposes of the
application process).
In March 1999 Kenneth and Judith Siebel applied to the Montana
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation ("DNRC") to appropriate Bitterroot River Basin ("Basin") water to their ranch ten days
before the Montana legislature closed the Basin to new water appropriations. The Siebels' applications stipulated the intended use of the
water as for the beneficial use of wildlife. Subsequent to filing their
applications, the Siebels amended all four applications to reflect increases in the requested water amounts and changes in the means and
points of diversion and the points of use. DNRC wrote to the Siebels,
requesting further justification for the requested amendments. Upon
receiving the Siebels' response, DNRC published a Notice of Application and entertained objections from the public regarding the Siebels'
applications. The Bitterroot River Protective Association, the Montana
Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks, the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service, and a Basin resident (collectively "BRPA") objected to
the applications. Specifically, BRPA argued the Siebels failed to articulate a beneficial use of the requested water.
A DNRC Hearing Examiner found the Siebels failed to establish a
beneficial use for the water requested and, accordingly, denied the
Siebels' applications. The Siebels appealed to DNRC. DNRC reversed
the Hearing Examiner and granted all four of the Siebels' applications,
concluding the Siebels proved the amounts of water requested were
"reasonably necessary" to achieve a beneficial use. BRPA appealed the
DNRC decision to the District Court of the FirstJudicial District for the
County of Lewis and Clark.
The district court held DNRC erred by failing to recognize the Siebels' amended applications as new applications. In particular, the district court found the application amendments to be so substantial that
the amended applications constituted new applications effectively
barred by the Montana legislature's closure of the Basin to new water
appropriations. The Siebels appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
The supreme court agreed with the district court that the Siebels'
amended applications constituted new applications and were not mere
"refinements" of their original applications because the application
changes were so significant that the amended applications did not resemble the original applications. Explicitly, the amended applications
requested water amounts more than quadrupled the original requested amounts, and each of the amended applications changed one
or more of: the means of diversion, the points of diversion, and the
points of use. The court noted it had previously stated that changes to
the place of diversion and changes to the place of use in water appropriation applications constituted significant changes indicative of a
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new appropriation. As such, the court refused to consider the application amendments as refinements to the Siebels' original applications.
The court also rejected the Siebels' argument that water appropriation applications needed only to indicate the applicant's interest in
acquiring water and did not need to specify water amounts, water uses,
or means and places of diversion. The court recognized such an application was acceptable prior to passage of the 1973 Montana Water Use
Act ("Act"). However, the Act fundamentally changed the appropriation process, thereby requiring specificity and completeness in appropriation applications.
The court thus affirmed the district court's decision to deny the
Siebels' application for water appropriation.
Kyle K Chang
NEBRASKA
Baumbach v. Hauxwell, No. A-03-549, 2004 Neb. App. LEXIS 247
(Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2004) (holding the trial court erred in granting adverse possession claim where disputed boundary was the thread
of an old river bed, the river was moved by an act of avulsion, and there
was no showing of continuous possession or claim of ownership).
In a quiet title action, Bill Baumbach ("Baumbach"), Patrick and
Cecily Bolte ("the Boltes") claimed adverse possession against Bryan,
Doug, and Ami Hauxwell ("the Hauxwells"), and John Doe in the District Court for Red Willow County, Nebraska. The district court quieted title in favor of the Boltes, and the Hauxwells appealed. After
reviewing the facts de novo, the Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed.
The Boltes purchased riparian land on the south side of the Republican River from Baumbach in January 2000. Prior to 1935, the
Republican River served as a boundary line for several lots to the south
of the land the Boltes purchased. The boundary of riparian lands extended to the thread, or center, of the river channel. In 1935 a flood
caused the Republican River to shift its course to the north. This was a
sudden act of avulsion and, as a result, the boundary line did not shift
with the river as it would during a slow process of accretion. For land
to be riparian, it must have water flowing over it or along its border.
Because the sudden avulsion in 1935 moved the flow of the river without moving boundary lines, the lands south of the old Republican
River no longer bordered water and, therefore, lost their riparian
rights. When the Boltes purchased their land in 2000, the deed
granted them riparian land starting from the thread of the current
Republican River, then going south to where the thread of the Republican River existed prior to 1935. However, a fence existed to the south
of the old river thread on land the Hauxwells owned in 2000. The
Boltes claimed they owned the Hauxwell property south of the old
river thread, to the fence, through adverse possession.
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On appeal, the court first noted, to acquire title by adverse possession, a claimant must show actual, continuous, exclusive, notorious,
and adverse possession under a claim of ownership for a period of ten
years. Moreover, each element must be both continuous and uninterrupted for the entire ten-year period. The court determined the
Boltes' use was not continuous, because the land was suitable for yearround use, and the Boltes only used it intermittently. Next, the court
rejected the Boltes' claim that the use of the fence as a boundary line
sufficiently established adverse possession. The court reasoned the
fence was insufficient because this use lacked a claim of ownership of a
nature sufficient to put the real property owner on notice. In conclusion, the court held the Boltes did not establish continuous use, exclusive use, or the claim of ownership necessary for an adverse possession
claim and, accordingly, the court reversed the trial court ruling and
remanded the case.
JonathanLong
Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005) (adopting
the Restatement (Second) of Torts rules for disputes between users of
hydrologically connected ground and surface water; holding that although Spear T did not precisely state a claim under the Restatement,
Nebraska's pleading rules require the district court to allow amended
claims, and determining that the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act does not abrogate any common-law claims).
Spear T Ranch, Inc. ("Spear T") alleged in the District Court for
Morrill County, Nebraska, that Knaub's irrigation wells drained water
from Pumpkin Creek, depriving Spear T of its surface water appropriation. Knaub moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
the court could grant relief.
On appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, Spear T argued it
stated a claim for conversion, trespass, or injunction. Knaub made two
arguments in the alternative. First, the Nebraska Ground Water Management and Protection Act ("GWMPA") abrogated any common-law
claims, and second, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the North
Platte Natural Resources District ("NRD") possessed jurisdiction to
determine the issues.
The court considered Spear T's prior appropriation claim and rejected it for three reasons. First, Nebraska law maintains a legal fiction
to the effect that the over-pumping of groundwater cannot harm a user
of surface water. Second, neither Nebraska's statutes, nor extant case
law, developed a system or doctrine to address conflicts between users
of surface and groundwater. Finally, if the court adopted Spear T's
rule, first-in-time surface water appropriators would have a superior
right to all later groundwater users. The court stated that this could
shut down all the wells in areas where ground and surface water are
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hydrologically connected. Therefore, the court declined to apply Nebraska's statutory surface-water appropriation rules to conflicts between users of ground and surface water. The court also rejected Spear
T's conversion claim because surface water rights are usufructory, not
property, rights and thus could not support a claim of conversion or
trespass.
The court next considered whether Spear T stated a claim under
other common-law doctrines. The court discussed various groundwater rules and concluded that the best rule was set forth by the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement"). The Restatement permitted
a user of groundwater to pump water for beneficial purposes unless: it
caused harm by unreasonably lowering either the water table or artesian pressure; it exceeded the user's reasonable share of the annual
supply or total store; or it had a direct and substantial effect on a watercourse or lake and unreasonably harmed a user entitled to use of
those waters. The Restatement determined reasonableness on a caseby-case basis and kept the test flexible by permitting consideration of
many factors during the determination. Because the Restatement acknowledged and attempted to balance the competing equities of users,
and because it permitted the fact finder flexibility in determining reasonableness, the court adopted the Restatement rule to govern conflicts involving hydrologically connected surface and groundwater users. Thus, the court held that a groundwater user is not subject to liability for interference unless the ground water use directly and substantially affects a watercourse or lake causing unreasonable harm to a
person entitled to use of the surface water.
The court concluded that under this rule, Spear T alleged that
Knaub's use of groundwater directly and substantially affected Pumpkin Creek. However, Spear T had not alleged that Knaub's actions
harmed Spear T, thus, Spear T failed to state a claim upon which the
court could grant relief. However, the court concluded that Nebraska's pleading rules permit a plaintiff to amend its complaint and
thus, the district court erred in dismissing Spear T's claim rather than
permitting Spear T to amend the claim.
The court also found that the GWMPA neither expressly abrogates
a common-law claim nor demonstrates any intent in its legislative history to abrogate a claim by a surface user against a groundwater user.
Moreover, the court found that the GWMPA is ambiguous regarding
procedure when a party requests that the NRD take action, nor does
the GWMPA authorize the NRD to remedy a past harm. Thus, the
GWMPA does not abrogate any common-law claim. Finally, the court
examined joinder, and held that Spear T did not need to join all the
well users in the Pumpkin Creek basin because a joint tort-feasor is
liable for his or her conduct that causes harm. The fact that the harm
would not occur without another party's concurrent actions provides
no defense. Thus, the district court erred in finding Spear T failed to
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join all necessary parties. The court reversed and remanded to the
district court for further proceedings.
Jeff Gillio
NEW HAMPSHIRE
Sandford v. Town of Woffeboro, 868 A.2d 1002 (N.H. 2005) (holding
the character and nature of the use that created the prescriptive easement defined the scope of that prescriptive easement, and a town had
limited flexibility in exercising its prescriptive easement where the water levels the town maintained affected private property owners).
Joseph W. Sandford,Jr. ("Sandford") appealed a decision from the
Carroll Superior Court of New Hampshire that determined the scope
of the Town of Wolfeboro's ("town") easement included the right to
flow Sandford's land as a secondary result from adjusting to the needs,
desires, and circumstances of the town's water situation by controlling
its dam. The superior court concluded it could not use the scope of an
easement to determine prescriptive flow rights because the nature of
the two rights was extremely different; instead, the court found only
historically and customary use of the dam could determine the scope
of an easement. On appeal, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
considered whether the superior court's assessment of the scope of the
easement was proper.
Sandford owned land on the shore of Lake Wentworth in Wolfeboro. A dam controlled the lake's water level and maintained a water
of level of approximately 534.7 feet above sea level, which it had been
since the 1920s. In 1958 Smith River Corporation deeded the dam to
the town, and the deed required the town maintain certain minimum
water levels in the lake, which varied by season. The deed did not specify a maximum water level for the lake. Through its predecessors in
title, the town also had a prescriptive easement to flow water up to the
top of the dam. As a result, for parts of each year, the town would flow
Sandford's land to the same level: approximately 534.7 feet above sea
level.
Sandford argued the trial court improperly defined the scope of
the town's easement based on intent, rather than actual use. He contended pre-1958 water reports and other documentation established
the town did not historically flow the dam, and thus his land, to the full
height, but that in most years, the town maintained lower water levels.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court stated the character and nature
of the use that created the prescriptive easement was what defined the
scope of that prescriptive easement. The court then noted it had previously addressed a similar case where the court held one acquires a
right to an easement by uninterrupted use of the right at all times in
accordance to the pleasure or convenience of the party claiming the
right. Accordingly, the court reiterated the right to a water level "as
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high as the owner of the easement desires, subject to the natural fluctuations of weather and seasons" was a long-standing rule of law in New
Hampshire. Furthermore, the court clarified an owner had the right
to increase water levels as high as possible, regardless of any seasonal
variations in water levels during the prescriptive period.
Looking to Sandford's case, the court then concluded a reasonable
person could have found the town did have an easement to flow Sandford's land to 534.7 feet above sea level. The court reasoned this was
consistent with the historical and customary use of the dam, taking into
account seasonal changes in weather. Therefore, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court agreed with the trial court in determining the scope of
the town's easement and affirmed its ruling.
John Lintzenich
NEW JERSEY
In re Authorization for Freshwater Wetlands Gen. Permits, 860 A.2d
450 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding the NewJersey Department of Environmental Protection must gather additional facts and
conduct further analysis to determine whether wetlands were isolated
because evidence suggesting otherwise).
Preserve Old Northfield ("POND") appealed the decision of the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") to issue
Daniel Markowitz of Maramark Builders, L.L.C. ("Markowitz") a Letter
of Interpretation ("LOI") and a Freshwater Wetlands General Permit
("GP6"). DEP issued the LOI and the GP6 after it concluded the wetlands on Markowitz's land were "isolated wetlands" within the meaning
of New Jersey state law. POND contended Markowitz's land, which sat
adjacent to POND land, contained numerous wetlands consisting in
part of an inland tributary system and the GP6 violated the Freshwater
Wetlands Protection Act ("FWPA").
In February 2001 Markowitz applied to DEP for authorization to fill
a portion of the wetlands in connection with his residential construction project. From the time of application time until the end of 2003,
POND, its engineering expert, and other interested parties submitted
numerous documents and reports to DEP in opposition of the application. Specifically, POND submitted information that indicated a loss of
flood storage from stormwater would occur with filled wetlands, resulting in ponding and flooding on POND land.
On June 8 and August 20, 2001, DEP inspected the property at issue. After these inspections, DEP issued the LOI on August 30, 2001.
The LOI reflected DEP's finding that the wetlands were of "intermediate" and "ordinary" resource value as defined in the FWPA and New
Jersey state law. DEP denied POND's request for an adjudicatory hearing. POND continued to submit additional reports and requested DEP
visit the property during the rainy months in order to observe the
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stormwater flows. In February 2002 Markowitz submitted a revised application for GP6, and POND again submitted additional materials in
opposition of Markowitz's application. DEP responded to POND's
submitted materials by indicating that DEP's on-site inspections did
not find any evidence to support an opinion that the wetlands were not
isolated. Consequently, DEP issued the GP6 in May 2003 and concluded a portion of the land contained isolated wetlands and that these
wetlands could be disturbed for the construction project.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, concluded
DEP's permitting process was quasijudicial and, thus, DEP needed to
engage in fact-finding to the extent required by statute or regulation.
The court also determined all FWPA permitting actions required certain fact-finding consistent with statutory criteria and reflected in the
record. The court pointed to evidence POND provided, including
POND's engineering expert, and decided an abundance of factual material contrary to DEP's determinations existed. The court also noted
its discomfort with the fact that DEP's 1986 Freshwater Wetlands map
reflected the wetlands in question as part of the inland tributary system
and that DEP's on-site visits took place during a dry period. The court
further stated that statutes and regulations did not define "sheet flow"
and "concentrated flow," and DEP failed to provide significantly distinct definitions of these two different types of flows. Because ample
evidence of water flowing from Markowitz's property existed, and due
to DEP's failure to distinguish the evidence as "sheet flow" or "concentrated flow," the court remanded the case to DEP for further factfinding and analysis to address the court's concerns.
Laura L. Chartrand
NEW MEXICO
State v. City of Las Vegas, 89 P.3d 47 (N.M. 2004) (overturning the
pueblo rights doctrine for inconsistency with the doctrines of prior
appropriation and beneficial use).
This case arose through the course of adjudicating water rights on
the Gallinas River when the New Mexico state engineer sought a declaration of the City of Las Vegas' ("City') water rights based on the
pueblo rights doctrine. The state engineer argued the inapplicability
of this doctrine in New Mexico, thus prohibiting the City's water right
entitlement under the doctrine's invocation. The Court of Appeals of
New Mexico did not follow the precedent of Cartwrightv. Public Service
Company of New Mexico, but instead offered an opinion to aid the New
Mexico Supreme Court's further independent consideration. Specifically, the appellate court expressed reservations over reconciliation
between the pueblo rights doctrine and the prior appropriation doctrine.
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Accordingly, the court held the pueblo rights doctrine offended
the doctrine of prior appropriation and beneficial use, the latter being
the basis of New Mexico water law. The court stated that for all appropriations of public water, including municipalities, the proper measurement for a water right was beneficial use within a reasonable time
after appropriation and the pueblo rights doctrine contradicted this
timeliness requirement by allowing indefinite expansion of a water
right to accommodate changing municipal needs. Therefore, the
court determined the pueblo rights doctrine encouraged underutilization of public water and prevented efficient and economic water use
both of which were antithetical to the doctrine of prior appropriation
and, therefore, contradicted New Mexico's established water law principles.
In overruling Cartwright's precedent, the court addressed issues of
stare decisis and prior reliance concerns. Regarding stare decisis, the
court stated because Cartwrightwas inconsistent with prior appropriation and did not establish a rule of property, following Cartwrightwould
be more injurious than not. The court reasoned following an incorrect principle established by case law was more injurious than overruling the case law and establishing a new, correct principle. Furthermore, regarding issues of reliance on the Cartwright rule, the court
stated, overruling Cartwrightdid not take away the City's colonization
grant water right, as the City retained vested rights in all water put to
beneficial use within a reasonable time after appropriation.
Finally, the court considered the City's argument that the court
should only apply the overruling of Cartwrightprospectively. To make
this determination, the court considered three factors: (1) whether the
ruling announced a new principal of law, (2) whether retroactive application would advance or hinder the purposes of the new rule, and
(3) whether prospective application of the new rule was necessary to
avoid injustice. Accordingly, the court determined because its ruling
clearly announced a new rule of law, a prospective application of the
new rule frustrated prior appropriation and was, therefore, not necessary to avoid injustice. However, the court noted the City's reliance
interest was substantial. Thus, the court ordered retroactive application of its decision with limited prospective application to the City: the
City could no longer claim a pueblo water right, but the City was entifled to an equitable remedy that balanced its reasonable reliance interests with the other interests of Gallinas River appropriators. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district court to complete the
balancing test above and determine the specifics of the City's equitable
remedy.
Amy Mockenhaupt
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NEW YORK
In re Viii. of Scarsdale v. New York City Water Bd., 15 A.D.3d 590
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (holding the Water Board's method for calculating excess water consumption of municipalities, using the monthly
consumption figures of individual municipalities, conformed with the
Water Supply Act).
The Village of Scarsdale ("Scarsdale") brought an action in the
Westchester County Supreme Court alleging the New York City Water
Board ("Water Board") improperly calculated its water entitlement
amount. Scarsdale claimed the correct procedure was for the Water
Board to calculate Scarsdale's annual consumption based on a larger
geographical unit, rather than its current method of using the monthly
consumption figures of individual municipalities. The lower court rejected Scarsdale's claim and held the Water Board's method of calculating Scarsdale's excess consumption of the New York City water supply complied with the Water Supply Act ("WSA") and was not arbitrary
and capricious. Scarsdale appealed to the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court, Second Department.
Under the WSA, municipal corporations were entitled to take a
particular amount of water from the New York City water supply system, called their "entitlement amount." Any water consumed in excess
of the entitlement amount was known as "excess consumption." The
Water Board billed municipal corporations for their water consumption, which the municipality was obligated to pay for under the New
York City Administrative Code. After the Water Board caialated the
municipality's entitlement amount, it billed the municipality based on
the amount of entitlement water and excess water the municipality
consumed.
Scarsdale argued the Water Board calculated Scarsdale's entitlement amount lower than it actually was because the Water Board used
an incorrect method to calculate the amount. Scarsdale argued the
correct method was to use annual consumption figures of a larger geographic area, such as Westchester County, rather than the monthly
consumption figures for an individual municipality. The court rejected Scarsdale's arguments, stating that Scarsdale raised the same
issue in Matter of Village of Scarsdale v. Jorling where the court rejected
the claim, and the previous case was binding. Also, the court held
Scarsdale failed to establish the method the Water Board used was an
error of law or was arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision of the lower court and declared the Water Board's
method of calculating excess water consumption was consistent with
the Water Supply Act.
Kate Brewer
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OHIO
Portage County Bd. of Comm'rs v. City of Akron, 808 N.E.2d 444
(Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (upholding the trial court's statutory interpretation that the state's grant of riparian rights to the City was limited to
the rights the state owned and reversing the opening of a privately
owned and non-navigable lake to public access, based on the lake's
potential capacity for recreational boating).
In 1911 the Ohio General Assembly passed a statute granting the
City of Akron ("Akron") the state's legal rights to the waters of the
Cuyahoga River ("Cuyahoga") and eminent domain to appropriate
land necessary for a water system for Akron's inhabitants. With this
authority, Akron, located in Summit County, obtained land in Portage
County and proceeded to build a dam across the Cuyahoga on this
land. Akron's dam created Lake Rockwell from which Akron supplied
its residents with drinking water for decades. Until recently, enough
water ran downstream from the dam to allow the neighboring cities
sufficient water use. However, due to population growth in Portage
County, the amount of treated sewage released into the Cuyahoga increased, generating problems related to low water level and high pollutants.
This dispute arose from the need for more water to dilute the pollutants. Portage County Board of Commissioners and other neighboring communities ("Portage") brought an action against Akron in Portage County Court of Common Pleas for unreasonable use of water and
nuisance. They also sought declaratory judgment concerning all parties' legal rights stemming from the 1911 statute. The trial court found
in favor of Akron regarding the reasonableness of its use, but found for
Portage regarding Akron's rights under the 1911 statute. The trial
court denied Akron's right to sell water to anyone outside its city limits,
to riparian rights on the "middle" Cuyahoga River, and to unlimited
use of the Cuyahoga. Finally, the trial court granted relief to Portage's
public access claim and ordered Akron to allow non-motorized boats
on Lake Rockwell. Akron appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Appellate District, Portage County, assigning twenty-five errors to the trial court's decision.
The first group of asserted errors concerned the trial court's interpretation of the 1911 statute. The trial court held the General Assembly granted Akron only those rights that the state itself had at the time.
Furthermore, under Ohio law, rights to river water were vested in those
owning property abutting the rivers. Therefore, because the state did
not have ownership of all the land abutting the Cuyahoga, it could not
grant Akron absolute control of the Cuyahoga. The court agreed with
the trial court's interpretation of the plain language of the statute.
The court reiterated the state could only grant what it had control or
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ownership of at the time of the grant or the 1911 statute. Accordingly,
the court limited Akron's asserted right to the middle of the Cuyahoga
River and restricted Akron's right to take unrestricted volumes of river
water and upstream water to the confines of the state's prior ownership.
However, the court agreed with Akron's argument that the trial
court misinterpreted the language in the W.S. Kent Deed, assignment
of error number eleven. W.S. Kent quitclaimed his riparian rights to
Akron, but conveyed the land to the City of Kent. The trial court interpreted the language in the deed, which stated, "expressly reserving... the right to use and enjoy.. .all waters... not made use of by the
City of Akron," to mean W.S. Kent had not conveyed exclusive rights to
Akron; rather, he had created a servitude. However, the court concluded the plain language of the deed did not create servitude. The
court focused on the first portion of the deed where W.S. Kent released all rights in the water and held Akron's riparian rights that the
deed conveyed were binding on the City of Kent.
In the next series of alleged errors, Akron asserted several theories
barring Portage's claims, including failure to seek timely remedy, doctrine of laches, res judicata, and statute of limitations on tort claims.
The court rejected each claim as lacking merit for the following reasons respectively: (1) Portage had several remedies available for protection of its riparian rights; (2) the laches defense was not applicable; (3)
Akron's use of the water did not constitute the same transaction or
occurrence disputed in the 1913 suit; and (4) Portage's injuries, the
basis for the tort claims, were ongoing and not limited to the construction of the dam.
Next, the court examined the trial court's decision to grant public
access to Lake Rockwell for recreational purposes. The court stated,
under federal law, the concept of navigability was based on whether
the water had ever been or was currently used for interstate commerce.
The court concluded, since the Cuyahoga had never been used for
commerce, Lake Rockwell was non-navigable. The court then acknowledged that the more expansive Ohio common law construction
of navigability allowed courts to consider the availability of recreational
boating in determining the navigability of a body of water. However,
the court held the capacity to boat constituted but one factor, rather
than grounds for making Lake Rockwell open to the public. Thus, the
court determined Lake Rockwell was a non-navigable, privately owned
body of water that Akron could keep from the public at its discretion.
Finally, the court discussed Portage's cross-appeal, finding merit in
Portage's argument that the trial court failed to issue declaratory relief
concerning the amount of water Akron released. Although the trial
court found Akron's use of the water was reasonable, it assumed Akron
would continue to release 5.0 million gallons of water per day. The
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court noted without a court-imposed requirement, nothing prevented
Akron from decreasing its water release.
In conclusion, the court upheld the trial court's interpretation of
the 1911 statute, reversed the trial court's judgment regarding the W.S.
Kent deed, which granted full riparian rights to Akron, and vacated the
trial court's judgment regarding public access to Lake Rockwell. The
court remanded the case to the trial court to render judgment in favor
of Akron on the Lake Rockwell public access issue and to make a declaration in favor of Portage as to Akron's water release requirement.
Lynn Noesner
SOUTH CAROLINA
White's Mill Colony, Inc. v. Williams, 609 S.E.2d 811 (S.C. Ct. App.
2005) (adopting the common law rule regarding who controls the surface of private, man-made, and non-navigable waters).
The South Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed a special referee
decision denying Williams and other adjacent landowners both public
and private access rights to White's Mill Pond. The pond is a manmade, essentially isolated body of water. White's Mill Colony ("Colony") held tide to the land north and east of the pond and at least a
substantial portion of the bed of the pond itself. The Colony brought
suit against Williams and other adjacent landowners seeking exclusive
use of the pond and damages for trespass onto the Colony's land.
The court first addressed whether the adjacent landowners had a
right of public access to the pond. The South Carolina Constitution
made all navigable waters of the state public highways, and guaranteed
a public right of access. Navigable waters included any waterway with
the capacity to support valuable floatage. Also, the waterway needed to
connect to other navigable bodies of water so collectively they formed a
means of transportation. The court found no evidence in the record
that the pond served any useful purpose for transportation, and the
streams flowing in and out of the pond were not capable of supporting
valuable floatage. The court concluded the pond was not a navigable
waterway and, therefore, no right of public access existed.
Next, the court addressed whether the adjacent landowners had a
private right of access to the pond, or littoral rights, since they lived
next to the pond. Under common law, landowners next to a body of
water possessed property rights that allowed them to make reasonable
use of the water for any lawful purpose. However, this case dealt with
rights to a private, man-made, and non-navigable pond owned almost
entirely by an adjoining landowner. The court acknowledged two
views on the rights of adjacent landowners in this situation emerged.
The common law rule entided the owner of the land underlying the
surface water to exclusive control of the water. The owner of the underlying land had the right to exclude all others from accessing or us-
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ing the water. The civil law rule entitled the adjacent landowners to
reasonable use and enjoyment of the body of water whether navigable
or not. The court followed the common law rule because South Carolina water law closely followed common law rules. Also, the court
noted the policy protecting landowners who made improvements on
their property was in accord with the general jurisprudence of the
state.
Therefore, the court affirmed the special referee's order that the
Colony had the exclusive right to use the pond to the extent they
owned the land underlying the pond in fee simple. The court's determination of who had rights to use the pond depended on who held
tide to land underlying the pond, which the special referee had not
determined when he awarded trespass damages. Therefore, the court
remanded the case for a determination of exact property boundaries
and damages.
HeatherHeinlein
SOUTH DAKOTA
Sorensen v. Sommervold, 694 N.W.2d 266 (S.D. 2005) (holding a
county has a general duty to improve roads in a manner that permits
surface waters to escape through their natural course to prevent flooding to a property owner's land).
Linda and Nels Sorensen ("Sorensens") own property on both
sides of a road that Clay County, South Dakota ("County") recently
modified by replacing a "T" intersection with a curved road. The
Sorensens claimed that the intersection previously had a twenty-four
inch culvert ("culvert") that allowed water to continue in the natural
course of drainage, and that the new road intersected the general
course of natural drainage. The Sorensens requested the County reinstall the culvert and alleged the County's refusal to do so caused flooding and irreparable damage to their land.
Following the County's denial to reinstall the culvert, the Sorensens applied for a writ of mandamus in the FirstJudicial Circuit Court,
Clay County, requesting an order to compel the County to reinstall the
culvert. The County moved for judgment on the pleadings and moved
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the
County's motions and the Sorensens appealed to the South Dakota
Supreme Court.
The County admitted that South Dakota statutes imposed a duty on
counties to maintain roads and culverts, but asserted that the manner
in which the County performed this duty was within the discretion of
the County and was not subject to mandamus relief. The County also
denied that the modified road prevented drainage.
The court stated that a township's duty with respect to natural
drainage was specific and that South Dakota law required authorities to
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place openings in highway grades to permit surface water to escape in
its natural course. The court also acknowledged that mandamus relief
enforced the County's drainage duty if the remedial action sought was
a ministerial duty, but not if the remedial action was a discretionary
duty. The court ruled a county's general duty to maintain roads was
ministerial, but how a county maintained a road was discretionary.
Therefore, the court ruled the petition stated a claim for relief in that
the Sorensens sought that the County perform its general duty, but the
petition failed to state a claim to the extent that the Sorensens sought
to require the County to perform the specific act of reinstalling the
culvert.
The court held the trial court correctly dismissed the portion of the
application that sought to require the County reinstall the culvert in a
specific location, but erred in dismissing the portion that sought to
require the County perform its general duty to permit surface waters to
escape through their natural course to prevent damage to Sorensens'
land. Thus, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
the case to the trial court.
Stacy Hochman
UTAH
Bd. of Trs. of Wash. Co. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Keystone Conversions, 103 P.3d 686 (Utah 2004) (holding a water availability fee is not
an impact fee pursuant to the Utah Impact Fees Act).
The Board of Trustees of Washington County Water Conservancy
District ("Water District"), a political subdivision of the State of Utah,
owned and operated a secondary water system that provided irrigation
water to the town of Toquerville. In July 2001 the Water District
adopted Final Rules and Regulations for Secondary Retail Water Service ("Final Rules"). The Final Rules outlined a fee schedule, including an initial water availability fee paid developers requiring water service within the developers' subdivisions. The Water District petitioned
the Fifth Judicial District Court to rule the water availability fee did not
constitute an impact fee and that the Water District had the power to
promulgate the Final Rules. Keystone Conversions ("Keystone"), a
Toquerville developer the Water District serviced, opposed the Water
District's petition.
Keystone filed a complaint requesting the district court find the water availability fee was an impact fee subject to Utah's Impact Fees Act
("Act"). Keystone argued the Water District required Keystone to construct a secondary water structure to receive water and the Water District provided written approval of the structure. Furthermore, Keystone paid the water availability fee prior to the Water District's written
approval. Keystone contended construction of the secondary water
structure constituted development activity, and because the water
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availability fee accompanied such development activity, the water availability fee was an impact fee. Alternatively, Keystone argued the town
of Toquerville would not approve Keystone's subdivision development
absent Keystone procuring secondary water service from the Water
District, and hence the water availability fee was an impact fee. The
district court agreed with Keystone's primary contention and held the
water availability fee was an impact fee. The Water District appealed to
the Supreme Court of Utah.
The Act defined an impact fee as a "payment of money imposed
upon development activity as a condition of development approval."
Development activity meant "any changes in the use of land that create[d] additional demand and need for public facilities." The Act required any public entity imposing an impact fee to justify the fee. Justification included preparing capital facilities plans, demonstrating the
degree of impact on system improvements, proportioning costs attributed to new development, and calculating the fee. Additionally, the
Act required the entity imposing the fee to establish accounting
mechanisms and processes for challenging the impact fee.
The court held the water availability fee was not an impact fee pursuant to the Act. The court found that, while the subdivision itself created additional demand for secondary water, construction of a secondary water system alone merely served that demand. The Water District did not authorize construction of a secondary water system on a
developer's property, nor did the Water District have the authority to
preclude a developer from constructing a secondary water system. The
court concluded the Water District's approval was not necessary for the
development of property and, therefore, Water District approval alone
did not authorize development activity as defined by the Act.
The court also held Keystone's alternative argument was not ripe
for review. Keystone contended the Water District's approval predicated the town of Toquerville's development approval. The court
stated many other approvals, such as contractor licenses and certifications, were also necessary predicates to Toquerville's approval, but the
water availability fee alone did not constitute an impact fee. The court
stated Keystone failed to show sufficient evidence that Water District
approval alone, demonstrated by payment of the water availability fee,
ensured Toquerville's approval. Thus, the court declined to review this
argument.
The court reversed the district court ruling and held the water
availability fee was not an impact fee pursuant to the Act.
Suzanne Knowle
Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Mountain Reg'l Water Special Serv. Dist.,
108 P.3d 119 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (holding a county could promulgate water regulations under the county's land use planning authority
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and extensive water regulation at the state level did not preempt
county water regulation).
In November 2002 Summit County promulgated Ordinance No.
436 ("ordinance") under the authority of Utah's County Land Use Development and Management Act ("CLUDMA"). The ordinance required all public and private water suppliers in the county to file annual supply and demand studies that included, among other requirements, water companies' currently available water rights, water source
capacity, reserve source capacity, outstanding commitment-for-service
letters, current number of service connections, and surplus capacity.
The ordinance allowed Summit County to prevent issuance of new
building permits unless a physical water supply to serve new connections existed. Under the ordinance, a water supplier could not issue
the mandatory commitment-of-service letter to a new customer unless
Summit County's district engineer and health department certified the
supplier had the present ability to provide the physical water in accordance with county and state water regulations.
Mountain Regional Water Special Service District ("Mountain Regional") filed an annual supply and demand study with Summit County
on January 31, 2003. Summit County's district engineer recommended
approval of Mountain Regional's study on March 3, 2003, and the
county health director approved the study the day after.
Summit Water Distribution Company ("Summit Water") filed a
complaint against Mountain Regional and Summit County in the
Third District Court, Silver Summit Department on June 26, 2003.
The complaint claimed the study misrepresented Mountain Regional's
ability to provide water to new and existing customers in Snyderville
Basin. The complaint sought mandamus and injunctive relief pursuant
to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, Summit Water demanded Mountain Regional file a true and accurate supply and demand study. Summit Water's complaint also sought mandamus and
injunctive relief against Summit County's district engineer and health
director, insisting those individuals perform their investigative and analytical obligations under the ordinance.
Mountain Regional and Summit County moved to dismiss, asserting that Summit Water failed to seek relief through other adequate
measures. Specifically, Mountain Regional and Summit County argued
Summit Water should have challenged Summit County's decisions
through the ordinance and through CLUDMA.
The district court dismissed the action, observing that Mountain
Regional was not an administrative agency. The district court also dismissed Summit Water's request for mandamus against Summit County
because the district court could not impose its will on the county and
because Summit County's decision was a land use decision within the
ambit of CLUDMA. Specifically, courts should not grant mandamus
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where other remedies were available. The district court found Summit
Water should have petitioned for review under the ordinance, and that
the thirty-day timeframe to challenge a county's land use decisions had
already expired.
On appeal, Summit Water argued the district court's rulings that
CLUDMA authorized Summit County to promulgate the ordinance
and that the timely filing constraints of CLUDMA did not apply to
Summit Water. To support this contention, Summit Water argued
Utah's comprehensive regulation of water precluded Summit County
from regulating water under CLUDMA.
The Utah Court of Appeals gave no deference to the district court's
statutory interpretations. The court held CLUDMA's authorization for
county land use ordinance-making did not exclude water regulations
such as the ordinance. While the court determined no Utah law explicitly authorized land use decisions to encompass water decisions, the
court reviewed treatises, persuasive authority, and the language of
CLUDMA to conclude that county water decisions fell under the ambit
of land use decisions.
CLUDMA allowed counties "to provide for the health, safety, and
welfare" of their "present and future inhabitants." The ordinance
"recognize[d] that the health, safety[,] and welfare of the inhabitants
of Snyderville Basin, depended in large part, on the availability of
drinking water and the reliability of the water suppliers." The court
noted other jurisdictions upheld zoning ordinances ensuring essential
services such as water, and concluded water decisions fell under the
umbrella of land use safeguards contemplated by CLUDMA.
Regarding Summit Water's contention that Utah preempted the
regulation of water, the court stated no legislative attempt to preempt
local regulation of water existed. On the contrary, the legislature explicitly allowed local jurisdictions to control water systems, if not otherwise inconsistent with state law. The court thus affirmed the district
court's decision.
Lukas Staks
WASHINGTON
City of West Richland v. Dep't of Ecology, 103 P.3d 818 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding the owner of inchoate groundwater permits may
alter the manner of use of his permits, but may not alter the purpose of
use of his permits).
In August 1993 the Department of Ecology ("DOE") granted two
family farm groundwater permits to John Michel pursuant to the Family Farm Water Act ("FFWA"). Michel failed to meet development
schedules stipulated in the permits and, in October 2000, DOE issued
an order to show cause, asking Michel to explain his inaction regarding his permits. Before Michel answered DOE's order, the Benton
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County Water Conservancy Board ("BCWCB") approved a request by
the City of West Richland ("Richland") to transfer Michel's agricultural
irrigation rights to Richland's municipal water supply. If transferred,
Richland would use Michel's permitted water mainly for lawn irrigation. DOE reversed the BCWCB decision and cancelled Michel's permits.
Michel appealed DOE's permit cancellation to the Pollution Control Hearings Board ("PCHB"). DOE and Michel reached a settlement
wherein Michel agreed to develop his two inchoate groundwater rights.
Shortly thereafter, Richland appeared before PCHB to contest DOE's
decision to invalidate the Michel-Richland groundwater permit transfer. Michel did not participate in this appeal. PCHB upheld DOE's
prohibition of the transfer of the unperfected water rights, arguing the
transfer proposed a change in purpose from agricultural to residential
irrigation. On appeal, the Benton County Superior Court reversed
PCHB and held that Washington case law and statutes empowered
DOE to change the purpose for the water permits. DOE appealed to
the Washington Court of Appeals.
The court concluded that the Michel-Richland transfer was invalid.
The Court reviewed the FFWA, which allowed transfer of family farm
permits under three circumstances: (1) the permit was transferred for
use for agricultural irrigation purposes, (2) the permit was transferred
exclusively via lease agreement for any beneficial water purpose, and
(3) the permit was transferred for any beneficial purpose of use and
the water was within the boundaries of an urban growth area at the
time of transfer. Viewed in the larger statutory framework, however,
the development status of the family farm permit was crucial. Washington law allowed permit holders with a perfected claim, specifically
one that put water to beneficial use, to change the "purpose of use"
from their original permits. In contrast, Washington law also stated
that a permit holder with unperfected water rights could only change
the "manner or place of use" of the water. The court relied on case law
to differentiate between "purpose of use" and "manner of use." "Manner of use" changes did not "alter the original project or the quantity
of water needed." Michel held two unperfected water permits and
could therefore only change their "manner of use." Richland, the
court said, impermissibly proposed changing the "purpose of use"
from agricultural irrigation of a small farm in the original project to
municipal water supply.
Even if Michel had perfected his water right, the court noted that
Michel failed to satisfy FFWA requirements for to transfer his family
farm permit. Specifically, Michel and Richland did not intend the
transfer for agricultural purposes, the duration of the permit "lease" to
Richland extended beyond the temporary change of purpose envisioned by the legislature, and Richland impermissibly planned to use
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the water within an urban growth area. The court reversed the superior court and affirmed PCHB.
Lukas Staks
Gunstone v. Jefferson County, No. 29709-4-H, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS
499 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2004) (holding the public duty doctrine
does not apply when a blocked culvert bursts on county land and destroys private property).
Reed and Diane Gunstone ("Gunstones") filed suit against Jefferson County ("County") in the Superior Court of Kitsap County to recover damages suffered when a seventy-foot deep lake created by a
blocked culvert burst its banks and flooded their property. The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the County, stating the
public duty doctrine shielded the County from liability. The Gunstones appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, arguing the
County's response to the blocked culvert was proprietary, not governmental.
The culvert, located on County land, diverted surface water under
the Old Gardiner Road in Jefferson County, Washington. In 1984 the
Gunstones warned the County that the culvert partially collapsed. The
County did not repair the culvert. During a winter storm in 1996, the
culvert became completely blocked and twenty-six million gallons of
surface water collected behind the culvert. The County responded to
the problem by digging a relief trench. The relief trench did not solve
the problem, and the fill supporting the Old Gardiner Road collapsed.
The debris and water from the collapse damaged the Gunstones'
property.
The Gunstones argued the County's response to the blocked culvert was proprietary since the blocked culvert was on County land. The
Gunstones argued the County acted as a property owner because the
County had no duty to respond to blocked culverts on private land.
The County responded that the response to the blocked culvert was
governmental because the burst banks and flooding constituted an
emergency.
The court agreed with the Gunstones' argument and held the
County's response to the blocked culvert was not governmental. The
court reasoned the County's response was not governmental because
the response was not comparable to typical emergency responses such
as crime or fire. Consequently, the public duty doctrine did not shield
the County from liability.
The court also discussed whether strict liability applied to the
County based on the culvert's artificial diversion and collection of surface waters. The court held that the superior court must decide the
issue of strict liability on remand. The court thus reversed and re-
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manded the case, holding the trial court improperly granted summary
judgment to the County.
Thomas Jantunen
Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist. v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., Nos.
22741-3-11, 22742-1-HI, & 22758-8-HI, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 454
(Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2005) (holding the Pollution Control Hearings Board erred in its decision on the sufficiency of the Washington
Department of Ecology's consultation regarding applications for surface water rights with the Columbia River Intertribal Fish Commission).
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Lower Stemilt Irrigation District
("LSID"), Kennewick Irrigation District ("KID"), Mercer Ranches
("Mercer"), and Kennewick Public Hospital District ("KPHD") (collectively "Applicants") filed five applications with the Washington Department of Ecology ("Department") for Columbia River water rights.
Washington state regulations required the Department to consult with
federal, state, local agencies, and Indian tribes before deciding
whether to approve the applications. The Department requested that
several entities review the applications, including the Columbia River
Intertribal Fish Commission ("CRITFC"). The Department specifically
asked the CRITFC to identify someone to participate in the consultation on the permit applications. The CRITFC responded in 2001, asserting that it opposed the applications. The Department prepared
preliminary decisions based on its evaluations of the applications and
provided draft Reports of Examinations to the various consulted parties. The Yakama Nation and the CRITFC indicated their continuing
opposition in response to these drafts.
The Department revised the drafts based on settlements with the
Columbia-Snake River Irrigators Association and KPHD. These revisions provided the Applicants with two options to mitigate the possible
effect of their surface rights. On January 15, 2003, the Department
approved the five applications for surface water rights from the Columbia River. The Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation ("Umatilla Tribes"), the Nez Perce Tribe, and the Yakama Nation (collectively "Indian Tribes"), appealed the Department's approvals to the Pollution Control Hearings Board ("PCHB"). The PCHB
ruled the Department's consultation with CRITFC satisfied the requirements of state law, but reversed the Department's approvals. The
PCHB held that the Department failed to adequately consult with the
Indian tribes on the draft revisions. The Department, KID, and KPHD
appealed the PCHB's decision to the Washington Court of Appeals.
The court stated that it could provide relief from a PCHB order if
the order was outside the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
PCHB or if the PCHB erroneously interpreted or applied the law. The
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court examined whether the PCHB erred upon concluding that the
Department did not comply with statutory consulting requirements,
and determined whether the Department properly consulted with the
appropriate tribes. The Department, KID, and KPHD claimed the
PCHB should defer to the Department's interpretations of state regulations governing such consulting procedures. However, the court ruled
the regulations unambiguous. The court held it was unable to rule on
the sufficiency of the revision consultation because the court determined that the PCHB's first ruling was in error, and that the initial
consultation with CRITFC was insufficient. The Department, KID, and
KPHD contended that the sufficiency of CRITFC's consultation was
not at issue, but the court held, as the Indian Tribes devoted a section
of their brief to the sufficiency of the CRITFC consultation, that the
Tribes preserved that issue for appeal.
The court ruled that state regulations governing the consultation
process for surface water rights required consultation with affected
Indian Tribes. The court determined that CRITFC was not an official
Indian Tribe, but was a supporting organization governed by the fish
and wildlife committees of the governing tribes. The Department admitted that it did not contact either the Nez Perce or Umatilla Tribes
during the consultation process, despite the lack of ambiguity in the
state regulations. The court also found that an issue of fact existed
regarding possible harm to fish, and held that the PCHB correctly determined that issue. Additionally, the Indian Tribes requested attorney
fees and costs. However, the court stated that the Indian Tribes offered no basis for which they could be entitled to fees under state law,
and no basis to determine whether the Indian Tribes satisfied the definition of "qualified party" under the statute. The court affirmed the
PCHB's reversal of the application approvals, but held that the PCHB
should have reversed the approvals because of insufficient consultation
with CRITFC, as regulations required the Department to consult with
the Indian Tribes, and the Department failed to do so.
David W. Hall

WISCONSIN
Helnore v. Dep't of Natural Res., 694 N.W.2d 730(Wis. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding a state department of natural resources' adoption of a wetlands map that rezoned landowner's property did not constitute a
regulatory taking).
In 1968, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("DNR")
promulgated a wetlands map that designated residentially zoned lots
within the Pioneer Acres Subdivision in Ozaukee County ("County"),
Wisconsin as wetlands. The County did not adopt the wetlands map at
that time. In 1993 James and Constance Helnore ("Helnores") pur-
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chased lots fifteen and sixteen of Pioneer Acres. Before purchasing
the lots, the couple contacted the DNR, which assured them the property required no DNR building permits because of its residential zoning. The DNR sent the Helnores a map of the wetlands area but did
not advise them as to whether their planned improvements disturbed
or encroached upon those wetlands.
After purchasing the two lots, the Helnores obtained proper permits and made improvements upon the land, including a house, some
outbuildings, and a pond spanning both lots. In 1994, after the
Helnores obtained their permits, the County enacted an ordinance
adopting the 1968 DNR wetlands map. In 2002 the couple applied for
additional building permits, which the County denied due to the lots'
reclassification as wetlands. The DNR sent the Helnores a letter informing them their property consisted almost entirely of wetlands,
their building project would require a water quality certificate
("WQC") the DNR would probably deny, and the DNR might also require after-the-fact permits for the structures already in place on the
property.
The Helnores brought suit against the DNR in the Circuit Court in
Ozaukee County, alleging the DNR's actions constituted a regulatory
taking of their property without just compensation. The circuit court
upheld the DNR's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the Helnores' case because the Helnores had not exhausted
their administrative remedies; therefore, the claim was not ripe before
the circuit court. The Helnores appealed to the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals, District Two.
The court upheld the lower court's ruling. The court first rejected
the Helnores' claim that a regulatory taking occurred when the County
merely adopted the wetlands map. Although designating wetlands was
injury enough to confer standing, the court distinguished an earlier
case to determine that wetlands re-zoning did not necessarily constitute
an injury that rose to the level of a regulatory taking. Because the DNR
had not yet applied the regulation to the Helnores, their claim was not
ripe, and the DNR had not yet taken the property when the County
adopted the wetlands map in 1994.
The court also stated the DNR's letter to the Helnores had not affected a regulatory taking in 2002. The court rejected the Helnores'
argument the DNR's letter constituted enforcement of the wetlands
map and held the letter was advisory and did not constitute an adverse
ruling by the DNR. The court noted Wisconsin statutes required the
DNR to consider amending the Helnores' proposal, allowing a variance, or equitable remedies before denying the Helnores' application.
The court held the Helnores had to exhaust their administrative
remedies before their takings claim became ripe in court. Finally, the
court held the Wisconsin code set out an administrative process that
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would appropriately protect the Helnores' property interests. The
court therefore affirmed the lower court's ruling.
Julie M. Schmidt

CONFERENCE REPORTS
WATER SUPPLY CHALLENGES IN TIMES OF DROUGHT AND
GROWTH
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, AND RESOURCES
23RD ANNUAL WATER LAW CONFERENCE
San Diego, California

February 24-25, 2005

DAY ONE
THURSDAY
Grady Gammage, Jr., a partner in Gammage & Burnham, P.L.C.
and board member of the Central Arizona Water Conservation District,
opened the conference by contending that the current drought is not
a "desperate crisis" and showed the ways in which the Phoenix metropolitan area has dealt with the issue. Mr. Gammage explained that the
city's development of the Central Arizona Project ("CAP") was its key
component in combating the drought. He noted that CAP has allowed
the city to bank excess water underground and, through the use of this
excess water, settle previous water disputes with the Gila River Indian
Community and sell water to the city of Las Vegas for its everincreasing water needs. Gammage went on to discuss the economics of
water and the insufficiencies in a pure market approach to managing
the resource. He contended that the pure market approach is insufficient due to the large infrastructure needed to develop water and the
controls that are necessary to allow for its affordable use in agriculture,
the home and in avoiding waste. These responsibilities, according to
Gammage, are more appropriately handled by the government, rather
than the free market. He also pointed out that government can spread
the costs of water management and development more broadly across
society, manage environmental impacts to avoid a "tragedy of the
commons" situation, and can set long term goals better than a private
actor.
PLENARY SESSION PRESENTATION #1-

PLJTING NEW IDEAS TO WORK-IMPLEMENTING CREATIVE
SETTLEMENTS & WATER MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS

This panel discussed settlement and management concepts involving Native Americans and state and local governments. Martha 0.
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Pagel of Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, P.C. in Portland, Oregon moderated the discussion, and the panelists included Jane Marx, an Albuquerque, New Mexico attorney, Norman Semanko of the Idaho Water
Users Association in Boise, and Lee Storey of Moyes Storey in Phoenix.
Marx presented first and she focused on the Zuni Indian Tribe Water
Rights Settlement of 2003, which attempted to restore the Tribe's sacred lake, Hadin Kyaya, and wetland environment on their land in Arizona. She then explained the religious significance of the area,
termed "Zuni Heaven" because of the Tribe's belief that a village of
gods rests beneath the lake's surface and that this is where they will live
in the afterlife. The lake became dry due to the over-pumping of hydrologically connected groundwater and the construction of Lyman
Dam on the Little Colorado upstream of the lake. Marx continued, to
combat this problem the Tribe asserted water rights claims in the Little
Colorado River general stream adjudication based on prior agricultural
and religious use and federal reserved water rights claims to surface
and groundwater on the reservation. The Tribe entered into negotiations with the other prominent water users in the area to settle the issue with the goal being to replenish the Tribe's water supplies while
leaving other water users unaffected. Marx then addressed the details
of the settlement and the ways the parties collaborated to find water in
an area of scarce water. In conclusion, she mentioned the compromises made by the parties and the uniqueness of this settlement
agreement that may or may not prove useful in future water settlement
negotiations.

Norman Semanko spoke next. He described the Nez Perce Tribe
Water Rights Settlement in Idaho. He first stated that the agreement
is not yet effective, and must receive Congressional approval, approval
from the Nez Perce Tribe and the Idaho Legislature, as well as a court
decree approving the water rights set forth before taking effect. Further, Endangered Species Act ("ESA") biological opinions covering the
terms of the agreement must also receive approval before the agreement takes force. He then gave an overview of the agreement, noting
that the parties contemplated the agreement to resolve the Nez Perce
federal reserved water right claims, and to provide ESA incidental take
coverage for several areas around the Nez Perce lands. The parties
intended the agreement to protect the status quo, provide for future
development, and provide for species and water quality protection under the ESA and Clean Water Act. Semanko then explained the technical details of the agreement outlining the "Upper Snake Component," the "Salmon/Clearwater Component," and the "Nez Perce
Tribal Component."
Lee Storey rounded out this session with a discussion of the Gila
River adjudication. He started by mentioning that the adjudication
process began in 1974 and, due to the more than 66,000 claims on the
river, the ongoing dispute took decades to resolve. Storey then de-
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scribed the adjudication process, noting that the adjudication occurred
on a watershed by watershed basis. He continued by going into the
details of the Santa Cruz Active Management Area, presenting issues
on dual-filed rights, abandonment and forfeiture, non-Indian reserved
rights claims of the National Parks' Service and the State Land Department, as well as the issues related to the Water Augmentation Authority.
PLENARY SESSION PRESENTATION

#2-

MOVING THE WATER-EFFECTIVE WATER TRANSFERS
This panel offered four different perspectives on whether water
transfers serve as a useful means to address water shortages, either for
the environment or for consumptive uses. The panel directed their
discussion to water transfers from two river systems: the Truckee River
system in Nevada and California and the Sacramento/San Joaquin
River systems in California.
David Aladjem moderated the discussion that included Jerry Johns
from the California Department of Water Resources, Susan JosephTaylor from the Nevada Division of Water Resources, Kenneth Robbins
from Mason Robbins Gnass & Bowning in Merced, CA, and Catherine
Wilson from the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs.
JerryJohns spoke first and stated his opinion that water transfers in
California are working today and will continue to play an important
role in drought years. He stressed that the Department of Water Resources ("DWR") and the other CALFED agencies developed programs
to expedite and assist in water transfers and remain directly involved in
developing and conducting water transfers each year. Johns also felt
confident that transfers can comply with Water Code principles, address fish and wildlife concerns, and still be sensitive to economic impacts of the area from where the water is transferred. He insisted the
DWR and others must work together with local leaders to develop sustainable water transfers and to assure adequate local water supplies.
Susan Joseph-Taylor took a more negative approach to water transfers. In particular, she stressed that transfers of the lower Truckee
River water rights created so much litigation that many of the transfers
are not readily accomplished. Ms. Joseph-Taylor explained the lack of
cooperation among interested parties often resulted in distrust and
animosity. She explained that protestors challenge many transfers of
the lower Truckee River, which results in many years of litigation. Ms.

Joseph-Taylor concluded that transfers of water rights might not be a
useful tool because the litigation may outlast the drought.
Kenneth Robbins offered the perspective of a local irrigation district with water rights on the San Joaquin River that attempted to transfer in a variety of ways. Robbins said water transfers from locally
owned, non-federal, non-state, California storage projects create poten-
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tial dangers and hidden costs for project owners. Therefore, he continued, transfers only occur to meet regulatory requirements, rather
than for general water supply augmentation. He felt to augment total
water supply from transfers, water rights holders and storage projects
must become transferors. Robbins stressed that California's loss of
reliability in the Colorado River combined with its state population
nearing 37 million people; California cannot continue to dedicate its
overworked water supply system to mitigation only. Therefore, California must obtain new supplies sooner rather than later.
The final panelist, Catherine Wilson, offered the perspective from
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and she described ways in which transfers
of Indian water rights throughout the West are similar and different
from water rights regulated solely by state law. She stated that temporary transfers of Indian water are fine so long as the transfer does not
result in the de facto alienation of Indian water rights. The transfers
benefit non-Indian communities by providing short-term relief while
they figure out their long-term water planning needs. In addition, the
transfers benefit Indian communities by providing revenue streams not
available from the federal treasury.
BREAK ouT SESSION #1BRINGING WATER TO TOWN

This panel discussion described the concerns and methods of acquiring and bringing water supplies to municipalities. Panelists included Adam Gravley from the Seattle, Washington firm of Buck &
Gordon LLP, Kevin Patrick from Patrick, Miller, & Kropf, and Bart
Miller from the Boulder, Colorado based Western Resource Advocates.
The panel explained the existence of an overall increasing demand for
water and the need for creativity to bring water supplies to new developments.
Adam Gravley spoke first and detailed several options and considerations in bringing water to a municipality. Overall, he stressed cities
and towns seek certainty and flexibility in water negotiations with new
growth or development. Gravley explained the most straightforward
method to accommodate new growth is for the property developer to
transfer an existing water right to the City. However, Gravley suggested
other alternatives including well sites or system facilities, consolidation
of domestic wells, interconnection with neighboring water utilities, and
pursuing cost-effective water conservation.
Kevin Patrick offered the developer's perspective in bringing water
to town. Mr. Patrick explained that municipalities should draft their
ordinances in a manner, which rewards a developer who makes infrastructure improvements that increase overall yield or capacity of the
water system. He felt this approach is better than simply requiring the
dedication of water. Mr. Patrick noted that the impact of drought
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conditions and global climate change should cause both the municipality and the developer to increase flexibility of their arrangements
and foster creative approaches to securing water for new growth.
Bart Miller presented the conservation perspective of bringing the
water to town. Miller provided a couple of alternatives to traditional
water development that would cause less impact on the environment.
First, Mr. Miller described demand side water management methods
such as use of water rate structures, upgrading of indoor appliances,
and reduction of outdoor demands. Then, he explained creative supply-side alternatives such as water loss reduction, reuse, conjunctive use
of surface and groundwater, and temporary or permanent water transfers. Mr. Miller felt the cost, delay and contentious nature of traditional water supply options will increase the frequency of use these
alternatives.
The panel concluded with a question and answer session where all
panelists agreed that water supply should not be a mechanism for controlling or managing growth.
BREAK OUT SESSION #2CRITICAL HABITAT AND ENVIRONMENTAL BASELINE ISSUES RELATED TO
HYDROPOWER OPERATIONS

This panel discussion included Mark Eames, Attorney Advisor for
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA") in
Seattle, Stephanie Parent, Staff Attorney for the Pacific Environmental
Advocacy Center at Lewis & Clark Law School in Portland, Oregon,
and Thomas Wilmoth of Fennemore Craig, P.C. in Lincoln, Nebraska.
Mr. Eames's discussion centered on Endangered Species Act
("ESA") issues that arose in the new biological opinion issued by the
National Marine Fisheries Service for the operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System. He noted that section 7(a) (2) of the ESA
applied and that two elements satisfy this section. The first relates to
federal agency involvement, in that an agency must exercise its discretion to authorize, fund or carry out an action. Secondly, that such action "may affect" an endangered or threatened species. He then discussed the NOAA's role in implementing section 7(a) (2), as the statute requires action agencies to consult with the NOAA to guide decisions for meeting substantive obligations under the statute. Eames
continued with the 'jeopardy standard" imposed by section 7(a)(2),
and its requirement that agency action "is not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of endangered or threatened species." Regarding
this standard, he noted that the NOAA, in issuing its biological opinion, is expected to describe current conditions representing the impacts of past and present human activities, as well as the likely impacts
of future federal actions. Cumulative effects must be considered because they represent non-federal future actions that are "reasonably
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certain to occur." All these factors represent the environmental baseline of the proposed action. Mr. Eames concluded by noting that the
current standards under section 7 (a) (2) adequately keep federal activities from standing in the way of species survival and recovery, but that
it will take much more to recover species to the point where they will
no longer require protection under the ESA.
Mr. Wilmoth discussed the recent Ninth Circuit decision of Gifford
Pinchot Task Force v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service that invalidated
the definition of "adverse modification" pursuant to the ESA because it
failed to account for the role critical habitat plays in species recovery.
Mr. Wilmoth expressed his belief that the reasoning of this case should
not be applied to the 'jeopardy" definition of section 7(a) (2). He
noted that if either agencies or the courts decide to read a recovery
standard into the jeopardy definition, a large expansion of the ESA's
reach will inevitably occur. He continued by contrasting the differences between the application of the environmental baseline by the
Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") in the Missouri Basin with that of the
NOAA Fisheries' in the Columbia Basin. According to Mr. Wilmouth,
this conflict in the application of section 7 causes confusion and dissension, and a more appropriate application method would include
following only those operations mandated by Congress.
Stephanie Parent also discussed the Ninth Circuit decision she
noted that the decision is significant because federal agencies can no
longer narrow the scope of protection commanded by Congress under
the ESA. Ms. Parent then explained the application of this decision by
FWS and NOAA, finding that FWS's interim guidance framework does
not provide much insight into its application due to its lack of clarity in
defining adverse modification. Ms. Parent continued with a discussion
of dams, and the fact that "nondiscretionary" operations are subject to
section 7 of the ESA. She stated that in order to truly protect endangered and threatened species, federal agencies must consider the impacts of the entire action, notjust those considered "nondiscretionary."
She explained that the aggregate effects of the action must be taken
into account and compared with the needs of the species, so that survival and recovery of the species are ensured.
BREAK OUT SESSION #3THE USE AND MISUSE OF MODELS IN WATER DISPUTES

The third panel discussion of Day One concerned the use and misuse of models in water disputes. Douglas MacDougal of the Portland,
Oregon firm Schwabe Williamson & Wyatt P.C. moderated the panel
discussion, which consisted of John Draper from the Santa Fe, New
Mexico firm of Montgomery & Andrews, PA, the Honorable Jonathan
Hays, a retired water judge from Weld County, Colorado, and Scott
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Wells from the Portland State University's Civil and Environmental
Engineering Department.
John Draper gave the perspective of the lawyer who must utilize the
technical input of the modeler and modeling in the adjudicatory conIn particular, Mr. Draper addressed issues that arise with
text.
groundwater and streamflow models. He explained acquiring adequate data is often very difficult, that choosing a computer code is a
key decision at the beginning of the model-building process, and calibration and sensitivity analysis are often necessary in during the model
construction phase. Mr. Draper concluded by stating modeling methodologies and computer capacities continue to improve the ability to
Further, he exaccount for the complexity of hydrologic systems.
dissuade
water tribushould
not
plained the existence of uncertainty
as the reso
long
nals and administrators from relying on the results
results.
sults are the best obtainable
The Honorable Jonathan Hays presented a Colorado water case,
which had evidentiary issues because of a modified Modflow computer
model and a computer-modeling program; know as a River Basin
Simulation Model. Judge Hays explained that, in his view, groundwater-modeling evidence would be regularly received in evidence at trials
at both State and Federal courts. Judge Hays mentioned the research
and development of a model and generating the results is too cosly for
a litigant to risk its outright exclusion at trial. He felt the models will
meet the admissibility threshold and the outcome of the majority of
future cases will depend upon the weight given to the modeling results
by the trier of fact.
Scott Wells stated that computer simulation models are powerful
tools when applied properly. He listed several examples of the misapplication of models which included inappropriate calibration technique, model results being averaged, physical data being ignored or
purposely changed to obtain better model-data agreement, model results not showing all model-data comparisons, and models being afraid
to show model-data errors. Mr. Wells then recommended suggestions
in order to ensure that a given model application is reasonable, such as
including peer review into the modeling study from its inception and
that all model results from dynamic models should be animated in order to detect errors in the model or boundary condition data.
BREAK OuT SESSION #4SHORTAGE ON THE COLORADO RIVER

This last discussion of Day One dealt with water shortage issues on
the Colorado River, and what the future implications of such shortages. Rita P. Maguire of the Arizona Center for Public Policy moderated the discussion, which got somewhat heated at points. The panelists included Scott Balcomb of Balcomb and Green, P.C. in Glenwood
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Springs, Colorado, Eric Kuhn of the Colorado River Conservation
Board, also in Glenwood Springs, and David E. Lindgren of Downey
Brand, L.L.P. from Sacramento, California.
Due to his technical expertise as an engineer, Mr. Kuhn led off the
discussion providing a statistical analysis of the current drought conditions on the Colorado River. He used Lake Powell, a major water storage reservoir for the river as an example, showing that it is currently
filled at just 35% of its capacity. This is the lowest level the reservoir
has reached since 1969. Mr. Kuhn also pointed out that the current
drought may not be a drought at all. He suggested that the current
conditions may be typical of the southwest and that the previous one
hundred years were abnormally wet. He also talked about the basics of
the Colorado River Compact, which is the agreement that proportions
the water between each of the seven states located within the river's
watershed. The states are divided into upper and lower basin states
with each basin receiving an equal share of river water. Mr. Kuhn
stated his belief that the Compact may be fraught with problems if the
current drought conditions hold. This is due to the fact that Compact
negotiations occurred during a time of high water levels, leaving many
questions as to what amounts states are guaranteed when the water
does not reach these levels.
Mr. Lindgren spoke next. He pointed out the problems created by
the different definitions used by the states under the Compact for
beneficial use. For instance, he noted that Arizona considers storing
water to constitute a beneficial use, where Upper Basin states do not.
This allows Arizona to bank water and causes dissension from the upper basin. Mr. Lindgren believes that Upper and Lower Basin states
need to settle these problems, and that this would best take place outside of court. Mr. Balcomb disagreed with Lindgren asserting that the
courtroom is the best place to decide this issue. Furthermore, Mr. Balcomb argued that the Arizona water banking scheme is illegal and
should be curtailed. Mr. Lindgren disagreed and contended that water
banking is a legal and beneficial use of water. Mr. Balcomb also addressed what may occur if a lower basin call on the river occurred.
Next, Mr. Balcomb pointed out that, if a call occurs, water rights predating the Compact will garner protection and only those water users
who perfected their rights after the Compact must curtail their use.
Mr. Balcomb believes that the Upper and Lower Basin states need to
cooperate in order to negotiate some further agreement to avoid a call
and the possible litigation that may result if a call occurs.
DAY TWO
PLENARY SESSION PRESENTATION #3-

ETHICS ROUNDTABLE: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: VIEWS FROM THE
BENCH
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Day Two began with an ethics discussion among three western
judges. The panel included the Honorable Susan Bolton, a United
States District Court judge from Phoenix, the Honorable Vickie Gabin,
Special Master of the United States District Court in Santa Fe, New
Mexico, and the Honorable Daniel Hurlbutt, Jr., SeniorJudge with the
Idaho District Court. Peter Sly, an attorney from Brooklin, Maine,
moderated the discussion. The talk centered on the conflicts of interest that attorneys typically encounter when involved in water adjudications. As alluded to by Sly, ethical standards preclude attorneys from
representing clients whose interests are directly adverse in the same
litigation. This issue arises quite often in the adjudication of water
rights due to the many and variable interests that encompass a particular stream segment. Due to this fact, as well as the complexity of water
adjudication, Sly pointed out that it is unrealistic to require every water
rights holder obtain separate representation. The panel then discussed practical approaches to handling this issue through concurrent
representation, disclosure, waiver, conflicts within government parties,
the determination of adversity among client interests, and joint representation agreements.
PLENARY SESSION PRESENTATION #4EMERGING ISSUES IN CONJUNCTIVE MANAGEMENT OF GROUNDWATER
AND SURFACE WATER

The second panel discussion of Day Two was moderated by Robert
J. Glennon, Jr., Morris K. Udall Professor of Law & Public Policy at the
James E. Rogers College of Law at the University of Arizona. The
panel consisted of Karl J. Dreher, Director of the Idaho Department of
Water Resources, Kevin M. O'Brien of Downey Brand, L.L.P. in Sacramento, California, and Karen Russell of WaterWatch in Portland, Oregon. Mr. Dreher began with a discussion of the recent five year
drought showing the effects on the Eastern Snake River Plain. These
effects include conflicts between the holders of relatively senior priority surface water rights from the Snake River and the holders of junior
groundwater rights from the hydraulically connected aquifer system.
Mr. Dreher stated that this problem is not dire and that conjunctive
use of surface water sources combined with hydraulically-connected
regional aquifer systems provide a substantial amount of usable water
supplies and curb the effects of the drought. Kevin O'Brien also spoke
about conjunctive use, outlining its history in California, the legal
principles that govern its use, as well as some other related issues. He
also provided an overview of California groundwater law and the "in
leau" storage issue. "In leau" storage refers to the resulting underground storage that comes from a groundwater right owner who foregoes a certain amount of underground water by substituting imported
surface water. Mr. O'Brien marveled at the West's widespread reliance

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 8

on this form of storage due to the fact that, in most western states, no
clear rules governing the allocation of this storage water exist.
Karen Russell took the podium next and she spoke of the conjunctive water management system in Oregon. As an example, she used the
Deshutes Basin, which is one of the fastest growing regions in the state.
She noted that state actions in the basin, including the steps taken to
protect surface rights and instream values from the immediate and
long term effects of groundwater pumping, sets precedent for how the
State acts in the future when the issue arises in other areas around the
state. Ms. Russell believes this approach is flawed, as it does not ensure
actual protection of surface water rights and instream flows and does
not allow for important public interest uses of water. She stated that
this would detrimentally affect the fish, wildlife, and recreational values
of Oregon's rivers.
PLENARY SESSION PRESENTATION

#5-

STRATEGIES AND PITFALLS IN ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT COMPLIANCE

The final panel discussion concerned water issues in conjunction
with different sections of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). Jennifer Gimbel from the United States Bureau of Reclamation in Lakewood, Colorado moderated the panel consisting of Professor Reed
Benson from the University of Wyoming College of Law, L. Michael
Bogert from Perkins Cole of Boise, Dale Hall, the Regional Administrator of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service from Albuquerque,
and Sam Rauch of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Professor Reed Benson explained the ESA section 9 take provision
and its application in the context of water management and use. Professor Benson stressed that unless and until more water users or managers are sued for violating the take provision, ESA section 7 will receive the majority of attention. He did say that a water user whose activities may kill or harm a listed endangered fish species do face potential liability. A water user can escape liability by showing that the actions do not actually cause harm to any member of a listed species, but
not by showing the water rights established under state law authorize
the use. Professor Benson explained that state water law must remain
flexible if cooperative approaches such as the Walla Walla settlement
and "safe harbor" agreements are successful. He felt without flexibility
in existing water uses and water rights under state law, cooperative approaches to resolving water use conflicts under ESA section nine may
likely fail.
L. Michael Bogert spoke about the innovations of ESA section 6
under the Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") and the Nez Perce
Tribe water rights agreement. He explained that the State of Idaho's
management of a Federal program will be more conducive to private
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and State interest taking advantage of federally-funded ESA protections. He mentioned such innovations as an instream flow program,
the Idaho Forestry Program, and a Habitat Improvement Program.
Mr. Bogert then pointed out benefits of approach under ESA section 6,
such as cooperative federalism and economies of scale including protection, access, and flexibility. He concluded by mentioning that the
ESA and Clean Water Act protections will, when litigated, establish
judicial precedent on the issues of long-term Federal ESA and Clean
Water Act assurances and state authority over important areas of Federal environmental law.
Dale Hall then expressed his concern that tools other than litigation and listing of endangered species must be pursued because 70%
of the fish and wildlife habitat in the United States remains in private
hands. He further argued that species conservation needed to be the
focus and not the regulatory process to list species and designate critical habitat. Mr. Hall explained how Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurances achieve this goal without regulation. He did
note that if a species needed listing, Safe Harbor agreements, section 7
consultations, and the No Surprise Rule allow for flexibility in the conservation and management of species. Mr. Hall concluded by stressing
that partnership and not regulation is the necessary tool to preserve
species.
Sam Rauch discussed statutory and regulatory requirements for offsite conservation programs to preserve species. He then enumerated a
number of judicially-created expansions to those requirements. Mr.
Rauch examined some principles derived from statute and regulations
including identifying "to jeopardize" as a verb, that a proposed action
does not have to be reasonably certain to occur, that an analytical difference between effects and actions exists, and to remember the ESA
ensures the species as a whole does not become extinct. For this reason, Mr. Rauch concluded off-site mitigation could be a viable alternative in appropriate circumstances so long as the preservation of the
species improved in other areas.
HOT TOPICS FOR THE WATER PRACTITIONER

The final panel of the conference focused on a discussion of hot
topics for the water lawyer. Roderick E. Walston, of counsel, from
Stoel Rives L.L.P. of San Francisco moderated the discussion. The
panelists included Hamilton Candee from the Natural Resources Defense Council of San Francisco, Roger J. Marzulla of Marzulla &
Marzulla from Washington, D.C., and Stuart L. Somach of Somach,
Simmons & Dunn from Sacramento.

Michael O'Loughlin
Kevin Lazar
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ANSWERING A CALL ON THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION WATER LAW SECTION &
UNIVERSITY OF DENVER WATER LAW REVIEW

Denver, Colorado

April 8, 2005

As drought conditions continue to plague the Western states, the
Colorado River provides much of the needed water for these states.
Hydrologic, legal, and political debates circle around the appropriation of Colorado River Water. The Colorado River Compact Conference, a one-day, collaborative presentation by the Colorado Bar Association and the University of Denver Water Law Review, provided an
opportunity for engineers, lawyers, students, and others to evaluate
potential impacts of appropriation and calls on the Colorado River.
The conference stimulated discussion about the future of the Colorado
River Compact and its effect on the Basin states. The conference focused on the impact of a shortage in water on the Upper Basin states
and Colorado in particular.
SESSION ONE: UPDATE ON THE LAW OF THE COLORADO RIVER AND
FUTURE LEGAL ISSUES-CAROL ANGEL, ASSISTANT ATrORNEY

GENERAL, COLORADO OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
INTERSTATE AND FEDERAL WATER RIGHTS

After an introduction from Bill Paddock of the Rio Grande Water
Users Association, Carol Angel, the assistant attorney general for the
Colorado Office of the Attorney General's Interstate and Federal Water Rights Division, commenced the conference with an update on the
law of the Colorado River and future legal issues associated therewith.
She provided a thorough overview of the terms of the Compact and its
history.
The Colorado River Compact was negotiated in 1922, and became
effective in 1929. Ms. Angel noted some important compromises in
the Compact: (1) Lee Ferry as a dividing point or "funnel" from Upper
to Lower Basin States; (2) recognition that Colorado River tributaries
may contribute of up to 2.3 million acre feet ("MAF") per year; and (3)
the Compact allows for trans-basin diversion of water. She also stated
that, when the Compact was negotiated in 1922, the Upper and Lower
Basin states were under no treaty obligation to provide water to Mexico, but if there is a deficiency of water at the Mexican border, the Upper Basin states must contribute one-half of such a deficiency. Ms. Angel stated that, in the event of no surplus, or only a partial surplus, it is
unclear what is required of the Upper Basin states. She also noted
that, at the time of negotiation, the Upper and Lower Basin states were
in a surplus water year and thus believed that additional water would
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be available for "future equitable apportionment." However, because
of droughts, the "equitable apportionment" clause of the Compact has
never come into play.
With respect to future legal issues, Ms. Angel stated that each state
maintains control over the water within its boundaries, but that Upper
Basin states cannot withhold water from the Lower Basin, and the
Lower Basin may not require additional water that will not be put to
beneficial use. The Compact states, "[p] resent perfected rights to the
beneficial use of waters of the Colorado River System are unimpaired"
by the Compact. Courts have not interpreted this clause and may indicate that the doctrine of prior appropriation applies between states.
The Upper Basin states entered into a Compact addressing Upper
Basin concerns in 1949. The motivation behind the Upper Basin
Compact was to avoid federal control, particular by the Bureau of Reclamation. The Upper Basin Compact has several salient features: (1)
temporary overuse by one state is acceptable as long as the overuse
does not injure another Upper Basin state; and (2) curtailment of water is proportional to each Upper Basin state's overage, except for
rights perfected prior to November 24, 1922 (the signing date of the
Colorado River Compact). The Lower Basin states do not apportion
according to an interstate compact; rather, litigation determines apportionment. Ms. Angel stated that the Lower Basin allots no credit
for water salvage because the Compact defines consumptive as diversions less return flow.
Ms. Angel addressed questions about curtailment, specifically
whether Lake Powell is a "dead pool," what previous deliveries past Lee
Ferry totaled in the past nine years, and whether there have been deficiencies to Mexico attributable to the Upper Basin. She noted that
these questions must be answered with specific hydrological data in
order to address the actual need for curtailment. She also stated that
Lake Powell is currently low because of drought conditions, and while
Basin states have been strongly urged to reach an agreement about
curtailment, no such agreement materialized.
SESSION TWO: KEYNOTE ADDRESS-RANDALL PETERSON,
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOuRcES DIsIoN, UNITED STATES BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION

Randall Peterson of the Environmental Resources Division of the
United States Bureau of Reclamation presented the keynote address.
He stressed three goals of the Colorado River Compact: consultation,
communication, and cooperation. Mr. Peterson focused on the foundational assumptions of the Compact and agreements, and reviewed
the impact of those assumptions on the future of the Colorado River
System. Mr. Peterson stated that the principle issue of shortage is di-
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rectly related to minimum objective releases from Lake Powell and
Lower Basin shortage criteria.
Mr. Peterson stressed the importance of Lake Powell and Glen
Canyon Dam as drought insurance for the Upper Basin states: both
water bodies allow the Upper Basin to consume Colorado River water
while making Lower Basin deliveries. He reiterated that Lake Powell
ensures that Lake Mead will not be fully depleted. Mr. Peterson stated
that coordination efforts require that Lake Mead and Lake Powell be
equalized with one another to meet the Compact's 602 (a) yield if Lake
Powell levels are greater than both Lake Mead and 602 (a) levels. Glen
Canyon Dam, on the other hand, is not an Upper Basin reservoir: the
Upper Basin does not have any consumptive uses from Glen Canyon
Dam. However, Glen Canyon serves as drought insurance for the Upper Basin by further stabilizing Lake Mead levels and providing much
needed power generation revenue. Additionally, Mr. Peterson stated
that Glen Canyon Dam serves the electric needs of many communities,
and if the power plant were to go off-line, nearly $80 million annually
would be required to fund dam operations. Such operations include
environmental mitigation in both Basins. Further, without Glen Canyon Dam, power prices could potentially double, leaving many customers without power. Mr. Peterson also noted that failure to release Glen
Canyon Dam water could have disastrous environmental effects, and it
is in the best interests of all the Basin states to maintain Glen Canyon.
Mr. Peterson noted that there are several options to keep Lake
Powell above minimum power pool levels, including: (1) reducing
Glen Canyon Dam annual releases below the minimum objective of
8.23 MAF; (2) moving mainstream reservoir storage to Lake Powell; or
(3) implementing Upper Basin conservation agreements to maintain
Lake Powell inflow.
Mr. Peterson concluded his address by noting that the Bureau of
Reclamation is currently reassessing the annual operating plans for
Colorado River System reservoirs. He stated that in order to reduce
conflict over water during these drought years, all Basin states must.
come to an agreement over the operation of Lake Powell, Lake Mead,
and Glen Canyon Dam.
SESSION THREE: EAST SLOPE REVIEW-PETER BINNEY, P.E., DIRECTOR
OF UTILITIES, CITY OF AURORA, COLORADO

Peter Binney, P.E. is the director of utilities for the City of Aurora,
Colorado. He addressed Colorado's east slope water concerns. He
focused on increasing population and water demand in Colorado's
Front Range, trans-mountain diversion projects from the west slope to
east slope, reuse of trans-mountain diversions, and future water development options.
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Mr. Binney discussed the rapid development of Colorado's Front
Range. He noted that while the west slope receives eighty percent of
Colorado's moisture, the east slope receives only twenty percent and is
home to four out of five Coloradoans. The current population of the
State is approximately four million; by 2030, an additional 2.4 million
people will inhabit the east slope. Increases in population, coupled
with onerous laws and regulations and insufficient municipal water
systems, strains the already scarce water supply in Colorado. Mr. Binney stated that Front Range water service providers are unable to maintain adequate water supplies to meet increasing customer demands.
Further, a shortage of sustainable strategies plagues Front Range municipalities, and requires trans-mountain diversions from the west
slope.
Mr. Binney evaluated the major trans-mountain diversion projects
and their applications along the Front Range. The Adams Tunnel,
operated by the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
("NCWCD"), provides the greatest amount of water to the Front Range
at a rate of approximately 230,000 acre-feet per year. The Adams Tunnel, part of NCWCD's Colorado-Big Thompson ("CBT") project, serves
twenty-nine municipalities, over 100 ditch and reservoir companies,
and 620,000 acres of irrigated farmlands. To meet changing water
demand demographics, the CBT project's mission and benefits have
been substantially altered; while the CBT project initially served agricultural purposes, it now primarily serves municipal water systems. Mr.
Binney also discussed several other trans-mountain diversions, including: the Moffat and Roberts Tunnels, which provide the forty and sixty
percent of Denver Water's supply respectively; the Fryingpan-Arkansas
project, which provides 80,400 acre-feet per year for municipal use and
an additional 280,600 acre-feet per year for supplemental irrigation in
southeastern Colorado; the Homestake Tunnel, which provides substantial water to both Colorado Springs and Aurora; the Busk-Ivanhoe
project, which provides water to both Aurora and Pueblo. Under
Colorado law, any water introduced into a system from trans-mountain
diversion is considered "foreign water."
Mr. Binney stated that, under the prior appropriation doctrine and
Colorado Revised Statute section 148-2-6 (1963), foreign water is not
subject to appropriation. He explained that an agency that imports
water may freely reuse the water, move the point of diversion, or sell or
lease the water to others. He noted that reuse of trans-mountain diversions will be an important aspect in long-term municipal water planning because it reduces the amount of "new" water that an agency must
import to meet increasing demands.
Mr. Binney concluded by outlining future water development options in the Front Range. Such options include: (1) water conservation
plans; (2) modification of water uses in communities; (3) non-potable
water reclamation projects for irrigation; (4) indirect potable uses; (5)
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non-tributary groundwater, such as confined aquifers; (6) rehabilitation, enlargement, and integration of existing water supply systems; (7)
additional trans-mountain and trans-basin diversions; and (8) changes
from historical agricultural uses to municipal uses.
SESSION FOUR: WHAT Do WE LOSE BEYOND WATER?-JAMES S. LOCHHEAD, ESQ., BROWNSTEIN HYArr & FARBER PC
James Lochhead of Brownstein Hyatt & Farber PC addressed the
consequences to the State of Colorado of a call on the Colorado River.
He discussed the history of the Compact, current hydrology and required delivery obligations, and curtailment consequences.
Mr. Lochhead stated that the Colorado River Compact simply allocates the right to use water, but does not allocate actual water. He
evaluated the development and negotiation of the Compact. The negotiation of the Colorado River Compact was initially driven by local
and state needs. The Upper Basin states urged the federal government
to comprehensively manage the Colorado River. The Upper Basin
wanted the federal government to construct a series of reservoirs to
create a "bank account" of stored water that ensured that the Upper
Basin could meet its 602(a) obligations. The reservoirs created (Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and Glen Canyon Dams) allowed the Upper Basin
states to fully develop their respective water rights without being subject to a Compact call.
Mr. Lochhead stated that Lower Basin state Arizona wanted to develop the Gila River, and thus wanted to exclude the Gila River from
the Compact. As part of Arizona's development plan, the Central Arizona Project was initiated, allowing storage in Arizona. However, as
part of the Central Arizona Project, diversions to the Project are limited so that California is guaranteed 4.4 MAF annually. In essence,
both Arizona and Nevada are 'junior" to California. As a result, many
of the projects envisioned by the Central Arizona Project have yet to
materialize. Nevertheless, Arizona currently diverts its apportionment
into aquifers for future withdrawal and municipal development. Mr.
Lochhead noted that Arizona's water banking, while controversial, is
an instance of Arizona acting like a good junior water rights user.
However, there is significant debate over whether such storage is considered a beneficial use.
The Lower Basin is currently at full allotment of Colorado River
water. Releases from Lake Mead average 9.5 MAF per year; however,
releases from Lake Powell average 8.23 MAF per year. Mr. Lochhead
stated that the Upper Basin states urged the federal government to
release less than the 8.23 MAF per year objective because the Upper
Basin is required only to provide 75 MAF every ten years on running
average. He noted that the Upper Basin has delivered over 100 MAF
over the past ten years, and therefore has no obligation under the
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Compact to deliver additional water. Additionally, Mr. Lochhead
stated that the Upper Basin has no obligation to provide any portion of
the Mexican treaty delivery. However, Arizona contend that Article
111(c) of the Compact relates to total water supply; a deficiency in the
Upper Basin means that the Upper Basin is required to meet both
Mexican treaty and transit losses.
Mr. Lochhead then addressed the impact of a call on Colorado.
He noted that there has never been a call on the River; the rules for
curtailment and the mechanics of doing so are foreign. Further, the
Upper Basin has the right consumptively use 7.5 MAF per year, subject
to delivery of 75 MAF over a ten-year period and potential Mexican
treaty obligations. Mr. Lochhead noted that it is unclear whether the
Upper Basin can consumptively develop 7.5 MAF annually and still
meet its obligations. Additionally, he stated that, in the event of a call,
Colorado would assert defenses, such as waste of water in the Lower
Basin. Finally, Mr. Lochhead noted that continued development of
Colorado's unallocated share of the River increases the probability of a
call. If an Upper Basin state overuses its share, it must "pay back" the
overuse before other states must contribute to the deficiency. This
may result in curtailment of junior users and thus, severe economic
loss in Colorado.
SESSION FIVE: HOW WOULD COLORADO ADDRESS THE CALL?-

MODERATOR: ROD KuHARICH, COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION
BOARD

Rod Kuharich of the Colorado Water Conservation Board moderated a panel discussion on the impacts to Colorado of a call on the
River. Participants in the panel discussion included: Peter Fleming,
Esq. of the Colorado River Conservation District; James Lochhead, Esq.
of Brownstein Hyatt & Farber PC; David Robbins, Esq. of Hill & Robbins PC; and Randy Seaholm, Chief of Water Supply Protection of the
Colorado Water Conservancy Board. The panel discussion focused on
the impacts to Colorado and means of curtailment in the Upper and
Lower Basins.
The panel addressed the implied provisions of delivery obligation
under the Colorado River Compact. Upper Basin states that use more
than their allocation must proportionally deliver their overuse in the
event of a shortfall at Lee Ferry. The delivery to Lee Ferry implies the
inclusion of transit losses. Curtailment of consumptive uses is also
proportional; a state using more than its fair share of River water must
curtail uses accordingly. Further, water rights perfected prior to November 24, 1922 are excluded from potential curtailment. However,
the panel noted that there are salient questions about the equity of
proportional curtailment. Questions included: (1) whether an entire
prior perfected right is protected, or just that water diverted?; (2) how
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do Upper Basin states establish actual prior perfected rights if early
diversion records are incomplete?; (3) because Colorado's records are
more accurate than other Upper Basin states' records, how do the Upper Basin states ensure equity?; (4) should Upper and Lower Basin
states be treated equally in curtailment?; and (5) how does Colorado
assure deliveries past the state line to Lee Ferry? Mr. Fleming also
stated that, while the Upper Basin states are required to follow Upper
Colorado Commission curtailment recommendations, the Colorado
River Compact itself conflicts with the Upper Colorado Commission's
findings.
The panel discussed the calculation of consumptive use. The Upper Colorado Commission makes findings as to the quantity of water
used in each Upper Basin state. The quantity of water used includes
evaporative depletions; in Colorado, this adds approximately 300,000
to 400,000 acre-feet per year. However, the panel called into question
the methodology for calculating evapo-transpiration rates; many states
rely on the Blaney-Criddle formula, which is not the most accurate
formula available. The panel discussed the impact of different evapotranspiration formulas by different states on the quantity of water consumptively used.
The panel addressed alternative arrangements for curtailment,
while still meeting human needs. Alternatives include: (1) water conservation; (2) agricultural efficiency; (3) permanent or interruptible
agricultural water transfers; (4) new storage; (5) enlargement of existing storage; (6) conjunctive uses of surface and groundwater sources:
(7) potable and non-potable water reuse; and (8) control of Dnw native
phreatophytes.
Finally, the panel noted that various curtailment mechanisms are
available. The State Engineer's office may elect to administer curtailment by strict statewide prior appropriation, by the native or natural
yield of the respective sub-basins, or by equitable apportionment. Mr.
Robbins noted that there are both elastic and inelastic water demands.
Elastic demands may more readily be curtailed without much economic impact, while inelastic water demands could suffer great economic hardship if water is curtailed to those users. Mr. Robbins further stated that the doctrine of prior appropriation should not be used
to curtail junior, inelastic users at great economic impact to the State.
In conclusion, the lively panel discussion raised a plethora of important questions regarding the impact of a Colorado River call on
Colorado.
SESSION SIX: PLANNING FOR A COMPACT CALL: COLLABORATIVE
PROCESS ON DEVELOPING COMPACT RULES-HAL SIMPSON, P.E.,
STATE ENGINEER, COLORADO DIVISION OF WATER RESOURCES
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Hal Simpson, Colorado Division of Water Resources State Engineer, addressed Colorado's approach to managing and addressing a
compact enforcement obligation. Mr. Simpson noted that additional
legal and technical analysis must be completed to effectively implement new rules. Further, he stated that public education is imperative
to the promulgation of successful rules for enforcing a call, that the
public must understand Colorado's obligations, and outreach and water user participation is important to the develop of rules in the event
of a call.
Mr. Simpson stated that the Colorado River Compact is administered in Colorado under Colorado Revised Statute section 37-80-104.
The state engineer's office is charged with such administration, and
thus must address several salient questions in the development of
Compact enforcement, including: (1) legally acceptable methods of
curtailment; (2) definition of "present perfected rights; (3) protection
of water to the state line and consideration of transit losses; (4)
whether curtailment includes wells; and (5) whether certain trans-basin
diversions are limited under federal law. He indicated that the State
Engineer's office must research the office's rulemaking power under
the Compact, the Upper Colorado River Compact, and federal authorizing legislation and decrees. Mr. Simpson expected such research to
expend approximately eight months.
In addition to legal research and analysis, technical issues must be
addressed. Such issues include updating diversion records into HydroBase and accurate determination of consumptive uses with Colorado. Mr. Simpson stated that while the State's consumptive use modeling is accurate for irrigation uses, additional work is required for
non-irrigation uses, including municipal and industrial uses. He also
noted that data on reservoir evaporation must also be updated. Along
with consumptive use records, the state engineer's office currently
identifies storage rights so that upstream out-of-priority storage may be
allowed in the event of a call on the River.
Central to Colorado's rulemaking on curtailment is the need for
public outreach. Mr. Simpson noted that although public understanding is imperative to effective rulemaking, not all water users will support such rules. However, input from users is vital to promulgation of
rules, and the State Engineer's Office will solicit input by holding public hearings, preparing draft rules, establishing a public website for
comments, utilizing Basin roundtables, and consulting with the Colorado Water Conservancy Board.
Mr. Simpson also addressed the need for additional or modified
legislation to meet Compact obligations. He stated that existing statutes concerning Interruptible Water Supply Agreements, water banking, and Substitute Water Supply Plans must be reviewed for compliance with the Compact. Mr. Simpson also proposed that new legislation may need to be established for rotational fallowing programs that
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allow domestic and municipal users access to water supplies. He estimated that the Colorado State legislature will need to appropriate approximately $135,000 towards the rulemaking process.
Suzanne Knowle

